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Purpose: The role of common knowledge in organizations (CKO) is emphasized in 
literature as an important topic; however, its formalization has been neglected. This 
dissertation presents a model of CKO that depicts its relationship with the capability of 
the organization within the context of theories of the firm.  
Design/methodology/approach: Considering the un-operationalized status of knowledge 
in organizations and the several approaches to organizational capability, this work 
interviews text of the theories of knowing and the theories of the firm, following 
grounded theory coding methods, to frame a model to observe and assess CKO instances 
that participate in the productive practice. 
The research empirical component of this dissertation follows case study strategy for data 
collection and grounded theory for data analysis. The case corresponds to a ten-year 
International Inter-university Cooperation Program that integrates knowledge into lessons 
learned. Data include program extensive program documentation, 3 sets of surveys, 16 
filmed interviews, and 36 stories. Grounded theory follows Charmaz (2000) sensitizing 
concept approach to guide initial coding using the developed framework. 
Findings: CKO is characterized by the (a) tension of integrating knowledge into the 
productive practice, (b) logic of instrumentalizing organizational tools (OT), and (c) 
processes by which knowers are recognized. CKO also operates as mediator between OT 
(directives, plans, structure, architecture and routines) and the efficiency of the 
organizational capability. CKO emerges, not as an organizational tool, but as the related 
processes that instrumentalize them, or by which knowers are recognized and shape the 




Research limitations/implications: Although methodology is qualitative and not subject 
to generalizations, study provides valuable insights about common knowledge in 
organizations and its relation with the organizational capability. 
Practical implications: Dissertation offers efficiency oriented managerial criteria 
(emerged from the CKO conception) for applying organizational tools to integrated 
knowledge into the productive practice. 
Originality/value: Dissertation proposes (a) an integrated organizational view of extant 
theories of knowing, (b) a model for observing knowing instances in organizations, (c) a 
scheme for framing theories of the firm, and (d) a model for understanding the role of 
common knowledge in organizations. 
Keywords: Knowledge in organizations, Knowing, Practice, Common knowledge, 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 RESEARCH MOTIVATION  
While working for IBM as a systems engineer, in the age of mainframes and midsized 
centralized computers, every year, during the almost 9 years that I worked there, we were 
tested on the issues of the commercial conduct guideline. In the following years, the same 
guideline text, with minor improvements, implied greater and deeper meanings as a result 
of the experience gained through business situations and by observing colleagues and 
managers’ behaviors.  
At age of 32, some IBM colleagues invited me to join them in a new venture, as a 
partner in charge of corporate sales. This was a small company that sold and serviced 
every computer product of that time. In eight years, the company grew from five partners 
to 130 employees, most of them recent graduates of electronics, telecommunications and 
systems engineering, who were assigned to one of nine different service areas.  
As the company grew, the partners decided to adhere to and share with employees a 
principle borrowed from our time at IBM: solve the customer´s problem first, and then 
address the technical issues. At the partner level, we were convinced that this simple 
directive should align our efforts, and lead us to sustainable customer relations and, 
therefore, success. 
Even though the company had an excellent financial performance during those years, 
we were not very successful in aligning the organization´s behavior to the general 




than expected. After-incident reviews showed that, in most cases, the specialist in the 
service line focused on the computer problem and not on the people or the business 
process, or that someone in logistics considered that the service engineer´s request for 
resources was incompatible with the problem reported by the customer and decided to 
block the request. 
 We were a little frustrated; the directive that was supposedly shared by all – a piece 
of common knowledge for everyone in the organization – was not consistently guiding 
our actions.  
Searching for understanding, I stated the question, in those days, as Why is it that, 
even though we advise everyone in the organization to take action according to a broadly 
shared specific directive, we frequently confront misalignments to it?  Time went on 
without a satisfactory answer. Later, enriched by new entrepreneurial and academic 
adventures, I rephrased the question in more general terms: What is the role of common 
knowledge in relation to the logic chosen by the firm to achieve its goals? 
In my personal search for an answer, I found books focused on the practice of 
managing knowledge in organizations, like Common knowledge – How companies thrive 
by sharing what they know (Dixon, 2000), which offer rich stories about successful and 
unsuccessful transferring know-how in organizations, a taxonomy of such transference, 
and knowledge management prescriptions for transferring knowledge. In this case, and as 
we will also notice later in organizational studies research works, authors adhere to the 
use of labels like common knowledge in organizations to refer to work related know-




(now I would say without “epistemological foundations”). This left me with good 
managerial advice, but still with no answer. 
Then, during the doctoral courses at the EUDOKMA Program, I found that several 
organizational researchers, as part of their proposed logic for theories of the firm, had 
referred to the role of common knowledge in the conception of organizations. 
 Authors like Simon (1991b) identified goal-satisficing rational choosing heuristics; 
Kogut and Zander (1992) specified shared coding systems that encapsulate substantive 
knowledge to offer it as functional knowledge; while the work of Robert Grant (1996a; b) 
recognizes knowledge in organizations as co-owned (individuals and organization) and 
argues that such interdependence shapes goals and plans in organizations. Such theories 
or views of the firm identified the role of common knowledge as relevant, but did not 
offer explicit explanations about the relationship of such knowledge to the logic 
(organizational capability) behind the view of the firm.  
Nurtured by such holistic views and theories, I thought I had a real business problem 
and a question related to the theories and views of the firm, a question to which I could 
apply scientific methods to frame possible answers. I was extremely motivated and felt 
that the quest’s closure was near. Now I know that thinking about it was immensely 
easier than achieving it. It was the arena of philosophers, and, at that time, I was not so 
aware of the variety of postures about the idea of knowledge in management studies.  
To start, I jumped on the fast train and tried to conceptualize and frame common 
knowledge. My information systems background led me to draw up an understanding and 




approaches toward formalizing context in the 2006 ICICKM Conference, published in 
2007 in the EJKM journal, and later (2011) included as part of a book called Leading 
issues in knowledge management research. This work portrays a contextual framework 
proposing a data-information-knowledge continuum (Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Bell, 
1999; Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001) to formalize common knowledge in organizations.  
Armed with such a framework, I tested it as an observational guideline for a case 
study in a Lottery organization. A year later, I found that, even though the contextual 
framework systematically guided the observation of common knowledge instances, it did 
not offer an explanation of the relationship of such instances to the organizational 
capability (for which I did not yet have an articulated framework).  
The contextual framework did not clearly set the criteria by which observable 
instances are either knowing or knowledge (Gourlay, 2006; Tsoukas, 2003), an 
assessment that was frequently required to decide which instances to observe.  
I assimilated the experience as a process in which I learned to use case study 
methodology (Yin, 2003a; b) and the rigor of observation, writing and publishing, while 
recognizing that I had advanced in one important piece of the puzzle: identifying the 
criteria by which common knowledge is common in organizations: its organizational 
context.  
After evaluating that experience, I had a clearer idea of the required dimensions of the 





First, I was asked to explore extant individual level knowledge and knowing theories 
(Polanyi, 1958; Bruner, 1990; Weick, 1995) in a way that ends up offering a framework 
for identifying observable instances of knowledge and knowing in organizational 
contexts.  
It was a defiant and enriching work, given that extant references to knowledge 
theories in organizational studies mainly invoke either their central ideas, for example, 
that personal knowledge is tacit or founded on tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1966), which 
offered limited observational handles to the organizational researcher (Gourlay, 2004; 
2006); or explore the development of new understandings of knowledge in organizations 
(Gourlay, 2006; Baumard, 1999).   
Second, the theories or views of the firm, in which knowledge plays a role (Simon, 
1991a; Cyert & March, 1992; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Spender, 1992; Kogut & Zander, 
1992; Grant, 1996a) needed to be framed in such way that the body of knowledge that 
participates in the logic behind the view of the firm (organizational capability) is made 
explicit.  
Finally, we need the criteria by which knowledge in organizations is framed as 
common knowledge (already dealt within my previously published work). With such 
clarity of requirements, I put myself to work again on the theoretical component of this 
quest. 
Since, extant literature did not offer such holistic framing of theories of knowledge 




surgical approach and extract the required epistemological foundations and the inventory 
of knowledge instances from those theories.  
However, while I was reviewing those theories, I found myself following the 
grounded-theory approach (Charmaz, 2006; Strauss & Corbin, 1998), in the sense that (a) 
I had articulated questions to be asked to the text of the knowledge theories (questions 
like “What is the role of language and meanings in the use, creation and sharing of 
knowledge?”) and to the text of the firm´s theories (questions like “What knowledge 
sustains the organizational capabilities in this theory?”); and (b) that I was comparing and 
contrasting in search of topics for framing possible answers.  
“What scientific method should be followed to frame such theories?” I asked myself. 
There was no easy answer, especially for the scientific consequences and scope that the 
answers implied. 
To frame the question, I considered that this was not an endeavor oriented towards 
the development of a new theory of knowledge - there are plenty of them (Polanyi, 1958; 
Weick, 1995; Bruner, 1990, Gourlay, 2006, Baumard, 1999) - but an endeavor trying to 
frame extant theories for ulterior purposes.  
Then, on one hand, following the traditional literature review approach and declaring 
adherence, following certain plausible criteria, to an understanding of knowledge, 
sounded methodologically acceptable. On the other hand, I thought that, as organizational 
researchers, we lack of a single scientifically accepted definition and operationalization 




concept of knowledge was a key issue in a dissertation that tries to frame common 
knowledge in organizations.  
I kept thinking for a while. Then, I recalled certain class discussions with professor 
Gourlay (2006), in Denmark, where he commented on his work on tacit knowing, in 
which he exhausted its conceptualization in empirical studies following a procedure that 
mirrors grounded-theory studies. Finally, I made up my mind when I also recalled the 
work of Cook and Brown (1999) questioning knowledge management research works 
that do not clearly specify their epistemological foundations.  
In short, the literature review and the emerging observational frameworks of this 
research will follow Charmaz (2006) and Strauss & Corbin’s (1998) grounded-theory 
approach.  In doing so, it reviews the extant text of theories of knowledge and theories or 
views of the firm following a careful line by line analysis, to compare and contrast them 
in search of topics that frame (a) individual knowing and knowledge, and (b) knowledge 
domains within organizational contexts. If successful, this could be considered a specific 
research contribution on its own merits.  
Twelve months later, such frameworks were ready for empirical testing. The framing 
of the theories or views of the firm revealed different organizational capabilities among 
them, and, as a consequence, different roles and instances of common knowledge. Given 
the previous Lottery case study experience, and after holding in depth discussions of the 
approach with colleagues [for which I am very grateful (see Acknowledgments)], I 
decided to let the document with the outline frameworks rest for a while (three months), 




For six months, construction workers were observed and invited to explain their 
doings in work related activities every working day, to validate the individual knowledge 
framework. Business process designers and software developers were observed and 
interviewed for another six months, in regard to how they integrate their work related 
doings into the deliveries of the automation project. All of it was done to validate the 
organizational capability framework. It took a while, which helped to add preciseness and 
to gain confidence in the frameworks.       
At that point, I made the decision of following Grant´s (1996a) knowledge based 
view of the firm for the empirical observation of organizational capability (Charmaz, 
2006), mainly for three reasons. First, it was clear that the organizational context of my 
original businessman question referred to an organization that integrates specialists’ 
knowledge into services (or products) supported by common knowledge, which is the 
main approach proposed by Grant (1996a) in his view of the firm. Second, Grant´s 
knowledge based view of the firm holds greater explanatory power (Deutsch, 1997), 
since it more closely describes the role of knowledge in regard to the organizational 
capability of a firm, with not much space for theory changes. And, third, Grant´s (1996a; 
b) is an exploitation view of extant knowledge of organizations (effectiveness) and of 
new knowledge (flexibility); which means that it may explain better how organizations 
incorporate knowledge to the productive practice.      
This choice of Grant’s (1996a) KBV of the firm helped to refine the research question as: 





These theoretical findings brought the great explanatory powers and rich details of the 
re-reading of extant individual knowledge theories (Polanyi, 1958; Weick, 1995; Bruner, 
1990) to light. Details such as (a) the understanding of knowing as the 
instrumentalization of physical or mental objects or behaviors, (b) the continuum between 
ability-based knowing and symbol-based knowing characterized by the gradients of the 
symbolic content of the tool in use, and its implications for making what we know either 
explicit or not; or (c) the characterization of the knowing tensions around the logic of 
contriving, that is, the criteria through which we assimilate physical and mental tools and 
qualify their usage as knowing.  
Finally, the empirical findings here are based on a case study (Yin, 2003a; b) that 
portrays a ten-year International Inter-university Cooperation Program – designed to dote 
the beneficiary university with its essential organizational capabilities (researchers, 
research culture and research facilities), and in which specialists’ knowledge was 
integrated during the externalization of the Program’s lessons learned. The process of 
framing the participating body of knowledge for this case, following grounded-theory 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998), was extensive but straight forward since the knowledge areas 
(12) for the management of programs had already been formalized by the Project 
Management Institute (PMI, 2009). 
Yes, there is an answer for the original businessman’ question (Why is it, that even 
though we advise everyone in the organization to take action considering the broadly 
shared specific directive; we frequently confront misalignments to it?) and for the refined 
question of the researcher (How is common knowledge in organizations related to the 




and framed to fit into Grant´s (1995a) invitation to advance in his proposed KBV of the 
firm.  
A businessman could always jump to the conclusions chapter and look at the single-
page 5x3 matrix (Table 51) that is proposed as the common knowledge framework in 
organizations. In it, he will find, in familiar terms, 42 entries about the role that common 
knowledge holds in tools like (1) directives, (2) plans, (3) routines, (4) organizational 
structure, and (5) architecture of capability when integrating knowledge into productive 
outcomes. And for the specific issue regarding the directives, a businessman will find, in 
section 6.4.2, a set of twelve questions, emerged from the common knowledge 
framework, which invites to re-think about managing knowledge in organizations.  
Additionally, a researcher will mostly find tools that are proposed to fill relevant gaps 
in certain lines of strategy research and knowledge management research. Among these 
tools are: (a) the framing and contrasting of extant individual level knowledge theories, 
(b) the framing and contrasting of extant theories of the firm with their knowledge 
domains, (c) the framing of common knowledge in extant theories of the firm, and (d) the 
framing of empirical findings about common knowledge in the context of the knowledge 
integration capability in organizations.  
Surely, at this point the reader may have become acquainted with the more general 
conclusion of this quest: the role of common knowledge in organizations depends on the 
theory that the business leader or researcher holds about organizations. The specifics of 




common knowledge supports the subjacent business logic of organizations and shapes the 
way of seeing organizations. 
Here, at this point, a narrative style that abuses the pronoun “I” is ended. This was a 
deliberate approach, not only intended to reveal research justifications, motivations, and 
contributions, but oriented to sharing the tension of the personal duality – the 
organizational researcher and the entrepreneur – and in sharing it, looking for a way to 
mitigate, in the reader, the tension of contriving the proposed extensive and detailed open 
and axial coded findings as the plausible and useful tools they are intended to be. 
1.2 DISSERTATION STRUCTURE 
This dissertation is structured in six chapters.  The first two chapters describe quest 
motivation and review the literature that contextualizes such quest. The third chapter 
describes research objectives, methodologies and the case being studied. Chapters 4 and 5 
frame individual level theories and theories/views of the firm. Finally, chapter 6 presents 
theoretical and empirical findings, conclusions, contributions and limitations. The next 
four sections summarize chapters’ content and their linkage logic.  
1.2.1 Research Motivation and Literature Review 
As it has been noticed, this first chapter tries to share research motivation which is 
captured in the quest of the businessman for an answer to: “Why is it that, even though 
we advise everyone in the organization to take action according to a broadly shared 




The chapter also contextualizes the quest in terms of common knowledge in 
organizations (CKO) in relation to knowledge theories and organizational capabilities 
within theories of the firm.  
Second chapter reviews literature regarding (a) knowledge and common knowledge 
in views of the firm, (b) its conception and role within their organizational capabilities, 
and (c) identifies research gaps in those two themes.  
Among those identified research gaps is the conclusion that since extant individual 
level knowledge theories has not been operationalized yet (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2001; 
Kakihara & Sorensen, 2002), then, as an extension, we do not count with a tool to frame 
common knowledge within views of the firm. The alternative of developing and isolated 
frame of reference for common knowledge returns to defining its epistemology.  
With similar framing limitations, organizational capabilities are identified as 
embedded in the explanations of knowledge-based view (KBV) of the firm (Grant, 1996; 
Spender, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992), in which their labeling is usually upfront (e.g. 
knowledge integration capability or organizing principles); but the complex patterns of 
coordination between people and between people and resources designed for value 
creation are not that evident in such firm views.  
1.2.2 Research Objectives, Methods and Case Study Description 





The dissertation´s general research objective is to understand and explain the role of 
common knowledge in organizations within the integrating capability of the KBV of the 
firm. 
Such objective emerges in the context of Grant´s (1996a) understanding of the firm as 
a knowledge integrator (p. 116), that is, as an organization that primary and routinely 
applies existing knowledge resident in individuals during its operations; and that the key 
is to minimize specialist knowledge transfer is through common knowledge.  
This objective sets the attention in the two previously identified research gaps: (a) 
framing knowledge within firm´s views and (b) framing organizational capabilities to 
unveil their supporting knowledge domains. This chapter argues and describes how 
grounded theory will be applied to frame extant theories of knowledge and views of the 
firm to fulfill such research gaps. 
Then, given the exploratory orientation of this quest, it was chosen that the empirical 
part of this dissertation follows (1) a qualitative approach using case study methodology 
(Yin, 2003a; 2003b) for the design, and (2) grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; 
Charmaz, 2000; 2006) for data analysis protocols, all this, in order to answer the research 
question:  
How is common knowledge in organizations related to the knowledge integration 
capability? 
Finally, this chapter also portrays the case, which corresponds to a ten-year 




externalization of the Program’s lessons learned. Data collected include extensive 
program documentation, surveys and 16 filmed interviews with Scholarship holders, 
Local Project team members, Flemish Project team members, Local Program 
administrators, Flemish Program Administrators and Non-participant Local Professor.   
1.2.3 Framing Knowledge Theories and Theories of the Firm  
Chapters 4 and 5 6 follow grounded-theory methods (Charmaz, 2006; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998), to develop (A) an Individual Knowing Framework, (B) an Integrated view 
of language, shared meanings, and recognition of knowers, (D) an Organizational 
Capability Framework within KBVs of the firm, that is used to reveal views´ knowledge 
domains. Note: references denoted here as A, B and D) follow codification used in Table 
1.  
The interception of the (B) Integrated view of language, shared meanings and 
recognition of knowers within the context of individual knowing theories, the (D) 
Organizational capability framework, and the transversal application of the (C) 
Commonness criterion ease the construction of a conceptual model that served as a 
departing point to observe the (F) empirical instances of common knowledge in the 
outcomes of the productive practice in organizations; and from there try to understand 
and explain the relationships among common knowledge types with the organizational 
capability in the context of KBVs of the firm in general, and with Grant’s (1996a; 1996b) 




1.2.4 Findings, Conclusions, Contributions and Limitations 
Chapter 6, the final chapter, is about the theoretical and empirical findings and 
conclusions. It shows the analysis of 36 lessons learned which are grouped by type of 
activity (Program Opening issues, Program and Component management, Sub-
Component Management, and Scholarship issues and Program Closing issues) and theme 
in 12 knowledge area, following PMI’s (Project Management Institute) practice.  
Strauss and Corbin (1998) grounded theory approach was followed to develop 
categories of the interviewees’ data, considering as departing point (Charmaz, 2000, 
2006) the developed frameworks (Individual knowing framework, the Organizational 
capability framework, and the transversal application of the commonness criterion), see 
Tabe 1. Chapter 6 also offers conclusions, theoretical contributions, practical implication, 
future research and limitations of the research. 
In this dissertation I have to recognize and apologize for an unbalanced distribution of 
content (pages) among chapters. Chapters 3 and 4, dedicated to conceptual frameworks, 
demanded a sequence of preciseness and details that for most I tried to place some of the 
content in appendices, they kept losing their clarity and richness. 
Finally, to ease the recognition of this dissertation structure and the connecting logic among 
chapters a graphical representation is presented in Table 1. Such structuring could be also 
understood as general framework for exploring empirical instances of common knowledge in 




General Framework for Exploring Empirical Instances of Common Knowledge in 











Research problem: Grant’s (1996a) KBV of the firm argues for knowledge as resident in individuals and that 
knowledge integration of specialist (KI) into outcomes of the productive practice is its distinctive organizational 
capability; which depends upon common knowledge of the organization (CKO) for its operation; view in which 
the relationships among CKO and its types with the KI capability have not been explained yet. 
Research Gap 1: Rich but divergent 
approaches to knowledge and knowing, 
and with no agree operationalization 
(Alvesson & Kärreman, 2001) that could 
be inherited to frame common knowledge. 
Research Gap 2: Organizational 
capabilities descriptions are embedded 
in the explanations of KBVs of the firm, 
that is the complex patterns of 
coordination between people and  
between people and  resources 
designed for value creation (Grant, 
1996; Spender, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 
1992) are not explicit, neither framed. 





A .  I n d i v i d u a l  K n o w i n g  V i e w  
Framing of individual level knowledge theories by 
interviewing its text following grounded theory 
methodology (Charmaz, 2006; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) 
approximating them from the point of view of Grant’s 
common knowledge types. [Polanyi (1958); Weick (1995); 












Knowing as the instrumentalization of objects or behaviors with 
different gradients of shared systematic symbolic content, 
implying more or less ability or symbol-based knowing 









In  the context  o f  Indiv idual  knowing theories  
C. Commonness Criterion for CKO 
Domain of practices exercised within the 
framework of the theory in use, to economize in 
communications, recognize, reconcile and share 
understandings, replicate and protect... 
(Wilby, 2010; Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001; Schutz, 
1970; McCarthy, 1994; Argyris & Schön, 1974…) 
                                   
  
                  

 
Shared tool with 
gradients of 
symbolization in 
which its inadequacy 
may limit sharing or 
trigger knowledge 
creation 
Tension among tight 
or loose patterned 
conceptions, its 




stage it follows 
authority-trust 
relationship; at 
















D. Organizational Capability Framework 
in the context of Theories of the Firm 
Framing of KBVs of the firm follows 
grounded theory methodology, first as a 
way to frame the general patterns of 
organizational capabilities; then, from 
that perspective, makes explicit in each 
view of the firm its capability and 
participating domains of knowledge. 
[Simon (1955, 1991a), Cyert and March 
(1992) Nelson and Winter (1982), 
Spenders (1992), Kogut and Zander 








E. Research design, methodology and case study description 
Qualitative approach using case study methodology (Yin, 
2003a; 2003b) and grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006; Strauss 
& Corbin, 1998) for data analysis protocols. 
Collected data (theories, observations, interviews, and 
documents) reveal common knowledge instances of the 
productive outcome participating in the integration 
process. 












 KBV logic 
 Capability 
approach 







































CHAPTER 2:  KNOWLEDGE, VIEWS OF THE FIRM AND COMMON KNOWLEDGE 
2.1 RESEARCH CONTEXT 
Now you are invited to get familiar with the context of this search, which holds as its 
main research question: How is common knowledge in organizations related to the 
knowledge integration capability?  
Since this research attends the quest from a comprehensive perspective it is 
convenient to star by segmenting the participating concepts into (a) the more general 
issues like knowledge-based views of the firm, and (b) the more specific issues like 
knowledge and common knowledge. 
The general research context involves a critical visit to the knowledge-based views of 
the firm, the role of organizational capabilities within them, and the role of knowledge 
within those capabilities. The more specific research context goes from characterizing 
knowledge and common knowledge as such  in organizations, and within the knowledge-
based views of the firm.  
2.1.1 From Resources to Knowledge in Views of the Firm 
When Robert Grant (1996a) published his article Toward a Knowledge-Based Theory 
of the Firm, he sketched a view of the firm that basically emphasizes the firm as an 
institution in which knowledge-based capabilities are the main driver for value creation, 




Grant´s (1996a) view, when recognizes knowledge in organizations as residing within 
the individual, is a portray of the firm that depart from other views that conceived 
knowledge residency in objects of the organization (Cyert and March, 1992, Nelson and 
Winter (1982, Kogut & Zander, 1992); that is, a view that raises epistemological 
discussions about the residence of knowledge in organizations (Tsoukas, 2009; Gourlay, 
2006, Foss 2003a), an in consequence about the approaches for managing knowledge in 
organizations.  
However, before getting into specifics, it is useful to review: How is that 
organizational researchers came to appreciate an understanding of the firm in terms of 
knowledge?   
The general context of value creation in organizations is best described by the way 
organizations are viewed in abstract terms. Penrose (1959) conceived the firm as an 
administrative entity with a collection of productive resources. In his view, material 
resources and human resources provide the firm a variety of services according to the 
firm´s ideas on how to apply them. In this view of the firm, called resource-based view 
(RBV), resources could be classified as physical, human or organizational according to 
Barney (1991); or tangible or intangible according to other authors like Mathews (2003).  
RBV is a strategic notion of the firm which conceives it as an entity that possesses 
scarce, durable, and valuable resources, through which the firm envisions and implements 
its value creation mechanisms (Barney, 1991); that is, an understanding that sets in 
resources possession the evaluations of strengths and weaknesses that eventually help to 




In this view of the firm, resources and capabilities explain the profit and value of the 
organization (Penrose, 1980), and they explain differences in performance within an 
industry (Hoopes et al., 2003). These differences in performance were revealed to happen 
when well succeeded organizations possess valuable resources that others do not have 
(Wernerfelt, 1984). 
In RBV, organizations are heterogeneous entities characterized by their particular and 
unique resource bases (Barney, 1991; Nelson & Winter, 1982) and in this sense the type, 
magnitude, and nature of resources and capabilities are important determinants of their 
capacity to generate profit (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993).  
In RVB, resource accumulation is considered to be a manifestation of innovative and 
entrepreneur activities; and profits can only emerge from these activities if resource 
accumulation costs are inferior to the rents that those resources might actually produce 
(Peteraf, 1993). This implies that the choice of the resources is the main mechanism 
influencing the generation of the economic rent (Makadok, 2001); thus, the organization 
should back with knowledge these superior capabilities to choose resources at the 
resource markets (Barney, 1986a, 1986b). These capabilities will traduce in better 
expectations of the future value of resources, than those presented by other participants in 
the resource market (Makadok, 2001). 
 Thus, the mechanism for economic rent creation acts before the acquisition of 
resources; and firms that hold superior capabilities to identify winning resources will be 




It should not past without noticing that in this RBV logic there is an instance of the 
value creation capability guided by knowledge-based activities, and it is in this relevant 
sense that RBV could be considered a theoretical predecessor of views of the firm that 
are based on capabilities that apply knowledge to create value.  
Then, these knowledge-based activities fit in the understanding of the firm as an 
entity in which the source of tangible resources lies outside the firm; and that the manner 
of exploiting factors of production is mainly originated within the firm. It is in this 
context that authors like Spender (1996), Grant (1996a, 1996b) and Zack (1999) proposed 
that, this unique manner – knowledge-based value creation capability – is in the core of 
the knowledge-based views (KBV) of the firm.  
Elaborating the KBV view, Grant (1996a, p. 112), following Demsetz (1991), argue 
that firms exist as institutions for producing goods and services because they can create 
conditions under which individuals can integrate their knowledge and that markets are 
unable to assume this role because of the immobility of tacit knowledge in organizations 
and the risk of appropriation of explicit knowledge by the potential buyer. 
Then, this is the point in which RBV and KBV set apart. While RBV argues mainly for 
the possession of resources types (material and human)  and characteristics (nature and  
magnitude) for explaining firm performance, that is a Ricardian view for rent creation; 
KBV argues mainly for the enactment of capabilities for explaining firm performance, 
that is a Schumpeterian view of rent creation (Teece et al., 1997).  
However, by accepting this breaking point between RBV and KBV we are also asked to 




organizations; that is, we are confronting a shift from the epistemology of possession of 
resources (knowledge about resources) to, both, the epistemology of possession of 
knowledge and its practice (knowledge in action). A relevant change that is well 
expressed by Cook and Brown (1999) in: 
Organizations not only create knowledge, they also – and usually primarily – 
create goods and services. In doing so, they need to be increasingly innovative. 
And this requires, we believe, attention not only to what they possess, but also 
to how they practice. This calls for a broadening of focus from one 
epistemology to two, including the generative potential of interplay between 
them (p.71). 
In summary, seeing now organizations as entities that create value supported in   
knowledge-based capabilities shift the explanations of the theories of the firm about 
performance from resource possession to knowledge possession and practice; and such 
change asks for the characterization of its main construct (knowledge) and its enactment 
(knowing) in organizations. 
2.1.2 Organizational Capabilities and Views of the Firm 
Let’s start reviewing such characterization of knowledge and knowing with a better 
understanding of organizational capability, by paraphrasing Zack´s (1999) 
contextualization of capability: “What a firm knows is a resource …What a firm knows 
how to do, is a capability”. And in that context, Simon´s idea of organizational processes, 
back there in 1947, fits also as capability: heuristics accumulated over experiences. 
However, what should not go unnoticed among those understandings is the difference of 




Descriptions of organizational capabilities come from many authors from different 
string of research – organizational studies, strategy, organizational learning, and 
knowledge management. Their summarized descriptions could be split in three groups: 
(1) those research works in which the focus is set in the capability itself, (2) those works 
that embed the capability description within a broader organizational study, and (3) those 
works that presents the capability within a view or theory of the firm.  
The first group of capabilities tends to hold a qualifying label and explicit definitions:   
(a) Core competences (Prahalad & Hammel, 1990):  Specific factor that is 
central to the way the organization works, which can be re-used in different 
products and markets, contributes to customers’ good experience and is difficult to 
imitate by competition. 
(b) Absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Van den Bosch et al., 2005): 
Ability of organizations to recognize external knowledge, assimilate it, and apply it 
commercially. 
(c) Capability as a network of routines (Grant (1991, p. 122): Complex 
patterns of coordination, between people and between people and resources, design 
for competitive advantage and profitability. 
(d) Dynamic capability (Teece et al., 1997): Organizational ability to build and 
reconfigure competences to tackle changing environments. 
The second group of capabilities corresponds to research proposals that tell us about 
the way organizations create knowledge (Nonaka, 1994) or the way they combine they 
routine activities with their innovative activities (Duncan, 1976). Even though their 





(e) SECI model capability (Nonaka, 1994): Ability of an organization of 
translating the tacit knowledge of the members, by means of dialogues and 
collective reflection, to explicit knowledge of the organization, manifested in the 
form of documents, procedures, plans. 
(f) Ambidextrous capability (Duncan, 1976; Tushman & O´Reilly, 1996): Ability 
of an organization to manage the tension of an asymmetric structure and culture that 
deals simultaneously with tight predictable units focused on economies of scale, 
scope and with loose risk taking units oriented to flexibility and customer closeness. 
The final group of capabilities is recognized as part of a view or theory of the firm in 
which knowledge is its key driver. Some of these theories were published under parallel 
lines of research like organizational learning, (OL) (Argyris & Schön, 1978), or 
published in organizational studies, even before the labels KBV or OL were coined.  
Most of these capabilities were not explicitly labeled with a specific name, nor 
concisely described, but hinted in the extensive narrative of the theory (Simon, 1947; 
1991a; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Cyert & March, 1992), or left for the inference of the 
reader (Spender, (1989; 1992); or combined with the description of the view or theory 
(Kogut & Zander, 1992; Grant, (1996a; 1996bs): 
(1) Heuristic-based capability (Simon, 1947; 1991a): Ability of the organization 
to satisfy its goals through heuristic-oriented rational competences guided by 
choosing rules. 
(2) SOP-based capability (Cyert & March, 1992): Ability of an organization to 





(3) Routine-based capability (Nelson & Winter, 1982): Repetitive patterns of 
activity oriented to fulfill firm´s targets, and that adapts to changes by replacing 
failing routines with existing satisficing recombined subroutines. 
(4) Industry recipe-based capability (Spender, 1989; 1992): Ability of an 
organization of either (a) reactively apply classical managerial knowledge by 
accepting certain institutional assumptions for action; or (b) proactively apply 
creative entrepreneurial and collaborative industry recipe-based knowledge by 
assessing and influencing institutional assumptions for action. 
(5) Replication and Combinative capabilities (Kogut & Zander, 1992): 
Ability of an organization to (a) replicate activities by means of a shared language 
to eases knowledge transferability and exploitation of complex knowledge 
embodiments, and (b) recombine functional knowledge through a common coding 
scheme that encapsulated substantial knowledge. 
(6) Integrating capability (Grant, 1996a; 1996b):  Ability of the organization to 
efficiently integrate the knowledge of specialists into productive outcomes by 
minimizing knowledge transfer through the use of common knowledge. 
In general, these three different groups of conceptualizations of organizational 
capabilities exhibit two, non-necessarily exclusive, approaches to organizational 
capabilities: (a) the exploitation of existing routines (also referred here as “application”) 
(Simon, 1947; 1991a; Cyert & March, 1992; Grant, 1996a; 1996b), and (b) the 
exploration of new alternatives (also referred here as “creation” or “generation”) (March, 




as alternatives (Spender, 1992), or as combined; but not in an integrated way (Raisch et 
al., 2009), see Tabe 2. 
Another issue that is relevant to establish is that such descriptions of organizational 
capabilities neglected the framing of knowledge and knowing instances that support the 
capability, that is, given the provided conceptualizations of capability there is still a 
pending theoretical work to enable the observation of specific knowledge instances 
linked to organizational capabilities; an issue to which this quest will have to attend. 
Summing up: 
Organizational capabilities are the complex patterns of coordination, 
between people and between people and resources for the purpose of 
creating value. 
These capabilities which are either described explicitly in focused organizational 
studies, or hinted in the narrative of the theory of the firm, or left for the inference of the 
reader to propose (a) the exploitation of existing routines and/or (b) the exploration of 
new alternatives, within a scope that left the capability unframed in respect to their 





S u m m a r y  o f  A p p r o a c h e s  t o  O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  C a p a b i l i t i e s  





Reapply core knowledge Exploitation 













Coordinate interaction between 
knowledge with resources  
Exploitation 




Recombine extant knowledge and 






Translate personal tacit knowledge into 
explicit organizational knowledge  
Exploitation 
Capability within 





Cope with the tension among applying 








 Apply heuristics to satisfy goals  Exploitation 
Capability within 
firm´s view 
Cyert & March  
(1992) 
SOP-based   
Apply standard operating procedures 






based   
Apply routines to satisfy targets and 






recipe-based   
(a) Apply managerial knowledge to 
attend given institutional goal 
conditioning 
Exploitation  
(b) Co-create industry recipe 
knowledge to influence institutional 
goal conditioning  
Exploration 





(a) Apply shared organizational 
language to ease knowledge transfer  
Exploration 
(b) Create functional knowledge by 
encapsulating substantial knowledge 





Integration   
Apply (integrate) specialists knowledge 
into productive outcomes by 
minimizing knowledge transfer through 
common knowledge  
Exploitation 




2.1.3 Knowledge in Capabilities within Views of the Firm 
Research regarding knowledge-based organizational capabilities shares principally 
the same motivation: management of the implications of the transferability of knowledge 
in organizations; implications that are best exemplified in the desirable replication that 
guides organizations’ grow and effectiveness; and the unwanted imitation by competition 
that drains organizations’ advantages (Winter, 1987).  
Managing such implications asks for reviewing the research status of the two 
epistemological issues previously identified: (1) knowledge understandings and its 
residency, and (2) recognizing knowledge domains of organizational capabilities. 
 That is, if we are asked to build and manage organizational capabilities that, at will, 
replicate effectively and deter unwanted imitation, it would be better to understand the 
“who”, “what”, and “how” of them.   
The first issue, besides discussing knowledge residency, has to do with the need to 
hold clarity about the difference and relationships between knowledge and knowing. The 
second issue has to do expliciting organizational capabilities domains of knowledge. 
Both of these subjects are attended in detail in Chapter 4 (Framing Individual level 
Knowing) and in Chapter 5 (Body of Knowledge of Organizational Capabilities); 
however, we will advance here with the mainstream of ideas to characterize the topics 




2.1.4 Knowledge Understandings and Residency within Views of the Firm 
Depending of the view of the firm, knowledge holds residence within the individual 
(Simon, 1947; 1991a; Grant, 1996a), or in the objects of the organization, either in 
abstract objects like routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982), or in physical objects like 
productive infrastructure (Spender, 1992), or in social or cultural objects like language 
(Kogut & Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996a; 1996b).   
Knowledge Conceptions and Residency within Knowledge-based Theories of the Firm 
Simon 
 (1947; 1991a) 
Satisficing heuristics and bounded rationality  Individuals 
Nelson & 
Winter (1982) 
Organizational routines Abstract objects 
Tacit knowledge and bounded rationality Organization 
Cyert & March 
(1992) 




Industry recipe  Social and 
cultural process 
Knowledge-embedded productive infrastructure   Physical objects 
Kogut & Zander 
(1992) 
Organizing principles Organization 




Common language, shared meanings  Cultural and 
social tools 
Recognition of knowers Social process 
Table 3. Summary of Knowledge Conceptions and Residency in Theories of the Firm. 
The lack of single scientifically accepted definition and operationalization of 




organizational researchers in their endeavors to adhere in practical terms to a variety of 
knowledge understandings and residency (see Tabe3).  
All this in the context of the two main trends in the study of knowledge in 
organizations (Bou et al., 2004a; b); one with emphasis in typifying knowledge and its 
exploitation in the organization endeavors, like the (a) data-information-knowledge 
continuum (Davenport and Prusak 1998; Bell 1999), (b) the tacit-explicit dichotomy 
(Nonaka, 1994), (c) the know what – know-how dichotomy (Davenport and Prusak 
1998), or the (d) declarative-procedural-causal structural content (Zack, 1999). The other 
trend focused in learning and action, in which knowing and practicing happens at the 
same time (Orr, 1993) within and considering a specific situation (Lave and Wenger, 
1991), in which actions are part of our ongoing sense-making (Weick, 1995). 
One key issue within the diversity of knowledge understandings is the risk of the 
reifying organizations as knowers; a concern presented by Grant (1996a) when arguing in 
favor of knowledge as residing in individuals, expressed as: 
Taking the organization as the unit of analysis not only runs the risk of reification, 
but, by defining rules, procedures, conventions, and norms as knowledge fails to 
direct attention to the mechanisms through which this 'organizational knowledge' 
is created through the interactions of individuals, and offers little guidance as to 
how managers can influence these processes (p. 113). 
Concerns about the risk of reification of organizations as knowing entities are not 
new. For example we can recall the words of Herbert Simon when he was invited to the 




that organizations learn) when presenting his paper on Bounded Rationality and 
Organizational Learning: 
However, we must be careful about reifying the organization and talking about it 
as "knowing" something or "learning" something. It is usually important to 
specify where in the organization particular knowledge is stored, or who has 
learned it. (Simon, 1991a, p. 126). 
Simon’s warning is helpful for characterizing the state of development of the KBV of 
the firm. Let’s start by assessing his statements. First, people of the organization learn; 
implying the exercising of an ability that achieves to acquire certain knowledge. Second, 
knowledge has a residing place in the organization, implying that knowledge is a 
conceivable object – tangible, intangible, concrete, abstract, logically or socially 
constructed – that is, the possibility of embedding it into objects of the organization.  
Then, Grant´s (1996a)  warning and Simon´s (1991a) call ask, in broader terms, that 
any theory of the firm that follows the dual residency posture should be ask to make 
reference to (a) theories about individual level knowing, and (b) theories about 
knowledge-embedded objects. 
However, what is actually posited in most theories of the firm is that organizations 
not only store knowledge in these objects but also learn or know while neglecting the 
epistemology requirements; and conceiving in this way knowing objects as the object of 
observation and measuring in the organization. Let’s briefly approach these theories of 
the firm to recognize these “knowers”.  
Most theories of the firm (Cyert & March, 1992; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Kogut & 




constructions as a knowing entity, and used these abstractions as unit of analysis; as is the 
case of the knowledge residing in Cyert and March’s standard operating procedures, or 
Nelson and Winter’s routines; or proposed the alternative of social constructions, as is the 
case of Spenders’ industry recipes, or Kogut and Zander’s organizing principles. 
Thereby, in these views, organizations “learn” by encoding inferences from history into 
routines that guide behavior (Levitt & March, 1988); or into organization’s industry 
recipes that hold knowledge that modulates rationality (Spender, 1989); or social 
knowledge as source of the combinative capability that creates value (Kogut & Zander, 
1992). 
In these views, in one side we have the posture of theories of the firm that advocates 
for knowledge residing at individual level (Grant, 1996a, Simon, 1947) which do not 
count with an operationalized knowledge theory yet; and in the other side there are 
theories of the firm (Cyert & March, 1992; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Kogut & Zander, 
1992; Spender, 1992) that argue for individual and organizational residency that propose 
approaches in which human knowing activity is assimilated into knowing organizational 
objects that eventually could be operationalized and measured.  
These last group of theories usually, when describing the body of knowledge that 
participate in the organizational capability, merge human native faculties that participate 
in the process of knowing – e.g. heuristic faculties – with the instrumentalized object of 
the knowing process – e.g. procedures, routines, recipes. However, no clear epistemology 
is provided to support such relationship. 
The rich but diverse understandings about the central construct of the knowledge-




constitute knowledge, and therefore to different managerial conclusions. Moreover, if we 
ponder that views of the firm does not always hold specific epistemological foundations, 
or such specifics refer to theories of knowledge (Polanyi, 1958; Weick, 1995; Bruner, 
1990) tangentially or misread them (Gourlay, 2004; 2006, Foss, 2003a; 2003b), or mix 
incompatible epistemologies (Miller, 2008). 
Then, if we consider: (a) the absence of a unified accepted conception of knowledge 
(even though they are plenty of theories available), (b) the two main knowledge 
management research trends (the application of a variety of knowledge types and the 
situated practice), (c)  the incomplete integration of such epistemologies when they are 
invoked in views of the firm, (d) the risk of reification when departing from individual as 
knowledge holders, and (e) the possible divergent management implications of such 
variety of conceptualization; we could say that there is a relevant research call for re-
reading extant theories of knowledge in search of their framing to offer a well founded 
approach to knowledge and knowing in the context of the capabilities of views of the 
firm.  
Given such warnings and call, I advance here a departing research posture about 
knowledge and knowing, not a radical one, but one that will demark our initial research 
steps:  to avoid the risk of reification, the act of knowing is recognized to happen at 
individual level.  
In regards to the knowledge-knowing dichotomy, Cook and Brown (1999) proposed 
bridging the two epistemologies and theories that regard about “possessing” different 




such view, non-translatable four types of knowledge (individual explicit and tacit, and 
collective explicit and tacit knowledge), understood as tools, are at the service of 
knowing, in an interplay that generates new knowledge and new ways of knowing. That 
is, knowledge, abstract and static, holds residency in the individual and such possession 
does not demand its usage; while knowing, concrete and dynamic, is related to the work 
individuals do with such tools.   
While Cook and Brown (1999) approach for bridging knowledge and knowing 
epistemologies is a compelling step forward the unification of knowledge management 
research endeavors (Merali, 2000; Okhuysen and Eisenhardt, 2002), however its 
taxonomy has been questioned for not reflecting Polanyi´s (1958) epistemological work 
(Orlikowski, 2002). 
2.1.5 Recognizing the implicated domains of knowledge at capability level 
With the to-be-emerged KBV of the firm integrating orientation to understand knowing 
and knowledge, we could attend the issue of recognizing knowledge domains of the 
organizational capabilities; to do so, we should star by recalling the ample number (14) of 
approaches that describe organizational capabilities (see Section 1.2.2), and in that sense 
we need to adhere to a productive selection criterion that helps to set the boundaries of 
the quest.  
The proposed criterion  is oriented to choose organizational capabilities that are hold 




including those that were stated even before the label KBV was coined by Grant and 
Spender (1996).  
This criterion leaves out of consideration well known approaches like (a) Nonaka’s 
(1994) SECI model, which concentrates in the knowledge life cycle in organizations, but 
without offering a complete view of the firm, and (b) Cohen and Levinthal´s (1990) 
absorptive capacity, which analyses the implications for an organization that is able to 
incorporate outside knowledge to innovate, but such following an approach that does not 
make explicit a theory of the firm.  
Similar arguments apply to core competences (Prahalad & Hammel, 1990), capability 
as a network of routines (Grant (1991), dynamic capability (Teece et al., 1997), and 
ambidextrous capability (Duncan, 1976; Tushman & O´Reilly, 1996). 
The eight selected capabilities, the ones listed in Table 2, already classified into 
exploitation and exploration approaches, could be framed additionally to attend the 
knowledge possession and practice dichotomy; which in organizational terms, I argue to 
be understood as the dichotomy between the knowledge participating in the 
organizational design stage, and the knowledge participating in the organizational 
execution stage. In such view the research endeavor invites to read (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998) theories of the firm in search knowledge domains considering the two dimensions: 
(a) exploitation-exploration and (b) design-execution. Such framed reading of capabilities 




2.1.6 Common Knowledge  
Before getting into the discussion of common knowledge in organizations (CKO), is a 
useful approach to recognize the status of the central idea of common knowledge in 
philosophy and cognitive psychology.  
Initially, this concept was reviewed from the perspective of philosophical studies by 
Lewis (1969) and described summarily as “there is common knowledge of p in a group of 
agents G when all the agents in G know p, they all know that they know p, they all know 
that they all know that they know p, and so on ad infinitum”. Later in 1976, Lewis´ 
understanding of common knowledge was mathematically formulated by Aumann 
(1976), who set the focus of his efforts in modeling the infinitum issue.  
In philosophical studies, in a work about meaning, Schiffer (1972) enrich the 
discussion of common knowledge by incorporating the idea that mutual knowledge can 
happen within finite situations, that is: 
If: 
Actor 1 knows about an Object or Event p, and  
Actor 2 knows about an Object or Event p, and 
Actor 1 knows that Actor 2 knows about p, and  
Actor 2 knows that Actor 1 knows about p 
…  
Them, even though there may be infinite number of iterations, Schiffer (1972) poses 
that for mutual knowledge to come into existence actors are aware of the situation 




of normal individuals, possibilities of generating shared inferences from the particular 
situation; which eventually will end up with the knowing interactions. 
However, Wilby (2010), in a revealing work in philosophical studies and cognitive 
psychology, considered that Schiffer´s (1972) approach was elegant but improvable, and 
proposed (a) to notice that the common generating property that eventually limits the 
infinite regression of embedded mental states within the conception of mutual knowledge 
is  “a visibly ´normal´ open-eyed, conscious person” (p. 35); and (b) to invoke 
Campbell´s work in cognitive psychology (2005) about the distinction between reductive 
analyses and relational analysis in the context of joint attention.  
In reductive analysis it is possible to identify, within the psychological states of an 
actor, which states matter, that without implying that there is joint attention with another 
actor about the object under consideration; and that in relational analysis, the ascribed 
relevant psychological states of the actor offer evidence that there is someone jointly 
attending (Campbell, 2005). That is, in relational analysis, the object of attention and the 
other actor also attending the object become part of the experience. 
With such conceptions, Wilby (2010) proposes to recognize that Actor 1 and Actor 2 
know about p in terms of a relational joint attention, and not as any unrelated normal 
persons knowing about p, as posited by Schiffer (1972); an understanding that helps to 
calibrate the interactions about their mutual knowledge; this because the needed 
interactions to reach common knowledge follows a single generating property: the jointly 




Common knowledge is not only what actors share about a particular 
situation, but about what actors, who know about the other; jointly know 
about a particular situation.  
The idea that actors “are in direct, unmediated cognitive contact with each other to the 
extent that they literally share the mental state of mutual knowledge” (Wilby, 2010, p. 93) 
does not only helps to identify its domain of knowledge, but also leads to frame the 
commonness criterion by which that shared cognitive state happens.  
Wilby (2010) does not explicitly talks about commonness criterion, but he provides a 
cue for identifying it when he posits that situations, subject of mutual knowledge, could 
be seen as a problem (the General´s problem), in which the generating property helps to 
calibrate the interactions toward a share understanding of the problem (p. 98): that is:  
Commonness criterion corresponds to the reference that drives joint actions toward 
a jointly understood situation. 
We will invoke these three proxies – common knowledge, commonness criterion and 
domains of knowledge – later to support the search for a better understanding of common 
knowledge in organizations.          
2.1.7 Common Knowledge in Organizations 
    In philosophy, organizational studies and communications literature the relevance 
of common knowledge, referred frequently with other names, is invoked in the context of 




Common cognitive schemas and frameworks that facilitate coordination (Weick, 1979). 
Shared success or failure stories about how work is accomplished (Orr, 1990). 
Knowledge that the communicating parties share in common and know they share 
(Cramton, 2001; Krauss & Fussell, 1990). 
Common cognitive schemas and common social norms of the communities that 
guide behaviors of practitioners (Brown & Duguid, 1991).  
Stories as vehicles for molding, integrating and reconciling different individual 
experiences and understandings (Brown & Duguid, 1991). 
Mutual cognitions to coordinate social actions (Leudar, (1992). 
Metaphors and analogies as tools that bridge knowledge gaps in organizations 
(Orr, 1990; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995).  
Network of intersubjectively shared meanings supported through the use and 
development of a common language brought into existence when people act in 
organizations (Weick, 1995). 
Language codes as tools used by specialists to economize communications in 
organizations (Arrow, 1974; Grant, 1996).  
Common ground integral to the coordination of actions (Clark, 1996). 
When people in organizations become practitioners, not only by modeling 
themselves, but also by the recognition of their colleagues; that is, the becoming 
and recognizing of practitioners share some common grounds (Duguid, 2001). 
In a more integrating approach, extant organizational research also states CKO as 




Industry recipe:  Common cognitive and social schema that facilitate coordination 
among and within organizations (Spender, 1989). 
Common knowledge of work activity and product ease operations of the 
organization (Demsetz, 1991). 
Common coding system exposes functional knowledge for its internal replication and 
also protects substantial knowledge from competition (Kogut & Zander, 1992). 
Principle of redundancy: mechanism that allows a loose coupling among members 
of a group in an organization (Nonaka, 1994).  
Genres: Historical usage-based meanings of typified physical and social artifacts and 
activities that contextualize ongoing work within groups (Cook & Brown, 1999).  
Such understandings of common knowledge in organizations could be 
categorized into: 
(1) Knowledge Types (types within a domain of knowledge pending of 
identifications): 
 (a) Common language (i.e. language code, coding system, metaphors, 
analogies, stories). 
(b) Shared meanings (i.e. shared understandings; shared cognitive schemas; 
molding, integration and reconciliation of experiences/understandings; 
industry recipes; common grounds; genres).  





(2) Practice (commonness criteria candidates):  
(a) Improving and economizing of communication.  
 (c) Loosely-couple mechanisms for coordinating actions.  
(d) Replication and protection of key knowledge. 
(e) Recognition, reconciling and sharing of understandings 
In this characterization the terms “loosely coupled” as a characteristic of the 
coordination of actions rescues the ideas posited by Nonaka (1994, p. 26) in: “each part 
has the potential of becoming the leader of the entire system when there exists 
redundancy of information”, and also by Thompson (1967) in that pooled 
interdependence is a kind of coordination driven by shared directives. 
At this point, CKO sounds a little bit clearer; its commonness criterion, in a broad 
sense, is argued to be linked to activities related to communicating, coordinating, sharing 
and protecting knowledge in organizations;  
That is, organizational studies description of the commonness criterion corresponds, 
with a more specific approach, to what has been reference in philosophy and cognitive 
psychology studies: it is what drives joint actions toward a jointly understood situation.  
And, in regards to the CKO domain we have advanced in typifying some general 
knowledge types that fit within common language, shared meanings and recognition of 




However, such commonness criteria and common knowledge domains need further 
clarification. The next section pays attention to that. 
2.1.8 Domains of Knowledge and Commonness Criterion 
While common knowledge in organizations, following Wilby´s (2010) social finite 
situation, is described as what members of the organization, who know about the 
others; jointly know about the organization. Here, the reference domain to which this 
knowing is common – organization - has been temporally admitted without adequate 
specification. Now, I argue that such finite situation is better described with the idea 
of organizational context.  
Such reference to “context” may sound also too general; however, further 
examination will reveal that it holds the required boundary specificity to help in the 
identification of common knowledge domains. 
Context characteristics have been discussed in detail in the knowledge management 
literature, as in Akman & Surav (1996) - Steps toward Formalizing Context; in 
Brézillon (2002) - Modeling and Using Context - Past, Present and Future in Strang et 
al. (2004) - A Context Modeling Survey, and in Akman & Surav (1997) – The use of 
situation theory in context modeling.  
These publications were critically analyzed by Loyola (2011) in Comparison of 
Approaches toward Formalizing Context, in a search for a proxy that bounds 




In Loyola (2011) the ideas of Tsoukas and Vladimirou (2001) on organizational 
knowledge are called to our attention. In there, they defined knowledge as the: 
“Individual capability to draw distinctions, within a domain of action, based on the 
appreciation of context or theory, or both”; and supported in Wenger (1988), they posit 
that to know how to act within a domain of actions is to make competent use of the 
distinctions constituting that domain.  
In Wenger (1988), the label “domain of actions” corresponds to a generalization that 
refers to the actions within the community of a specific scientific or professional practice. 
Then, within this specific domain – practice in organizations – is where the standard of 
knowledge is measured through theory and/or context.  
Also, social construction of reality (Schutz, 1970) is brought to our attention by Tsoukas 
and Vladimirou (2001) to argue in favor of context equipped as theory in the phrase:  
“we routinely bring to situations of interaction a tacit awareness of the normative 
expectations relevant to them and an intuitive appreciation of the consequences 
that might follow from breaking them” (McCarthy, 1994).  
Normative expectations and consequences imply shared tacit propositions and 
conditions. It is in this ethno methodological sense that context guides the appreciation of 
our capacity to exercise judgment (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001). 
When talking about the theory in use, it is useful to recall Kogut and Zander´s (1992) 
coverage of the debate between Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s (1988) doubts about the 
possibility of identifying the theory that allows for the codification of background 




more certain posture about the possibility of developing models of actions that explains 
interpersonal behavior.  
Here, following Argyris and Schoen (1978), we take the posture that the theory in 
use, from our theoretical research work, is equivalent to the espoused theory, which is 
either explicitly declared in the views of the firm in the form of organizational capability 
– complex patterns of coordination, between people and between people and resources 
for the purpose of creating value – or because it’s organizational capability could be 
revealed from the views of the firm.  
Then, considering (a) Wilby’s (2010) social finite situation as the boundary that 
defines the domain within mutual knowledge happens, (b) that at organizational level 
CKO´s knowledge domains was described to be bounded by its organizational context, 
(c) the arguments that characterized context as the theory in use (Argyris & Schön, 1974), 
and to the (d) emerged drives expressed in the different descriptions of common knowledge 
in organizational studies (Brown & Duguid, 1991; Arrow, 1974; Weick, 1979; 1995; 
Polanyi, 1966; Leudar, 1992; Clark, 1996; Cramton, 2001; Krauss & Fussell, 1990), it could 
be said that:  
CKO´s domain corresponds to the practices that are bounded by the theory in use 
by the members of the organization. 
Then, since commonness criterion corresponds to the reference that drives joint actions 




Domain of practices exercised within the framework of the theory in use by the 
members of the organization, to economize in communications, recognize, 
reconcile and share understandings, replicate and protect key knowledge, and ease 
coordination of actions. 
Note: Domain of practices exercised within the framework of the theory in use by the 
members of the organization (Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 2001; Schutz, 1970; McCarthy, 
1994; Argyris & Schön, 1974), to economize in communications (Arrow, 1974; Grant, 
1996), recognize, reconcile and share goals (Brown & Duguid, 1991), replicate and 
protect key knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1992), and ease coordination of actions 
(Nonaka, 1994; Thompson, 1967, Demsetz, 1991, Spender, 1989). 
2.1.9 Common Knowledge in Theories of the Firm 
In theories of the firm, with greater or lesser emphasis, CKO hold a declare role in the 
subjacent logic of the theories.  
Understood from  a broad perspective, in some of the theories the role assigned is not 
explicit, as are the cases of Simon (1991b) and Cyert and March (1992); in others, like in 
Nelson and Winter (1982), Spender (1996) and Kogut and Zander (1992), common 
knowledge is proposed as the context that helps to modulate the  interpretations and  
coordination system; or as in Grant (1996a & 1996b), who proposes that common 





In the first chapter, I shared the managerial motivations of this research work – an 
organization that integrates knowledge through shared directives – and the scientific 
justification – greater explanatory power of the theory – for following Grant´s (1996a) 
knowledge-based view of firm as the reference within which understand the role of 
common knowledge. Now it is the time to describe how Grant explains CKO, and what is 
still pending in such approach. 
Common knowledge is described by Grant (1996a) in general terms as composed by 
three types: (a) common language, (b) shared meanings, and (c) recognition of knowers. 
This taxonomy is similar to what emerged from our previous literature review of theories. 
 Even thou Grant (1996a) did not follow an structured literature review to argue for 
these emerging common knowledge types, but presented them at front, it is reasonable to 
think that he made such review and did not presented it in his research paper. 
Grant´s descriptions of common language include literacy, numeracy, rules, 
directives, English, computer software, statistics, other languages and specialized 
organizational knowledge.  
Shared meaning, according to Grant (1996a), is a common knowledge type that holds 
the tacit to explicit conversion process challenge where losing happens; and to confront 
this challenge, he lists approaches like the development of shared understanding between 
individuals by indwelling in the others practice (Polanyi, 1966), or the recognition that 
when people acts in organizations bring common schemas of organizational structures 
and events into existence (Weick, 1979) or the role of metaphors and analogies  (Nonaka 




integrating and reconciling different individual experiences and understandings” (Grant, 
1996a, p. 116).  
The last common knowledge type referenced by Grant (1996a) is the recognition of 
individual knowledge domains which according to him facilitates non-explicit coordination 
of activities by knowing everyone knowledge repertories; that is, the interdependences for 
organizing for a task are known by the participants (Thompson, 1967).  
Grant´s description and framing of CKO are enlightening, but still broad; in it he 
declares a relationship with the efficiency of knowledge integration capability (ability of 
the organization to efficiently integrate the knowledge of specialists into productive 
outcomes by minimizing knowledge transfer through the use of common knowledge). This 
is an idea that holds grounds; however, such relationships in case of CKO types are not 
explained; and to my best of knowledge, empirical research in this issue has also been 
neglected.  
In brief, in general theories of the firm seems to approach common knowledge, when 
they do, from the perspective of interpretative systems or types (language, meanings and 
know-who). Apparently, in these theories, there is not a focus in the issue of practice for 
the role of common knowledge. This is a matter worthy of paying attention. 
2.2 KNOWLEDGE IN ORGANIZATIONS – EMPIRICAL RESEARCH STATUS 
Extant relevant research works related to frameworks that posit explanations about 
knowledge and knowing in organizations are here critically reviewed to recognize their 




Given that there is not a specific approach to common knowledge in extant empirical 
research works a useful criterion for selecting findings about common knowledge is 
collectiveness. A criterion that is used to map findings labeled as collective, group, 
social, shared, community or contextual knowledge.   
Among those works are Wenger´s (1989) Community of Practice, Baumard´s (1999) 
Cunning intelligence, Carlile´s (2004) Boundary Framework, Vladimirou and Tsoukas´ 
(2001) Organizational Knowledge, Cook and Brown´s (1999) Knowledge-Practice 
framework, and Bou, Sauquet and Bonet´s (2004a; 2004b) Bundles of Knowledge 
approach.  
2.2.1 Wenger´s Community of Practice (CoP) 
Lave & Wenger (1991) and later Wenger (1998) observed communities, such as 
midwives, insurance claims processors, and apprentice tailors, interacting in their 
practices. Such observations were realized from the perspective of a learning theory that 
proposes that context and social interactions within it influence how people share 
knowledge and learn (situated learning theory).  
Situated learning theory is related to (a) Brown et al. (1989), who presented a situated 
learning model that extends the traditional classroom approach to consider apprentice 
reflection and coaching,; (b) to the ethnography work of Orr (1990) on photocopier 
technicians, in which sharing knowledge is mainly achieve through telling stories; (c)  to 
Brown and Duguid (1991), who, based on Orr’s empirical data, views learning, not as a 
master-apprentice relationship, but as a peers that share and  create knowledge by 




(1997), who emphasized the idea of  learners participation focused on the practice, in 
contrast to personal interaction with the other. 
Wenger’s (1998) approach to communities of practice (CoP) emerged from an 
ethnographic study regarding a group of insurance claims processors at their work. His 
findings argue for an evolutionary apprentice-to-expert community, in which new 
members, in their condition of novices, are assimilated at the periphery, and advance to 
the center of the community, to become experts; not by the information of manuals, but 
by the community mechanisms for sharing tacit knowledge; in such evolution older 
members move away from the center to the periphery, an eventually leave the 
community.  
However, such description of CoP may direct over consideration to its members says 
Wenger (1998). He asks to pay attention toward the analytic components that 
characterized the (a) community, as a creation capable of learning trough (a1) mutual 
engagement around (a2) joint enterprising while sharing a (a3) common repertoire; and 
toward four interrelated aspects that shape (b) practice, as the symbiotic interrelation of 
(b1) meaning, (b2) community, (b3) learning, and (b4) identity.  
Bozarth (2008) argues that the fact that Wenger (1998) text is difficult to read and 
filled with abstractions, and that may the reason why no researcher yet have follow his 
framework for the analysis of other CoPs.  
Attending such research gap, Bozarth (2008), by means of an instrumental case 




the framework, and suggests refinements to the analytic components of the CoP 
framework.  
Bozarth´s (2008) refined CoP framework confirms the support to the shift in focus 
from managing a community of practice, to “nurturing and understanding the significant 
internal dynamics of learning, meaning, and identity” (Bozarth, 2008, p. 2).  
Then, even though that organizations hold a high interest in encouraging CoPs to gain 
from meaning making, the emergence of identities, and the sharing of knowledge 
(Wenger 2004), Bozarth (2008) confirms Wenger´s (1998) view that CoPs cannot 
effectively be setup by an organization, neither its membership, nor participation could be 
ordered, since they are emergent, self-managed, and motivated by the members’ 
commitment for better work practices.  
That is, CoP´s view offers rich descriptions for the understanding of common 
knowledge, as are the cases of: (a) community´s analytic components like (a1) mutual 
engagement, (a2) joint enterprising, and (a3) common repertoire; and (b) the practice´s 
aspects like (b1) shared meanings from the practice aspect; however the way it is framed 
becomes problematic for the knowledge-based views of the firm that proposes knowledge 
as the mechanism of value creation (Spender, 1996) when Wenger (1998) and Bozarth 
(2008) propose CoP as non-manageable; especially if we are considering efficient forms 




2.2.2 Baumard’s Cunning Intelligence 
Baumard (1999) argues for discernible behaviors exhibited related to the well-known 
dimensions in knowledge categorization: tacit-implicit and individual-collective.  
To evaluate his observations, instead of referring to the traditional Greek concepts 
related to knowledge, like episteme (principles and reasons of all categories), techne 
(knowledge on how to do something), phronesis (practical wisdom), empeiría 
(accumulation of particular memories) or aletheia (sensation or feeling when truth is 
revealed), Baumard referred to the not very well diffused Greek concept of metis.  
Metis, a concept rescued as conjectural intelligence and cunning by Détienne and 
Vernant (1978), which Baumard (1999, p. 65) explains as “certain type of intelligence 
that is committed to practice, confronted with obstacles that must be dominated by 
cunning to obtain success in the most diverse areas of action”  
Then, with the concept of “metis” as the building block of his epistemology and an 
emphasis that acts of behavior reveal knowledge instances, Baumard (1999) offers a 
guideline for observing human behavior, as follow: 
 (a) Tacit individual behaviors are related to lose attention, automatic behavior, 
suppressed conflicts, mixed feelings, and succeeding in chaos, among others.  
(b) Explicit individual behaviors may be explicit avoidance, attempting to articulate a 
situation, conflict seeking, showing awareness of a situation, focus on problem solving, 




(c) Explicit collective behaviors may be related to collective involvement, collective 
evasion, deliberate sharing of knowledge, formation of task force, and working on 
collective sensemaking.  
(d) Tacit collective behaviors include practice in communities, achieving task without 
explanations, networks of tacit understanding, sought of collective orientation, 
uncomfortable atmosphere, and knowledge sharing emergent attitude.  
Baumard (1999) achieved to discuss this behavior observational framework in four 
different organizational settings. There, he found not only evidence of instances of 
knowledge sharing and transformation, but some general principles for managers when 
they confront strategic issues.  
In a more broad reading, Baumard’s (1999) framework mainly intents to provide an 
account of the role of tacit knowledge in the everyday functioning, observed in individual 
and collective behaviors, through the lenses of the epistemology of commitment to the 
intelligent and cunning practice to achieve success. The identified explicit and tacit 
collective behaviors describe practices in which common knowledge holds a role, but 
such CK instances are not completely categorized given the strategic thinking approach. 
   This is a different enriching view of personal and collective knowing; it presents a 
theoretical and empirical exercise in which certain types of knowing are operationalized 
in observable human behaviors. Interestingly, this approach attends Gourlay´s (2004) 




However, Baumard (1999) is a focused approach to knowing, which, for the purposes 
of this research, it has the pending tasks of giving an account for the role of symbol-based 
systems and the production of other kind of knowledge besides the strategic kind. 
2.2.3 Carlile´s Boundary Object Framework  
Shannon and Weaver (1949), in their seminal work on information theory, describe 
the three levels of communication complexity. First, they relate the available repertoire of 
distinct symbols and their syntax - rules between symbols - to the syntactic or technical 
level of communication.  Then, they identify the process by which symbols actually get 
meaning as the semantic level; and finally, they consider the desired effect of a particular 
message on a message destination as the effectiveness or pragmatic level.  Even though 
Shannon and Weaver avoid much elaboration on the semantic and pragmatic level of 
communication, these three levels – syntactic, semantic and pragmatic – have been 
referenced by several authors as an approach to understand and map the data-
information-knowledge continuum (Carlile, 2004; Boisot and Canals 2004). 
Complementarily, the idea of boundary objects, a term coined by Star (1989), in 
sociologist of science, makes reference to artifacts (physical or mental) that allow 
members of different practices to share common grounds (Arias and Fischer, 2000).  
Boundary object supports the distinguishing of differences but also provides common 
points of reference (Harvey and Chrisman, 1998).  
Boundary objects hold several characteristics that help to explore the interactions 




 (a) Modularity: (e.g., a plan, in which its sequencing, timing, costing, risk 
managing, says something specific to each stakeholder),  
(b) Abstraction (e.g., an organizational structure diagram that reveals general 
dependencies among members),  
(c) Accommodation (e.g., organizational directives that hold different implications 
depending of the role), and  
(d) Standardization (e.g., organizational routines as guideline for working 
behavior). 
It is within these two approaches (the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic framework 
and the boundary object approach to artifacts) that Carlile’s (2004) argues for an 
“integrative framework for managing knowledge across boundaries when innovation is 
desired”. His work, an empirical research, presents the case study of an automobile clay 
model, considered as boundary object, to explain the dynamics of the exploration for new 
knowledge.   
Carlile (2004) argues that in order to achieve novelty different capabilities are needed 
at different boundaries of communication. The transferring capability invites to consider 
as necessary (thou not sufficient as we see later) the development of a common lexicon to 
deal with the syntactic issues; the translation capability takes care of semantic issues and 
asks for the development of shared meanings, and the transformation capability ask for 




In short, Carlile´s (2004) framework argues for understanding of the knowledge 
creation process as the interactions among: 
(a) Organizational artifacts evaluated in terms of their boundary object´s characteristics, 
(b) Knowing human abilities (transferring, translation and transformation), and  
(c) Forms of common knowledge (language, meanings and interest).  
Interactions in which either (a) members of the organization may or may not hold the 
demanded knowing abilities to operate within or in transcended boundaries, or (b) 
artifacts, as conceived, hold or does not hold the characteristics for the required 
knowledge transferring, translation or transformation. 
 The specifics of Carlile ´s (2004) findings of the automobile clay model case study 
reveal, by examining the two previous mentioned interactions, that in innovative 
environments: 
(a) Common lexicon is necessary but not sufficient to share and asses the differences 
and dependencies of specific domains of knowledge,  
(b) Sharing meanings is not simply an issue of translating but a “political process of 
negotiating and defining common interest” (p. 559), and  
(c) Willingness of an organizational member to act in new ways is not only adversely 
linked to the cost of learning the new knowledge, but also affected by the cost of 




Carlile’s knowledge creation framework follows the information system approach to 
knowledge. In it, common knowledge has been related to common lexicon, shared 
meaning, and common interest; however their commonness criteria are not explicit. Also, 
three knowing abilities (transferring, translating and transforming) have been referenced 
in regard to the “boundary object” characteristics. This is a compelling conception that is 
useful as an academic abstraction, but also it is an approach that leaves as pending the 
easier practitioner understanding. 
2.2.4 Tsoukas´ Organizational Knowledge 
Fusing predominantly Polanyi´s (1958) view of knowledge – “All knowing is 
personal knowing” and combine it with the Wittgensteinian claim that all knowledge, in a 
fundamental way, depends on historically evolved collective understandings and 
experiences, Tsoukas and Vladimirou’s (2001) proposed and tested, in a case study 
related to a call centre of a leading mobile phone operator in Greece, an understanding of 
organizational knowledge.  
Starting with Bell´s (1999) conception of (a) data as an ordered sequence of given 
items and events, (b) information as a context-based arrangement of items and their 
relationships, and (c) knowledge as the judgment of the significance of events and items 
which comes from a particular context and/or theory, Tsoukas and Vladimirou’s (2001) 
rescued that judgement could be based on context, and not only on theory.  
Social construction of reality (Schutz 1970, Berger and Luckmann 1967) is also 




bring to situations of interaction a tacit awareness of the normative expectations relevant 
to them and an intuitive appreciation of the consequences that might follow from 
breaking them” (McCarthy 1994, p. 65); in such acceptation normative expectations and 
consequences imply shared tacit propositions. It is in this ethnomethodological sense that 
context supports the capacity to exercise judgement (Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 2001). 
The research case study presents how personnel at the customer care department were 
exposed in their work to many discrete items (names, addresses and phone numbers) and 
business rules (if <problem> then <check this or that>) in which their invocation required 
certain level of judgment; departing from such exposition and by means of experience, 
operators discovered from customers´ verbal hints that they were dealing with an 
unhappy or perplexed customer and acted according to the circumstances, adapting the 
business rules to the context of their conversations.  In summary, the case study reveals 
different levels of human involvement and abilities (Tsoukas and Vladimirou 2001): (a) 
discriminating: identifying phone numbers, (b) inferring: selecting applicable business 
rules, and (c) judging and acting: deciding how to act in a particular context. 
The case study supported Tsoukas and Vladimirou (2001) proposition that to know 
how to act within a domain of actions is to make competent use of the distinctions 
constituting that domain. Domain of actions is a generalization that refers in terms of 
organizations to the community of a specific scientific or professional practice.  Within 
this specific domain – practice – is where the standard of knowledge is measured through 




Building upon recognizing organizations as three things - historical social communities, 
real settings where individuals take action and sets of abstract rules - Tsoukas and 
Vladimirou (2001, p. 983) also proposed a definition of organizational knowledge, as 
follow: 
Organizational knowledge is the capability that members of an organization have 
developed to exercise judgment and act in particular concrete contexts, by enacting 
sets of generalizations (propositional statements) based on the appreciation of theory 
or historical evolved collective understandings regarding experiences in their 
practice - which is based on the appreciation of context - or both. 
Tsoukas (2009) extended this definition of organizational knowledge to posit a 
dialogical description of how new knowledge is created in organizations. In such 
description, besides ratifying the individual ability to draw distinctions in relation to the 
practice at hand, he proposes an evolutionary appreciation of new experiences in terms of 
the extant distinctions.  
Tsoukas argues for the productive relational and engaging practitioner dialog around 
the reflective articulation of such new distinctions, an interaction in which the 
responsibility assumed about the joint new conceptualization and the emerged 
relationships among participants triggers the creation of new knowledge in organizations. 
Here, we are ready to pledge to Tsoukas and Vladimirou´s (2001) criterion by which 
personal knowledge is considered organizational. However, lexicon and scope ask for 
precision. First, since here we argue for knowledge holding residence in the individual, 
we insist, to avoid the misunderstanding of the organization as a knowing entity, and in 




to which Tsoukas and Vladimirou refer is the practice in play; however, the scope 
pledged in this dissertation is related to the theory in use at firm level. 
Their epistemological arguments mainly follow Dewey´s (1934) re-order approach to 
create a new vision, McCarthy´s (1994) normative approach to social construction of 
reality, Bell´s (1999) data-information-knowledge continuum and their associated human 
abilities (discriminating, inferring, judging and acting), and Wenger´s (1998) joint and 
engaged participation from the communities of practice.  
Then, in summary, Tsoukas and Vladimirou (2001) and Tsoukas (2009) is an 
approach to knowledge in organizations that argue for the judgment of distinctions as the 
central personal ability to make distinctions within a practice at work, in which 
responsible joint action creates new knowledge.  
I found Tsoukas and Vladimirou´s (2001) view of knowledge in organizations as a 
plausible one, and share it partially; as it was evident in section 2.1.6 when organizational 
context was invoked as the criterion for bounding common knowledge in organizations.  
However, I also found that Tsoukas and Vladimirou´s (2001) narrated approach while 
providing plausible line of thoughts, but with no punctuated or taxonomic themes 
distinguishing knowledge from practice, invites for detail epistemological work that may 
complete a framework oriented to unproblematic empiric observations of knowledge and 




2.2.5 Knowledge-Practice Framework and Bundles of Knowledge 
Cook and Brown (1999), questioning Nonaka´s (1994) SECI knowledge types 
conversion model, proposed the dichotomy knowledge-practice as a framework that in 
which the same SECI four knowledge types – outlined within the individual-collective 
and explicit-tacit two-by-two matrix-based taxonomy – operate as distinct non-
convertible tools at the service of practice through interactions that enrich each other – 
knowledge and practice.    
Cook and Brown (1999) summarily identified common knowledge types as: 
(a) Explicit shared stories, metaphors or phrases about successes or failures at work 
and about know-how that provide useful meanings within groups. For future 
reference this understanding is labeled here as shared work-related transcendent 
narratives. 
(b) Useful and continually practice-based negotiated tacit shared meanings that a group 
attaches to its symbolic, physical and social artifacts and to its activities. This type 
of knowledge was labeled as genres by Cook and Brown (1999), but given the 
scope of this work, organizational genres sound as a more suitable and memorable 
label.  
In a complementary line of empirical research, the works of Bou, Sauquet and Bonet 
(2004a; 2004b) regarding job placement and consulting practice, follow critically Cook 




Bou, Sauquet and Bonet (2004a; 2004b) found that such framework while being a 
good initial reference for observing knowledge types, it holds certain shortcomings. In 
their research they experienced: 
(a) Variation of the predominance of certain knowledge types depending on the 
proficiency of the knower in the specific practice, all this within the extremes 
defined by the novice status in one side and the recognized expert in the other. 
(b) The limited description of practice, that Cook and Brown´s knowledge-practice 
framework provides, does not explain that similar observable acts may imply 
different meaningful actions, as is the case of the cannon follower (novice) versus 
the cannon re-framer (expert).  
Such findings led Bou, Sauquet and Bonet (2004a; 2004b) to propose the idea of 
bundles of knowledge as a proxy that:  
(a) It extends the knowledge types that participate in practice, to include knowledge 
types like: structure, implicit contextual norms and know-who. In other words, 
the recognition of organizational context as a knowledge type that shape 
practice.  They argue that contextual variables influence, both, the types of 
knowledge use by the knower, and the knowing aspects while practicing.  
(b) It describes that knowledge types participate in different combinations and 
proportions depending of the apprentice-expertise gradient. That is, they 
propose a dynamic framework that depicts an evolution the goes from the 




collective) in terms of the level of experience hold (novice-expert) and 
organizational contextual factors like structure (formal, hierarchical ladder, 
division of labor), directives (implicit mostly), and social knowledge (know-
who). 
In summary, bundles of knowledge (Bou, Sauquet & Bonet, 2004a; 2004b) propose a 
dynamic extension to Cook and Brown (1999]) static knowledge-practice framework, in 
two dimensions.  
First, the knowledge-practice dichotomy is shaped by the organizational context; that 
is, organizational structure and know-who induce certain knowledge usage and practices. 
Second, the usage of certain knowledge types is dependent of the level of expertise hold; and 
in practice novice tend to apply them as given, and experts tend to reframe them. 
In terms of this research, the collective types (explicit shared work-related 
transcendent narratives and tacit organizational genres) proposed by Cook and Brown 
(1999) as common knowledge instances are extended by Bou, Sauquet and Bonet (2004a; 
2004b) to consider organizational context (structure, implicit directives and social 
knowledge), not as a “mere container” but as an actor that modulates the bundles of 
knowledge in play when practicing. 
2.2.6 CKO: Empirical Research Summary  
The previous review regarding empirical findings about common knowledge in 




two concepts that describe CKO types: common language and shared meanings (Wenger, 
1989; Baumard, 1999; Carlile, 2004; Cook & Brown, 1999; Bou et al., 2004a; b). 
In addition, there is evidence about a third more active conceptualization of common 
knowledge which emerges with lesser clarity but providing illustrative facets of what 
may be pending for discovery. Here, I dare to link them, when possible, to some of the 
ideas emerged in the previous theoretical review (see Table 4): 
Loose coordination of actions: Wenger (1989) and Bozarth (2008) argue for a 
community learning-oriented component characterized by mutual engagement 
around joint enterprising. 
Evaluation criteria: Baumard (1999) describes it as dynamic and evolving, shaped 
by the successful practice.  
Theory in use: Tsoukas and Vladimirou (2001) invokes the role of organizational 
context as the shared theory that assesses the practice of judgments and acts as the 
knowledge in organizations; and  
However, special attention deserves the approach followed by bundles of knowledge. 
Bou, Sauquet and Bonet (2004a; b) argue for an active role of the organizational context, 




Approaches to Knowledge in Organizations and Participating Common Knowledge Types 
Com munity  o f  
Pract ice  
Wenger (1989)   
Bozarth (2008) 
Argues for an evolutionary apprentice-to-expert 
community driving by community mechanisms for 
sharing tacit knowledge 
 Community´s analytic components 
 Mutual engagement 
 Joint enterprising 
 Common repertoire 
 Practice´s aspects 
 Shared meanings 
Cunn ing  
In te l l igen ce  
Baumard (1999) 
Provide an account of knowledge through the 
lenses of the epistemology of commitment to the 
intelligent and cunning practice to achieve 
success. 
 Explicit: collective involvement and 
evasion, deliberate sharing of knowledge, 
formation of task force, and working on 
collective sense making.  
 Tacit: achieving task without explanations, 
networks of tacit understandings, 
sought of collective orientation, 
uncomfortable atmosphere, and 
knowledge sharing emergent attitude.  
Boundary  
Ob jec t  
Fram ewor k  
Carlile (2004) 
Understand the knowledge creation process as the 
interactions among: 
 Organizational artifacts as boundary objects 
(modularity, abstraction, accommodation and 
standardization). 
 Knowing abilities (transferring, translation and 
transformation).  
 Common language 
 Shared meanings 





An approach to knowledge in organizations that 
argues for context operating as the criterion by 
which knowledge of members is assessed.  
 Organizational context understood as 
historically evolved collective 
understandings regarding experiences in 
their practice. 
Know ledge  &  
Pract ice  
Fram ewor k  
Cook & Brown 
(1999) 
An approach that proposes a static understanding of 
knowledge types, framed within the individual-
collective and explicit-tacit 2x2 matrix-based 
taxonomy, which operate as distinct non-
convertible tools for the practice in organizations. 
 Shared work-related transcendent narratives. 
 Evolutionary shared meanings (genres) 
attach to symbolic, physical and social 
artifacts and activities. 
Bundles  of  
Know ledge  
Bou, Sauquet & 
Bonet (2004a; 
2004b) 
A dynamic extension of Cook & Brown (1999) in 
which the knowledge-practice dichotomy: 
 Is shaped by organizational context structure 
and know-who) 
 Usage of certain knowledge types (explicit-tacit 
/ individual-collective types) is dependent of 
the level of expertise hold. 
 In practice novice tend to apply knowledge as 
given, and experts tend to reframe it. 
 Shared work-related transcendent narratives. 
 Evolutionary shared meanings (genres) 
attach to symbolic, physical and social 
artifacts and activities. 
 Organizational context (a) modulates 
proportions and combinations of the bundles 
of knowledge in play, and (b) the identification 
of the abilities that shape successful practice 
within the novice-expert gradient (knowledge 
follower – knowledge reframer). 




They propose an understanding of organizational context that (a) participates in 
modulating proportions and combinations of the bundles of knowledge in play (explicit-
tacit / individual-collective types), and (b) the identification of the abilities that shape 
successful practice within the novice-expert gradient (cannon follower – cannon re-
framer).  That is a CKO understanding that did not emerged in the theoretical review of 
common knowledge, which deserves attention. 
In brief, empirical research, thou not specifically oriented to common knowledge, but 
understood from the categories belonging to social, collective or organizational 
knowledge, approach CKO from three different perspectives: (a) pure practice (Wenger, 
1989; Bozarth,2008), or (b) a mix of knowledge types and practice, with emphasis in 
taxonomy (Cook & Brown, 1999), or (c) a mix of bundles of knowledge and practice, 
with emphasis in practice (Bou, Sauquet & Bonet,2004a; 2004b). 
2.3 COMPARING OCK THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH STATUS  
Theoretical approaches, from philosophy, cognitive psychology, communications and 
organizational studies, to common knowledge propose to understand it as the domain of 
practices exercised within the framework of the theory in use by the members of the 
organization to economize in communications, recognize, reconcile and share goals, 
replicate and protect key knowledge, and loosely coordinate actions.  
That is an understanding of CK that emphasizes (a) practice, (b) knowing 
performance evaluation criteria, (c) common repertoire as efficient communication 




purpose (productive and defensive) instrumentation and (f) loose approach for the 
coordination of joint actions.  
However, views and theories of the firm seems to conceived CKO from the 
perspective of either (a) interpretative and coordination systems, or (b) knowledge types 
(language, shared meanings, know-who). 
Extant empirical research about common knowledge in organizations reveal certain 
level of agreement on two common knowledge types – shared symbolic systems and 
shared meanings – and in its evolutionary condition and active modulation role. These 
findings emphasize (a) practice, (b) common symbolic repertoire, (c) shared meanings, 
(d) joint action, (e) knowledge type composition, and (f) ability type relevance.  
Empirical findings (Bou, Sauquet & Bonet, 2004a; 2004b) also reveal the limited 
description of practice that the knowledge-knowing framework (Cook and Brown, 1999) 
provides. In addition, even though, they propose extensions to the framework to fit 
findings (evolutionary composition of knowledge types and organizational context as 
knowledge and knowing modulator) there is still pending some integrating 
epistemological discussion of practice (knowing) since its taxonomy has been questioned 
for not reflecting Polanyi´s (1958) epistemological work (Orlikowski, 2002).      
Advancing in discussion of OCK research status, the comparison of the theoretical 
and empirical approaches reveals similarities, with different levels of specificity, in 
constructs related to shared symbolization, share meanings, and joint action.  
However, while theories of the firm focus in knowledge instrumentalization and 




goal-defined organizations, but still appreciating more knowledge types than practice; 
empirical studies focus more in composition and interaction of bundles of knowledge 
with practice and its participating abilities, within a more circumscribed organizational 
scope.     
I argue that some epistemological work could bring more clarity to role of common 
knowledge in organizations, especially if we considered them from the perspective of 
views of the firm.  Then, the understanding of CKO confronts: 
(a) The rich but divergent approaches to knowledge and knowing.  
(b) The understanding of the commonness criteria in organizations (already 
attended in Section 2.1.8), and through it  
(c) The specification of the instances of common knowledge participating in KBVs 
of the firm. 
From a broad perspective, such gaps suggest for at least three frames of reference: an 
integrated view of knowing, an organizational capability framework, and the framing of 
common knowledge in the context of KBVs of the firm. Such work will allow exploring 
and explaining knowledge-based capabilities and CKO in the various conceptions of 
KBV of the firm.  
In the specifics of this work, those frameworks will provide an understanding of the 
role of common knowledge in organizations in the context of Grant´s (1996a) knowledge 





CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODS  
3.1 PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS AND GENERAL INQUIRY STRATEGIES 
Here, I follow Creswell (2003) to guide the three research issues that a scientific 
study should consider. The first one corresponds to the philosophical assumptions of the 
knowledge claims, the second are the inquiry strategies, and the last one are the methods 
for data collection and analysis. 
This quest follows a constructivist philosophical approach, in which the most 
important issue of the quest is to understand relationships between common knowledge 
resident in the members of an organization with the integration of specialized knowledge 
into the productive practice. This philosophical approach, expressed in terms of Crotty 
(1998) when discussing constructivism, invites us to understand the problem of common 
knowledge as implied in the social interactions of the members of the organization, 
including their shared environment, in relation with the productive outcomes of the 
organization. 
Complementarily, Schutz (1973) posits that to understand human behavior we 
should account for human intentions, and to understand intentions we should take in 
consideration the contexts in which they make sense. In organizations, those contexts 
correspond to the physical environment, directives, organizational structures, plans, 
routines, processes, or any other artifacts enacted by men. Context, in this sense, it is 
understood more specifically, since it holds an important role in the conception of the 




In addition, common knowledge in organizations needs to be understood from the 
perspective of the knowers: the members of the organization. The exploration of their 
world from a social perspective situates our quest in the position of the organizational 
member that tries to interpret departing from his (organizational) context (Creswell, 
2003, p. 8). 
Then, while proposing a constructive philosophical assumption for our knowledge 
claims, we also pledge to a qualitative research methodology, which is well adjusted to 
this philosophic focus. Among the five alternatives for research strategy presented by 
Creswell (2003), that go from ethnographies, grounded theory, case study, 
phenomenological research, to narrative research, this dissertation follows the case study 
and grounded theory approaches.  
3.2 THEORETICAL INQUIRY STRATEGIES 
As it was mentioned in chapter one, the scientifically conceptualization and 
operationalization of knowledge has not arrived yet to a conclusive definition (Alvesson & 
Kärreman, 2001; Kakihara & Sorensen, 2002), and it had lead organizational researchers to 
adhere in practical terms to variations of knowledge types (tacit-explicit, individual-
organizational); and not always specifying its epistemological foundations (Cook & 
Brown, 1999). Among such postures is Grant´s KBV of the firm that proposes an 
organizational capability that recognizes, as assumption, that knowledge holds residency in 




The works of Tsoukas (2003) and Gourlay (2006) set the status of this problem in 
context, when they recall that if knowledge is mostly tacit or supported in tacit knowledge 
(Polanyi, 1966), then there is an implicit call to frame extant theories of knowing that 
allows to discuss about (Tsoukas, 2003) or observe behaviors related to (Gourlay, 2006) 
knowing instances given than knowledge articulation is not always possible.  
Tsoukas (2003), following Wittgenstein (1958) and Shooter & Katz (1996), argues 
that the “[I]neffability of tacit knowledge does not mean that we cannot discuss the 
skilled performances in which we are involved” and that “[n]ew knowledge comes about 
not when the tacit becomes explicit, but when our skilled performance – our praxis - is 
punctuated in new ways through social interaction”. 
Gourlay (2004), based on Dewey and Bentley (1949), proposes to understand 
explicit and tacit knowledge within a behavioral framework, in which tacit knowing 
corresponds to signaling and explicit knowledge corresponds to designation of symbols and 
symbols itself.  
Both, Tsoukas (2003) and Gourlay (2006), achieve to contextualize the kind of 
issues to be attended when exploring knowledge, a superset of common knowledge, within 
organizational studies.  
Finally, Grant (1996a, p. 113) insists that understanding the residence of knowledge 
at organizational level offers little guidance on how management can influence individual’s 
knowledge creation and application, and advocates for knowledge to be understood at 





Then, following Tsoukas (2003), Gourlay (2006) and Grant (1996) arguments, and 
the theoretical and empirical status of common knowledge in organizations (see section 
2.3) in which it was argued for epistemological work to bring more clarity about the role of 
shared symbolization, share meanings, joint action, knowledge instrumentalization, and its 
performance criteria, and knowing participating abilities.  
Then, summarizing, in this quest, given the following arguments: 
(a) The lack of operationalization of individual level knowledge theories 
(Alvesson & Kärreman, 2001; Kakihara & Sorensen, 2002).  
(b) The warnings shared by Gourlay (2004; 2006), Foss (2003a; 2003b) and 
Miller (2008) about the miss-read or mixed incompatible epistemologies that 
organizational studies hold.  
(c) The limited description of practice (Cook and Brown, 1999) that the 
knowledge-practice framework provides (Bou, Sauquet and Bonet, 2004a; 
2004b), and  
(d) The knowledge-practice framework´s taxonomy has been questioned 
(Orlikowski, 2002) for not reflecting Polanyi´s (1958) epistemological work. 
This research work will follow a methodologically re-reading of knowledge 
theories, invoking grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Charmaz, 2000; 2006) to 
interpret the texts that describe the individual knowing theories, and the knowledge 
oriented views/theories of the firm to achieve and well-founded emergent and holistic 




This is not an open re-reading, but a focused one. Knowledge-based views of the 
firm, as is noticeable in Table 2, recur to a variety of conceptions of knowledge and 
knowing to support their organizational logic; however at higher level of abstraction those 
instances invites for conceiving knowledge within human limitations (Simon, 1947; 
1991a), and abilities to contrive order and patterns (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Cyert & 
March, 1992), and to share their meanings them through socially and culturally enacted 
tools or systems, like a common language  (Spender, 1989; 1992; Kogut & Zander, 1992; 
Grant, 1996a; 1996b) or  modes for recognizing knowers (Grant, 1996a; 1996b).  
3.2.1 Framing Individual Level Knowing Theories 
The proposed re-reading will try to underline, following an integrating approach, 
those characteristics of knowledge that organizational views geared. Given firm´s 
theories orientation to knowledge to the issues of common language, shared meanings,, 
and to social and cultural enactments I choose to draw on Polanyi’s (1958, 1966) tacit 
knowledge approach, Weick’s (1995) enactment of sense-making and Bruner’s (1990) 
meaning readiness approaches as the main objects of study.  
The data to be interpreted, using grounded theory, are the relevant research texts 
that describe individual level knowledge theories used as foundations of theories of the 
firm in which knowledge, in any form or residency plays a key role. 
This section describes the general inquiry strategy followed to examine knowing 
theories. For reasons of clarity, methodological details of such inquiry are presented in 




Chapter 4 of this study holds a section named “Framing Individual Level 
Knowing – A Note on Method” which describes in detail how the open coding and axial 
coding methods of grounded theory were applied (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Charmaz, 
2000; 2006). In it, conceptual ordering approach was followed to unveil categories within 
the individual level knowledge theories.  
The coding design hold two stages (see Table 11 for a diagram of the coding 
design). In the first stage the research question  (1) Which are the participating constructs 
that are related to common knowledge types in the context of the knowledge integration 
capability as reference by Grant’s (1996a; 1996b) KBV of the firm? led to the “Framing 
Scheme for Individual Level Knowledge Views” (see Table 12).  
In the second stage, the research question (2) Which are the explanations that 
individual level knowledge theories offer for the constructs related to common knowledge 
type? achieved to reveal comparative frames for each individual level knowledge theory. 
Polanyi´s personal knowing theory (1958 & 1966) is framed in Tables 17, 18 and 27; 
Weick´s social sensemaking theory is framed in Tables 23, 24 and 28, and in Figure 1; 
and Bruner´s enculturated meaning theory (1990) is framed in Tables 25, 26 and 29, and 
in Figure 2.   
Finally, following (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) notion of theorizing – the emerging 
of a schema that describes the relations among categories – three frameworks arise from 
the set of framed individual level knowledge theories:  




(b) Integrated Knowing Framework: Personal, Cultural and World States Layers 
(see Table 31).  
(c) Integrated View of Language, Shared Meanings, and Recognition of Knowers 
(see Table 32). 
3.2.2 Framing Organizational Capabilities 
The second inquiry strategy attends the research gap related to interpreting the 
theories of the KBV of the firm to make explicit is organizational capability and the body 
of knowledge participating in it. Chapter 5 of this study holds a section named “Framing 
Capabilities – A Note on Method” which describes how the open coding and axial coding 
methods of grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Charmaz, 2000, 2006) were 
applied in this inquiry. 
The coding design holds two stages. In this first stage, each of the six theories of 
the firm was open and axial coded as a whole asking the questions (a) “How does an 
organization function within this theory of the firm?” and (b) “What does it make this 
theory the same as, or different from, the previous one that I coded?” (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998, p. 120).  
The emerged categories revealed an (1) Organizational Capability Framework to 
portray the capabilities approach of KBVs of the firm (see Table 33) which summarily 
holds two dimensions which correspond to (a) the dichotomy exploration-exploitation; 




In the second stage, the emerged Organizational Capability Framework is used 
to query each theory at a time, applying the open and axial coding method. Such 
inquiry resulted in framing the body of knowledge of the following capabilities:  
(a) Exploitation capability of Simon’s (1947; 1991b) administrative behavior 
theory (Table 35, Figure 4).  
(b) Exploitation capability of Cyert and March’s (1992) behavioral theory of the 
firm (Table 36, Figure 5).  
(c) Exploitation and exploration capability of Nelson and Winters’s (1982) 
evolutionary view of firm (Table 37, Figure 6).  
(d) Exploitation and exploration capability of Spender’s (1992, 1989) theory of 
postindustrial organizations (Table 38, Figures 7 and 8).  
(e) Exploration capability of Kogut and Zander´s (1992) theory of replication and 
combinative capabilities (Table 39).  
(f) Exploration capability of Grant’s (1996a, 1996b) KBV the firm (Table 40, 
Figure 9).  
Additionally, two summarized comparisons of organizational capabilities are 
presented in Tables 41, 42 and 43.  
Finally, following (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) notion of theorizing – the emerging 
of a schema that describes the relations among categories – arises an observational model 
labeled as Framework of Common Knowledge Types in Views/Theories of the Firm (see 




This model is composed by the interception of the (a) Integrated View of 
Language, Shared Meanings, and Recognition of Knowers (Table 32 in Chapter 4) and 
the (b) Organizational Capability Framework (see Table 33 in Chapter 5).  
The Framework of Common Knowledge Types in Views/Theories of the Firm 
plays three roles.  
First, it allows identifying from the body of knowledge of the organizational capabilities 
of the theories of the firm the theoretical types of instances that correspond to CKOs.  
Second, it plays the role of a theoretical “sensitizing concept” (Charmaz, 2000) 
that serves as departing reference for the observation of the empirical instances of CKO 
in relation with the organizational capability in KBV of the firm.  
Third, it operates as an initial reference for the coding ((Strauss & Corbin, 1998; 
Charmaz, 2000, 2006) of the empirical instances of CKO) in general for any of the six 
theories of the firm, and in particular with the knowledge integration capability of Grant’s 
(1996a; 1996b) KBV of the firm.  
3.3 EMPIRICAL INQUIRY STRATEGIES 
In reference to the empirical part of this quest, we follow case study research 
strategy for the research design, and grounded theory for data analysis.  
3.3.1 Case Study Research Strategy 




“(T)he researcher explores in depth a program, an event, an activity, a 
process, or one of more individuals. The case(s) are bounded by time and 
activity, and researchers collect detailed information using a variety of 
data collection procedures over a sustained period of time” (p. 15).  
The justification for this research strategy follows Yin (1994), who presents a 
matrix that helps to decide what research strategy to use, in which case study approach is 
appropriate when the form of the research question is of the “what” and “how” type, no 
control or manipulation is to be exerted over the behavior of members of the organization 
and participants, and a contemporary focus predominates in the research.  
Giving that the research questions deal with contemporary issues in knowledge 
management of the type “How” and that no influence is planned over the participant’s 
behavior, case study research strategy is considered to be plausible. 
Among the research methods referred by Creswell (2003, p. 17) that could be use 
in case study – the quantitative (predetermined, instrument based questions, performance 
data, attitude data, observational data, and census data, and statistical analysis), the 
qualitative (emerging methods, open-ended questions, interview data, observation data, 
document data, audiovisual data, text and image analysis), and mixed methods (both 
predetermined and emerging methods, both open and closed ended questions, multiple 
forms of data drawing on all possibilities, and statistical and text analysis) – this study 
choose to use qualitative research methods characterized by surveys with a mix of closed 





The reasons presented to support the selection of these methods are found in the 
need of using exploratory inquiries with the purpose of developing themes for the data for 
an issue that has not been explored before (Creswell, 2003, p. 18, 22).  
In our quest, to my best of knowledge, common knowledge and its types has not 
been explore before in the context of the knowledge integration organizational capability. 
Then, an in-depth and rich single-case design is used to conduct the exploratory research, 
and grounded theory was invoked to discover explanations about the relationship 
between common knowledge types and the integration capability. 
Yin (2003a) presents a guide that helps to decide what types of research design to 
use for case study. Type 1 design, that Yin (2003a) names “holistic single-case designs” 
holds five rationales that justify a single case study (critical case, unique case, 
representative case, revelatory case, and longitudinal case). Considering our research 
questions – How are common knowledge and their types in organizations related to the 
knowledge integration capability? – we found that a holistic case, which is focused on a 
single unit of analysis – integrated specialized knowledge in the outcomes of the 
productive practice through common knowledge hold by members of the organization – 
could be  justified to be representative when the lessons learned from the case are 
informative about the average person in organizations (Yin 2003a).  
In this study, the case corresponds to a ten-year International Inter-university 
Cooperation Program that integrates the knowledge of PhDs, master in science and 




case that clearly asks for the integration of knowledge of specialist into a productive 
outcome (program’s lessons learned) after collaborating for a long period.  
3.3.2 Grounded Theory Research Strategy 
The case study design will be followed by a grounded theory strategy “in which 
the researcher attempts to derive a general, abstract theory of a process, action, or 
interaction grounded in the views of participants in a study.” (Creswell, 2003, p. 14). 
The justification of such inquiry strategy is twofold. First, this research is looking 
for making explicit relations among categorized instances of human behavior grounded in 
the views of the participants of the University Program (Creswell, 2003). Second, the 
focus of attention of this interpretation considers sensitizing concepts as departing point 
for the analysis (Charmaz, 2000, p. 515) like common knowledge types identified in the 
literature review and in the theoretical findings. 
Grounded methods like the conceptual ordering approach can help to unveil 
instances of how common knowledge types are related to the integration of knowledge 
into the lessons learned of the program (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 19-20).  
In addition, this research asks for a method that presents such ordered concepts in 
a “logical, systematic, and explanatory scheme” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 21); that is a 
theorizing method from grounded theory is a useful tool for such endeavor.  
This research work asks for a method that allows to see the relations of common 




search of a systematic set of interrelated statements that depicts a theoretical framework 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 22).  
3.4 CASE STUDY DESIGN AND GROUNDED THEORY DESIGN 
This research used the case study methodology (Yin, 2003a) as a design 
framework and the grounded theory methodology ((Charmaz, 2006; Strauss & Corbin, 
1998) to analyze data about the role of common knowledge in the integration of 
knowledge in the outcomes of the productive practice.   
3.4.1 Research Problem 
Grant (1996a, p. 112) argues that firms exist as institutions for producing goods 
and services because they can create conditions under which individuals can integrate 
their specialist knowledge. Research about the role of knowledge in the value creation 
capability (Schendel, 1996) and in firm strategy (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Prusak, 1996; 
Grant, 1996a; Zack, 1999; Foss, 2005) proposed knowledge as a factor linked to 
sustainable advantage and organizational performance. Grant’s (1996a) view of value 
creation capability, focused on knowledge application, is described as the capability of 
integrating the specialist knowledge into goods and services (p. 120), which is, into the 
outcomes of the productive practice of the organization.  
Grant (1996a) proposes to understand the firm as a knowledge integrator (p. 116), 




in individuals during its operations; and asserted that the key is to minimize specialist 
knowledge transfer; and that this depends upon the existence of common knowledge.  
Even though Grant (1996a) described common knowledge and its types (common 
language, shared meanings, and recognition of individual knowledge domains); he did 
not describe the specifics of the positive relationships among common knowledge and the 
knowledge integration capability.  
Summing up, there is a relevant view of firm, Grant’s (1996a) knowledge-based 
theory of the firm, that argues for the integration of knowledge into the outcomes of the 
productive practice as its distinctive capability; which depends upon the existence of 
common knowledge and its types for their operation; in which the specifics of the 
relationships among common knowledge, as a whole and its types in particular, with the 
knowledge integration capability are not explained; and that to the best of my knowledge, 
an integrated explanation of such relationships has not been proposed. 
3.4.2 Research Questions 
Main research question attend to the need to understand and explain the relation 
between common knowledge and the integration capability, and take the form of:  







Secondary research questions are: 
(b) How is common language in organizations related to the knowledge integration 
capability? 
(c) How are shared meanings in organizations related to the knowledge integration 
capability? 
(d) How is the recognition of individuals as knowers in organizations related to the 
knowledge integration capability? 
3.4.3 Research Design 
Research design follows a straightforward design:  
(1) Choose relevant participants and categorize them according to their role in the 
program (PhD scholarship holders, project team members, and program team 
member). 
(2) Develop, and run three different surveys, one for each role in the program (two 
of these surveys were written in Spanish and English to attend language needs of 
the participants). 
(3) Ask survey respondents for an interview.  
(4) Develop an interview protocol (Kvale, 1996) for each participant; by means of 
researching his/her activity in the Program and the answers offered in the survey.  
(5) Film the interviews. 
(6) Transcribe (and translate) interviews. 
(7) Ask interviewee to validate transcribed interviews, 8) interpret surveys, 
interviewed data and program documents using grounded theory methods- 




In this study, surveys followed two objectives, as a selection mechanism to 
identify collaboration aptitude, and as an interview profiling mechanism. The general 
guideline for the interview invites to recall stories related to the Program or Project 
(Component) that are linked to the answers and comments  of the Lessons Learned 
Survey.  
The guidelines for the interviews asked specific questions that were developed for 
each interviewee based on the answers and comments of the Lessons Learned Survey. 
Those questions are exposed at the beginning of each interview protocol. (See Appendix 
7: Interview Protocols). 
3.4.4 Contextual Setting: Inter University Cooperation Program  
The Escuela Superior Politécnica del Litoral (ESPOL) is a public university with 
a trajectory of 50 years and of great academic prestige in Ecuador. ESPOL embarked on 
cooperation processes with Belgian universities in the field of aquaculture in the early 
1990’s. This experience motivated ESPOL to participate in the Institutional University 
Cooperation Programme (IUC-VLIR) organized by the Vlaamse Interuniversitaire Raad 
– VLIR (Flemish University Council). In 1999 the VLIR-ESPOL Cooperation 
Programme initiated its activities with a 4 year time frame and a funding of $3.2 million.  
The Program had as its main objective the development of sustainable research 
with two basic premises: To solve problem in vital areas for Ecuador and to transfer these 
results to the productive sector. Initially, the program’s development was made up of six 






Inter University Cooperation Program - First phase components and objectives 





José Luis Santos, 
Ph.D.  
Strengthening of CICYT  
Formation of interdisciplinary groups at PhD level 
working on applied research  
Increase in the number of scientific publications  
2 
New technologies for 
Education on 
Engineering and 
Environmental Sciences  
Enrique Peláez, 
Ph.D.  
Creation of a Center for Innovation of Education  








Development of Biotechnology to combat Black 
Sigatoka in an environmentally sound manner  




in Agriculture and 
Aquaculture  
Ma. del Pilar 
Cornejo, Ph.D.  
Development of environmental quality indexes  
Use of geographic information systems as a 








Development of management techniques to 
increase the density of desirable benthic organisms 
in shrimp ponds  
Improvement in post-larvae management  
6 
Studies for the 
development of the 




Development of new materials, and building 
standards techniques for Ecuador taking into 
consideration the effects of the El Niño Event  
Plan for the establishment of an interactive 
museum  
Redirection of the Tourism program  
Table 5. Inter University Cooperation Program, first phase components and objectives. 
Once the Program concluded in 2002 and due to the results obtained, ESPOL was 
granted funding for a second phase of the project, with a budget of $4.5 million and a 




This second phase of the Programme started in April 2003 and concluded in 
March 2009. The 8 components addressed in this second phase were: 
1  Strengthening of ESPOL’s research capacity  
2  Education innovation through the use of Technology  
3  Tools for the, environmentally friendly, production of bananas in Ecuador  
4  Environmental management system in Agriculture and Aquaculture  
5  Management Techniques towards Sustainable Aquaculture  
6  Research program on Materials  
7  Program for the Development of Entrepreneurs  
8  Development of the Education and Research Capacity on Software Engineering, 
Telecommunications, and Robotics 
The ten years of activities carried out within the VLIR - ESPOL Programme have 
represented a change in the institutional paradigm which supports ambitious projects such 
as the Parque del Conocimiento (Knowledge Park) which ESPOL is setting forth as part 
of its institutional development (see www.youtube.com/watch?v=z9yXAsS8h1o).  
3.4.5 Contextual Setting: Project Management Practice and Lessons Learned 
Project and program management has evolved from basic initiatives in the U.S. 
defense industry in the late 1950s into a capability that is broadly known across most 
sectors. Early project management schemes were constituted by directives that define 
policies, procedures and formats. These initiatives were followed by the development and 




In the natural flow of collaboration, several initiatives followed.  The 
International Project Management Association (IPMA) was founded in Europe in 1967 
(Kousholt, 2007) as a federation of several national project management associations. 
Later in 1969, the Project Management Institute (PMI), a US based Project Management 
Institute not-for-profit professional association, was formed dedicated mainly to the 
advance of the project management knowledge (Harrison & Lock, 2004), and in 1972 the 
APM, a UK based Association for Project Management came into existence.  
By 1976, PMI, embarked on programs to test whether people met their standards 
of project management professionalism, and this was followed by APM. This testing sets 
the knowledge areas that the project manager has to demonstrate their competence.  PMI 
and APM developed their own reference for the related body of knowledge (BoK) which 
has been updated several times to reflect the learned practices of their members.  
PMI has developed several standards that collect the best practices of their 
profession which are widely deploy in organizations. Among those practices are: (a) The 
Standard for Program Management, 2nd. Edition and (b) Project Management Body of 
Knowledge, 4th. Edition.  
Lessons learned, considered in this study as the outcome of the productive 
practice, adhere to the concepts defined in these two proposed PMI standards, from 
which applicable terms are summarized as follow:  




Program: “a group of related projects managed in a coordinated way to obtain 
benefits and control not available from managing them individually”. 
Process: “Interrelated group of actions and activities undertaken to develop a 
previously specified products, services or outcome”. These standards group the 
process in two categories: a) Project or Program Management Process and b) 
Product Oriented Process. Here, we only care for the first ones. 
Project or Program Management Process: processes are designed to either 
initiate, plan, execute, control or close a project or program. These 5 design 
orientations should not be understood only as phases or stages but as a way of 
categorizing the process in terms of the type of activity involved (initiate, plan …). 
The standards include 42 processes for Project Management and a total of 59  (42 
plus 17) processes for Program Management. These processes interact among 
them following the Shewhart - Deming continuous improvement quality cycle: 
“Plan – Do – Check – Act”; in these iterations among processes the outcome of 
one part of this cycle becomes the input to other process or processes. 
Knowledge Area: Domain of knowledge, mostly business management 
knowledge with some specialization in microeconomics, identified as required 
and useful for the success of project and program management endeavors. The 
two standards describe their processes by grouping then in 9 knowledge areas for 
projects (the management of scope, cost, time, risk, quality, procurement, human 
resources, communications and integration) and a total of 12 knowledge areas for 




knowledge areas: financial management, stakeholder management and 
governance). PMI’s program and project knowledge areas and their related 
processes are summarily described in the Appendix 1. 
Now, we can say more precisely that lessons learned is an outcome of the Close 
project or phase process which is categorized within the Integration knowledge area of 
the PMI practice (see Appendix 1). Lessons learned are also used as incomes when 
developing other related new project chapters in the organization.  
It is also perceptible that if we are to follow these standards that there are three 
perspectives from which we could analyzed lessons learned: a) Type of Activity (Initiate, 
Plan, Execute, Control or Close a project or program), b) Type of Process Interaction 
(Plan, Do, Check, Act) and c) Knowledge Areas (12 business management and 
microeconomics knowledge domains).  
In the context of the lessons learned (the productive outcome of a knowledge 
integration process), it is relevant to identify categories that eased the discovery of events 
or situations that relevantly affect (positively or negatively) the success of the projects or 
programs. Type of Process Interaction (Plan, Do, Check, Act) is a too general approach to 
characterized individual knowledge contributions and too distance to be applicable (talk 
about) during the interview process.  
On the contrary, the 12 instances included in the program and project Knowledge 
Areas relate to more tractable and specific concepts (Scope, Cost, Time, Risk, Quality, 
Procurement, Human Resources, Communications and Integration) in the sense that they 




argument is also applicable for the case of the Type of Activity (Initiate, Plan, Execute, 
Control or Close a project or program), in the sense that defines a dimension for grouping 
lessons learned. Here, we propose to map: Initiate with the narratives related to Opening 
stories, Plan with the Program & Component stories, Execute with the Sub–Component 
stories and Scholarship Holders stories, and finally Control with the Closing stories. 
So, based on the argument of usefulness and organizing, this work pledged to the 
PMI’s Knowledge Area and Type of Activity as the categories that guide the survey 
design and interview protocol to collect data that makes explicit the integrated knowledge 
in the lessons learned of the VLIR – ESPOL international cooperation program. Such 
grouping eases the identification of situations of joint attention (Wilby, 2010). 
3.4.6 Case Description 
The international inter university VLIR - ESPOL cooperation program between 
ESPOL from Ecuador and 5 Belgians universities ended, after 10 years of execution, in 
March 2009.  
The externalization of lessons learned in the VLIR – ESPOL program was 
promoted in February 2008 by Virginia Lasio (VLIR - ESPOL Local Promoter) in her 
efforts to put in practice, for the Program, the discussions they were holding about 
knowledge management at ESPAE (ESPOL’s Business School). Sergio Flores (VLIR - 
ESPOL Local Coordinator) and Magda Vincx (VLIR - ESPOL Flemish Coordinator) 
bought the idea and scheduled a presentation for their once-a-month meeting in which 




Research Center), the ESPAE Graduate School of Management and the VLIR – ESPOL 
Program.  
Lessons learned was an initiative that collected stories from people that were 
involved in the program and intended to be useful for the impact analysis of the Belgian 
and Ecuadorian outlined program policies and their outcomes, as well as a point of 
reference for the continuous development of the scientific and academic capacity of 
ESPOL. 
At the time the initiative started, July 2008, the recorded list of program’s 
participants included 119 participants, of which 23 PhD scholarship holders, 45 Local 
Project team members, 18 Flemish Project team members, 19 Local Program 
administrators, and 14 Flemish Program administrators. Records showed that 116 of them 
hold e-mail accounts belonged to universities domains. 
3.4.7 Data Collection 
By September 1, 2008, three different surveys, one for each role – PhD 
scholarship holders, project team members, and program team member – have been 
developed, pilot tested and sent by e-mail to 119 people by the sponsors of the initiative 
using the e-mail account lessons_vlir@espol.edu.ec. See Appendices 2 for the surveys 
and their introductory message. 
Getting the surveys answered was not an easy task; mail and phone follows up 




accounts were no longer in use, however new e-mail accounts were used to resend the 
survey.  
By the end of September, not all the ones that were expected had responded, but 
having answers (34) from stakeholders of all components (8) of the Program was 
sufficient to keep going. We had to recall ourselves that this was not a quantitative 
research.  
To take advantage of Sergio Flores’s (VLIR - ESPOL Local Coordinator trip) to 
Belgium during the last week of September, four interview protocols (Kvale, 1996) were 
developed: Magda Vincx (VLIR - ESPOL Flemish Coordinator) , Dominique Van Der 
Straeten (PhD Promoter), Martin Valcke (PhD Promoter) and Rony Swennen (VLIR 
Promoter). Sergio succeeded filming 3 of the 4 planned interviews. See Apendix 3 for 
interview protocols. 
During October and November, surveys were analyzed and 16 interview protocols 
were prepared in total. December 2008 and the first week of January 2009 were interview 
filming time. During the second week of January 2009, we got a unique opportunity to 
interview Serge Hoste (Flemish Promoter) and made a second interview to Magda given 
that they were visiting ESPOL.  
Interviews were focused (Yin, 2003a), that is the questions in the protocol were 
directed, based on answers of the survey, to explore lessons learned in those categories of 
knowledge related their studies, project or program, depending on their role. Also, 




offered to the initial questions set in the interview protocol, clarification or extending 
questions were posited to externalize the lesson learned being shared. 
Additionally, documents related to the program were available through a web site 
dedicated to store the program progress reports (www.vlir.espol.edu.ec/paginas/galeria.htm), 
these documents were consulted to clarified and validate surveys and interview data. 
Appendix 8 contains extracted transcripts of the interviews structured as stories, 
which capture, as a whole, the key ideas behind each lesson learned. Those transcripts 
were validated by each interviewee and by them as a group. In that group validation, it 
was clear that the product, as a whole, holds internal tensions that indeed capture their 
diverse knowing. 
3.4.8 Data Analysis  
The remainder of the story, I mean methodology, can be summarized as a period for 
transcription, analysis and reflection with the filmed interviews covering 36 lessons learned.  
The next paragraphs give account of the conceptual ordering approach followed 
to unveil instances of how common knowledge types are related to the integration of 
knowledge into the program lessons learned. (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 19-21).  
The focus of attention of this interpretation is characterized by the definition of the 
problem, the stated research questions, and definition and application of the corresponding 
coding methods of grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 39-48) while considering 




Answering the stated research questions follows the sequence described by 
Strauss and Corbin (1998): “the purpose of axial coding is to begin the process of 
reassembling data that has been fracture during open coding” (p. 124). That is, first, the 
interviews will be fracture using open coding in terms of the research questions; and then, 
by assessing the founded categories, the relationships and the dimensions, a paradigm 
will emerge (p. 127).  
This coding “sharpens our use of sensitizing concepts – that is, those background 
ideas that inform the research problem. Sensitizing concepts offer ways of seeing, 
organizing, and understanding experience; they are embedded in our disciplinary 
emphases and perspectival proclivities” (Charmaz, 2000, p. 515).  
In this sense, this study will pledge to the framework of common knowledge types 
in Views/Theories of the Firm (see Tables 44 and 45 in Chapter 5) as sensitizing concept 
that is both, embedded in our disciplinary way of seeing, and as warning of our biases. 
Then, lessons learned, contextually saw, in the ten-year VLIR–ESPOL 
International Cooperation Program are tabulated in Tables 6, 7, 8. 9 and 10, labeled with 
a title that reflects the main content of the interview. Lessons, grouped by type of activity 
(Program Opening issues, Program and Component management, Sub-Component 
Management, and Scholarship issues and Program Closing issues) and theme in 12 
knowledge area, following PMI’s (Project Management Institute) practice were examined 
following Strauss and Corbin (1998) open coding approach to unveil themes (instances of 




List of Lessons Learned grouped by Type of Activity and Themed by Knowledge Area (Part 1 of 5) 
Knowledge 
Areas  


































1. A Flemish Historical and 
Critical view of the 
Program  
 








Sharing the meaning of research 
culture and integrating the 
organization around it, it holds 
debates, it is progressive, leadership-
dependable at start, and incentive- 




designs do not 
necessarily fit the 
new initiative and 























2. An Outsider‘s 






colleagues   
      
Diffusing may only 
mean going from 
none to a more 










3. The Beginnings  1: 
Building Trusty networks  
       
Gaining trust on 
delivery precedes 









4. The Beginnings 2: 
Identifying Stakeholder´s 
Expectations  
          





5. From Exploiting to 
extending the Trusty 
network  
       
Trust helps tuning 







other members  
 
6. A Look to the 
Institutional Culture  
          
It pays – economic benefits, 
prestige and higher standards 
- to pledge to the normative 
values of the research culture 
7. “Sharing” an approach 





















related criticism is 




support “fund’ is 




“fund’ as a way 
of balancing 
budgets 
Sharing as a way 
of incorporating 
new members  
Sharing as a 
way of  
growing 
8. Peer Review - A way of 
living … the culture  
       
Peer criticism as a 
way of executing 
    




List of Lessons Learned grouped by Type of Activity and Themed by Knowledge Area (Part 2 of 5) 
Knowledge 
Areas  



































9. Let's replicate 
management - Let's 
refine policies  
There should be alignment 
between scholarship holder 
research background and 










Project planning and 
control demand 
skills, money, tech. 
and  time 
 
 
Potential benefits of 
project’s products 
demand diffusion and 
knowledge sharing to 
ease transition to the 
ongoing stage 
  There should be alignment 
among specialist’s skilful 
execution, power requirements, 



































10. Do you travel and 
eat well in the 
ESPOL-VLIR 
Program?  
      
Assessing stakeholders’ possibilities of 
meeting requirements may be 











11. Difficulties on 
sharing what you 
do not know or 
Have  
      
There should be 
alignment between 
scholarship holders 
and the future 




are not part of the 
core ones     
    
12. Research scope: It’s 
not always crystal 
clear, on occasion it 
has a white spot  
Knowledge to frame 
scope  may be hidden, 
which collaboration could 
efforts release it 
           
13. Research planning 
– Tension between 
norms and creativity  
Not everyone still has 
learn the meaning of 
research plan 
          
Administrative plans follows 
strict formats, research plans 
asks for flexible scopes 
14. More and better  
Ambitious goal (Research 
Center) demands an 
aligned scope breakdown 
(+PhDs, +masters, 
specialist, own PhD  
program, mgmt. skills)  
          
 Management of research 
demands specialized skills, 
planning and a governance 
structure, and not only good 
teams 
15. Variations and 
differences: 
Weaknesses , 
therefore Threats  
Either, not knowing, or 
own weakness awareness 
may distort scope meaning 
(Research Council)     
      
Diffusion may be 
aligned to a distorted 
scope through 
“coherent” means. 
    




List of Lessons Learned grouped by Type of Activity and Themed by Knowledge Area (Part 3 of 5) 
Knowledge 
Areas  


































16. We learned to do 
Research … and also 












































exports),  may 



































































prioritizing) may be 
unknown to 
specialists and 


















18. We learned to do 
Research … and also 
to Manage – Part 2  
    
19. A very Sad 
procurement story  
      









   
21. Do we need to keep 
the Research 
assistants? 
     
HHRR planning may 
be unknown to 
specialists and bring 
long time 
consequences 
     
22. We learned to do 
Research … and also 
to Manage –  An 
alternative 











efforts     









   




List of Lessons Learned grouped by Type of Activity and Themed by Knowledge Area (Part 4 of 5) 
Knowledge 
Areas  

































 23. Frozen for the 
Commitment: Tension 





programs’ goals may be 














Level of students’ 
commitment to living cost 
estimates may change 
over time 








































to students’ living cost 
commitments may be 
linked to own experience 
       
25. Sandwich Studies:  A 
“Glocal” approach  
Students’ goals should 
include learning with  
global standards while 
willing to beat local restrains 
Overcoming local research limitations ask for 
students’ anticipation and planning mentality 



















communities   
   
26. Sandwich Studies:  A 
“Community of 
Practice” approach  
Students’ goals should 
include integrating to local 
CoPs to learn about 
collaborating opportunities 
with their abroad research 
Long and disjoint  students´ abroad stays 
hold the risk of goal disconnection  
      
27. Sandwich Studies:  A 
“Flexible Control” approach  
Program should be open to adjust time and budget to research work 
requirements by coordinating it with the supporting network  
      
28. Please Send More PhD 
students, as long as …  
      
English language proficiency 
affects PhD mentoring, studies 
pace, abroad integration and 
social life 
(See Lesson 20) 
    
29. English Proficiency optimizes 
not only Lab Interactions but 
also Social Life  
          
30. English Language - More 
planning is Required 
          
31. The Number One 
Rate-defining Factor 
Students´ English language proficiency affects the accomplishing of goals, plans, budgets,  risk level, quality of outcomes, interaction between stakeholders, and the 
integration process 
32. Get Together and 
Learn to Discuss  
      
Institutionalizing discussing own & others 
works helps to build a research culture  
   
33. We need X PhDs, ¿Do we 
send X /(1 – f1 - f2 – f3)  
scholarship holders to study?  
Estimation of the number PhDs scholarship holders in relation to the PhDs required, in the long term, it should consider the 
“human nature” story (students failures, non-returning and school changing)  
   




List of Lessons Learned grouped by Type of Activity and Themed by Knowledge Area (Part 5 of 5) 
Knowledge 
Areas  


































Projects to Solve 























Goals program should be aligned and integrated to 
attend society problems 






















35. Research Council – A 
more Deductive 
Approach  
Priorities for selecting and funding 
projects should consider those 




should be externally 
retrofitted and 











36. Sustaining Dreams and 
Opportunities  













deliveries but it 















An option for economic self-sustainability is the 
exploitation of intellectual property rights, which ask 








    




3.4.9 Evaluation Criteria  
The case study quality, according to Yin (2003a), is revealed, first, by the 
capacity of making it so explicit than it helps to operationalize it. Second, the quality of 
the study need to satisfied four conditions: 1) construct validity, 2) internal validity, 3) 
external validity, and 4) reliability. Attending to these five criteria allows starting to build 
a preliminary theory about the theme of study. 
Construct validity (Yin, 2003a, p. 34) is related to the operational measures that care 
for the concepts being studied. This was attended by collecting data through multiple sources, 
asking the interviewee to validate the transcripts, and maintaining a chain of evidence.  
Internal validity is related to establishing the correct causal relationship among 
conditions in explanatory studies (Yin, 2003a, p. 34). This was addressed by 
incorporating in the interview protocol the approach of asking the interviewee to tell 
about lessons learn in the form of stories (e.g. Would  you recall stories related to this 
Program or Project that are linked to  your answers and comments of the Lessons 
Learned Survey?).  
Elliot (2005) recalls that internal validity is improved by the use of narratives 
because (a) interviewees are given the power to offer more concrete and specific details 
about the themes conversed, and (b) they use their own language and framework to 
describe experiences (Smith, 1996), resulting in more accurate or valid evidence (Cox, 




Complementarily, Chase (1995a) argues that by assigning the responsibility of the 
narrative to the interviewee, researchers can get a better understanding of the experience. 
Then, here internal validity is designed in the data collection process, by letting the 
participants expose their meanings by structuring a narrative with their vocabulary.  
Of course, data analysis requires the researcher interpretation; however, such 
interpretation is bounded by the context provided by the story and by the backtracking 
references evidenced in the List of Lessons Learned grouped by Type of Activity and 
Themed by Knowledge Area (Tables 6 – 10) and in the tables title Empirical Instances of 
Common Knowledge Types founded in the Lessons Learned (Tables 46 – 48). 
External validity relates to the identification of situations in which the findings 
can be generalized (Yin, 2003a, p. 34). This was addressed by the selection of a 
representative case: the integration of specialized knowledge into lessons learned.  
Lessons learned is a productive outcome of a business process broadly executed 
in organizations when closing projects and programs. For such process, associations of 
practitioners had documented best practices and described formally their pertaining 
domains of knowledge.  
This is a representative case for which its replication – the process of integrating 
specialist knowledge into lessons learned - and its logic - data recollection and data 
analysis - is formally explicit, and by which generalizations may be possible.  
Of course, replicating the logic in cases other than the integration of knowledge 




the existence or the formalization of the domains of knowledge participating in the 
integration process, which now days is frequently available given that most business 
process, products or services are guided by public standards that expose in their 
rationalities the criteria (body of knowledge) that guides them or pledge to. 
Finally, reliability has to do with the replication of the operations of a study (Yin, 
2003a, p. 34). This was attended by providing a clear and extensive description of the 






CHAPTER 4: FRAMING INDIVIDUAL LEVEL KNOWING 
4.1 FRAMING INDIVUAL KNOWING –  A NOTE ON METHOD 
Beforehand, I recognize myself as a holder of certain motivations that drives my 
search into the individual level knowledge theories toward instances, in those texts, that 
may constitute, later, a participating construct of an organizational capability.  
I also recognize that I hold an intellectual call that remembers me that I have 
certain duties as a researcher that I should follow to assure that this endeavor toward the 
truth is executed with universal intent.  
Both stances lead the application of grounded theory coding methods (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998; Charmaz, 1993) when reading and framing individual level knowledge 
views or theories in search conceptual ordering (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 19).   
The data to be interpreted using grounded theory are the documents that contain 
the text that describe: (a) common knowledge and its types in the context of the 
knowledge integration capability in the KBV of the firm, and (b) individual level 
knowledge theories that are used as foundations for the theories or views of the firm in 
which knowledge, in any form or residency, play a key role. 
The next paragraphs give account of the conceptual ordering approach followed 
to unveil categories within the individual level knowledge theories (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998, pp.19-21). The focus of attention of this interpretation is characterized by the 
sequence (a) the definition of the problem, (b) the stating of the research questions, and 




Since the final understanding is directed toward an integrated approach of what 
individual level knowledge views posit, the search is driven by the three common 
knowledge types related to the integration capability (Grant, 1996a). In this way the 
emphasis is set on specifics, and about the role of language, shared meanings, and 
recognition of knowledge domains in individuals. However, also this emphasis needs to 
attend to the main activities related to knowledge - application, creation, and sharing - 
foreseen already in the preliminary review of organizational capabilities’ approaches.  
C o n c e p t u a l  O r d e r i n g  o f  I n d i v i d u a l  L e v e l  K n o w l e d g e  T h e o r i e s  
Holding as reference Grant’s KBV of the Firm  
Q u e s t i o n s  M e t h o d  
1. “Which are the participating 
constructs that are related to 
common knowledge types in the 
context of the knowledge 
integration capability as 
referenced by Grant’s (1996a; 
1996b) KBV of the firm?”  
O p e n  C o d i n g  
Applied to Grant (1996a; 1996b) to reveal common 
knowledge related categories. 
A x i a l  C o d i n g   
Applied to Grant (1996a; 1996b) using open coding 
unveiled categories to make explicit a paradigm.  
2. “Which are the explanations 
that individual level knowledge 
theories offer for the constructs 
related to common knowledge 
types? 
 
O p e n  c o d i n g   
Applied to each individual level knowledge theory 
using the unveiled paradigm reframed as questions 
to reveal categories of each element of the 
paradigm. 
A x i a l  c o d i n g   
Apply to individual knowledge theories using open 
coding unveiled categories to make explicit 
comparative frameworks  of individual knowledge 
theories 






The research questions attend to the need to identify (a) the constructs that are 
related to common knowledge types as is express in Grant’s (1996a; 1996b) KBV of the 
firm, and (b) given those constructs, we them will ask individual level knowledge 
theories about those constructs.  
Research questions take the form of: (1) “Which are the participating constructs 
that are related to common knowledge types in the context of the knowledge integration 
capability as reference by Grant’s (1996a; 1996b) KBV of the firm?” and (2) “Which are 
the explanations that individual level knowledge theories offer for the constructs related 
to common knowledge types? 
Answering the research questions follows the sequence stated by Strauss and 
Corbin (1998): “the purpose of axial coding is to begin the process of reassembling data 
that has been fracture during open coding” (p. 124). That is, first, Grant (1996a; 1996b) 
will be fracture using open coding in terms of the first question; and then, by assessing 
the founded categories, relationships and dimensions, a paradigm will emerge (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998, p. 127). 
The emerged paradigm – the answer of the first question – will be applied, 
reformulated as questions, to each text of the individual level knowledge theories, to start 
the second coding process; if successful, the final product of this quest will achieve 




4.2 GRANT’S KBV OF THE FIRM: KNOWLEDGE CONSTRUCTS  
Applying Open coding to Grant’s (1996a; 1996b) revealed the following thirteen 
categories:  (a) knowledge/knowing, (b) common knowledge, (c) specialized knowledge 
(d) knowing abilities, (e) knowing triggers, (f) language (including common language as 
subcategory), (g)  meaning, (h) knowing process/principles, (i) recognizing knowers, (j) 
creating knowledge, (k) applying knowledge, (l) sharing knowledge (including 
knowledge transferring as subcategory), and (m) organizational capability.  
Also, the following relationships were identified: (1) language-meaning, (2) 
meaning-knowledge, (3) language-knower, (4) meaning-knower, (5) knowledge-knower, 
(6) knowing process-creating knowledge, (7) knowing process-applying knowledge, (8) 
knowing process-sharing knowledge, (9) knowing process-recognizing knowers, and 
relationships between every previous mentioned category with knowledge/knowing, 
common knowledge, specialized knowledge, and organizational capability; except for the 
subcategory “common language” which points only to ‘language”.   
Several things were interesting at this open coding stage: 
First, in Grant (1996a; 1996b) relationships points to language and not to common 
language, as we can read in “The higher the level and sophistication of common 
knowledge among the team, whether in the form of language, shared meaning, or 
mutual recognition of knowledge domains, the more efficient is integration likely to 
be.” (p. 117). Indeed, common language concept is as broad as language can cover: 
“A single tongue is but one aspect of commonality of language. If language is defined 




familiarity with the same computer software are all aspects of common language 
which enhance the efficiency and intensity of communication.” (p. 116). Besides, 
there is no reference to the concept of specialized language. Then, in Grant (1996a) 
the category to frame is language, since it holds in this case the same properties as 
common language. 
Second, categories (j) creating knowledge, (k) applying knowledge, and (h) sharing 
knowledge fits into a dimension label (1) knowledge activities, this reduces the set of 
categories and helps in the drafting of a paradigm.  
Third, categories (a) knowledge, (b) common knowledge and (c) specialized 
knowledge hold the same set of relationships with the other categories, implying that 
the essential property is the same, and that the difference is in regard to the covered 
domain; them  these categories at this stance ask for the interpretation of  what is 
understood for knowledge before inquiring for subsets. Them, at this level the 
categories knowledge, common knowledge and specialized knowledge are equated, 
and leave for later is sub setting.  
Fourth, category (m) organizational capability is a broad concept in this context, 
linkable to any category, and does not belong to this unit of analysis – individual level 
knowing. Then, the category was dropped. 
Finally, the category (i) recognizing knowers point to (h) knowing process/principles, 
and most of the relationships of other categories points to (h). That leads us to sub 




alert us to keep in mind (i) (recognizing knowers) in explicit form in the final 
framing.  
Then, re-examination of the text using axial coding to validate the depurated set 
of categories [(a) knowledge/knowing, (d) knowing abilities, (e) knowing triggers, (f) 
language, (g) meaning, (h) knowing process/principles (including recognizing knowers)], 
and the dimension (1) knowing activities (creating, applying and sharing) was in order. 
This is the short version of the story, re-examination of text happens for every depuration 
of categories.  
Re-examination of text achieved to clean up some relationships, and reposing of 
intermediate findings provided opportunities for higher levels of abstraction.  
The result is a paradigm that reveals a scheme for inquiring individual level 
knowing theories in the context Grant’s (1996a; 1996b) common knowledge; or better 
said, inquiring the concepts of knowing and knowledge, since the emerged paradigm 
equated common knowledge to knowing/knowledge (see Table 11).  
This framework holds two dimensions, the first structured around the (a) 
individual knowledge category in which subcategories like (d) knowing abilities, (e) 
knowing drives (re-labeled from knowing triggers), (h) knowing process/principles, and 
(f and g) participating knowing constructs (by combining language and meaning in a 





Finally, to answer the second question – “Which are the explanations that 
individual level knowledge theories offer for the constructs related to common 
knowledge levels types?” – if we are to follow open coding method (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998) which asks that the frame of reference or theories that guide the inquiry should be 
reframed into questions, lead us to reframe subcategories and relationships into the 
following six questions:  
(a) “What does it trigger the application, creation and sharing of knowledge?”, (b) 
”Which are the personal abilities that drive the application, creation and sharing of 
knowledge?”, (c) “Which is the role of language in the application, creation and 
sharing of knowledge?”, (d) “Which is the role of meanings in the application 
creation and sharing of knowledge?”, (e) “What does drive the recognition of the 
quality of knower during the application, creation and sharing of knowledge?”, and 
(f) “Which are the principles, logic or processes that guide the application, creation 
and sharing of knowledge?”. 
In summary, the framework for the reading of views or theories of individual 
level knowledge is structured in three levels. First, a top level category related to 
individual knowing/knowledge; a second level with four subcategories: [a] drives of 
knowing behavior, [b] personal knowing abilities, [c] participating knowing constructs 
(constituted by the relationships language-knowledge and meaning-knowledge), [d] 
knowing principles or process (including a third level category: recognizing knowers); 
and third, the dimension labeled “knowledge activities” with the categories creating, 




This scheme, even thou it departed from Grant´s (1996a) requirement to frame 
common knowledge, has emerged as a more general method to frame theories of 
knowledge from the perspective of organizational studies, and this happens because 
Grant´s view of the firm inherits in the common knowledge construct the logic that 
organizations follow when they look for creating value based in knowledge. Thus, the 
inquiry executed by the use of such framework will ask to the theories of knowledge for 
explanations that theories of the firm in general need to attend when conceiving 
knowledge-based organizations.  
We have to recognize that the particular questions, not the dimensions, of the 
scheme are lean toward Grant´s understanding of knowledge – it residency in individuals. 
This is a view that guides the asking about language, meanings and the recognition of the 
knower. However, to avoid the intentional narrowing of findings, here the questions are 
assumed as a sensitizing concept (Charmaz, 1998) that illuminates the search, but does 
limit it. And, since the scheme dimensions that guide the inquiry hold a broader scope 
that the questions, we already count with an explicit reference to be considered, including 





F r a m i n g  S c h e m e  f o r  I n d i v i d u a l  L e v e l  K n o w l e d g e  V i e w s  
 Individual level knowledge/knowing 

























[a] What does 













[c1] Which is the 





[c2] Which is the 





[d1] Which are the 
principles, logic 






[d2] What does it 
drive the 
recognition of the 










Table 12. Framing Scheme for Individual Level Knowledge Views. 
4.3 VISITING INDIVIDUAL LEVEL KNOWLEDGE VIEWS 
The individual level knowledge views initially considered for framing are supposed to be 
those that are the keystone of the views of the firm that propose that knowledge holds a 
central role in the organizational capability of theory of the firm. Following this criterion, 
we found Polanyi’s (1958, 1966) tacit knowledge approach, Weick’s (1995) sensemaking 
approach and Bruner’s (1990) meaning readiness approach. Additionally, relaxing a bit the 
criterion, brief analytical comments are made about Gourlay’s (2004) “semiotic tacit 




Before getting into the fine coding details, let us make a quick visit to these individual level 
knowledge views.  
Polanyi´s (1966) central idea is that our personal knowledge is tacit or founded in tacit 
knowledge. Polanyi’s (1958, 1966) personal knowledge view is the main and most 
referenced approach to individual knowledge approach in organizational studies (Gourlay, 
2004). However, these studies – like the Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) SECI model, in 
which tacit knowledge is translated to explicit knowledge –  have “very little in common” 
with Polanyi’s theory (Tsoukas, 2003) and have referenced the central idea of personal 
knowing at the distance.  
Gourlay (2006), Hildreth and Kimble (2002), and Tsoukas (2003) reveal a pattern of 
worries about Polanyi’s misleading interpretations in two fronts: (a) emphasis in 
epistemological confusions, specially about the conception of truth in knowing; and (b) 
omission of certain features of tacit knowing that constrains its conversion to explicit 
knowledge. However, as revealing as their analyses are, they do not offer an integrated 
interpretation of Polanyi’s personal knowledge theory, and rather tend to contrive 
alternative ones.  
Nonaka and Krogh (2009) responded to these questionings, with three lines of arguments in 
mind. First, they invoke Polanyi’s specific descriptions of the tacit knowing process to 
assimilate it as a continuum, to support its conversion to explicit knowledge. They 
accompanied this argument with supportive current literature. Second, they recognized that 
current challenges have changed, and proposed an agenda to attend to the relationships 




in the endnotes, that Polanyi was inspirational, but is not a restriction   (Nonaka & Krogh, 
2009, p. 648). 
Polanyi’s (1958, 1966) knowledge view is not narrated to offer manageable handles for the 
organizational researcher, its operationalization is not a one stop reading; and to my best of 
knowledge, it has not been interpreted yet as to offer a guide for the empirical observation 
of the knowing phenomenon . Polanyi’s personal knowledge view begs for it is framing.  
Weick’s (1995) sensemaking and related works (Weick, 1993, 1988; Weick, Sutcliffe & 
Obstfeldis, 2005) proposes to conceived reality as an ongoing project, among many others, 
in which we plausibly assemble a prospective story that is retrospectively clarified through 
selecting distinctive cues from past experiences; based not only on perceptual similarities, 
but also in emotional ones; by conversing with ourselves and with other real or imaginary 
interested parties, about the living experience, and how our role in it defines us; and by 
executing constraining or habilitating acts  that redefined the situation (Weick, 1995; 
Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeldis, 2005).   
Analysis invoking Weick’s (1995) sensemaking approach has been used (a) to understand 
micro processes that provoke significant changes over time (Ocasio, 2001); (b) as a frame 
of reference for studies of common sense and consensus in organizational theory (Lant, 
2002); or (c) to frame the expectations that people hold, and to understand how the level 
and violation of them trigger certain actions (Berscheid & Ammazzalorso, 2003). These 
different applications and others are exemplars that achieve to structure the unknown in ill 
defined situations (Weick, 1995); and reveal sensemaking as a tool to frame, understand 




problem framer; but it holds the potential of framing the description of micro activities that 
participate in individual knowing process. This potential of a more generalized 
understanding – from sensemaking to knowing as it is proposed here – has been already 
exemplified in Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeldis (2005), when they argue in favor of 
sensemaking as organizing when they say:  
“If we conceptualize organizing as a sequence of ecological change-enactment-
selection-retention with the results of retention feeding back to all three prior 
processes, then the specific activities of sensemaking fit neatly into this more 
general progression of organizing” (p. 414).    
The reading that we proposed for framing Weick’s (1995) sensemaking as individual 
knowing will try to reveal that the activities of sensemaking, as is, fits the individual 
knowing process. 
Bruner’s (1990) Acts of meaning, an approach that argues for a view than humans are 
meaning ready, is a well known proposal from cultural psychology studies that has been 
referenced by Spender and Grant (1996a) in their knowledge based-theory of the firm; and 
more recently Gourlay (2004) made reference to Bruner’s (1978) previous works. Bruner’s 
view is brought here, as we will see later in detail, because its constructs and the 
relationships among them are highly connected to the concept of organizational 
capabilities; and because, I believe, it brings more light to the issue of language as 




Finally, Gourlay’s (2004, 2006) semiotic approach is a draft proposal that searches into 
Dewey and Bentley’s (1949) sign framework to reconsider the main tendency of recurring 
to the misread Polanyi’s tacit knowledge.   
4.4 POLANYI’S PERSONAL KNOWING VIEW 
4.4.1 Polanyi’s Writing Logic 
Let’s star saying that Polanyi’s (1958) Personal Knowledge – Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy was mainly motivated as a response to the depersonalized approach 
to knowledge articulated in positivism (Polanyi, 1958, p. 9, 265; Miller, 2008, p. 936); in 
which his main postulate is that humans have the intellectual ability of holding 
deliberately unproven beliefs following self-set standards of reasonableness (Polanyi, 
1958, p. 268), which ultimately are upheld by the confidence in themselves (p. 256),  
characterized by  the vocation to the truth (p. 65) and submitted to reality (p. 63); 
claiming that man can rise above his own subjectivity by fighting avidly to satisfy his 
personal duties to universal standards (p. 17).  
Now, let us continue, from the distance yet, reviewing what Polanyi (1958) offers as a 
description of knowing process that enacts the intellectual ability: 
A subsidiary process (Polanyi, 1958, p. 59-61) – also called subsidiary awareness (1958, 
p. 55) - characterized by an initially uncritically assimilation (1966, p. 62), as in our own 




used as an ultimate interpretative framework – tools, set of beliefs – for a purpose that is 
the centre of our focal attention – also called focal awareness (1958, p. 55).  
Process in which: 
“Subsidiarity” is achieved by a repeated mental effort aiming at the unarticulated 
instrumentalization of certain objects - physical or intellectual (1958, p. 59) - in 
which we commit and rely (1958, p. 61), acting with universal intent (p. 308) based 
on self-standards of usefulness (p. 63),  in the service of some purpose (1966, p. 62).  
“Initially uncritically assimilation of unasserted pre-suppositions” has its origins in 
(a) that the pre-suppositions show to be useful and confident (Polanyi, 1958, p. 59 - 
60), and, (b) the initial acceptance of authority of others - adults, teachers, or 
leaders, that appears meaningless to start with, but in fact has an unarticulated 
meaning that is discovered by hitting in the same kind of indwelling as the other is 
practicing” (1966, p. 61-62). 
At first instance, the previous summary and abstract description of Polanyi's (1958) 
personal knowledge does not reveals much to the organizational researcher; however it 
provides clues about the kind of challenge that implies framing a more concrete 
understanding of his theory.  
Polanyi’s (1958) writing maintains a consistent, but not obvious, logical structure that 
holds the tension of meeting two major objectives:  
(1) Proposing a holistic and integrated epistemology capable of attending, from the 




(2) Describing the particulars of the process of personal knowing from the restrained 
perspective that our knowing is tacit or founded in tacit knowing.  
Then, Polanyi (1958) is broad and detailed simultaneously, and this provokes a 
tension that may look to the reader as a jumping around from the general to the particular, 
without easy recognition of which objective Polanyi is attending.  
A few cycles of reading, analyzing, resting, and rereading reveal Polanyi´s (1958) 
intellectually beautiful recursive logic that he used to attend the two objectives:  
(a) First, he framed the challenge by arguing that: 
“[T]he act of knowing includes an appraisal; and this personal coefficient, which 
shapes all factual knowledge, bridges in doing so the disjunction between subjectivity 
and objectivity. It implies the claim that man can transcend his own subjectivity by 
striving passionately to fulfill his personal obligations to universal standards” (p. 17).  
(b) Then, he develops key common concepts (e.g. appraisal of order, commitment, 
subsidiary, particulars, tools) to attend both challenges. The processual and very detail 
description of each concept, which does not state a direct definition, it is not in most 
cases easy to relate with the main objectives; but connections exist in a language that, due 
to its preciseness, asks for patient rereading.  
(c) Finally, he reuses these common concepts by scaling them up or down through 
qualifications or specializations, fitting them to the flow of the arguments. This is 





“On these grounds I suggest, quite generally, that the appraisal of order is an act of 
personal knowledge, exactly as is the assessment of probability to which it is allied. 
This is, of course, quite evident when the ordered pattern is contrived by ourselves; 
such cases may help us therefore to recognize the principle asserted here and to see 
that it holds quite generally” (p. 36).      
In summary, Polanyi (1958) follows a modular, scalable and recursive approach to 
describe the fine details of knowing at individual level and the building blocks of a social 
and scientific epistemology. 
4.4.2 Polanyi’s Taxonomy of Knowing and Abilities 
Polanyi (1958) did not make explicit a knowledge taxonomy; however, his work revealed 
a knowing taxonomy. Such taxonomy is not easy to frame since it holds the difficulty of 
differentiating contextualized meanings for some key terms like “articulate”.  The next 
paragraphs provide an account of framing difficulties: 
(1) Polanyi (1958) follows a processual approach to describe his theory, that is, an 
emphasis on describing ongoing intellectual acts instead of describing the objects to 
which those acts are directed.  
(2) Separation of  what is qualified as “inarticulate” from what is qualified as 
“articulate”, as follows:  
(2a) “Inarticulate” comprises processes enacted by primitive knowing abilities 
related to intertwined sensory-motor-logical powers that humans share with animals 
(Polanyi 1958, pp. 96-98); and  
(2b) “Articulate” comprises processes enacted by intellectual knowing abilities, 




of preciseness (p. 77), or richness (p. 86). When the symbol system in use is not 
adequate enough, in a particular striving of intellectual control, our knowing stays 
tacit; otherwise our knowing becomes explicit, at least a subset of it (Polanyi 1958, 
pp. 70, 86, 96-98, 328). 
At this point, the reader may be worry for the lack of literal transcriptions that 
supports the interpretation assigned to the terms “articulate” or “inarticulate”. The 
argument offered to dissipate the concern is to present a textual example of how Polanyi 
(1958), not only neglected a direct description of a concept, but also argued for a 
contextual understanding of it: 
“My use of the words 'articulate', 'articulation*, etc., in this chapter is wider than the 
common linguistic usage, in which these terms refer only to the actual enunciation of 
the sounds of language. The context, however, should make my meaning clear, and it 
is not without precedent. See for example: A. D. Sheffield, Grammar and Thinking, 
New York and London, 1912, p. 22: 'Psychologically, the simple assertory sentence 
expresses the articulation of a conceptual whole into such of its elements as are 
pertinent to the interest guiding the train of thought.” (p. 70). 
As a result, what it presented here as meanings of “inarticulate” and “articulate” 
corresponds to the effort of recognizing the patterns of usage of these two terms in 
Polanyi’s (1958, 1966) whole texts, and then positing interpretations. 
On this basis, I propose a simple taxonomy of knowing of two levels.  At the first 





Here, articulate is understood as an incomplete formalization of the expression of 
ideas that recurs subsidiarily to a system of symbols and to its language laws.   
At the second level, “Articulate knowing” is separated into (a) “Tacit Knowing” 
(subsidiary process that assimilates tools as part of oneself), (b) “Ability-based knowing” 
(focal process that follows private standards of usefulness or beauty), and (c) “Symbol-
based knowing” (focal process that follows self-adhered public duties).  
This taxonomy proposes that “knowing” be understood as the instrumentalization of 
objects, an understanding that holds different gradients of symbolic, systematized, and 
sharable content (see Table 13). This is an approach to knowledge that proposes an 
understanding, as we will see in detail at the end of the section, that makes the concept of 
knowledge more tractable from the perspective of management science. 
Here, it is not argued that this is the only way of classifying knowing and knowledge, 
but positing a frame to read Polanyi’s (1958, 1966) work given the approach of his 
writings, which essentially argues that the use of a symbol-based systems to gain 
intellectual control of situations establishes a breakpoint in human knowing (p. 95, 100, 




P o l a n y i ’ s  T a x o n o m y  o f  K n o w i n g  a n d  K n o w l e d g e  
Primitive inarticulate knowing  
 Drives Abilities Process  
Appetite satisfaction, perceptual and 
surroundings sensemaking 
Innate mix of sensory-
motor-logical powers 
Self-satisfaction of cravings as the 
 way of assenting and knowing 
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A b i l i t y - b a s e d  K n o w i n g  
 Less Expl ic it
Focal process that follows private standards 
of usefulness or beauty 
S y m b o l - b a s e d  K n o w i n g  
More Expl ic it   
Focal process that follows self-adhered public 
standard of duty 
Table 13. Polanyi’s (1958, 1966) Personal Knowing and Knowledge Taxonomy. 
4.4.3 Primitive Inarticulate Knowing 
Polanyi (1958, p. 71), following Theories of Learning of Hilgard (1956) and Learning 
Theory and Personality Dynamics of Mowrer (1950), who in their turn were guided by 
Tolman’s (1932) Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men and Skinner’s (1938) The 
Behavior of organism argues that our, both, understanding of knowledge and the consent 
that it is true, lies in our active innate sentience and abilities. 
 Such abilities correspond to (a) our innate sentience, alertness and motility which are 
actuated by appetitive drives (Polanyi, 1958, p. 96), (b) our innate sensory powers which 
react to the need of making sense of what is being perceived (p. 97), and (c) our innate 
mix of sensory-motor and primitive logical powers which are alive by our need to make 




This Polanyi’s approach to human powers is similar to psychology’s nativism 
(Byrnes, 2001) which posits that humans are born with cognitive abilities that allow 
attaining more skills. 
The effort to satisfy these appetitive and needs follows silent exploration guided by 
perception, which in the event of success leads to a silent affirmation; which is a 
primitive manner of establishing a fact. Moreover, the information that we acquire by 
sensory perception, for example by eating or making love, implies selecting, relating and 
judging the objects in relation to its own motivation; entering in this way in our picture of 
the world (Polanyi, 1958, p. 99).  
However, Polanyi (1958) noted that human perceptual senses hold limits and that we 
make understandings and assert with conviction those understanding based on what we 
have perceived following the criteria of reasonableness (p. 96). Polanyi described these 
perceptual limits and dilemma with clarity in the following paragraph: 
“The muscles of the eye adjust the thickness of its lens, so as to produce the sharpest 
possible retinal image of the object on which the viewer's attention is directed, and the 
eye presents to him as correct the picture of the object seen in this way. … But sharpness 
of contour does not always predominate in the shaping of what we see. … when a ball set 
against a featureless background is inflated, it is seen as if it retained its size and was 
coming nearer. This illusion seems to be due to the fact that in this case we accommodate 
our eyes to a closer range, even though in consequence the object gets out of focus. 
Worse still, we simultaneously increase the convergence of our eyes so that the two 
retinal images are displaced from corresponding positions, which would normally make 
us see the object double. These defects of the quality and position of our retinal images 
are accepted here by the eye, in the urge to satisfy the more pressing requirement of 
seeing the object behave in a reasonable way. Since tennis balls are not known to blow 




4.4.4 Tension between “Sharpness’ and “Reasonableness”  
Polanyi’s (1958, pp. 95-97, 138) detailed description of perception should not pass 
without being commented. He defends two combined, but confronted, criteria for the 
right perception to determine what the eyes see: (a) “sharpness of contour”, and (b) 
“reasonableness of the image”. The tension that our senses experience in trying to make 
sense of an observation at the level of primitive knowing is analog to the tension that we 
hold at other levels of knowing; such is the case of the tension between "certainty" and 
“systematic relevance" for the criteria of scientific value. Nothing better than quoting him 
to describe this analogy’ 
"Just as the eye sees details that are not there if they fit in with the sense of the picture, 
or overlooks them if they make no sense, so also very little inherent certainty will 
suffice to secure the highest scientific value to an alleged fact, if only it fits in with a 
great scientific generalization, while the most stubborn facts will be set aside if there is 
no place for them in the established framework of science." (p. 138, italics added). 
These perceptual sensemaking criteria (sharpness - reasonableness) characterize the 
general profile of the knowing tension; however, tension origin holds more enriching 
antecedents. As we get (a) sensory clues of the present experience, and (b) react making 
sense of it, as best we can; (c) the resolutions “appear to be evaluated together with an 
immense array of past clues, gone beyond recall – but not without effective trace” 
(Polanyi, 1958, p. 97, italics added). 
This perceptual sensemaking tension between “sharpness’ and “reasonableness” is 




personal abilities and the benefit of un-specifiable effective “traced past cues” (p. 97); which it 
is no necessarily the truth, as it was evident with the case of closer tennis ball (p. 96).  
The described tension holds a logic that is shared in the need of making sense of our 
surroundings, at the primitive knowing level, and in all knowing instances; as we will see later 
in the issues of skills, tools, language, and meaning.  
However, in those knowing cases the tension’s resolution criterion will migrate from 
a private perspective – usefulness – to a public one – duty, but retaining the self-adhere 
postulates of the personal knowing approach. 
This section – a necessary deviation of the original planned sequential review of 
knowing and knowledge types – helps to appreciate a key seminal construct: the 
persistent tension that knowing holds at different levels; a characteristic that Polanyi 
(1958) rescues and emphasizes in his understanding of personal knowing.   
4.4.5 Reversibility Criterion  
Now, returning to the interviewed Polanyi in the issues of primitive knowing, he went 
on and said that appetitive satisfaction and perceptual sensemaking are the main 
interwoven sub-intellectual bare bones, but still inarticulate level, of intelligent behavior 
that we share with animals. This behavior takes the form of different types of learning: 
(a) Trick learning, (b) Sign learning and (c) Latent learning. 
In trick learning, the subject achieves to contrive relationships between means and 




In sign learning, the individual observe useful relationships between signs and events 
(e.g. the rat that learns to choose the marked door – sign – to get access to food – event). 
In latent learning, problems and solutions (e.g. the rat that has learned, given that one of 
the path has been closed – problem – to choose the shortest alternative path – solution).  
Trick learning extends on innate motility powers and it is mainly controlled by a purpose. 
Sign learning deploys innate sensory powers and is mostly guided by strained attention. And, 
latent learning uses a mix of sensory-motor and primitive logical powers and it is primarily 
actuated by the need of making sense of the surroundings (Polanyi, 1958, p. 71 – 75).  
In each inarticulate learning type, there are two knowing stages: (a) the heuristic stage - 
when a mostly irreversible innovative actual learning happens, and (b) the routine stage – 
when a comparative reversible display of the knowledge learned happens (Polanyi, 1958, p. 76).  
While in trick learning, contriving is the heuristic ability showed, observing is for 
sign learning, and understanding and reasoning is for latent learning (pp. 76, 328).  
Polanyi’s (1958) argument about the tacit characteristic of knowing starts here, at the 
inarticulate knowing level with the concept of reversibility. He applied this concept to 
discuss the reversibility of the three inarticulate learning types.  
Piaget (1928) presents the criterion applied to evaluate reversibility (Polanyi, 1958, p. 
75). He states that an inference is reversible when it can be traced back to its premises by 




In trick learning and sign learning, the heuristic and routine stages are irreversible and 
reversible respectively.  
However, while in latent learning the solution obtained in the heuristic stage could 
range from the result of a systematic exploration of a situation – framework building – to 
a flash of insight after a perplexed contemplation – no framing is possible. 
Even more, in the routine stage of latent learning, ingenuity could be the source of the 
applied solution instead of the operation of a framework (e.g. for the rat experiment, it 
corresponds to the alternatives between the use of ingenuity or recurring to a mental map 
of the maze), Polanyi, 1958, pp. 74-75. 
 It is relevant to recall that reversibility in inarticulate knowing does not incorporates 
any symbolic externalization tool of the heuristic or routine premises of the framework in 
used; reversibility is analyzed at this level in terms of the possibilities of re-instantiating 
the framework that followed the mental abilities.  
Recalling that the reversibility of the heuristic stage of this process, that is, tracing 
back its premises is denied when mainly sensory and motor powers participated, and it is 
possible when the primitive logical power are involved. However, even in those 
circumstances, there is the alternative of taking the ingenuity route (Polanyi, 1958, p. 74), 
which is irreversible in Piaget’s (1928) terms.  
In summary, this irreversible condition at primitive level set the drafts of the non-




sensory and motor abilities, or based on logical abilities with ingenuity plays a role 
(see Table 14).  
4.4.6 Self-Satisfaction of Cravings and the Truth  
Briefly, Polanyi (1958) posits, in regards to inarticulate knowing, that individuals 
 (1) in search of successful self-satisfaction of fundamental human appetites, 
perceptual sensemaking, and surroundings sensemaking,  
(2) by means of primitive innate sensory-motor-logical abilities,  
(3) inarticulately assert the truth about facts and acquire knowledge about the world;  
(4) while resolving perceptual and surrounding sensemaking tension between 
“sharpness’ and “reasonableness”  in favor of rationality in terms of the best of 
our innate abilities, and the reference of un-specifiable past cues;  
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(1) in search of successful self-satisfaction of fundamental human 
appetites, perceptual sensemaking, and surroundings sensemaking,  
(2) by means of primitive innate sensory-motor-logical abilities,  
(3) inarticulately assert the truth about facts and acquire knowledge 
about the world;  
(4) while resolving perceptual and surrounding sensemaking  tension 
between “sharpness’ and “reasonableness” in favor of rationality in 
terms of  the competences of our innate abilities,  and the reference of 
un-recallable past cues;  












4.4.7 Articulate Knowing and Intellectual Sensemaking Logic 
According to Polanyi (1958), the transition from inarticulate knowing – Trick 
learning, Sign learning and Latent learning – to their articulate counterparts – 
Discovering, Observing and Interpreting (p. 76 – 77) – is triggered by the human push for 
making intellectual sense of the experienced circumstances, an express as: 
"… an urge to achieve intellectual control over the situations confronting it. ... This is 
the principle which guides all skills and connoisseurship, and informs all articulate 
knowing by way of the ubiquitous tacit coefficient on which spoken utterances must 
rely for their guidance and confirmation." (p.132). 
Polanyi (1958) posits that almost all knowledge that man holds that exceeds animal 
knowledge is gained by the usage of language (symbol-based tool); operation of which 
relies in the tacit intellectual abilities that are continuous to those of the animals (p. 95). 
The understanding of an experience, together with the language we use to make reference 
of the experience is an effort that is attending to our needs of intellectual control (p. 100) 
that continuously feeds human knowledge domains.   
Polanyi (1958, p. 172 - 173) argues that our strivings for the satisfaction of our 
intellectual appetites (our urge to make sense, not only of ever alert eyes and ears but to 
understand experiences) operate as the trigger of the articulate knowing framework. This 
trigger can go from motivating a student to solve a mathematical problem, to the joy of 
conceiving a whole scientific or cultural system (p. 173).  
This intellectual appetite, which drives discovery, assumes the possibility that there is 




assuming ability’s infallibility, but its competence; and when it is successful, the found 
knowledge satisfies the urge (p. 173). 
It is important to take note that at articulate level of knowing we complement to the 
innate private standards of satisfaction an acquired public standards of obligation.  
Our primitive standards are predominantly innate and private, while intellectual 
standards are acquired by education, and at the highest level – scientific – we believe to 
be attending public universal obligations (Polanyi, 1958, pp. 174, 315).  
In other words, knowing standards are characterized by the kind of appetite  
that invoked knowing, which ultimately rely on our self-adherence. 
However, in articulate knowing, there is the case of ability-based performances that 
follow acquired self-set standards of usefulness that are private, but also may be partially 
public in the form of maxims that could be shared by masters or connoisseurs (experts), or 
have been made explicit from the successful applications of the skill (Polanyi, 1958, pp. 162).  
Ability-based acts are not only the domain of artist or connoisseurs, but also domain of 
inventors, scientists, and good citizens; acts in which intellectual beauty guides, as we can 
interpret it from: 
“[T]he assessment of what is of higher and what of lesser interest; what is great in 
science, and what relatively slight. …this appreciation depends ultimately on a sense of 
intellectual beauty; that it is an emotional response which can never be dispassionately 
defined, any more than we can dispassionately define the beauty of a work of art or the 




Then, at the level of articulate knowing in general, we follow acquired private self-
standards of usefulness and intellectual beauty at ability-based level (pp. 59, 60, 63, 135) 
and acquired public self-imposed obligations at symbol-based level (pp. 174, 315).  
It is convenient at this point, to reproduce a text from Polanyi’s (1958), which I 
believe it offers light about two important intertwined processes in articulate knowing: 
intellectual gratification and intellectual appetitive perpetuation: 
“Our intellectual passions, however, differ essentially from the cravings and emotions 
which we share with the animals. The satisfaction of these terminates the situation which 
evoked them. Discovery likewise terminates the problem from which it started, but it leaves 
behind knowledge, which gratifies a passion similar to that which sustained the craving for 
discovery. Thus intellectual passions perpetuate themselves by their fulfillment.” (p. 173). 
I propose to understand Polanyi (1958) description of intellectual passion as the 
holder of, what is labeled here, the intellectual sensemaking logic, which posits:  
(1) The belief that there is knowledge, in which our intellectual need declares its 
satisfaction. 
(2) We hold the ability to recognize that knowledge as true – not infallibly, but our 
competence.  
(3) That is, by accepting the discovery, our intellectual passions is satisfied.  
(4) Since the discovered knowledge stays, it may trigger recursively more intellectual 
needs. 
Now, it is time to direct our attention to the resources in charge of satisfying this 




4.4.8 Tacit Knowing 
Identifying the abilities that satisfy our needs of intellectual control invites to recall 
that these abilities are tacit (Polanyi, 1958, p. 95).  
More precisely, these abilities participate in a subsidiary process (p. 59 – 61) 
characterized by an initially uncritically assimilation (1966, p. 62), as in our own body, 
aim to the instrumentalization of certain objects (1958, p. 59), in which we commit and 
rely (1958, p. 61), in the service of some purpose (1966, p. 62) that is the center of our 
focal attention (1958, p. 55).  
Then, we could say that these abilities are related to the committed 
instrumentalization of objects, in which physical objects, intellectual frameworks, 
language symbols or system of symbols are among the cases of instrumentalization. 
The objective in the following sections is to argue that Polanyi (1958) posits that the 
tacit intellectual abilities that satisfy our intellectual cravings correspond to the following, 
here labeled, tacit heuristic abilities: (a) order and pattern recognition and contriving, (b) 
anticipating generalizations and (c) intellectual commitment.  
These three elements of his view are constructs for which Polanyi dedicated a great 
deal of his work – Chapters 2 and 3 for “Order”, Chapter 5 “Anticipations” , and 
Chapters 4 and 10 for “Commitment” –  are key to understand the modular, scalable and 




4.4.9 Order: Building Block of Future Suggestions 
In the strivings of making sense of experience, we count with the heuristic ability of 
recognizing order in contrast to randomness (Polanyi, 1958, p. 38). This ability is best 
described by the process of making sense of our visual perceptions, in which we separate 
the field of vision into the figure of the object and its background.  
This process is achieve by (a) identifying a set of particulars – figure – that retain its 
internal identity even though is moved against a (b) non-identifiable set of particulars – 
background – which retain its resting identity even though it may be subject to changes.  
Then, the ordered particulars of the figure are recognized in contrast to the random 
particulars of the background by confirming that the nature of the relation between the 
particulars of the figure and the background are random (p. 38).  
Moreover, we are able to appreciate in order certain degrees, like in the identification of the 
degree of symmetry in triangles. We can give account of the standard of symmetry of a scalene 
triangle and assert that is unsymmetrical, and assert than an isosceles triangle is symmetrical, 
but an equilateral triangle is more symmetrical than the isosceles triangle (p. 44).  
Even further, man holds the intellectual ability to establish patterns (contriving 
patterns) in nature and the assessment of such order is made with universal intent (Polanyi, 
1958, p. 37), that is, humans believe that such assessment of order is true and submits it to 
reality as a discovery (p. 63); in doing so the stated finding holds future implications that 




Therefore, “[a]ll kinds of order, whether contrived or natural, have existential meaning 
but contrived order usually also conveys a message [denotative meaning]” (p. 58). 
In abstract terms, the act of tacit knowing commits to certain standards of coherence – 
assessments of order – set by oneself (p. 63) believing (p. 303) that those standards are 
true, fit reality, and hold the capability of revealing true non-specifiable future 
insinuations (p. 37). 
4.4.10 Anticipating Generalizations  
One way to explain the heuristic ability of anticipation is to review how humans are 
able to assert with the word “chair” a particular object among many different objects once 
he had previously pronounced the word “chair” or listened others pronounced it in 
reference to the experience of any other chair (p. 92). Beforehand, it is necessary to 
qualify the act of denotation as “chair” the particular chair as an act of generalization. 
Then, the inquiry changes to “How are humans able to articulate generalizations?” 
Polanyi (1958) argues that the human ability of pronouncing generalizations is rooted in 
his heuristic abilities of anticipation, which is manifested, in the case of language usage, 
while denoting an object with a symbol, when humans achieve to identify acceptable 
variances of the substantial character of the object under different experiences (1958, p. 80).  
As we feel that the denotation is correct we accept language as part of a theory of 
generalization, in which the symbols of a vocabulary appears to constitute a theory of all 
the objects that can talk about now and in future occasions; which implies its applicability 




In a more broad discourse, in the context of any object, symbol-based or not, we can 
understand generalization as an universal theory that is rooted in the anticipatory ability 
of identifying new instances of certain things that we know (Polanyi, 1958, p. 103). 
Briefly, the anticipatory ability provides humans the capacity of asserting 
generalizations by recognizing new instances of certain known objects by identifying 
acceptable variances of the substantial character under different experiences (p. 110 – 112).  
In a more specific discourse, to classify objects in terms of a range of non-formalized 
variations of the substantial character, for which there are symbols, holds certain 
indeterminacy that is resolved by the observer using a known but unspecified criteria 
(Polanyi, 1958, p. 80 -81).  
This unspecifiable self-accreditation of language reveals: (a) an endorsement to our 
heuristic language skills, and (b) the personal tacit groundings of knowledge, since what 
we say or write assumes our endorsement (p. 81).  
4.4.11 Intellectual Commitment: the Road to “Committed True Belief”  
Polanyi (1958) made a consistent plea for “commitment” in the understanding of 
personal knowing. He presented many examples that followed a pattern, which is 
summarized in the following analysis.  
The reading of letters presupposes that words and the objects they represent – a 
framework characterized by signs an meanings - have been absorbed as part of our own 




the service of some specific purpose (p. 62), in this specific example, the capturing of the 
meaning of the letter (p. 59).  
The justification of the commitment to objects, assimilated as tools, that unconsciously 
function as extension of our bodies, is mainly based on our belief on their efficacy (p. 60), 
effectiveness or suitability (p. 59); which is gained while making sense of the experience of 
using them (p. 60) for the purpose at hand (p. 63); or based in our belief that they are able to 
validate (pp. 202, 312) the intellectual beauty that is privately demanded in discoveries, 
inventions or noble acts (p. 135), or based on in our belief that we should follow our self-
adhered public duties (p. 315).    
A more general understanding of intellectual commitment can be expressed as the 
ability of acting with universal intent (p. 308) based on self-standards of usefulness (p. 
63), beauty (p. 321), or duty (p. 315) with the conviction that the assumptions in which 
we rely about the instrumentalized objects of experiences follows the truth (p. 305). 
Our acts and thoughts in the search of truth imply a personal participation in the desire 
of something impersonal – universal – as the truth (Polanyi, 1958, p. 308).  
Polanyi proposes conviction for the truth within the framework of the passionate 
aspects of intellectual commitment (Polanyi, 1958, p. 171). To explain this human passion 
for truth, Polanyi recalls that the strivings for satisfaction of our basic needs and fears 
depart from the supposition that there exist: (a) objects that satisfy our needs and fears, (b) 




Then, understanding of the truth within the framework of commitment allows confining 
of the dangers of understanding knowledge as justified true belief (Gourlay, 2004).  
Commitment is the competence that authorizes the choice of believing that something 
is true (Polanyi, 1958, p. 315). This a deliberate and necessary choice made by the call of 
the best of abilities (p. 315), that holds the tension between the wiliness of acting 
judiciously and the confidence of executing a novelty (p. 318).  
In this approach, error is a possibility if we are not to lose contact with reality (p. 315). 
4.4.12 Tools 
Expliciting the conception of tools in Polanyi’s (1958) follows three lines of 
reasoning. First, we will unveil the connection between tacit knowing heuristic abilities 
and the logic of contriving and using objects as tools. Second, we will explore the 
implications of Polanyi’s language principles in the conception of symbol-based tools. 
Finally, we will posit that the understanding of tools as more or less symbol-based 
implies different process of knowing and ways of sharing knowledge. 
This Polanyi’s (1958) reading of knowledge as tools, holds the possibility of given a 
more tractable understanding to those theories of the firm that posit that knowledge is 
embedded in objects, however, as we will see later, this knowledge embedding in objects 




4.4.13 Tools’ Contrivance and Usage Logic 
Here, I am ready to make explicit a link between significant patterns and tools that 
Polanyi (1958) exposed extensively but only by indirect references. The purpose is to 
make explicit the logic for tools contrivance and usage, a sequence that goes from (1) 
pattern recognition or contriving, (2) trough pattern generalization, (3) to the committed 
instrumentalization of patterns. 
First, I state my understanding clearly, and say, based on Polanyi (1958) that the order 
recognition and contriving ability, founded on the ability of assessing a degree of order to a 
set of objects while experiencing them, it is not only able to contrive a message about 
certain order (p. 58), but contriving it as a whole, that is, as a pattern, without taking focal 
attention to the assessed degree of order of the particulars, but subsidiarily (p. 57).  
Second, I argue that the heuristic ability of anticipating generalizations able us to 
identify acceptable variances of the substantial character of the patterned objects under 
different experiences (1958, p. 80, 103).  
Third and finally, here I argue that the previous abilities be considered as intertwined 
abilities – anticipating patterns from experiences – and that they set together the drafts of 
instrumentalization of intellectual or physical objects.  
This instrumentalization is guided mainly by the committed belief that patterned 
objects are either useful, intellectually beautiful or duty complaint; that is they satisfy either 
the self-set standards of usefulness (p. 63), or intellectual beauty at the ability knowing 




In summary, anticipating patterns leads to the subsidiary instrumentalization of 
certain intellectual or physical objects, that is, the recognition or contreiving of object or 
set objects as a tool or framework (Polanyi, p. 59).  
This recognition implies that (a) we do know what these objects are for, (b) we 
believe them to be useful for those purposes; and that (c) on the contrary they will just 
look as strange objects (p. 56).  
Furthermore, based on the extension of the visual and auditory wholes of Gestalt 
psychology and in particular in the Law of good forms (prägnanz), Polanyi (1958,  pp. 56 
- 57, p. 79) asserted that (a) the particulars of a tool or framework must be apprehended 
jointly, that is that the focus on the particulars separately forms no tool nor framework, 
implicating that when the usefulness of a tool is questioned its meaning as a tool is 
vanished; and (b) that we can focus our attention one at a time, that is, we cannot be 
aware at the same time of the subsidiary particulars of the tool or framework and be 
focally aware of the whole task or action of applying it.  
The subsidiary awareness of tools or frameworks can be regarded as the act of 
making them a part of the body or the mind. This is best exemplified by recalling that 
when reading a letter we are aware of the words of a language only in a subsidiary 
manner, and that only when our understanding of the text is inadequate them the words 
will catch our attention (Polanyi, 1958, p. 57 - 59). That is, (c) efforts for specifying the 
subsidiary particulars is a destructive analysis of personal knowledge cause by the change 




In practical terms, as we learn to read a book, to handle a hammer, to drive a bicycle, we 
progressively become unconscious of the actions by which we accomplish the result (Polanyi, 
1958, p. 61). The route to unconsciousness – “a change achieved by a repeated mental effort 
aiming at the instrumentalization of certain things and actions” (p. 62) - is accompanied by a 
newly acquired consciousness of the experiences regarding the specific purpose (p. 62).  
Then, in summary to use an object as tool, according to Polanyi (1958) requires: 
1. Our recognition and commitment of its utility for our purposes. 
2. Our focus on the whole, since particulars of the instrumentalized object forms no tool. 
3. Our progressive unconsciousness of the actions with the object by which we 
achieve our purposes. 
4. Our evaluations of the object performance as tool follow either, self-set private 
standards of usefulness or intellectual beauty, or self-adhered public standards of duty.  
4.4.14 Symbol-based Tools  
Tools contriving and usage logic applies to any kind of tool, physical or intellectual; 
however, there is a characteristic at the tool level, through which Polanyi (1958) explains 
the progress of human kind: it’s symbolic representation and operation; best exemplified 
in language.   
Polanyi (1958) emphasizes the double role of language in the development of human 
knowledge. First, language explains the gains in the inventory of knowledge in respect to 
the animal level (p. 95), and second, language is also a response to the humans urge to 





In this second issue, this reading of Polanyi understands language as the tool created 
by humans to support the efforts of intellectual control - the search for clarity and 
comprehension (p. 100).  
Then, language, as tool, overcomes human memory limitations by (a) creating a set of 
manageable symbols that scale up or scale down the notation of objects of experiences to 
the dimensions of our comprehension, and (b) by organizing the combination of those 
symbols - which are in the range of 2000 to 3000 English words at speech level and 
30000 at library level – to provide for precise or rich description of the experiences 
(Polanyi, 1958, pp. 78 – 80, 84).   
The precision and richness of what can be explicated by using a language is described 
by Polanyi (1958) through what he called the laws of language representation and 
operation.  
These laws state that language vocabulary must be poor enough to allow symbols to 
be remembered (Law of Poverty), and be repeatedly used to catch a recallable definite 
meaning (Law of Iteration), in a consistent way according to the theory of generalization 
following unspecifiable self-accreditation judgments (Law of Consistency).  
This small enough recallable vocabulary counts with a fixed set of rules for the 
combination of symbols to provide for the great variety of meanings of life experiences 
(Law of Grammar).  
Vocabulary and its combinations offer gradients of symbolic notation that allows for 




of novel aspects of the life experience in which the object participates (Law of 
Manageability).  
The first three laws correspond to the principle of language representation and the 
two aspects of the Law of Manageability constitute the principle of language operation, 
which assists the process of thought (p. 78 – 82). 
In summary: 
Principle of language representation:  
Poverty: poor enough vocabulary allows remembering. 
Consistency: consistent usage of symbols allows identifiably repetition. 
Iteration: repeatedly usage of symbols catches a recallable definite meaning. 
Grammar: fixed set of rules for combining symbols increases possibilities of meanings. 
Principle of language operation: 
Manageability: capability of the symbol system for scaling down or up the 
denotation of the experienced object, by offering a set of symbols that fits the 
dimensions of our comprehension, which eases the understandings of the 
experience, and allows for the discovery of novel aspects of it. 
The possibility of subsuming an object, while denoting it, leads to a more 
general idea: the subsidiary modular and recursive construction of other tools; 
an understanding that is consistent with our cognitive human cravings.  
An everyday example of this modularity happens at operational level when we read; in 




the sentence and their structuring; and, while when we pay attention to a paragraph, we pay 
subsidiary attention to the sentences and their structuring (Polanyi, 1958, pp. 91 – 92).  
Polanyi’s approach to modular tools, even though is not labeled in such way, is 
similar to what Karmiloff-Smith (1996) proposed in Beyond Modularity: A 
Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science.  
Speaking holds a similar operational experience, which goes (a) from assigning a 
primary denotation to an object, (b) to reconsider the symbol assigned – reorganization, 
either by a novel reconsideration of the object or the decision to use of another set of 
symbols – e.g. equations instead of text; and finally (c) to the utterance of the result (p. 82).  
These three stages of language usage can be described in relation to, and as an 
expansion of the three primitive types of heuristic abilities associated to inarticulate 
learning as is revealed in the following Polanyi’s phrase: 
 “To speak is to contrive signs, to observe their fitness, and to interpret their 
alternative relationships; though the animal possesses each of these three faculties, 
he cannot combine them” (p. 82).  
The highest manifestations outcomes of intellectual articulate performance like (a) patents 
from contriving-based science like engineering and technology; (b) frameworks and diagnosis 
from induction-based sciences like natural and social sciences; and (c) intellectual objects from 
deduction-based and exact base sciences like mathematics, logic and mathematical physics; 




This symbolization is effective because it is assisted by our heuristics abilities that support 
the uttering or writing of the results (Polanyi, 1958, p. 83); however, the reliance on these 
heuristic abilities does not apply in the same degree to all knowledge domains (p. 86).  
In exact sciences, a mathematical symbol follows explicit operational known rules 
(Polanyi, 1958, p. 85), and a system of pure mathematics tell us something important, 
without mostly referring to anything outside itself; following predominantly the Law of 
Manageability (p. 86).  
A manageable set of symbols embodied with a specified fixed set of complex rules 
may scale down or scale up objects of hard science notations to the dimensions of our 
comprehension (p. 81), which makes this type of body of knowledge more reversible (p. 
86). However, this articulation is achieved with a sacrifice in content given the 
detachment from experiences of the symbolic framework applied (p. 86).  
As a note, I emphasized that these hard science symbols are habitually used in written 
form, that is, we do observe most of the time when people is giving a speech that (a) they 
point to an equation without reading it aloud; or (b) they write silently and then they 
pronounce a contextually understandable utterance in reference to the written mathematical 
expression. 
I argue that the emphasis given here on the written role of hard science symbols could 
be achieved through extreme inference of Polanyi’s (1958) pages 82 to 87 as a whole.   
Descriptive sciences provide a more comprehensive account of experiences using less 
precise language – e.g. the use of words in metaphors (p. 102). Here, the indeterminacy 




participation governs the richness of concrete experiences to which our speech can refer” 
(Polanyi, 1958, p. 87)  referred by the Law of Consistency. 
Finally, Polanyi posits that engineering sketches and drawings “picture the essentials 
of a situation on a reduced scale, which lends itself more easily to imaginative 
manipulation than the ungainly original” (1958, p.85).  
These free forms and geometrical figures – ranging from (a) informal sketches that 
assist the imagination of the inventor (p. 85), to (b) very formal engineering drawings that 
guides the building of infrastructure to the operation of organizations – follow principally 
the Law of Manageability, and also Laws of Consistency and Iteration, otherwise the 
creator will not be able to read back his articulation.  
Then, men have created three different forms of symbolic representation – hard science 
symbols, words and drawings – to make reference, with different levels of preciseness and 
richness, to the objects of experiences.   
Also, symbols may be less systematic as in “[c]hurches and pyramids are symbols but they 
are not language because they cannot be easily reproduced or handled” (p.81); or more 









Then, Polanyi (1958) achieved to describe – through the principles that guide 
symbolization – the characteristics of tools as symbol-based systems, which holds 
implications that are summarized as follows (see Table 15): 
1. Tools take physical or intellectual form. 
2. Symbolic characterization of tools is a response oriented to satisfy our intellectual 
needs to understand experiences, given our human limitations. 
3. The level of symbolic systematization of tools, following representation and 
operational rules, defines the precision, richness, routine and novel aspects of its 
workings, and holds the: 
3.1 Symbol representation tension between: 
- Precise, detach, and more reversible representation, attained through: 
Specialized set of symbols (Poverty law)  
Stricter symbol combination rules (Grammar law) 
Repeated consistent usage of symbols (Consistency and Iteration laws) 
- Rich, connected, and less reversible representation, attained through: 
Generic set of symbols (Poverty law) 
Looser symbol combination rules (Grammar law) 
Sporadic and less consistent usage of symbols (Consistency and Iteration laws) 
3.2 Symbol operation tension between: 
- Novel operations attained through: 
Set of symbols and combination rules that allow for rich scalable denotation of the 
experience to allow for novel aspects of our comprehension (Manageability law)  
- Routine operations, attained through: 
Set of symbols and combination rules that allow for limited scalable denotation of 
the experience, which leads to the same routine comprehension (Manageability law) 
3.3 The level of symbolic systematization of tools, following representation and 
operational rules, defines the potential of tools to instrumentalized, modularly and 




4.4.15 Knowledge as the Instrumentalization of Objects  
Now, we are ready to argue in favor of bringing some clarity in two Polanyi’s (1958) 
conceptions that previous literature has missed. First, we will make clearer the difference 
between Polanyi’s knowing and knowledge; second, we will establish the role of tools in 
knowledge and knowing.  
At this point, our open coding approach reveals a pattern in the properties of the three 
different forms of knowing already reviewed (inarticulate knowing, articulate knowing, and 
tacit knowing) which corresponds to the instrumentalization and assimilation of objects as 
tools for satisfaction of certain personal appetite or purpose.  
Such emerging theme is clearly supported by: 
“Subsidiary or instrumental knowing, as I have labeled it, is not known in itself but is 
known in terms of something focally known, to the quality of which it contributes; and 
to this extent it is unspecifiable. Analysis may bring subsidiary knowledge into focus and 
formulate it as a maxim or as a feature in a physiognomy, but such specification is in 
general not exhaustive. Although the expert … can indicate their clues and formulate 
their maxims, they know many more things than they can tell, knowing them only in 
practice, as instrumental particulars, and not explicitly, as objects. … This applies 
equally to connoisseurship as the art of knowing and to skills as the art of doing, 
wherefore both can be taught only by aid of practical example and never solely by 
precept.” (Polanyi, 1958, p. 88, italics added). 
Then, here it is posited that if knowing is about intellectual efforts in which certain 
human abilities participate instrumentalizing objects, them the instances of such enacted 
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Articulate behavior drive 
Intellectual sensemaking logic: 
 1. There is knowledge in which our intellectual need declares its 
satisfaction.  
2. We hold the competence to recognize that knowledge as true.  
3. By accepting the discovery, our intellectual appetite is satisfied.  
4. Since the discovered knowledge stays, it may trigger recursively 














Intellectual Appetite  Intellectual Passion 
In search of intellectual control of experiences 
following private self-set standards of 
usefulness or beauty at ability-based level, and 
public self-set standards of duty at symbol-
based level, following a logic that perpetuates 
the intellectual passion drive. 














Tacit knowing process: 
(1) Invoking subsidiarily a set of heuristic 
abilities to use tools (with or without 
symbolic representation) as part of our 
existence;  
(2) tools in which, we recognize or 
contrive certain order, anticipate  
generalizations, commit and rely;  
(3) for which the invoked abilities must 
meet truth-committed private or public 
self-adhered standards of performance 
in terms of the non-symbolic or symbolic 
nature of the tools in use, respectively; 
while we pay focused attention to the 
purpose of the supported act. 
Tacit knowing heuristic abilities: 
1. Order and pattern recognition and contriving: ability of recognizing 
and contriving patterns from experiences; and submitting such 
assessment of order with universal intent and instrumentation 
purposes, while embedding an unspecified transcending message. 
2. Anticipating generalizations: ability of recognizing new instances of 
certain known objects by identifying acceptable variances of the 
substantial character under different experiences (universal theory). 
3. Intellectual commitment: ability of acting with universal intent based 
on self-standards of usefulness, or intellectual beauty at ability-based 
knowing level; or self-imposed obligations at symbol-based knowing 
level; with the conviction that the assumptions in which we rely 
about the instrumentalized objects of experience are true, while 
holding the tension between the wiliness of acting judiciously and 









Tools as a response to the need 
to understand experiences, 
given our human limitations. 
















1. Order recognition and contriving abilities recognized a degree of order in a 
set of objects while experiencing them, as a whole, without focally 
attending the assessed order of the particulars, but subsidiarily. 
2. Anticipating generalization ability assesses such degree of order and contrives it 
as a pattern of past experiences to typify the set of objects of future experiences.  
3. Intertwined ability of anticipating patterns to experiences sets the drafts for 
instrumentalization of intellectual or physical objects; this asks for the 
commitment to it, which is guided mainly by the belief on self set standards 
of usefulness or intellectual beauty at the ability knowing level or self set 
standards of duty at symbol-based knowing level. 
Tools  ́usage logic: 
Commitment to its utility & 
progressive unconsciousness of 
the actions by which we 





Poverty: poor enough vocabulary allows remembering.  
Consistency: consistent usage of symbols allows identifiably repetition.  
Iteration: repeatedly usage of symbols catches a recallable meaning.  
Grammar: fixed set of symbols combination rules provides variety of meanings. 
Principle of 
operation  
Manageability:  scaling symbols to fit dimension of our comprehension and 






Hard science notation 
(mathematics, logic, chemistry) 
Tool’s symbolic content 
tension between: 
Representation: Rich, connected, and less reversible  Precise, detach, and more reversible 


















Communication-        
 oriented 
knowing 
Drives         
with public 
standards 
Table 15. Polanyi’s (1958, 1966) Personal Knowledge Framework: Articulate and Tacit Knowing, 




4.4.16 Human Limits, Drives, Standards, Tools and Sharing 
This reading of Polanyi (1958) reveals that the need and possibilities for sharing 
knowledge follows some chained conditions.  
Human memory limitations (p. 78) and perceptual senses limitations (p. 96) are 
examples of the human conditions that shape the way in which personal drives – 
appetites, and perceptual, surroundings and intellectual sensemaking (p. 90) – are 
satisfied. 
The self-set standards (criteria) of evaluation of the knowing skills to satisfy these 
personal drives are aligned with such human limitations (p.80).  
At the ability-based level of knowing, the assimilated physical or intellectual tools 
participating in our knowing acts or thoughts are evaluated in terms of private criteria of 
usefulness (pp. 59, 60, 63, 135), or intellectual beauty (p. 321).  
At the symbol-based level of knowing, the tools participating in our knowing are 
evaluated in terms of public self-imposed standards of duty (pp. 174, 315).  
The private or public nature of such knowing standards becomes relevant in the 
understanding of knowledge sharing, because it shapes the symbolization requirements 
for the participating tools 
If the knowing self-set standard is private, then most probably the individual holds no 
need for sharing; and if the knowing self-set standard is public, then most probably 




In any case, the adequacy of the systematic symbolic content of the tool in use while 
knowing defines the possibilities and characteristics of our talking about of what is 
known, therefore the potential for sharing knowledge.  
Then, (1) what triggers knowledge sharing is the need to overcome our human 
limitations in search of satisfying our appetites, while meeting self-set standards (private 
or public) of knowing performance; and (2) what shapes knowledge sharing possibilities 
is the adequacy of symbolic system hold and in use while knowing. 
The following section will offer the details of how the above reading of Polanyi 
(1958) emerged. 
4.4.17 Ability-based Knowing 
Polanyi’s approach to explain the articulation of knowledge postulates the persistent 
participation of the tacit process of knowing in the articulation of the known (p. 87). 
The famous case argued by Polanyi, in which the tacit knowing predominates, is related 
to skillful doing. There, he starts arguing that we may say that we know how to ride a 
bicycle, and indeed ride it with mastery; however, our descriptive saying about how to 
ride is defective; because we know it only in an instrumental way, while practicing (p. 
88). “When I am riding a bicycle …, I do not know [focally] the particulars of my 
knowledge and therefore cannot tell what they are” (p. 90). 
Experts could describe some principles or maxims about this physical skill and state 
for example that. “analysis shows that for a given angle of unbalance the curvature of 




proceeding” (p. 50). However, we can recognize that such kind of “[r]ules of art [of 
skillful doing] can be useful, but they do not determine the practice” (p. 50).  
Then, “[t]o assert that I have knowledge which is ineffable [subsidiary] is not to deny 
that I can speak of it, but only that I can speak of it adequately, the assertion itself being 
an appraisal of this inadequacy” (p. 50).  
Complementary, following an example about the art of skillful knowing, related to the 
anatomic knowledge of the human body, Polanyi sets emphasis on the topographic 
understandings – intellectual skill – of the known particulars – organs – in relation to the 
whole – region of the body (p. 89 - 90).  
This is a case in which the medical student may say with precision the location of the 
organs in the body, but it is the practice of the experienced surgeon that provides the 
understandings of the implications of the three dimensional arrangements (relationships of 
the particulars to the whole) which still remain incompletely narrated (p. 89 - 90); 
“particulars of which are fully accessible. The difficulty lies here entirely in the subsequent 
integration of the particulars…[a] process … left without formal guidance”. (P. 90). 
“This ineffable domain of skillful knowing … possess[es] the capacity for reorganizing 
their inarticulate knowledge and using it as an interpretative framework” (P. 90), that is, by 
following the  heuristically irreversible ingenuity route ( p. 74).  
Then, we hold limitations, in case of physical skill, in speaking about the useful 
particulars of the act of assimilating the tool; and in case of intellectual skills, in speaking 
about the interpretative framework that explains the relationships of the particulars with the 




count with an adequate symbolic representation system (Polanyi, 1958, p. 90), for either 
describing the assimilation of tools, or the operation of interpretative frameworks..  
While, tacit knowing invokes a set of fundamental and generic abilities – order 
recognition or contriving, pattern generalization, and the committed instrumentalization 
of patterns; ability-based knowing, following and supported in the tacit knowing logic 
calls for specific abilities that are linked to the particular act (pp. 49-63). 
Then, Polanyi’s ability-based knowing is a process exercised without any assisted 
formalism; by means of tools that are subsidiarily assimilated and that do not need to hold 
systematic symbolization; in which its performance is evaluated in terms of private self-set 
standards of usefulness for physical acts and intellectual beauty for intellectual acts. 
Briefly, the principles that illustrate skillful knowing and doing are summarized as follow: 
(1) Involves muscular or intellectual acts  
(2) Exercised without any assisted formalism 
(3) Skill premises about assimilation of tools for physical skills, or the operation of 
interpretative frameworks for intellectual skills are known subsidiarily.  
(4) Skillful knowing is evaluated by private standards of usefulness for physical skills or 
intellectual beauty for intellectual skills.  
(5) Skill maxims could be known by analyzing application and success. 
(6) Talking about a skillful execution depends of  the need of overcoming human 
limitations and the adequacy of the symbolic system known and in use. 
(7) Skills maxims may guide learning and improvement as long they are re-integrated 




4.4.18 Symbol-based Knowing 
The issue of counting with and effective set of language symbols has not been 
completely covered yet. Let’s start quoting three paragraphs from Chapter 5 of Polanyi 
(1958), when he was referring to “thought and speech” and “text and meaning”: 
“No such limitation is imposed on the articulation of a spatial topography, the 
particulars of which are fully accessible. The difficulty lies here entirely in the 
subsequent integration of the particulars, and the inadequacy of articulation consists 
altogether in the fact that the latter process is left without formal guidance.” (p. 90, 
italics added). 
“To assert that I have knowledge which is ineffable is not to deny that I can speak of 
it, but only that I can speak of it adequately, the assertion itself being an appraisal of 
this inadequacy. Reflections of the kind that I made a moment ago ... Such reflections 
must of course appeal ultimately to the very sense of inadequacy which they intend to 
justify. They do not try to eliminate, but only to evoke more vividly our sense of 
inadequate representation, by persevering in the direction of greater precision and 
reflecting on the ultimate failure of this attempt.” (p. 91, italics added). 
 “The domain of sophistication [sophisticated usage of language], on which we now 
enter, is formed by not fully understood symbolic operations which can be:  
(a) a fumbling, to be corrected later by our tacit understanding 
(b) a pioneering, to be followed up later by our tacit understanding. 
More precisely speaking, we should say that we are referring in both these cases to a 
state of mental uneasiness due to the feeling that our tacit thoughts do not agree with 
our symbolic operations, so that we have to decide on which of the two we should 




The main interpretation raised here could be posited in a straight way: when the 
representation or operation of the set of language symbols in use is not adequate for a 
particular striving of intellectual control, our knowing may stay tacit. This insinuates the 
possibility of achieving to express such ineffable knowledge if: (a) such a symbol-based 
system is available, and (b) the knower knows about it, and commits to it.  
The difficulty of such insinuation is that Polanyi (1958) argues for a tension in 
denotation systems between precision and richness, in which the content of what is 
experienced is sacrificed. If we are to be precise, Polanyi was making reference in this 
subject to how detached from the experience are the mathematical symbols (p. 86). 
The issue here is not the possibility of articulating the known by additional means of 
technical or scientific methods and sophisticated language, but if the knowledge holder 
counts himself with the appropriate tool - set of symbols and related meanings - to 
express his understanding effectively, with the richness and precision demanded.  
Finally, as we mentioned before, symbols operation hold the tension between routine 
operations and novel operations define by the level scalability of the symbols in use; now 
we enrich this idea with the alternative that holds the sophisticated usage of language as 
“a pioneering, to be followed up later by our tacit understanding” (Polanyi, 1958, p. 93). 
In summary: 
Communicating about the experiencing of objects use subsidiarily a symbol system 
that hold, to denote the experience, different levels of preciseness, richness, routine 
and novelty, to make explicit our knowing about it. When representation or operation 
of the set of symbols hold and in use is not adequate for a particular striving of 
intellectual control, our knowing may stay tacit and may trigger the knowing, with 




4.4.19 Language-oriented Meanings framed by Culture 
The subsidiary usage of language is the center of Polanyi’s approach for explaining 
meaning.  
First, he starts arguing that our conceptions of objects and the reference to them 
through language terms is “achieved subsidiarily, while our attention is focused on 
making sense of a situation in front of us” (p. 112). The chosen term embodies a 
commitment to “the premises of the traditional interpretation of the universe” of the 
culture of the group to which we belong (p. 112).  
In this sense the “choice of language is a matter of truth or error, of right or wrong, 
of life or death” (p. 113, emphasis added). 
Then, following a conceptual view of meaning, in which the meaning of a term 
corresponds to the concepts of the properties associated with it (Quine, 1960); Polanyi 
(1958) goes on arguing that expanding our abilities of pattern recognition and 
anticipation is our ability of conceiving objective classifications.  
This ability, Polanyi (1958) described, starts by (a) recognizing specifiable properties 
of objects and by denoting those objects to form a vocabulary. The next stage (b) 
involves organizing these denoted objects into denotable classes following intentional 
known but un-specifiable common properties. Noting that, the higher the intention, the 
more clearly will be the identification of the nature of the classifying properties (Polanyi, 
1958, pp. 115, 80). Efforts of clarification of class terms hold a long tradition in history, 
with documented beginnings in the Socratic inquiries about the meaning of terms like 




One outcome of these efforts is the articulation of a definition of the classified object, 
which should be understand as an incomplete formalization of its properties. This 
definition operates as kind of maxims that guide our understanding while dealing - 
practicing – with the essence of the subject matter (Polanyi, 1958, p. 116).  
Finally, (c) there is the territory of the intentional designation of the yet to be known, 
it is the extreme application of our anticipatory abilities; believing it as real (Polanyi, 
1958, p. 116). Here, “our tacit thoughts do not agree with our symbolic operations” (p. 
93), it is either the territory of discovery/invention or the correction of a fumbling (p. 95). 
If successful, it will offer unexpected new ways of clarification and classification – 
pattern detection (p. 117). 
Polanyi (1958) suggest confronting the conflicting situation, in which the same term 
can apply to different particulars, by: (a) admitting that terms has open texture, that is, the 
speaker's sense of fitness of the term is the one who judges that “his words express the 
reality he seeks to express” (p. 113); but (b) arguing that “disagreements on the nature of 
things cannot be expressed as disagreements about the existing use of words” (p.114), 
that is, for example, that we should not present grammar rule based  arguments to solve 
misconceptions about the nature of the object (p. 114).  
We could say that Polanyi (1958) described five principles that relate culture, 
meanings, and language; these, summarily, could be expressed as (see Table 16):  
(1) Conception of meanings is a process that commits focally to a culturally 




(2) Selecting language symbols, which denote our conception of the experienced 
object, is a subsidiary process in regards of the focally attended situation. Here, 
pattern recognition and contriving, and anticipatory abilities achieve to: 
(2a) Organize classes of meanings by their known, but not specifiable common 
properties, and 
(2b) Describe incompletely these meanings through definitions that expressed as 
maxims that guide understanding in action. 
(3) In the case of conflicting denotations, speaker’s sense of fitness to reality in terms 
of the notion of the object and not the symbol resolves the issue. 
(4) In the case of disagreements between tacit thoughts and symbolic operations, the 
alternatives are to consider it, either an invention, or a correction of a fumbling; 
which if successful it will show novelties. 
(5) When representation or operation of symbols in use is not effective for a particular 
experience, our knowing may stay tacit, and may trigger the knowing, explicit or not, 
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1. Involves physical or intellectual acts. 
2. Exercised without any assisted formalism. 
3. Skill premises about assimilation of tools for physical skills, or the operation of interpretative 
frameworks for intellectual skills are known subsidiarily.  
4. Skillful knowing is evaluated by private standards of usefulness for physical skills or 
intellectual beauty for intellectual skills.  
5. Skill maxims could be known by analyzing application and success. 
6. Talking about a skillful execution depends of  the need of overcoming human limitations and 
the adequacy of the symbolic system known and in use. 




































1. Communicating about experiencing objects use subsidiarily a symbol system 
that hold, to denote the experience, different levels of preciseness, richness, 
and scalability, to make explicit our knowing about it.  
2. When representation or operation of the set of symbols hold and in use is not 
adequate for a particular striving of intellectual control, our knowing may stay 
tacit and may trigger the knowing, with symbolic representation or not, of 
novel aspects of the experienced object. 
A focal process that uses 
subsidiarily symbol-
based systems that 
condition the expliciting 
of the known. 




Spoken and written 
words 
Hard science notation 
(mathematics, logic, 
chemistry) 
Domains of the tacit  
Particulars of the act of 
assimilating the tool 
Relationships 
between particulars 
with the whole 
intellectual act 
Anything not specifically 
written 
Precision level   
Lower: sketch,  
Higher: tech drawings 
Lower Higher 
Richness level 
Low: tech drawings, High: 
artwork 
Higher Lower 
Scalability level Higher Intermediate Lower 
Personal attachment 
level 
Higher: sketch,  
Lower: tech drawings 
Intermediate Lower 
Knowing type and 
Knowing domains  
Contriving-based sciences like 
engineering, technology 
Induction-based and 
description sciences like 
social and natural 
sciences 
Deduction-based and exact 
base sciences like logic, 
mathematics & math. 
physics 
Main knowing outcomes  Patents, machines 
Frameworks, 
diagnosis 
Intellectually created objects 
Principles of language-
oriented meanings 
framed by culture 
1. Conception of meanings is a process that commits focally to a culturally 
constructed interpretative framework. 
2. Selecting language symbols that denote our conception of the experienced object 
is a subsidiary process of the focally attended situation; in which pattern 
recognition and contriving, and anticipatory abilities achieve to:  
2a. Organize classes of meanings by their known but not specifiable common 
properties. 
2b. Describe incompletely these meanings through definitions that are 
expressed as maxims that guide understanding in action. 
 3.  In case of conflicting denotations, it’s solved by the speaker’s sense of fitness 
to reality in terms of the object and not the symbol. 
4.  In case of disagreements between tacit thoughts and symbolic operations, 
this is consider either an invention or a correction of a fumbling; which if 
successful it will show novelties. 
5. When representation or operation of symbols in use is not effective for a 
particular experience, our knowing may stay tacit, and may trigger the 
knowing, explicit or not, of novel aspects of the experienced object. 
Language and meanings 
co-operate in a cultural 
interpretative 
framework following 
tool’s contrivance and 
usage logic, and symbols 
representation and 
operation principles. 




4.4.20 Intellectual Passion: Discovering Knowledge, Vision and Persuasiveness 
Previously we reviewed in Polanyi (1958) the case of intellectual appetite as a drive 
that seeks intellectual sensemaking, following private self-adhere standards of usefulness 
for physical acts or intellectual beauty for intellectual acts. Now it is time to view drives 
in terms of interests – passion – instead of appetite (p. 174).  
Polanyi (1958) described intellectual passion in the context of scientific knowing; 
however, Polanyi’s premises explain a broader issue: the intellectual acts of educated 
people (p. 321). 
In few Polanyi’s (1958) passionate words, intellectual passion drives the selective 
function that discriminates between what is and what is not defined (p.142), by charging 
objects with attractiveness or repulsiveness (p. 134), and by accompanying it with 
assertions of fact that hold some personal persuasive feeling, otherwise they are words 
saying nothing. (p. 254).  
Polanyi (1958) presents plausible arguments in support of the three previous phrases. 
Synthesis of his arguments emerged as the following propositions: 
1. Discovery changes the way we see the world, it changes us, by changing our thinking, 
by crossing the problem-discovery heuristic gap (p. 143). 
2. It is logically impossible to fill the heuristic problem-discovery gap by executing 
diligently any previously known and specifiable procedure; we achieved it “by 
relying on the unspecifiable impulse of our heuristic passion, and must undergo as we 




3. Vision that accompanies discovered knowledge “is foreknowledge of things yet 
unknown and at present perhaps inconceivable” and an indispensable guide for “the 
interpretation of all future experience” (p. 135). 
4. New vision of reality separates us from others who still see in the old way. Heuristic 
persuasive passion is the personal ability we use to convert them to ours way of 
seeing (p. 150). 
5. Discovery, to persuade, must suggest a plausible view that resolves the tension among 
(5a) its conceptions, backing facts (certainty, p. 138), contradicting evidence, and 
guide to reject baseless evidence (systematic relevance, p. 138); and (5b) the vision 
(intrinsic interest, p. 138) that guides “the kind of questions that  should be reasonable 
and interesting to explore (p. 135). This tension is resolved in favor of the last priority 
(p.139) when theoretical interest (certainty and systematic relevance) are less 
attractive than practical interest (intrinsic interest) (p. 138). 
6. Persuasive passion leads to controversy (p. 159). 
Then, three ideas are important to recap at this point: 
 (a) Intellectual appetite (making intellectual sense of experience) is the drive that 
triggers ability-based knowing to direct the creation of knowledge, which submits its 
creation to private self set standards of usefulness for muscular/physical acts, or 
private intellectual beauty for intellectual acts that connoisseurs, inventors, scientists, 
and good citizens hold, or  
(b) Intellectual passion (discriminating between what is and what is not defined) is the 




submits its creation to the private (intellectual beauty) and public (practical and 
theoretical interests) standards that educated people hold; and at the scientific level, 
the adhered public standard, is given by the methods and procedures that academics 
formally set.  
(c) A creation, when conceived, changes oneself by framing a new way of seeing 
reality, and it drives to the conversion of others to this understanding by sharing a 
vision that is not only argue by its certainty or systematic relevance, but by its 
plausibility. 
A combination of innate abilities (powers) and developed abilities interact in the 
intellectual passion’s call. Innate abilities are not described at all in this stage of articulate 
knowing by Polanyi (1958); however, he did mentioned them while explaining 
denotations and the principles of representation and operation of language (p.80-82), 
which was review in the previous section.  
We are referring here to a mostly subsidiary act; it is about the usage of symbol-based 
systems laws to describe incompletely our understanding (p. 70), labeled here as symbolic 
denotation. This human innate ability is stated explicitly to recognize formally the key 
role that play language-based systems, and more generally symbol-based systems in 
Polanyi’s personal knowledge. 
Articulation for Polanyi is an explicit act in which its performance is evaluated in 
terms of the expressed ideas, but is tacit in terms that the invocation of the system of 
symbols and its language laws happed subsidiarily (p.59). Now I dare to summarize the 




1.  Heuristic passion works tacitly while crossing the problem-solution gap, it is about 
jumping from conception, backing facts, contradicting evidence and baseless 
evidence, to discovery; it is about changing our thinking, thus changing us (p. 143). 
2. Persuasive passion, which is about the tacit building of the vision of the discovery, 
which advocates for its intrinsic interest and foreseeing of possibilities of the 
discovery, to persuade others about the proposed way of seeing (pp. 138-139, 145). 
3.  The final it’s a ability labeled here as plausible expliciting, which is reveal in the 
way we use symbol-based tools to persuade others about the discovery. It is not only 
about the abilities of speaking or writing properly, like the mentioned at the 
beginning; it is about the plausible linguistic structuring of the new conception, its 
supporting facts, and convincing arguments oriented to convert others, including 
controversy managing, to the new framing of reality (p. 159).  
Interestingly the sequence of these four abilities starts with a tacit knowing act and 
ends with an explicit manifestation (tacit/explicit (symbolic denotation), tacit (heuristic 
passion), tacit (persuasion passion), tacit/explicit (plausible denotation).  
4.4.21 Authority and Trust: a Way of Sharing Meanings and Knowing Convivially 
Previously, when discussing the possibilities of externalizing knowledge, it emerged 
that (1) knowledge sharing is triggered by the need to overcome human limitations in 
search of satisfying appetites, while meeting self-set standards (private or public) of 
knowing performance, (2) knowledge sharing possibilities are shaped by the adequacy of 




exclude premises about assimilation of tools for physical skills, and the operation of 
interpretative frameworks for intellectual skills, since they are known subsidiarily. 
Extending those drivers and limitations, the desire for companionship is argue as the 
main reason for which humans talk to each other; even though company is in some cases 
silently enjoyed, and conversation is the most common mean of sharing experiences 
(Polanyi, 1958, p. 210). 
Polanyi (1958) argues that learning a language ask for the imitation of other persons 
practicing the use of the language, and the effectiveness of this imitation pass thru the 
confidence that the learner places in his masters – the adult, the teacher, the speaker (p. 206).  
Authority of the master and the trust of the learner support the learning of shared 
tools, like language, and their use for carrying messages among them. (p. 207).  
In learning by example, in which one submits to the authority of the skillful master or 
the recognized connoisseur, it is trust – by believing in the knowledge of the connoisseur 
or master’s ways of doing things, even when effectiveness cannot be verified (Polanyi, 
1958, p. 208) – what drives the efforts of the apprentice to unconsciously learns how to 
use tools (p. 53-54).  
Such is also the case of the infant that indwells in the practice of talking in order to 
learn the hidden meaning of speech from the adult behavior (1966, p. 61).   
The messages transmitted include the historically accumulated intellectual artifacts 
and articulate traditions that are passed from one generation to another (Polanyi, 1958, p. 




apprentice of the community that nurtures these traditions; it starts with an act of 
affiliation to their values and a commitment to act according to their standards (p. 207 - 
208) by indwelling in the practice (1966, p. 61).  
Throughout life, the learner places confidence and accepts authority of the intellectual 
leaders of his community; however, this confidence is tacitly supported in a heuristic 
conjecture (Polanyi, 1958, p. 208).  
When the learner becomes skillful and his practice shows results, then his knowing 
justifies the deposited confidence in his masters, releasing the tension of the conjecture. 
However, the proportion of the body of knowledge that we can personally justify is small, 
so we still go on trusting in the knowing authority of others for a huge domains of 
knowledge (p. 208 - 209). 
In a long-term view, the accepting of a knowing authority and his doing and saying 
increases the consensus about his authority. In the opposite way, our dissent with a 
master by rejecting the imitation of his doings and sayings affects his authority in two 
contrasting but enlighten ways. First, the dissenter, if it wishes to impact, “must speak in 
terms that people can understand” (p. 209 – 210) and second, the dissenter is in the route 
of becoming a new teacher or master, a future holder of authority.          
Characterizing many of these communication acts – asserting, accepting, dissenting, and 
explaining – is the nurturing of good fellowship (Polanyi, 1958, p. 210). Fellowship among 
family members, school, work and congregation members besides contributing to “the 




it makes more effective the combined activities of the group, and in this way confirms our 
ascription and search to companionship (p. 211).  
Then, conviviality nurtures not only the communication and sharing of experiences, but 
also the participation in joint activities. At this level, cooperation follows the purposes that 
keep the group together.  
However, conviviality may also be understood by its own right in the form of rituals – 
anniversaries, celebrations, events linked to the rhythm of the season – in which the members 
of a group emotionally “affirm the community of their existence, and at the same time 
identify the life of their group with that of antecedent groups, from whom the ritual has 
descended to them” (p. 211).  
Therefore, convivial existence of a group transcends individuals and establishes 
continuity of the history of the group (p. 211), and by that, the continuity of the time 
instances when sharing of the knowledge of the community happens.    
Summing up, based on the previous review, it is attainable to frame Polanyi’s (1958) 
approach to share meanings by following the classical views of meaning: (1) the cultural 
view (the meaning of a term is given by the beliefs and desirables of the belonging 
culture, Bruner, (1990)); (2) the conceptual view (meaning of a term corresponds to the 
concepts of the properties associated with it, Quine (1960)); and (3) the referential view 
(the meaning of a term corresponds to the object of the world it refers to, Mill (1843)).  
Then, Polanyi’s shared meanings framework could be characterized as language-




(1) Cultural approach to meaning follows conviviality, authority, and trust to shape 
the general interpretative framework.  
(2) Conceptual approach to meaning follows ordering, generalizing, and committing 
human’s heuristic abilities to frame the particular experience. 
(3) Referential approach to meaning follows poverty, consistency, iteration, grammar, 
and manageability symbols laws to denote objects by attending to their notions; while 
ineffective representation or operation may stay tacit, open to novel interpretations, 
with or without symbolic representations.  
In addition, the sharing of knowledge in a community for Polanyi (1958) is explained 
by mainly the six following propositions, in which three constructs - conviviality, 
authority, and trust – play key roles: 
(1) Authority of the master and the trust of the learner support the learning of 
language, skills, and its use to carrying messages among them and using shared 
tools.  
(2) Assimilation of historically accumulated intellectual artifacts and traditions is 
achieved by becoming an apprentice of the community that nurtures these 
traditions; it starts with an act of affiliation to their values and a commitment to 
act according to their standards by indwelling in the practice. 
(3) As the learner becomes skillful and shows results, then his justified knowledge 
validates the confidence in his masters, releasing the tension of the tacitly 
supported trusting heuristic conjecture.  
(4) Given the limited personally justified knowledge, we still continue trusting in the 




(5) Rejecting imitation of masters’ doings and sayings, affects his authority, and leads 
the dissenter in the route of becoming a new teacher, gaining authority. 
(6) Convivial existence of a group transcends individuals and time, establishing 
continuity of the history of the group, and the continuity of future knowledge 
sharing activities; like in rituals as anniversaries, celebrations, events linked to the 
rhythm of the season 
4.4.22 Expressing Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge closer to Organizational Science Needs 
Now we are ready to describe Polanyi’s (1958, 1966) personal knowing in terms more 
close to organizational science; and say that personal knowing is about processes in which:  
1. Inarticulate knowing level: 
Individuals,  (1) in search of successful self-satisfaction of fundamental human 
appetites, perceptual sensemaking, and surroundings sensemaking, (2) by means of 
primitive innate sensory-motor-logical abilities, (3) inarticulately assert the truth 
about facts about the world; (4) while resolving perceptual and surrounding 
sensemaking  tension between “sharpness’ and “reasonableness”  in favor of 
rationality in terms of the best of our innate abilities, and the reference of un-
specifiable past cues; (5) leaving the sensor-motor and ingenuity-based logical  acts 
as non-reversible.. 
2. Articulate knowing level: 
Individuals, (1) in search of intellectual control of experiences following private self-
set standards of usefulness or beauty at ability-based level, and public self-set 




intellectual passion, that assumes (2) there is knowledge in which intellectual needs 
declares its satisfaction, (3) while holding the competence to recognize that 
knowledge as true; and that (3) by accepting the discovery, their intellectual passion 
is satisfied; and (4) since the discovered knowledge stays, it may trigger recursively 
more intellectual needs.  
3. Tacit knowing: 
A process characterized by (1) a subsidiarily call of heuristic abilities to contrive ad 
use tools (physical or intellectual), in such a way that they operate as part of our 
body or existence; (2) tools in which, we recognize or contrive certain order, 
anticipate generalizations, commit and rely; (3) for which the invoked abilities must 
meet truth-committed private or public self-adhered standards of performance; while 
we pay focused attention to the purpose of another act. 
4. Instrumentalization of objects: 
Individuals (1) in their need to understand experiences, and given our human 
limitations, (2) recognize or contrive order in physical or intellectual objects, 
generalize such order in patterns, and commit to its utility for their purposes; (3) 
while achieving progressive unconsciousness of the actions by which the purpose is 
accomplished, (4) following self-set private or public evaluation standards. (5) Such 
instrumentalization may be related to symbol-based content, (6) which follows 
representation and operation principles that (7) hold tensions (7.1) between (7.1.a) 
precise, detach and more reversible representation, and (7.2.b) rich, connected and 




5. Ability-based knowing: 
Process that (1) involves physical or intellectual acts (2) exercised without any 
assisted formalism; (3), by means of objects subsidiarily used to support the purposes 
of the skill under execution, (4) in which its performance is evaluated in terms of 
private self-set standards of usefulness for physical acts and beauty for intellectual 
acts. 
6. Symbol-based knowing: 
Individuals, when (1) communicating about experiencing objects use subsidiarily 
symbol-based systems, conceived with different levels of preciseness, richness, and 
scalability, to make explicit our understanding about it; (2) when representation or 
operation of the set of symbols in use is not adequate for a particular striving of 
intellectual control, our understanding may stay tacit and may trigger the knowing, 
with symbolic representation or not, of novel aspects of the experienced object. 
7. Articulate knowledge sharing level: 
Individuals, when sharing meanings, by means of contrived symbol systems, consider 
their cultural baggage, in which:  
(1) authority of the master and trust of the learner support the learning of tools, 
like language, and their use for carrying messages among them;  
(2) assimilation of historically accumulated intellectual artifacts and traditions is 
achieved by becoming an apprentice in the community that nurtures these 
traditions; and it starts with an act of affiliation to their values and a commitment 




(3) learner’s skillful performance justified his knowledge and release the tension 
in master’s trusting conjecture,  
(4) limited personally justified knowledge, keeps trusting in the authority of others 
for huge domains of knowledge,  
(5) Rejecting imitation of masters’ doings and sayings, affects his authority, and 
leads the dissenter in the route of becoming a new teacher, gaining authority; and  
(6) convivial existence of a group transcends individuals and time, establishing 
continuity of the history of the group, and the continuity of future knowledge 
sharing activities. 
8. Articulate knowledge creation level: 
Individuals trigger either by its 
 (a) intellectual appetite (making intellectual sense of experience), recurring to 
ability-based knowing, create knowledge that submit it to private self-set 
standards of usefulness for physical acts, or private intellectual beauty for 
intellectual acts that connoisseurs, inventors, and good citizens hold; or  
(b) intellectual passion (discriminating between what is and what is not defined), 
recurring to symbol-based knowing, create knowledge, that submit it to private 
(intellectual beauty) and public standards (of practical and theoretical interests) 
that educated people hold; and at the scientific level, the adhered standard, is 
given by the methods and procedures that academics formally set.  
A creation, when conceived, changes oneself by framing a new way of seeing reality, 
and it drives to the conversion of others to this understanding by sharing a vision that 




The above constructs, relationships among constructs, and propositions about Polanyi’s 
personal knowledge view provide more specific handles to the organizational science 
researcher covering specifics on: (1) drives of knowing behavior, (2) personal knowing 
abilities, (3) participating knowing constructs, and (4) knowing principles and processes.     
4.4.23 Polanyi’s Modular, Scalable and Recursive Approach - In a Nut Shell 
Polanyi (1958, 1966) follows a modular, scalable and recursive approach to describe 
the fine details of knowing at individual level keeping in mind social life and science 
epistemology requirements. 
The key to understand the transversal coherence of Polanyi’s personal knowledge 
self-crediting epistemological posture resides in recognizing that the theory provides the 
same consistent explanation for the most rudimentary intellectual behaviors of humans, 
like strivings for the satisfaction of appetites at organs level, to the need to make sense of 
our surroundings, and also for more advance cultural and intellectual behaviors; each 
time, in each level, increasing its scope and complexity, but recursively invoking, through 
specialization or integration, a set of seminal constructs that describe knowing.  
Polanyi’s approach to knowing, over simplify it, points out that humans, by 
instrumentalizing and assimilating physical and intellectual objects, seek to satisfy 
needs and duties related to survival and making sense of experiences; through  a 
process in which acceptance performance criteria, understood as universal and truth 




Such instrumentalization objects – modular, recursive and scalable – goes through 
the application of innate abilities, such as perceiving order, contriving patterns, and 
its commitment; to the more intelligent abilities that assimilate such tools subsidiarily 
as extensions of self; and to abilities that potentially denote the knowledge of 
applying such tools, in terms of the adequacy of symbolic system hold and in use, and 
ultimately, if the satisfaction of our knowing need makes the sharing call.  
However, these transitions do not go easy, since assimilation of tools following self-
set standards of coherence hold the tension between the wiliness of acting judiciously and 
the confidence of executing a novelty. 
The framework draw in Table 17 and Table 18 shows in a tight nutshell – a two-page 
schema– a compact but dense externalization of an elaborated theory. This format is justified 
against the reading tension that provokes Polanyi’s (1958) jumping around from the general 
to the particular, without easily recognizing what construct you are attending.  
In this tabulated framework, except for articulate knowing, vertical pivots describe 
kinds of drives, abilities, and processes; horizontal layers describe the premises of the 
theory that consistently evolve from top to bottom reusing modularly previous premises 
but now specialized or integrated.  
Such layers include primitive truth and knowing criterion, sensemaking logic, tool 
contrivance logic, knowing logic, ability-based and symbol-based knowing processes, 
principles of meaning, and principles of sharing meanings and knowledge.  
Dispense me for showing such dense diagram of the framework, I believe it is useful 
as it provides an integrated view the knowing theory; a seeing annoyance that any PDF 




P o l a n y i ’ s  P e r s o n a l  K n o w l e d g e  F r a m e w o r k  i n  a  N u t s h e l l -  1 / 2  
(1) P r i m i t i v e  i n a r t i c u l a t e  k n o w i n g   
 Drives Abilities Process  
  Appetite satisfaction, 
perceptual and surroundings 
sensemaking 
Evaluated in terms of innate 
private standards of satisfaction 




 sharpness vs. 
reasonableness 
Self-satisfaction of cravings as the 
way of assenting and knowing 
Resolving in favor of rationality in 
terms of best of our innate abilities, 





























      (3) T a c i t  k n o w i n g  
Drive 
The need to make intellectual sense of 
experiences. 
Evaluated by private or public self-
adhered standards of performance, in 
terms of the non-symbolic or symbolic 
nature, respectively, of the tools in use. 
Heuristic Abilities 
Order and pattern 
recognition and contriving 
 Anticipating generalizations 
Intellectual commitment 
Process 
Subsidiary call of heuristic abilities that 
assimilates tools and rely on them as part of 
oneself while paying focused attention to the 
purpose of another act. 
Tension between 

























(4) T o o l s  
 Knowledge as the inst rumenta l i z ed  objects
 
Drive 
Tools as a 







Tools’ Contrivance Logic 
Goes from order recognition or 
contriving, through pattern 
generalization, to the committed 
instrumentalization of patterns. 
Symbols Representation & Operation  
Poverty, Consistency, Iteration, Grammar and 
Manageability Laws define how symbols may 
scale up or down the notations of objects to the 
dimensions of our comprehension. 
Tool’s symbolic content holds the tension between 
  Representation:    Rich, connected, and less reversible  Precise, detach, and more reversible 
      Operation:       Novel operations (rich scalability)  Routine operations (limited scalability)  
Tools   Usage  




    Action- 














Communication-    
 oriented 
knowing 
Drives                 
 with public 
standards 
(5) A b i l i t y - b a s e d  K n o w i n g  
Skillful Doing and Knowing Principles 
1. Involves physical or intellectual acts. 
2. Exercised without any assisted formalism 
3. Skill premises about assimilation of tools 
for physical skills, or the operation of 
interpretative frameworks for 
intellectual skills are known subsidiarily.  
4. Skillful knowing is evaluated by private 
standards of usefulness for physical skills 
or intellectual beauty for intellectual skills.  
5. Skill maxims could be known by 
analyzing application and success.  
6. Talking about a skillful execution 
depends of the need of overcoming 
human limitations and the adequacy of 
the symbolic system known and in use. 
7. Skills maxims may guide learning and 
improvement as long they are re-
integrated subsidiarily.  
(6) S y m b o l - b a s e d  K n o w i n g  
Symbolic  Knowing Process  
(1) Communicating about experiencing objects 
use subsidiarily symbol-based systems, conceived 
with different levels of preciseness, richness, and 
scalability, to make explicit our understanding 
about it. 
(2) When representation or operation of the set 
of symbols in use is not adequate for a particular 
striving of intellectual control, our understanding 
may stay tacit and may trigger the knowing, with 
symbolic representation or not, of novel aspects 
of the experienced object. 
Princ iples of  language -or iented 
meanings  
 Language and meanings co-operate in a cultural 
interpretative framework following tool’s 
contrivance and usage logic, and symbols 
representation and operation principles. 
 
Table 17. Polanyi’s (1958 and 1966) Personal Knowledge Framework – (1 of 2). 

























 (7)  K n o w l e d g e      
 S h a r i n g  L o g i c
Knowledge Shar ing Dr ives and L im itat ions  
1. Triggered by the need to overcome human limits in search of satisfying appetites. 
2. Shaped by the adequacy of symbolic system hold and in use while knowing. 
3. May exclude premises about assimilation of tools for physical skills and operation 
of interpretative frameworks for intellectual skills, since they are known subsidiarily.  
4. Desire for companionship: Triggers conversations, which is the most common 
mean of sharing experience. 
 
Authority and trust to share 
meanings and knowledge 
convivially 




























(1) Authority of the master and the trust of the learner support the 
learning of shared tools, like language, and their use for carrying 
messages among them.  
(2) Assimilation of historically accumulated intellectual artifacts and 
traditions is achieved by becoming an apprentice of the community 
that nurtures these traditions; it starts with an act of affiliation to their 
values and a commitment to act according to their standards by 
indwelling in the practice. 
(3) As the learner becomes skillful and shows results, then his justified 
knowledge validates the confidence in his masters, releasing the 
tension of the tacitly supported trusting heuristic conjecture. 
(4) Given the limited personally justified knowledge, we still continue 
trusting in the authority of others for huge domains of knowledge. 
(5) Rejecting imitation of masters’ doings and sayings, affects his authority, 
and leads the dissenter in the route of becoming a new teacher, gaining 
authority. 
(6)    Convivial existence of a group transcends individuals and time, 
establishing continuity of the history of the group, and the continuity of 
future knowledge sharing activities; like in rituals as anniversaries, 
celebrations, events linked to the rhythm of the season. 
(1) Cultural approach: 
conviviality, authority, and 
trust shape the general 
interpretative framework.  
(2) Conceptual approach:  
ordering, generalizing, and 
committing human’s heuristic 
abilities frame the particular 
experience. 
(3) Referential approach:  
follows poverty, consistency, 
iteration, grammar, & 
manageability symbols laws 
to denote objects by 
attending to their notions; 
while ineffective 
representation or operation 
may stay tacit, open to novel 
interpretations, with or 
without symbolic 
representations. 
(8)   K n o w l e d g e C r e a t i o n Knowledge Creation Drives 
Intellectual appetite: Need to make intellectual sense of experience. 
Intellectual passion: Selective function that discriminates between what is and 
what is not defined, by charging objects with attractiveness or repulsiveness.  
 Knowledge Creation Logic
Knowledge created is submitted: 
(1)  at ability-based knowing, to 
private standards of usefulness & 
intellectual beauty that connoisseurs, 
inventors, and good citizens hold, or 
 (2) at symbol-based knowing, to 
private & public standard of 
intellectual beauty & practical or 
theoretical interest that educated 
people hold, and  
(3) at scientific level, to the methods 
that academics formally set;  
(3) such knowledge changes oneself by 
framing new ways of seeing reality, and 
(5) drives to convert others by sharing 
a vision, 
(6) that is not only argued by its 
certainty or systematic relevance , but 















































Articulating what is known 
Symbolic denotation (labeled here) is about the usage of 
symbol -based systems laws to describe incompletely our 
understanding. 
Heuristic passion works subsidiarily while crossing the problem-
solution gap, and it is about jumping from conception, backing 
facts, contradicting evidence, and baseless evidence, to 
discovery; it is about changing our thinking, thus changing us. 
Persuasive passion heuristic is about the subsidiary building of 
vision of the discovery, which advocates for its intrinsic interest 
and foreseeing possibilities of the discovery, to persuade others 
about the proposed way of seeing.  
Plausible expliciting (labeled here) is about the plausible 
linguistic structuring of the new conception, its supporting 
facts, and convincing arguments, oriented to convert others, 
including controversy managing, to the new framing of reality. 




4.5 WEICK’S SENSEMAKING AS INDIVIDUAL KNOWING 
4.5.1 Weick’s Sensemaking Unframed Characteristics 
According to March and Olsen (1976), in organizations, assigning meanings to text, 
events, issues, situations, organizational hierarchies, work environments, and so on, 
reflects an interpretation of them by organizational actors and observers (p. 19).  
This process of interpreting in organizations is best described by the sequence of 
assumptions of the empirical work of Porac, Thomas and Banden-Fuller (1989), where: 
(a) organizational activities and structures are specified in part by micro-momentary 
actions of their members, (b) actions that follow a sequence in which members focus on 
environmental cues, interpret them, and show their interpretations by means of concrete 
activities, (c) then, meaning is developed when cues are linked to learned or in progress 
cognitive structures, and (d) organizational members are able to externalized their 
interpretations and the process followed to arrive to those meanings. 
Weick (1995) critically examined this previous interpretation sequence and identify 
that the above conception of interpretation left unspecified some important issues like 
how the particular cues were choose from the ongoing situation, how are the 
interpretations revealed as concrete activities (p. 8), and how do we go from discovering 
meanings to creating meanings (p. 9).  
In order to attend to this issues, he did not question such conception of interpretation 
but advocates for the understanding of sensemaking as a concept (Weick, 1995, p. 4 - 62), 




situations (Weick, 1995, p. 4; Schon, 1983), characterized by incoherent and unordered 
events, in which issues and surprises (Louis, 1980), current and possible, are 
retrospectively analyzed, progressively clarified (Weick, 1995, pp. 4, 11), and  justified 
from an anticipated conclusion to the later revealed definitions, and explained as coherent 
(Weick, 1995, pp. 10-11; Garfinkel, 1967; Louis, 1980).  
Then, the sensemaker selects, labels with a sharable language, places and links 
objects of the situation, and sets its boundaries (Weick, 1995, p. 9; Schon, 1983; Shotter, 
1993), in a social ongoing conversation with others and himself, among the many he is, in 
regards of the appreciations that the implicated members hold about him and about the 
situation; with a triple intention: (a) describing self and thus defining self (Knorr-Centina, 
1981); either by (a1) following a self-image maintaining options (Dutton & Dukerich, 
1991), or by (a2) following a innovating transacting pattern (Ring & Van de Ven, 1989); 
(b) shaping or reshaping of a plausible story, revealed sometimes as frame of reference 
((Starbuck & Milliken, 1988), or cognitive map (Gioia & Chitipeddi, 1991), and other 
times articulated as a metaphor (Shotter, 1993); and (c) enacting workable understandings 
that tells “as it is”, but also “as it might be”, voicing a leading and compelling way of 
seeing the situation (Thayer, 1988).  
Thus, giving plausible prospection and reverse clarification, sensemaking is about 
reading and discovering, but also about authoring and invention, (Daft & Weick, 1984); it 
is about structuring the unknown (Waterman, 1990) and about defining and creating the 
faced environment (Pondy & Mitroff, 1979); and about the alternatives of describing self 




In this sensemaking interactive process Weick (1995, p. 17) discussed and worked 
with seven characteristics historically considered in the literature of sensemaking: (1) 
grounded in identity construction, (2) retrospective, (3) enactive of sensible 
environments, (4) social, (5) ongoing, (6) focuses on and by extracted cues, and (7) 
driven by plausibility rather than accuracy).  
He offered then as raw material and as an observer’s manual, neglecting for then a 
framing, other than a sequence, and inviting to refine and test them (p.18). However, 
trying to apply Weick’s sensemaking narrated view in observations in everyday life and 
in the life of organizations, as is, ended, after persistently trying, being a confusing and 
incomplete effort.  
Weick’s observer’s manual is a profound narrated structuring of the main constructs 
that participate in a human act that deals with the structuring of the unknown, called 
“sensemaking’. His guide asks for a tentative explicit frame with more identifiable 
propositions (p. 18) than the ones than are being offered if one will like it to test it, or 
apply it. I could not find such framing in extant literature.  
4.5.2 Weick’s Sensemaking as Individual Knowing 
When sensemaking is argued extensibility by Weick to be more than interpreting or 





“… think about the wonderfully compact account of sensemaking mentioned by Graham 
Wallas. “The little girl had the making of a poet in her who, being to be sure of her 
meaning before he spoke, said: ‘How can I know what I think till see what I say’ ” (p. 12).   
I argue here that such quotation equates sensemaking to knowing; in the same way 
that it does the following Weick’s example of sensemaking: 
 “… a pivotal painter or sculptor or poet gives those who follow him (or her) a 
different way of “seeing” - and therefore saying and doing and knowing in the 
world” (p. 10).   
Reviewing in detail the sensemaking process – defined as the dealing with ill defined 
situations (p. 9), or confronting the stimulus placed into framed situations (pp. 4, 31), or 
more generally conceived as the need to structure the unknown (p. 4) – will reveal that 
Weick’s sensemaking describes an integrated approach and process of individual 
knowing that includes the self, logical, emotional, social and actionable perspectives of 
individual knowing. 
The case presented to understand individual sensemaking as individual knowing will 
be fully crystallized in the next sections. The approach follows rigorously Weick’s (1995) 
sayings, and corresponds to its open coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) that tries to make 




4.5.3 Plausible knowing: Skills and Context Shape and Limit Stories Told  
To structure the unknown of ill-defined situations, citing Miller (1978), Weick (1995, 
p. 57) argues that (1) people invokes filters to avoid data overflow, and that (2) given this 
human limitation, the filtering of cues makes accuracy meaningless.  
From that position, Weick posits, that we tend to choose among the multiple filtered 
cues, one that we embellish. Such embellishing is frequently achieved by linking the cue 
to a more general idea that mostly brings memories of interpretation form the past. In 
doing so, time plays a role, in which (3) quick responses shape meaning before the 
accurate one, together with an implied lower cost (p.58).  
However, in situations in which accuracy is critical, (4) we are able to attend such 
requirement in a circumscribed way; that is, focally and for a short period; this is due to 
our human limits and to the speed of changes of the world, and because (5) accuracy 
demands constant stimulus, a condition that seldom happens (p.58).  
In any case, (6) personal abilities for action affect what is believed and acted; then 
accuracy stops being the target, since (7) it holds immobilization powers, which is 
avoided through simplification (p. 60).  
In such process, Weick (1995, p.61) argues that (8) a plausible story, instead of an 
account that tells with accuracy the perceive objects of a situation, is more viable. 
Plausible, coherent, and reasonable stories, in the form of metaphors, paradigms, or cause 
maps, reveal patterns of what is already in the mind of the actor and insinuate more order 
for the future.  
In few words, the structuring of a plausible story is shaped and bounded by certain 




4.5.4 Prospective Knowing: Faithful Presumption of certain Contextual Order 
While plausibility defines the kind of story that will structure the unknown, the logic 
that defines the referent of the story, as we will see in certain detail, is prospection for a 
cue to which we will faithfully follow (Weick, 1995, p. 54).  
This prospection generally goes on by noticing particular cues from a situation in 
which (1) we extract a characteristic as representation of a whole noticed object 
(Weick, 1995, p. 49). This extracted cue highlights distinct implication of the whole 
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Propositions Participating Factor Factor Type 
1 
People invoke filters to avoid data 
overflow. 





Accuracy is meaningless with filtered 
cues. 





Quick responses shape meaning before 
accuracy. 
Cost benefit assessment Context 
4 
Circumscribed accuracy is the most we 
can hope in a changing world. 
Human limits of attention 





Accuracy demands steady stimulus, 
state that seldom happens. 
Limits in external stimulus Context 
6 
Human capabilities affect what is 
believed and acted, accuracy is not the 
goal. 
Misaligned human abilities Constrain 
7 
Accuracy can immobilize, to avoid it 
people simplify. 
Pattern simplification Skill 
8 
Instead of accuracy, plausible, coherent, 
and reasonable stories show patterns of 
what is already in the mind and 











object (p. 50), and (2) points to it offering several possible expressions, in which the 
actual one is progressively specified while interacting with its context (Weick, 1995, 
p. 51; Shotter, 1983). 
Here, context influences what is noticed and (4) how is extracted (Weick, 1995, p. 53; 
Leiter, 1980): 
(3) What is noticed as a clue follows criteria like (3a) time (speed, frequency), (3b) 
valuation of experience (positive, pleasant, extreme), and (3c) form (color, shape). 
(4) Context provides a frame to decide meanings of objects like in (4a) social context 
(Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) (norms and expectations), (4b) institutional and 
political context (explanations of struggles) (Hall, 1984), or (4c) organizational 
context (expert’s openness to changes and generalist’s preference for stability) 
(Starbuck & Milliken, 1988).  
Then, when conceiving extracted cues as a point of reference, (5) we presume 
cognitively certain contextual order. The faith on such conception leads people to act, 
which materializes order (p. 54; Weick, 1983), given space to a self-fulfilling prophecy 
that mutually informs and adjust the reference point according to the emerging situation 





Table 20. Weick's Sensemaking (1995): Framing Prospective Knowing. 
 
4.5.5 Retrospective Knowing: a Stimuli-based Reverse Clarification Process 
Retrospection is set as the most relevant feature of sensemaking and meaning 
building by Weick (1995, p. 24). Let us start its framing by synthesizing the five key 
propositions that Weick states about retrospection (p. 24 – 30).  
Weick says first, (a) that situations are experiences of the past; then the act of 
attention is focus on what has already occurred; that is, experiences will be known only 
when they have been completed.  
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Prospective Knowing: Faithful presumption of a contextual order  
Context guides 
What is noticed 
Cue Prospection Logic 
Context guides  
How is extracted 
(3) Context influences 
what is noticed as a clue, 
following criteria of: 
(3a) Time (speed, 
frequency). 
(3b) Valuation of 
experience (positive, 
pleasant, extreme). 
 (3c) Form (color, 
shape). 
(1) Extracted cue 
(property of the object) is 
taken as the object’s 
representation, and that 
highlights the distinct 
implication of the object. 
(4) Context provides frame to 
decide   meanings of objects: 
(4a) Social norms and 
expectations. 
(4b) Institutional and 
political explanations of 
struggles. 
(4c) Organizational account 
for expert’s openness to 
changes & generalist’s 
preference for stability. 
(2) Extracted cue points 
to object as a whole, 
offering several possible 
expressions, the actual 
one is progressively 
specified in interaction 
with its context. 
(5) Faith and action over -> extracted cue’s presume contextual order -> leads to tangible 




Second, (b) what is occurring at the moment of attention influences the meaning 
discovered. The implication of this is that given the several independent projects that one 
maybe participating at one moment, in which particular private and not necessarily 
compatible purposes are pursued, the sensemaker confronts the challenge of equivocality 
due to the many meanings that may surge from the retrospective synthesis.  
Then, this equivocality challenge asks for values and priorities to clarify what is 
relevant in the analyzed experience (Weick, 1995, p.28). Notice that, if the time span 
between act and reflection is short it implies that our memory is fresher and that there are 
fewer projects ongoing in the mind, making distortion less significant.  
Third, (c) that these experiences of the past are in our memory and anything affecting 
remembering will affect the meaning assigned to those memories. This is, that giving the 
different level of awareness, due to the passing of time, which we hold about experiences, 
past is rebuild knowing the conclusion by tending to erase causal links that make difficult 
the arrival to it (Weick, 1995, p. 28; Starbuck & Milliken, 1988, p. 37).  
Fourth, (d) what we chose as stimulus affects the choice of meanings of the 
experiences, that is motivations make reading of past experiences as ordered and holder 
of clear causality, even if it sounds as a poor story (Reason, 1990, p. 91).  
And fifth, (e) different situational contexts affect choices of stimulus and 
meaning, that is, as present projects and goals change, meanings change (Weick, 




Weick closed the review of the features of retrospection by saying that the current 
context determines the meaning of past, and when a situation is seen from a high 
order level, the sensemaker is focused on issues like strategy, risk and speed factors; 
while at the operational level, sensemaker is more concerned with tactics, 
entrepreneurship and accuracy (Gephart, 1992, Fiske, 1992).  
There is a need to comment here that, since the implications of the human memory 
limits have already been argued and framed while discussing Plausible Knowing; 
concerns may question its double referencing. To attend this, we have to recall that its 
previous framing followed a structural and given cause (skill) and here, the approach is a 
processual and intended cause (logic of retrospection).  
In summary, Weick’s picture of retrospection for meaning building is characterized 
by (1) experiencing a specific later contextualized attention, (2) influenced and stimulated 
by: (2a) current values and priorities (it helps to reduce equivocality due to data 
overload), (2b) role (which focuses attention in their corresponding rights and dues), and 
(2c) goals and other ongoing projects (their changes, change meanings of actual 
situation); (3) using a logic that  (3a) searches for unproblematic cues, (3b) selects 
imperfect memories of past situations, and (3c) structures causal links that explain a 
previously known conclusion.  
However, the following question rises “How does this description of retrospective 
knowing offers lights on what triggers knowing reactively or knowing proactively?” I 
believe that a possible answer is buried in the values, priorities and preferences that are 




matters in a specific experience giving the multiple interpretation paths offered by the 
sensemaker’s current several ongoing projects.  
In other words, values hold the capability of influencing interpretation on either the 
passive reading of the situation or the active authoring of the particular situation (p. 7). 
Then, proposition 2a regarding current values and priorities is not only oriented to reduce 
the equivocality due to data overload, but also to influence the reading-authoring 
knowing posture (see Table 21). 
However, this approach raises a new question, “How is that the issue of values, as a 
caller of the reading-authoring knowing posture, is framed in the retrospective knowing 
characteristic and not in the apparently more appropriate prospective knowing?” 
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Influenced and stimulated by : 
(2a) Current values & priorities: 
          to call reading-authoring knowing postures 
          to reduce equivocality due to data overload 
(2b) Role 
        which focuses attention in their related rights and dues  
(2c) Goals and other ongoing projects 





c Shaped by the chosen stimulus toward:  
(3a) Unproblematic searches 
(3b) Selection of imperfect memories of past situations  
(3c) Reverse clarification of causal links  




 Intents to answer are based on the believe that a seminal prospection (Proposition 1 
of prospective knowing: Extracted cue is taken as object’s representation and highlights a 
distinct implication) triggers retrospective knowing to choose a distinct cue stimulated by 
values (proposition 2a), and then goes back to prospective knowing to frame the 
presumed contextual order (propositions 2 to 5). Of course, this answer is a systemic 
oversimplification, however a plausible one, among many others.     
4.5.6 Emotional Knowing: Interruptions Invoke our Emotional Memory 
Weick’s (1995) on-going characteristic of sensemaking, describes humans as living in 
a continuous flow of simultaneous projects in which (1) cues are extracted from the flow 
of projects through interruptions (p. 43). This (2) interruptions provoke a slow arouse of a 
rudimentary sensemaking (p. 45; Mandler, 1984) that insists in completing the sequence 
of the ongoing activities (p.46). The (3) longer the primitive search for sense, the stronger 
the emotion (pp. 45, 48; Mandler, 1984) that accompanies the cognitive appraisal of the 
link between the actual situation (at the point of the interruption) and the relevant prior 
situation (p. 46; ). (4) Speed, kind (positive or negative) and intensity of triggered 
emotions are proportional to (4a) how tight the activities are organized, (4b) how 
important they are, and (4c) the level of alignment of the interruption with the execution 
(p.47 – 48).  
Closing this on-going characteristic Weick’s (1995) posits that (5) cue recalling tend 
to be mood congruent (p. 49, Snyder & White, 1982), that is, past experiences are framed 




Then, emotional knowing is trigger by interruptions which affect cue noticing and  
shaping in prospective knowing and retrospective knowing, but also what is noticed in 
them also shapes emotional knowing. 
Now that  we understand that (1) plausible knowing shapes and limit the story, (2) 
prospective knowing faithfully follows presume contextual order towards a tangible 
ordered story, (3) retrospective knowing searches for causal links of the known order 
stimulated by values, role and goals, and (4) emotional knowing affects cue noticing; we 
can notice the multiple relations that they hold among them, and propose to conceive 
them as intertwined activities that invoke each other interactively (see Figure1).      
4.5.7 Self knowing: Describing Self or Defining Self 
From a Weickanian (1995, pp. 18-61) perspective in which sensemaking is an 
ongoing retrospective process grounded in the construction of identity, focus on and by 
the extraction of cues, to enact a sensible and plausible environment. 
Here, knowing starts with oneself by conversing among the many that we are (pp. 19-
20), developing understandings while either describing self and thus defining self (Knorr-
Centina, 1981), or defining self and thus describing self, in such a way that the definition 
operates in the service of three personal needs: (1) self-enhancement, (2) self-efficacy, (3) 
self-consistency (Weick, 1995, p. 20; Erez & Earley, 1993).  
The sensemaking pattern proposed by Weick (1995) to service these three self-image needs 
follows two different approaches, the first one, a reactive one, holds an adaptive reading tone of 




In the sensemaking reactive approach, the previously three declared identity needs 
reveal dependence of our perception of the assessments of our image by others. Thus, 
preservation or repairing of image follows a certain adaptive pattern as described by Weick 
(1995, p. 21) when following Dutton and Dukerich (1991), summarized as follows: 
(a) Owning or disowning actions depending on how favorable they attend identity 
needs, or 
(b) When actions represent a personal image threat related to identity needs, then 
people may opt to search for a new sense of their images, including the chance to 
change the situational image, or  
(c) When redefinition of the situational image does not work, them people may even 
search for another frame of reference (e.g., professional, political, religious). 
So, the rephrasing of these ideas in the context of self-knowing, portraits self-image 
caring behavior options that are enacted by (a) selecting cues from the situation that are 
compatible with oneself and personal image in the situation, or (b) re-interpreting 
threatening cues as benign, when possible, or (c) trying to adapt the situational image to 
assimilate these threatening cues, or (d) looking for a less-threatening elsewhere to shared 
meanings with, when the previous actions fail.   
In the sensemaking proactive approach, the identity needs reveal a simultaneous 
reacting and shaping of the situation. Weick (1995, p.22), when referencing Ring and 
Van de Ven (1989) and Louis (1980) on occasions of transacting in innovation in 
organizations described a sensemaking pattern - label here innovative transaction 
behavior pattern - that is basically characterized by following four central ideas (Louis, 




(1) Selecting the role that one will be played in the situation, taking into account the 
consequences for oneself.  
(2) Extracting cues according to the chosen role.  
(3) Enforcing workable understandings according to chosen role.  
(4) Invoking mutability, flexibility and adaptability approaches to deal with 
inconsistencies of oneself and of the situation. 
However, following this self-knowing framing raises a relevant question “What does 
trigger the reactive self-image caring behavior options or the proactive innovative 
transaction behavior pattern?  
Weick’s (1995, pp. 24 - 30) description of the retrospective characteristic of 
sensemaking as framed in the proposition 2a in the section Retrospective Knowing: A 
stimuli-based reverse clarification offers hints for an answer: values hold the capability 
of influencing interpretation on either the passive reading of the situation or the active 
authoring of the particular situation. 
4.5.8 Social Knowing: Workable Social Understandings 
Since (a) the work of Schutz (1964), in which the requisites for participation in a 
social group follows interpretations and interactions that recur to natives’ constructs, to 
(b) the updated version of the socialization of apprentices, from Lave and Wenger (1991), 
in which new comers become familiar with tasks, vocabulary, and organizing principles 
of the community through peripheral activities; learning has been conceived as a social 





However, Weick (1995) emphasizes, from the perspective of social knowing in two 
central main ideas that, as we will see, they are recognizable, but they are not enough 
developed as to be easily framed as propositions.  
The first one, simply set, it is that we hold conversations with others and selves about 
what the implicated others think about the situation (p. 39). These conversations covers a 
variety of issues like promises, lies, threats, rumors, commitments in which words, 
working as categories, help to develop stable connections that guide people in their 
endeavors (Weick, 1985, p. 128; 1995, p. 41).   
The second idea, confines the purpose of social interaction to agree on, or better to 
trigger joint action (Weick, 1995, p. 42). However, this is not only about sharing 
meanings, but also about a variety of approaches for arriving to joint action. A brief 
review of these workable social mechanism can sent light about their reading or 
authoring posture for joint action.  
Non-disclosive intimacy (Eisenberg, 1990) corresponds to the shared sufficient 
condition that allows the relating among participants and the coordination of actions 
“as long as the task stays constant and the environment remains stable” (p. 160).  
Equivalent meanings (Donnellon, Gray, and Bougon, 1986) correspond to those 
interpretations of participants about a shared object or situation that are 
equifinal, which is "interpretations that are dissimilar but that have similar 
behavioral implications" (p. 44). 
Satisficing naming (Turner, 1978; Czarniawska-Joerges, 1992) corresponds to the 
satisficing denotation of objects, from the participants, that allows action to follow, or 




Distributed meanings (Rasmussen, Brehmer & Leplat, 1991) is described as the 
approach in which participants shared cognitions by means of symbolic 
representations encapsulated in entities that people use as tools. Such entities offer 
handles that other participants may use to invoke cognitions similar to the intended 
representation, however, such representations may fail or provoke different 
cognitions to the intended one.    
Collective action (Hardy, Lawrence and Grant, 2005) corresponds to the process in 
which participants, while discoursing, construct a collective identity that relates them 
to shared issues and to each other, which lead them to collaborate in innovative 
actions, while participants discoursing keep on. 
Overlapping views of ambiguous events (Eisenberg, 1984) is described as the kind of 
communication process among participants that “foster(s) agreement on abstractions 
without limiting specific interpretations” (p. 235) in search of flexibility, creativity, 
and adaptability. 
Then, (1) conversation with others and self  about what the implicated think about the 
situation, and (2) workable social formations oriented to joint action based on (2a) non-
disclosive intimacy, (2b) equivalent meanings, (2c) shared meanings, (2d) satisficing 
naming of objects, (2e) distributed meanings, (2f) collective action, (2g) overlapping 
views of ambiguous events, constitute the central ideas of social knowing.  
4.5.9 Enacting Knowing: Constraining or Habilitating Acts  
When we confront either meaning making as, either, the interpretation that explains 
the things that exist, or as the sensemaking that explains how things come to exist 
(Weick, 1995, p. 30), we are dealing with graded scenarios, in which, in one extreme, 




options; and, in the other extreme, people face a same situation to construct new realities 
(p. 31) through authority acts following a innovative transaction behavior pattern.  
In any case, people’s acts create objects that become constrains or opportunities – 
stimulus – that will: (a) confront their own created challenge, (b) face reactions of our 
pre-announce posture, or (c) pay the consequences of our own created increasingly 
uncontrolled situation (Weick, 1995, p. 31). 
In this mutual interaction that cause the individual to act with the activity that himself 
produced, Weick (p. 32) poses that the individual behavior should be understood as the active 
process of the relating activities – meeting and interpreting; in which intervening parts 
continuously change due to their own responding act, by the very process of expecting a 
meeting, and by the meeting itself we become something different (Follet, 1924, p.62 – 63). 
In the context of the individual knowledge framework, these interdependent relating 
activities with the environment are understood, in the case of the more passive knowing 
reading tone (Weick, 1995, p. 34), as the enactment of a form of resistance to change (p. 
33) - by bracketing experiences and imposing known categories to things discovered in 
the specific situation (p. 35) - through acts that create constraining objects (p. 31).  
In addition, in the more active knowing authoring tone, these relating activities are 
understood as the enactment of a form of confrontation of possible incompatible interests 
- in which judgment is temporarily suspended (Weick, 1995, p. 33) to achieve 
possibilities of integrating differences (p. 34) - through acts that create opportunities 




the situation. What is created is given meaning (p. 38), “[i]n other words, people set in 
such a way that their assumptions of realism become warranted” (p. 36).  
Summing up, enactment of discovering or inventing in certain situations correspond 
to a behavioral process, and not to the outcome of the process, in which interdependent 
relating activities between individuals and the situation produce changes in interpretation 
just by expecting to act and by acting itself. In this process, discovering and inventing 
follow different routes, but it is in these enactments, when successful, that the recognition 
of knowers happens.   
Discovering is enacted by: (1) resisting change by means of instantiating constraining 
objects or events; which is, by imposing known categories to the situation; thus (2) 
discovering meanings of what is there.  
Inventing is enacted by: (1) embracing change by creating opportunity-enable objects 
or events; which is, by exploring with new categories to frame the situation. This ask for 
(1.a) suspending judgment, and (1.b) confronting and, if possible, integrating differences; 
which in summary corresponds to (2) assigning meanings to the created reality.       
4.5.10 Weick’s Sensemaking Framework 
Weick´s (1995) sensemaking activities are interactive and recursive; nevertheless, a 
departing point is a helpful way to star adding conditions and refinements within an 
initiative that tries to frame sensemaking as knowing. We have already characterized 




(a) Ill-defined situations, which are defined as events that trigger the structuring of the 
unknown. This is a starting point that follows the structure “knowing drives - knowing 
abilities”. 
(b) Enactment of constrains (constraining acts) or opportunities (habilitating acts) 
that create situations that also ask for their structuring.  
These two departing points (ill-defined situations and enactments) are a simplified 
way of understanding the triggering of knowing in everyday situations, and a useful path 
for drafting a scheme of the knowing process.  
The graphical representation of the framework showed in Figure 1 posits a way of 
seeing Weick’s sensemaking from the perspective of individual knowing. A way that 
shows a continuous flow of interacting activities (1 to 8) that are invoked by changes in 
the situation (1 and 8.3),  other activities, and interruptions of the knowing process. 
Weick’s (1995) recalls us, that we attend many projects in a certain moment, this 
framework assumes that attending to other knowing processes is another kind of 









4.5.11 Matching Weick’s Sensemaking Constructs with Individual Knowing 
The emerged constructs, relationships among constructs and propositions about 
Weick’s sensemaking, framed, as individual knowing, are now ready for the discovery of 
the following specifics (through the grounded theory): (a) personal knowing abilities, (b) 
drives of knowing behavior, (c) participating knowing constructs, and (d) knowing 
principles and processes.  
In terms of Weick, drives of knowing behavior are given by the human need of 
structuring the unknown manifested in (a) making sense of ill-defined situations or (b) 
enacted situations through constraining or habilitating objects or events (see Table 23). 
While interviewing Weick’s (1995) text, personal knowing abilities were made 
explicit in some of the sensemaking stages, not so much in others. What comes next is a 
summarized description of the axial coding process, in which the (a) Ability’s reference 
numbering with [brackets] follows Table 23, and the (b) Proposition’s reference 
numbering without brackets follows Weick’s Framework diagram in Figure 1. 
In the Plausible knowing stage, we identify the following four abilities: [1] Perception 
filtering, [2] Pattern recognition, [3] Pattern simplification, [4] Pattern contriving, and 
[11] Plausible storytelling.  
In the Prospective knowing stage, proposition 5: Faith and action over presumed 
contextual order leads to tangible order, allows to posit [5] Commitment as knowing 
as a personal ability.  
In the Retrospective knowing stage, is easy to recognized that the abilities invoked 




In the Emotional knowing stage, proposition 5: Cue recalling tends to be mood 
congruent; leads to a broader understanding of Patterning recognition. The 
proposition posits that we do not only incorporate recalled past events due to how 
they look, but also how they feel (Weick, 1995, p. 49). Therefore, the specialization 
of the ability 5 into: [2a] Perceptual pattern recognition and [2b] Emotional pattern 
recognition is more plausible. 
Self Knowing stage invokes, for the case of Self-image caring behavior options, to [2] 
Pattern recognition, [3] Pattern simplification, and a specialization of [5] 
Commitment, which is [5a] Tight commitment to recognized pattern ability.  
Stage Self Knowing invokes, for the case of Innovative behavior transaction pattern, to [2] 
Pattern recognition, [3] Pattern simplification, [4] Pattern contriving; and a specialization of 
[5] Commitment; which is [5b] Loose commitment to contrived patterns ability.  
In the Social knowing stage, given the already explained difficulties to elaborate 
propositions for this stage; the most we can say is based in the tradition of 
socialization studies (Schutz, 1964; Lave & Wegner, 1991), which is that the knower 
needs to be competent in interacting with others by being familiar with vernacular 
interpretation framework, language and artifacts of the participating community ([7] 
Interacting through vernacular language and artifacts).  
Also, we could say that the concept of workable social understandings, with its 
variety of ways of driving joint action through social meaning (non-disclosive 
intimacy, equifinal meanings, shared meanings, satisficing naming of objects, 
distributed meanings, collective action, and overlapping views of ambiguous events)  
portrays a set of personal knowing abilities, label here as [8] Forming social 
workableness.  
These abilities were listed above and grey tinted in the diagram of the frame (Figure 





Finally, Enacting knowing stage, in case of the Discovery posture, invokes the 
abilities [2] Pattern recognition, [3] Pattern simplification, and [9] Imposing known 
categories/patterns; and, in case of the Inventing posture, the abilities invoked are [6] 
Suspending judgments, [4] Pattern contriving and [10] Exploring new 
categories/patterns. 
Knowing constructs that relates language with knowledge are evident in the (a) 
Plausible knowing stage in the proposition 2.8 about telling a plausible story; and in 
the (b) Social knowing stage in propositions 7.1 which is related to conversations 
with others and self, and the proposition 7.2d which says about assigning satisficing 
name to objects.  
Knowing constructs that relates meaning with knowledge are all over the framework 
given the sensemaking approach.  
Finally, the knowing process progressively emerged; piece by piece, capture in the central 
idea of each section and labeled along the titles assigned to each stage of the framing and 
revealed as a schematic account of them. The detail account of all the emerging categories is 
listed in Table 22, Weick´s Sensemaking as Integrated Knowing Framework is showed in 
Tables 23 and 24, the graphical approach of this framework is presented in Figure 1, and its 
narrated version comes next: 
In structuring the unknown, trigger by the need to make sense, personal skills 
and context shape and bound the stories told; in which a faithful presumption of 
certain contextual order is followed by a stimuli-based reverse clarification 
process; in which interruptions invoke our emotional memory; all this in search 
of describing self or defining self; through workable social understandings that 
triggers constraining or habilitating acts in a now redefined situation that 
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and limit the 
stories told 
(4)    Memory limits (12)  Skill (19)   Plausible story/storytelling 
(5)    Biological limits (13)  Aligning personal skills (20)   Conceived order 
(6)    Data overflow / overload (14)  Goal (21)   Plausible pattern 
(7)    Data filtering (15)   Accuracy immobilization (22)   Insinuating future order 
(8)    Accuracy (16)   Simplification (23)   Metaphor 
(9)    Circumscribed accuracy (17)   Coherent story (24)   Paradigm 
(10)  Context (18)   Reasonable story (25)  Cause map 









(26)  Cue (33)  Time (40)  Expert's openness to changes 
(27)  Extracted cue (34)  Experience assessment (41)  Generalist's stability preference 
(28)  Distinct implication (35)  Form (42)  Self-fulfilling prophecy 
(29)  Possible expressions (36)  Social norms (43)  Faith 
(30)  Progressive specification (37)  Institutional explanations (44)  Action 
(31)  Interaction with its context (38)  Political explanations (45)  Presumed contextual order 








(6)    Data overflow / overload (53)  Author posture (59)  Meaning change 
(75)  Alignment of interruption (54)  Role (60)  Chosen stimulus 
(48)  Past (55)  Focused attention (61)  Unproblematic search 
(49)  Stimulus (56)  Obligation (62)  Selection of memories 
(50)  Current value (14)  Goal (63)  Causal link 
(51)  Equivocality reduction (57)  Ongoing projects (64)  Reverse clarification 








(27)  Extracted cue (63)  Causal link  
(65)  Interruption (70)  Speed of emotions (76)  Cue recalling 
(66)  Ongoing insistence (71)  Kind of emotions (77)  Emotional memory 
(67)  Emotion (72)  Intensity of emotions (78)  Mood congruent 
(68)  Actual situation (73)  Tightness of activities   
(69)  Prior situation (74)  Importance of activities   
6 Self Knowing 
Describing self 
or Defining self 
(79)  Self (85)  Threatening cues (91)  Enforce understandings 
(80)  Describing self (86)  Defining self (92)  Mutability 
(81)  Compatible cue (87)  Role selection (93)  Flexibility 
(82)  Re-interpret cue (88)  Consequence acceptance (94)  Adaptability 
(83)  Readapt self-image (89)  Select cue (95)  Inconsistencies 







(96)  Conversing with self (101) Non-disclosive intimacy (106) Distributed meanings 
(97)  Conversing with others (102) Equivalent meanings (107) Overlapping views 
(98)  Talking  about the situation (103) Shared meanings (108) Ambiguous event 
(99)  Workable social formations (104) Satisficing object naming   






(109) Constrain  (114) Habilitation (119) Create opportunities 
(110) Constraining act (115) Habilitating act (120) Assign meanings 
(111) Change resistance (116) Confront differences (121) Created reality 
(112) Discovering meaning (117) Integrate differences   







(122) Enacted situation (125)Face reactions  
(123) Invitation to know (126) Pay consequences   
(124Created challenge (127) Uncontrolled situation 
 




W e i c k ' s  S e n s e m a k i n g  a s  I n d i v i d u a l  K n o w i n g  F r a m e w o r k  
[Drives and Abilities] 
[a] Knowing Drives 
What triggers the application, creation 
and sharing of knowledge? 
Making sense of ill-defined situations, 
self-enacted situations 
Applying / Creating 
/ Sharing  
[b] Knowing Abilities 
 Which are the personal abilities that drive the application, creation and sharing of knowledge? 
[Ref] Knowing Ability Knowing Stage Activity type 
[1] Perception filtering Plausible knowing Creating / Applying 
[2] Pattern recognition 
Plausible knowing Creating / Applying 
Retrospective knowing Creating / Applying 
Self Knowing - Self-image maintenance 
posture 
Applying 
Enacting knowing - Discovery posture Applying 
Self Knowing -Innovative posture Creating 
[2a] Perceptual pattern recognition Emotional knowing Creating / Applying 
[2b] Emotional pattern recognition Emotional knowing Creating / Applying 
[6] Suspending judgments Enacting knowing - Inventing posture Creating 
[3] Pattern simplification 
Plausible knowing Creating / Applying 
Retrospective knowing Creating / Applying 
Self Knowing - Self-image maintenance 
posture  
Applying 
Self Knowing -Innovative posture Creating 
Enacting knowing - Discovery posture Applying 
[4] 
Pattern contriving 
Plausible knowing Creating 
 
Enacting knowing - Inventing posture Creating 
[5] Commitment Prospective knowing Creating / Applying 
[5a] 
Tight commitment to 
recognized patterns 




Loose commitment to 
contrived patterns 
Self Knowing -Innovative posture Creating 
[7] 
Interacting through vernacular 
language and artifacts  
Social knowing 
Sharing / Applying / 
Creating 
[8] Forming social workablenesses Social knowing 





Enacting knowing - Discovery posture Applying 
[10] Exploring new categories/patterns Enacting knowing - Inventing posture Creating 
[11] Plausible storytelling Plausible knowing Sharing / Creating 




W e i c k ' s  S e n s e m a k i n g  a s  I n d i v i d u a l  K n o w i n g  F r a m e w o r k  
[Language and Meaning Knowing Constructs and Knowing Processes]  
Participating Knowing Constructs and Processes 
 
[c1] Language and  Knowledge 
What is the role of language in the application, creation and sharing of knowledge?  
 
Knowing Stage 
Constructs with references to Figure 1 
are shown between [brackets]  
Activity type 
2 Plausible knowing 
[2.8] Plausible, coherent, and 
reasonable stories (metaphors, 
paradigms, cause maps), show 
patterns of what is already in the mind 





7 Social knowing 
 [7.1] Conversation with others and 
self about what the implicated think 
about the situation. 
Sharing 
[7.2.d] Satisficing naming of objects Sharing 
  
[d1] Language, Meaning and Knowing Process 
Which are the principles, logic and processes that guide the application, creation and 
sharing of knowledge? 
 
 
1 Structuring unknown  
In structuring the unknown, trigger by 




2   Plausible knowing 
skills and context shape and bound 






 in which a faithful presumption of 






is followed by a stimuli-based reverse 






in which interruptions invoke our 
emotional memory;  
6 Self-Knowing 
all this in search of describing self or 
defining self;  
 
7 Social Knowing 








8 Enacting Knowing 
that triggers constraining or 
habilitating acts in a now redefined 
situation that invites to more knowing. 




4.6 FRAMING BRUNER’S ACTS OF MEANING AS INDIVIDUAL KNOWING 
4.6.1 Bruner’s Call against Information Processing 
Bruner (1990) is a call to for the recovering of the original drives that originated 
cognitive psychology back in 1950, a recovering from the computational oriented 
conception of mind that was dominating research in 1990. His call remembers that “it 
was, we thought, an all-out effort to establish meaning as the central concept of 
psychology – not stimuli and responses, not overtly observably behavior, not biological 
drives and their transformation, but meaning.” (p. 2). The scope of such endeavor was 
supposed to follow an interpretative approach to discover and describe the symbolic 
devices that we use to make sense of the living situation and of ourselves.  
The processing of information, Bruner’s (1990) said is a completely different from 
the construction of meaning. While ‘information comprises a pre-coded message in the 
system” (p. 4) and information processing can deal with meaning in the lexical, 
dictionary, pre-defined rules or algorithms sense, there is no place for intentional states - 
believing, desiring, intending - in such conception (p. 4-8). Construction of meaning 
happens within a culture of shared rhetoric for negotiating meanings and interpretations, 
even within ambiguous discourses (pp. 11-12). That is, an ethno methodological 
approach to meaning that frames the social assessments that people under study made in 
their everyday life (Garfinkel, 1967).  
Giving his motivations, Bruner’s (1990) work reveals a complete theory of meaning 




as holders of a set of native communication primitive skills oriented to trigger more 
advance narrating abilities that use the constructs of “ordering events” and “value-based 
assessing of events”, to structure and plot, in search of legitimacy, a particular situated 
interaction of acting and saying. This narrative, if successful, creates and shares 
meanings. 
These events happen in a cultural setting that is characterized by a set of beliefs and 
desirables; which also counts with a set of symbolic tools, like language, a tools built up 
to overcome human’s biological limits. These cultural settings are challenged and 
enriched, to handle changes and complexity of life, with new created and shared 
meanings and with new symbolic tools.  
In summary, Bruner’s (1990) theory holds two intertwined drivers: the shaping of 
culturally situated meaning and the building of culture itself, the later understood by its 
values, desirables, and symbolic tools.  
4.6.2 Bruner’s Framing Challenge 
This intended framing of Bruner’s (1990) acts of meaning makes a rigorous reading 
and interpretation of his theory in the context of individual knowing; such framing, at the 
best of my knowledge, has not been published in academic literature.  
Bruner’s approach centrally argues that significant outcomes of our native 
predispositions, characterized by primitive communication functions, are our shared 
symbol-based systems – e.g. language -, which are the tool kits through which human 




 However, the framing of Bruner’s act of meaning also read Bruner in the context of 
our particular quest: understanding the relationships of shared meanings with language 
and knowledge.  
Then, even though the final exposed understanding holds and integrated view; it also 
presents emphasis on specifics related to: (a) “What is the role of language in the creation 
and sharing of meanings?” and (b) “What is the role of meanings in the creation and 
sharing of knowledge?”. 
Bruner (1990) does not posits propositions, neither he describes a neat explicit meaning 
construction and sharing process;  however he does posits (a) two universals drives that 
explain causes for human action, and (b) descriptions of the constructs that participate in 
those universals; revealing in them certain relationships among each other.  
Attending to these universals propositions for human action, and constructs about 
culture and meaning building achieved to contrive a plausible interpretative story about 
individual knowing.  
However, such story, in the disciplined side, asks for some alphanumerical references, 
which are written between brackets ([#a#]), which allows for an easy matching with the 
emerging framework (see Figure 2).  
4.6.3 Bruner’s canon and narrative-based knowledge construction approach 
Bruner (1990) argues in favor of multidisciplinary culturally oriented studies in which 




between the meaning of what we say and what we do guide the interactions with one 
another (Bruner, 1990, p. 19).  
Here, action and saying are understood; first, as situated in a [2] cultural setting that is 
characterized by [2a] a shared interpretative system to organize and to know about 
experiences and social transactions, built around established or expected canonical 
patterns  (pp. 35, 50); and second, they are not about any [1] human behavior, but about 
the intentionally counterpart of behavior, including what we act and say about our 
intentional states – beliefs, desires, intentions, moral commitments (pp. 9, 19); which are 
sufficiently coherent and organized, as to describe a committed disposition to a “way of 
life” (p. 38). 
To avoid the eventual indeterminacies of cultural relativism critic and the need of 
particulars parameters to account for local variations in a cross-cultural approach, Bruner 
(1990, pp. 20 - 21) proposed to understand that the universals that cause human action 
have to do with higher-level issues: [6] culture building and [3] the quest of meaning 
within culture.  
In this way of seeing, the two central arguments that explain the triggering of  human 
actions are defined: first, by the [6a] limits of our biological substrate, that while it 
constrains us, it also challenges [6] our cultural inventiveness through the creation of soft 
and hard tools (p. 21), which enrich our [2] cultural setting;  and second, [3c] by the 
breach between world states and personal intended states, which leads either to [5] 
meaning construction within the existing [2] cultural setting. Otherwise, [3b] existing 




These two Bruner’s (1990) universal departing drives take us to - what I believe it is 
the foundation of Bruner’s theory: the argument that (5e) humans hold a native and 
primitive readiness for social meaning creation and sharing (p. 71). In more detail words, 
humans come equipped with a set of protolinguistic predispositions [5e1] to grasp the 
significance of situations (Bruner, 1990,  p. 72) by [5e3] means of praxis (pp. 70, 74), and 
[5e2] to construe the social world over which we act upon (p. 73).  
These predispositions are characterized by certain [5e3] native and primitive 
communication functions and skills like indicating, labeling, requesting, misleading, joint 
attention; turn taking and mutual exchange (p. 71).  
Significant outcomes of these native predispositions are [2b] our shared symbol-based 
systems (e.g. language) which are the tool kits through which [6b] human knowledge 
becomes enculturated knowledge (p. 21), which also overcome our biological limits (e.g. 
immediate memory (Miller, 1956)); allowing the handling of complex meanings through 
[2b] communal agreed notations (p. 21), which in turns enrich our knowledge, therefore 
our [2] cultural settings.  
Moreover, Bruner (1990) argues, that when people, guided by our natural human 
motives, for example get hungry or sexy, it is not a simple conversion of biological drives 
into psychological preferences, but a mediation of the symbolic means of a culture that 
guide our way of life (p. 22) .  
This is a belief that a certain mode of life is worthy, even if suffering is necessary. 




pain or physical exhaustion that break the cultural connection that offers direction to our 
strivings (Scarry, 1985). 
In other words, generally, and excluding unsurpassed biological constrains, in the 
context of a [2] shared cultural setting, we go from [1] personal intended behavior and 
states to [5] the construction and sharing of meanings when there is a gap between 
outside world states and personal intended states by means of a [2a] shared interpretative 
system and [2b] shared symbol-based systems.   
Bruner’s (1990) approach to cultural psychology is a called for aligning, while 
interpreting, our cultural creations and inventiveness – instead of our biological 
limitations - with the ends we profess (pp. 23-24); an alignment that is also expressed as 
an optimistic prescriptive message, as we will see in detail in the next paragraph.  
In his constructivist approach, in which every belief is as good as any other; and in 
which the corresponding pragmatic inquiring procedure suggests asking questions like 
“What it would be to believe that?” or “What would I be committed myself if I believed 
that?” (Rorty, 1982);  values are neither discovered from every situation as in rational 
choice theory (Friedman and Hetcher, 1988), nor a function of gut reactions as in the 
irrational approach (Ferenczi, 1968), but values underlay our way of life. 
Here, values are shared and hold consequences (Bruner, 1990, pp. 27 - 30), in the 
sense that commitment to them “provide[s] either the basis for satisfactory conduct of a 




As we can see, for Bruner, values hold a normative status; and as we will see farther 
in the specifics, he prefers referencing to them with the terms “canons” and “canonical” 
since those notations hold the mediation role of symbols in the cultural setting.  
It is in his prescriptive approach of cultural psychology that, I believe, Bruner (1990) 
configured a clearer appreciation of the alignment between our cultural creations and our 
desires; and the role of values in it.  
He argued, referencing the democratic culture of Skinner (1972), for open-mindedness; 
and in it, he demanded to “be conscious of how we come to our knowledge and as conscious 
as we can be about the values that lead us to our perspectives” (Bruner, 1990, p. 30).  
Here, Bruner insisted that being accountable of what and how we know does not 
imply a single way of constructing meaning, or only one right way; it is about the values 
that fit best to cope with changes in life (p. 30); freedom, democracy and accountability 
are presented as particular instances of normative constructs in this prescriptive way of 
conceiving personal knowing. Prescription that is understood here, taking a distance from 
these particulars values, as the canonical approach to knowing, in which cultural canons 
are revealed by observing the adherence to them.  
Then, we could follow that, if the [1] situated adhered values guide the [5] construction 
of meanings, and the relationships between the meaning of [5b1] what we do and what 
[5b2] we say guide the interactions with one another, and that what we say is mediated 




Then, inferring from Bruner (1990), I suggest to appreciate a relevant key role for the 
language symbols that we associate with cannons and values in the construction and 
sharing of meanings (a relation between [5b1] and [5b2]). 
This suggested relevance of the link between language symbols and values can be 
also appreciated when Bruner (1990) argues that humans hold a [5d] native and inherent 
narrative structure in the praxis of social interaction even before we can achieve our first 
[5e] linguistic expression (pp. 77 - 79).  
Bruner’s main arguments on this issue goes on detailing that, when the structure of 
narrative is effective, it asks for four requirements: (a) [5b1] sets emphasis on the agency 
of human interaction toward goals (Brown, 1973), (b) [5c1] maintains a sequential order 
of events and states (Levelt, 1989), (c) [5c2] holds sensitivity to the canons of what is 
usual or unusual in human interaction, and (d) [5b2] reveals the narrator’s perspective 
(Stern, 1977).  
Since humans reveal innate readiness to satisfy this requirements, showed by Bruner 
through many examples and references in his book, then this [5e] primitive ability to 
organize narratives allows humans to understand and use language - and its more [5d] 
powerful narratives manifestations - through the [2b] symbol-based tools and traditions 
that constitute the culture in which we participate (p. 80). 
Here, “sensitivity to cannons” and “narrator’s perspective”, as part of the narrating 
structure, reveal the confrontation of two sets of values – [2] cultural interpretative 




goals, in which [5b1] action is not enough, but [5b2] “telling the right story, putting her 
actions and goals in a legitimizing light, is just as important” (Bruner, 1990, p. 86).  
At this point, before getting into specifics about how the legitimized story is build, it 
helps to recall the intentional counterpart of the construction and sharing of meanings, 
that is, to give attention to the question: “What are the motivations that drive the efforts 
of building shared meanings?” will provide a more holistic view of the matter at hand.  
Bruner (1990) undertake this issue by recognizing [7] an outside world in which our 
actions are situated, and this world holds certain states that provides reasons for our [1] 
beliefs and desires; however, it is when our [1] personal beliefs and desires, by 
themselves, confront the perceived [7] world states, and discover a breach  between them, 
it is that our actions lead to [5] meaning construction and sharing (pp. 39 - 43), otherwise 
[4] narrating, therefore, meaning sharing and creation, is unnecessary (p. 40). 
Here, then, I propose a straight forward reading of Bruner (1990), and say that for 
him, [5] meaning creation and sharing is about the integrative effort of: [5a] recognizing 
and understanding the normative values of the culture in which we participate, [5b1] 
acting in ways that depart from the “way of life” canons toward certain goals, [5b2] 
narrating, in our social interactions, an orderly canon-based story of justified acts 
searching legitimacy, which in turns achieves to go from [5c1] meanings creation, by the 
explication embedded in the structuring of events, [5c2] to meanings sharing, by the  





The previous stated Bruner’s (1990) reading about the [5c1] creation and [5c2] 
sharing of meanings asks for some specificity of the meanings attached to “values” and 
the now emerging concept of “order”.  
These two concepts are intertwined when they are seen from the narrating perspective; 
starting with the initial efforts to [5c1] make sense of some acts, we connect the referencing 
to these acts in certain order and sequence (e.g. “and”, “then”, “because”), noticing their 
quantitative canonical characteristics, expressing then as usual or unusual, in terms of their 
frequency, steadiness or reliability of the acts (e.g. “sometimes”, “always”), and eventually 
incorporating [5c2] qualitative normative forms, manifested by a deontic modal expression 
(e.g. “got to”, “must”), to finally incorporate a personal evaluation using epistemic 
normative expressions (e.g. “I think”, “It is surely the case”) (pp. 90 – 92).  
Simplifying and framing, [5c1] “order”, a construct related  to meaning creation, is 
about sequential connections and canonical frequency-based qualifications of actions; 
and [5c2] “values”, a construct related to meaning sharing,  is about deontical causations 
and epistemic conclusions in the [1b] context of cultural canon-based shared 
interpretative system and in search of legitimization.  
Then, Bruner’s (1990) [3d] human’s native narrative abilities for the praxis of social 
interaction, in relation to meaning creation and meaning sharing could be break down 
further in two main ideas: [3d1] humans’ order recognition and order establishing 
abilities (sequencing and frequency-based normative qualifying) guide the structure of 
the narrative, and [3d2] human’s value appreciation and influencing abilities (obligation, 





Bruner’s Acts of Meaning Framework
A canon-based and narrative-based knowledge building approach 





















[5b] Interaction of acting and saying toward certain goals reveals narrator’s perspective
[5b1] Acting in ways that depart 
from “way of life“ canons toward 
certain goals 
[4] Using existing meanings
[5d] Human’s narrative competences
[5d1]Narrative structuring is guided by 
the order recognition and order 
establishing competences
[5d2] Dramatization of narrative content is guided 
by the canon appreciation and influencing 
competence
[5a] Recognizing normative values of the participating culture
[5c] Narrating  and legitimizing meanings
[5c2] Meaning sharing is manifested by 
the  legitimacy of a plotted narrative that 
follows culture-based canons, deontical 
causations and epistemic conclusions 
[5c1] Meaning creation is manifested by
the structuring of a narrative that follows
ordered connections and canon
frequency-based qualifications of actions
[5b2] Narrating an orderly 
canon-based story of justified 
acts searching legitimacy
[4b] Acting and narrating  in ways compatible 
with “way of life” canons















leads  to  …
[3c] Breach between  
world states and 
personal intended 
states leads  to …
Supported by
Could be understood as …
[5e] Human native readiness for social meaning in the context of limitedbiological substrate
[5e1] Set of protolinguistic 
predispositions  grasp the significance of 
situations, and
[5e2] Construe the social world over 
which we act upon 
[5e3] Indicating, labeling, 
requesting, misleading, joint 
attention, turn taking and mutual 
exchange
Residing in 
[2] Cultural setting : 
[2a] Shared interpretative system, built around established or expected canonical patterns, to organize 
and know about experiences, and about social transactions

























































by  certain …



































































4.6.4 Matching Bruner’s Acts of Meaning Constructs with Individual Knowing 
The above constructs, relationships among constructs and propositions about Bruner’s 
acts of meaning, framed as individual knowing, provides an opportunity to explore 
specifics of the originally set individual knowing structure: [a] actuators of knowing 
behavior, [b] personal knowing abilities, [c] participating knowing constructs, and [d] 
knowing principles and processes. 
Bruner’s Acts of Meaning - A canon-based and narrative-based knowledge building  approach  
Individual Knowing Drives and Knowing Abil i t ies   
[a] Drives of knowing behavior 
Framework Reference Drive Activity Type 
3 
Quest of meaning 
within culture 
(1) Breach between world states and personal 
intended states leads to meaning construction; 




6 Building of culture  
(2) Limits of biological substrate, while it constrains 
us, challenges our cultural invention to construe and 




[b] Personal knowing abilities Activity Type 
Framework Reference Abilities 










to grasp situation significance) 
Indicating, labeling, 
requesting, misleading, 
joint attention, turn 









(2) Order recognition Sequencing events 
Qualifying events with 
frequency-based canons  
Applying 
Creating  
(3) Order establishing 
Creating 
Sharing 





(5) Canon influencing 
Creating 
Sharing 




Bruner’s (1990) text interview revealed nativism and constructivism views of 
knowing in its two drives of knowing behavior – (1) overcome breach between world and 
our intentions, and (2) overcome our biological limits. A similar dual approach is 
founded in their five personal knowing abilities, at the level of human native readiness 
for social meaning we find the (1) Protolinguistic sensemaking ability, and at the level of 
human’s narrative abilities; we find (2) Order recognition, (3) Order establishing, (4) 
Canon appreciation, and (5) Canon influencing abilities (see Table 25).  
Coding Bruner (1990) reveals 38 participating knowing constructs, they help to reveal 
from the stages (4) Using existing meanings, (5) Construction and sharing of meanings, 
and (6) Building of culture  of the contrived framework (Figure 2) which are the 
relationships between language, meaning and knowledge (see Table 26).  
Using existing meanings starts with (4a) recognizing normative values of the 
participating culture, and ends with (4b) acting in ways compatible with “way of life” 
canons. Construction and sharing of meanings starts with (5a) recognizing normative 
values of the participating culture, follows with (5b) interaction between acting and 
saying toward certain goals revealing narrator’s perspective, and ends with (5c) narrating 
and legitimizing meanings.  
In these two stages (4 & 5) the recognition of the quality of knower is presented in 
two different forms; as application of knowledge when the knower recognizes cannons 
and acts accordingly (4a & 4b), and as creation of knowledge when the knower narrates 




Building of culture stars with (6a) assessing personal biological limits as a challenge, 
and ends with (6b) negotiating as enculturated knowledge new meanings and symbol-
based systems and tools.  
The six main knowing processes show clearly that Bruner’s framed his theory 
following a canonical narrative-based knowledge construction approach, which assumes 
a native readiness for narrating, in particular, and abilities for social meaning, in general 
(See Figure 2).  
These human abilities are challenged, in the context of recognized biological human 
limitations, and respond by creating new meanings to attend individual intentions, and 
new knowledge, as systems and tools, that redefined way of life.  
Then, Bruner’s meanings has to do with the particulars of canon-evaluated acts and 
narratives about human intentions, believes and desires, directed to certain goals; and 
knowledge has to do with human conceived symbol-based tools and systems that has 
been assimilated by the cultural setting as respond of (a) a particular persistent or key 





In summary, Bruner’s posits, from the perspective of knowing and meaning that:  
(1) Individuals, as holders of certain personal intended behavior and states, share with others  
(2) cultural settings that work as  
(2a) interpretative systems, built around established or expected canonical 
patterns, to organize and know about experiences, and about social 
transactions; supported by  
(2b) shared symbol-based systems and tools; in which  
(3a) outside world states provides reasons for beliefs and desires; that is, the  
(3) quest of meaning within culture; and that in the case of a 
 (3b) match between world states and personal intended states, it leads to keep  
(4) using existing meanings, by  
(4a) recognizing normative values of the participating culture; and  
(4b) acting in ways compatible with “way of life” canons; and in the case of a  
(3c) breach between world states and personal intended states, it leads to the  
(5) construction and sharing of meanings by  
(5a) recognizing normative values of the participating culture, in which the  
(5b) interaction of acting and saying toward certain goals that reveals the 
narrator’s perspective; which could be understood as  
(5c) narrating and legitimizing meanings supported by means of  
(5d) human’s narrative abilities; which assumes  
(5e) a human native readiness for social meaning that eventually confronts the  
(6a) limits of the human biological substrate, which in turns challenges our 
cultural inventions by proposing  
(6b) new meanings and symbol-based systems and tools, that are negotiated as 
enculturated knowledge; that is, the  
(6) building of culture, which also implicates that  
(3d) new meanings challenge the outside world states; which takes us back to the 
individual in a world of states that provide reasons for action and narratives, 




Bruner’s Acts of Meaning - A canon-based and narrative-based knowledge building  approach  
Language, Meaning, and Know ing Constructs  





and states  
Outside world states provides 
reasons for personal intended 
behavior and states 







Shared interpretative system, built 
around established or expected 
canonical patterns, to organize and 
to know about experiences and 
about social transactions 
Meanings Sharing 
(5) Interpretative system 
(6) Established canonical patterns 
(7) Expected canonical patterns 
(8) Knowing experiences 
(9) Social transactions 
Shared symbol-based system and 
symbol-based tools 
Language Sharing 
(10) Symbol-based system 






New meanings challenge  the 
outside world states which 
provides reasons for personal 
intended behavior and states 
 (12) Meaning 
 (13) Outside world 
 (14) Reasons for intended behavior 
 (15) Reasons for intended states 
 (16) Intended behavior 
 (17) Intended states 
Breach between  world states and 
personal intended states leads  to 
the construction and sharing of 
meanings 
Meanings Creation 
(18) Breach between world and intentions 
(19) Intended states 
(20) Construction of meaning 
(21) Sharing of meanings 
Match between world states and 
personal intended states leads  to 
use existing meanings 
Meanings Applying 
(22) Match between world and intentions 





4a. Recognizing normative values of 









(23) Culture canons 
4b. Acting and narrating in ways 





5a.Recognizing normative values of 











(25) Culture canons 
5b. Interaction of acting and saying 
toward certain goals revealing narrator’s 
perspective departing from “way of life” 




(29) Narrator's perspective 




Human’s narrative abilities 
 (32) Order recognition 
 (33) Order establishing 
Human native readiness for social 
meaning 
 (34) Grasp situation significance  




6a.Biological limits challenge  (36) Biological challenge 
6b. New meanings and symbol-
based systems and tools are 








(37) New meaning 
(38) Symbol-based system 
(10) Symbol-based tool 
(11) Enculturated knowledge 




4.7 GOURLAY’S SEMIOTIC TACIT KNOWING 
Gourlay’s (2004; 2006) works question the lack of specifics about the concept of tacit 
knowing in extant research and reviews its theoretical a practical aspects.  
Gourlay (2006) invokes a research procedure that mirrors the constant comparison 
method from grounded-theory studies (Strauss & Corbin, 1990); and through it exhausted the 
distinctions of the usage of the concept of tacit knowledge in empirical research published 
peer-reviewed journals in the fields of management, organizational and social studies.  
Gourlay (2006) arrived to three distinct categories that described tacit knowledge as 
(a) the knowledge that in some degree had been externalized at certain time, (b) 
knowledge that could not be made explicit by the actor, but feel it; and (c) the behavior 
that could be observed, but the actor cannot provide an account of it.  
In an effort to bound the issue of tacit knowledge, Gourlay (2006) argues that only 
observable behavior underpinned by unarticulated knowledge is an empirical 
phenomenon that provides firm grounds for inferring tacit knowledge; and that for the 
other cases we should consider leaving philosophical tribulations to philosophers. 
Gourlay (2004) proposes a draft schema for a semiotic approach for knowing based 
on Dewey and Bentley’s (1949) semiotic framework. Gourlay (2004)´s  taxonomy of 
knowing proposes a transition that goes from (1) no symbol-based system in used 
(signals), to (2) loose symbol-base system in use (language, narratives), and (3) precise 
symbol-based system in use (mathematics, scientific denotation); and their associated 





Gourlay (2004) postulates that:  
(a) Maybe the sign process component of behaving is knowing.  
(b) Understanding of the sign process should be broad and include perceptual, 
manipulative, cognitive and linguistic manifestations.  
(c) Explicit knowledge lies within the name designation and symbolic activities.  
(d) Tacit knowledge is equivalent to pre-linguistic modes of human knowing, that is, 
knowing without designation (Gourlay made reference here to Dewey & 
Bentley’s (1949) ‘signal’ and Bruner’s (1966) ‘enactive and iconic’).  
Gourlay (2004) ended his work inviting to study tacit knowing as a non-verbal signal-
based process, to discover if we could manage it by training people to read it.  
Gourlay (2004) provides a view of tacit knowing, departing from different seminal 
works (Dewey & Bentley, 1949; Bruner, 1966), that I found enriching, and at the same 
time compatible to the framed Polanyi (1958, 1966). (see Tables 16 and 17). 
In response to professor´s Stephen Gourlay invitation, first it is interesting to 
recognize that clarity about individual knowing may come from different strings of 
research. The approach followed here to framed Polanyi (1958, 1966) provided a 
description of the tacit knowing process; description that I believe provides some light to 
professor Gourlay’s postulates, as follows: 
Polanyi’s (1958) framed description of the instrumentalization of objects coincides 
with professor Gourlay’s statements (a) and (b) regarding sign process as knowing, 
and that such understanding should be include perceptual, manipulative, cognitive 
and linguistic manifestations.  
Polanyi’s (1958) framed description of symbol-based knowing coincides with 
professor Gourlay’s statements (d) regarding that explicit knowledge lies within the 




Polanyi’s (1958) framed description of inarticulate knowing and tacit knowing 
coincide with professor Gourlay’s statements (d) regarding  as being equivalent to 
pre-linguistic modes of human knowing, that is, knowing without designation. 
 Given Gourlay´s (2004) invitation, an exploratory approach could consider Polanyi’s 
(1958) language laws to explore the concept of signals laws in tacit knowing. 
Such exploration holds two strings of actions. First, Gourlay (2004) insistence on 
observing “non-articulated knowledge revealing behavior”, as the empirical phenomenon 
that gives account of tacit knowing, could be used to validate Polanyi’s (1958) tacit 
knowing abilities, like confirming if people is recognizing or contriving certain order, 
anticipating generalization, and so on.  
The second action proposes a line of research into novel aspects of tacit knowing, like 
the case of the public and known tendency of enacting new symbol-based systems 
through information and communication technology.  
I argue that we are in the need of a semiotic frame of reference for understanding 
knowing when the symbol-based system used to designate objects, actions and behavior 
provides designations that are similar in scale to the perceived signal.  
The insinuated challenge is related for instance to the understanding of the tacit 
knowing of kids when they play and win in electronic games; a knowing that they cannot 
explain with words much about it; but explain it with incomplete descriptions while 
interacting with the video-based system embedded in the game.  
Soon, those kids will be managing organizations interacting with devices in which 




4.8 INDIVIDUAL LEVEL KNOWING - AN ENRICHED PERSPECTIVE  
Here, I advocate that the understanding of knowledge as committed (Polanyi, 1958, 
1966), enculturated (Bruner, 1990), and enacted (Weick, 1995) offers an enriched 
perspective for the understanding of the process of knowing; an integrated perspective 
that holds no conflicting claims; but better, it captures a compelling frame, in which the 
three qualifications fit together and complement or extend each other. In order to 
appreciate their complementarities let’s star summarizing their respective ontology: 
In Polanyi (1958) there is a reality that its framing asks for my commitment, in which 
I recognized that my limited perception abilities hold the tension between sharpness 
and reasonableness. 
In Bruner (1990) there is a reality that challenges my intentions and there is a shared 
culture, through which, or by enriching it, I legitimize the satisfaction of the 
intentions. 
In Weick (1995) there is a reality that I can accept or interpret differently by enacting it. 
In these ontological stances, the personal interpretation framework is related to 
different, progressive and complementary tensions, which could be characterized within 
the biological (Polanyi, 1958), cultural (Bruner, 1990) and intellectual (Weick, 1995) 
approaches. We could also say that such tension is exemplified in the personal posture 
assumed to interpret reality, which goes from a passive reading of reality that eventually 
shapes us, to an active reading that focus in shaping a different reality. 
In the epistemological side of these theories, so far, we have reviewed extensively 




integrating posture. Knowing drives, knowing abilities, language and meaning constructs, 
and knowing processes will be compared to identify complementarities and conflicts. 
One relevant idea of this integration is that it proposes a way of clarifying the tension 
between tacit knowing and explicit knowing, by (a) understanding them as dependent on 
the level of the systematic symbolic content in the knowing and (b) how this knowing is 
assimilated and enacted subsidiarily.  
That is, human knowing drives contrive and use tools to satisfy urges, and it is in that 
process that the level of the symbolic preciseness and scalability of the participating 
knowing tool defines the level of representation (explicitness) of the knowledge in play.       
By following these general ontological and epistemological postures, the integrated 
description of personal drives, abilities, language, meanings and knowing processes will 
finally portray an enriched perspective of individual knowing that is built over extant and 
well referenced knowing theories, that had not been previously integrated, or in some 
cases partially misread.   
4.8.1 Knowing Drives and Abilities 
Ten different types of drives trigger knowing according to Polanyi (1958), Weick 
(1995) and Bruner (1990) in human beings. These drives cover most aspects of human 
nature, from basic biological human urges, to the need for situational sense, the passion 
for intellectual sense, the attention to personal desires and intentions, the challenges 
implied in the recognition of human limits and personal intentions, and finally the desire 




The specific list includes (1) Appetite satisfaction, (2) Perceptual sensemaking, (3) 
Surrounding sensemaking, (4) Need of intellectual sense, (5) Passion for intellectual 
sense, (6) Desire for companionship, (7) Ill-defined situations, (8) Enacted situations, (9)  
Breach between world states and personal intend, and (10) Challenge to the limits of our 
biological substrate (see Table 30). 
This inventory of knowing drives says a lot about the foundations of asserting the 
truth (satisfaction of needs), the discovery process (sense making), inventing (intellectual 
passion, overcoming limits, and self-triggering), and knowledge sharing (need for 
companionship and attending desires).  
Here again, at this level there are not conflicting approaches, but plausible 
complementarities. That is even the case between the (4) Need of intellectual sense and 
(7) Ill-defined situations, since the first one ask for intellectual satisfaction, as explicitly 
posit by Polanyi (1958), the second drive considers a complex set of rational, emotional 
and social needs (Weick, 1995).    
Attending these drives invokes a set of knowing abilities that are grouped in three 
sequentially supportive categories: (a) Native knowing, (b) Ability-based knowing, and 
(b) Symbol-based knowing (see Table 31).  
Polanyi, Weick, and Bruner present similar sets of abilities, but with different 
emphasis, however all of them depart from order or pattern recognition, and end with 
plausible expliciting.  
Polanyi (1958) argues for 10 abilities grouped in the primitive, heuristic and 




cultural issues partially (see Table 27). Abilities for knowledge creation are considered 
mostly from the perspective of the linkage between language and meaning. 
Weick (1995) argues for 13 abilities that reveal a very well structured set that 
considers rational, emotional and social aspects. However, native abilities are not 
considered in his approach (see Table 28). 
Bruner (1990) argues for two sets of abilities. First is the native readiness for social 
meaning presented as protolinguistic sensemaking ability. The other set correspond to the 
four legitimizing abilities regarding cannons recognitions and establishing. These abilities 
focus on recognizing and following the patterns of a given culture or legitimizing new 
patterns through plausible linguistic artifacts (see Table 29).   
Difference in the description of abilities resides in the level of details. Polanyi’s 
approach presents a foundational set of 10 heuristic abilities (pattern recognition, 
generalization and commitment), Weick offers the most granular explanation for 
sensemaking with 13 rational and emotional abilities for making sense of everyday life, 
and Bruner presents five (5) abilities to attend cannon appreciation and influencing within 
a culture and in the world.  
All of these 28 abilities conform together a non-conflicting set that attends most 
knowing human urges.  
4.8.2 Knowing Constructs: Language and Meanings  
 The understanding of the language and meaning constructs in the context of knowing 




The first, proposed by Polanyi, presents an integrated and balanced approach that 
flows from symbolic representation and operation to meaning and back.  
The second, proposed by Weick and Bruner, departs from a higher level in the usage 
of language – narratives - while making emphasis in meaning.  
Polanyi achieves to integrate language, meaning, and knowledge following a 
framework that covers the three classical approaches to meaning: cultural (general 
interpretative framework), conceptual (logic to frame the meaning of experiences), and 
referential (principles of symbol representation and operation to denote objects of 
experience) (see Table 27).  
Weick and Bruner do not talk about the logic of language denotations, however 
Bruner’s  approach refers to the usage of certain terms that operate as culture-based 
canon qualifiers (e.g. always, frequently) and argument concatenation (e.g. and, but, 
therefore); while Weick refers to conversing about plausible stories while using 
satisficing naming of objects. Both of them argue about the logic of telling a plausible 
story; Bruner making emphasis in legitimacy within the cannons of the culture or by 
overcoming human’s limits by negotiating the creation and acceptance of new tools and 
symbol-based systems; and Weick in conversations with others and self to enact 
emerging patterns (see Tables 28 and 29).  
Weick goes beyond in the issue of sharing meanings and posits, what it is labeled 
here as workable social formations, seven approaches to joint action: (1) non-disclosive 
intimacy, (2) equivalent meanings, (3) shared meanings, (4) satisficing naming of objects, 
(5) collective action experiencing, (6) distributed meanings, and (7) overlapping views of 




Then we have here, two complementary approaches, one that emphasizes language as 
meaning building, and other that describes social acts as meaning building.   
Interestingly, both approaches get close when Polanyi (1958) talks about failures in 
symbolic representation that may rigger innovative actions with or without symbolic 
representation, and Weick (1995) refers to socially satisficing naming of objects in the 
context of habilitating acts. 
4.8.3 Knowing Principles and Processes 
The comparison of the knowing processes of Polanyi (1958), Weick (1995) and 
Bruner (1990) is segmented in three aspects: (a) tools roles, (b) knowledge application 
and creation process, and (c) knowledge sharing.  
Polanyi and Bruner argue for (a) tools as a human’s response to overcome our 
limitations, and conceive its instrumentalization as knowledge (Polanyi’s 
instrumentalization of objects and Bruner’s enculturated knowledge). Both of them refer 
to the symbolic content of tools (Polanyi’s language principles and Bruner’s assimilation 
of symbol-based systems to the cultural interpretative framework).  
In (b) knowledge application and creation process, Polanyi breaks apart the knowing 
process into the subsidiary tacit knowing, ability-based knowing, and symbol-based 
knowing; however, our reading emphasizes the process of instrumentalization of objects 
as the mechanism that separates ability-based knowing (with the usage of non-symbol 




Weick and Bruner treat only the symbol-based knowing process. Weick describes the 
logic of discovering by telling and enacting constrains that lead to accept reality as is, and 
the logic of inventing by telling and enacting enablers that lead to create a new reality. 
 Complementarily, Bruner describes the dilemma of satisfying personal intentions and 
desires in the context of an outside world that may be compatible with the meanings of 
our culture, in which case we go by using existing tools of our culture; but in the case of 
an unsolved breach, we either narrate a legitimization of our non-orthodox canonical acts, 
or, if need it, we construct tools or symbol-based systems to bridge the gap with the 
outside world, which eventually are negotiated as enculturated knowledge.  
Finally, (c) in the knowledge sharing approach, Polanyi (1958) recalls the need to 
overcome human limits as driver for sharing knowledge, the externalization of it is 
shaped by the adequacy of the symbolic system of the tool in used, and observes that it 
may exclude premises about assimilation of tools for physical skills, and operation of 
interpretative frameworks for intellectual skills, since they are known subsidiarily. 
Polanyi also describes a framework that recognizes the authority of the master in the 
context of the trust of the learner in a convivial environment; while Weick makes 
emphasis in the search of describing self or defining self by means of conversations with 
self and others regarding the situation on hand through vernacular language and artifacts 
to form workable social understandings; and Bruner, complementarily follows the 
recognizing normative values of the participating culture to narrate a legitimizing story of 
the shared meanings.  
See Tables 27, 28, and 29 for a summary of each individual level knowledge view, 




Polanyi’s Personal Knowing: A commitment to heuristics, instrumentation, intellectual passion, and convivial approach 
S u m m a r y  o f  D r i v e s ,  A b i l i t i e s ,  C o n s t r u c t s  a n d  P r o c e s s e s  
[a] Drives of knowing behavior [b] Knowing abilities [c] Knowing constructs:  
[c1] Language & knowledge – [c2] Meanings & knowledge 
[d] Knowing principles or processes:  




































Inarticulate drives:  Primitive abilities: [c1&c2] Principles of language-oriented meaning framed by culture [d1]Tacit knowing process & Instrumentalization of objects    
A C  
1. Appetite 
satisfaction 
A C  1. Innate motility power 
A 
1. Meanings commits focally to a culturally 
constructed interpretative framework. 
A subsidiary process characterized by: 
A C  
2. Perceptual 
sensemaking  
A C  2. Innate sensory power 
A 1. Invoking subsidiarily a set of heuristic abilities to 
use tools (with or without symbolic 
representation) as part of our existence. C 
A C  
3. Surrounding 
sensemaking A C  
3. Innate mix of sensory-
motor-logical powers A 
2. Selecting language symbols is subsidiary, in a 
focally attended situation; in which pattern 
recognition and anticipatory abilities:  
A 2. Tools in which, we recognize or contrive certain 
order, anticipate generalizations, commit and rely.  C 
Articulate drive: Tacit heuristic abilities: C 
2a. Organize classes of meanings by common 
not specifiable properties. 
A 3. Invoked abilities must meet truth-committed 
private or public standards of performance in 







4. Need of 
intellectual sense 
A C  
4. Ordering & pattern 
recognition & contriving 
C 
2b. Describe incompletely meanings through 
definitions expressed as maxims that guide 
understanding in action. 
A 4. While holding tool’s symbolic content tension between: 
Rich, connected & less reversible    Precise, detach & more reversible 




A C S 
6. Intellectually 
commitment C 
3. Conflicting denotations are solved by the 
speaker’s sense of fitness to reality in terms of 
the object and not the symbol. 
[d2] Knowledge sharing propositions - Recognition of knower 
S 1. Authority of master and trust of learner support 
learning of shared tools and their use for carrying 
messages among them. 
Knowledge creation drives: Intellectual abilities: C 4. Disagreements between tacit thoughts and 
symbolic operations is considered either 
invention or correction of fumbling; which if 
successful it will show novelties. 
A 
S 2. Assimilation of historical intellectual artifacts and 
rituals starts with an act of affiliation to a 
community that nurtures its traditions and values, 
and follows with a commitment to act according 
to their standards by indwelling in their practice. 
 C S 
5. Passion for 
intellectual sense 
A C S 7. Denoting symbolically  
S 
 C  8. Heuristic passion 
 C S 9. Persuasive passion 
C 
5. When representation or operation of language 
symbols in use is not effective for a particular 
experience, our knowing may stay tacit, and 
may trigger the knowing, explicit or not, of 
novel aspects of the experienced object. 
A  C S 10. Plausible expliciting 
 
S 
 Knowledge creation logic [d1]
A 
3. As learners show results, their justified knowledge 
validates confidence in masters, releasing the tension 
of the trusting heuristic conjecture. Knowledge sharing drive: 
C 
Knowledge created is 
 (1) submitted to the personal 
adhered public standard that 
educated people hold, and  
(2) at scientific level, to the 
methods that academics formally 
set, (3) such knowledge changes 
oneself by framing new ways of 
seeing reality, and (4) drives to 
convert others by sharing a vision,  
(5) that is not only argue by its 
certainty and systematic 
relevance, but by its plausibility. 
[c1 & c2] Sharing meanings framework 
 
A  S 
6. Desire for 
companionship 
S 
1. Cultural approach: conviviality, authority, and 
trust shape the general interpretative framework. 
S 4. Given limited personally justified knowledge, we 
continue trusting authority of others for lots 
domains of knowledge. 
  S 
7. Overcome human 
limits 
A 
2. Conceptual approach:  ordering, generalizing, 
and committing human’s heuristic abilities 




5. Rejecting imitation of masters' doings and sayings, 
affects his authority, and leads the dissenter to be a 
new teacher, gaining authority. 
 C 
3. Referential approach: follows poverty, consistency, 
iteration, grammar, and manageability symbols laws 
to scale up or down the notation of objects to the 
dimensions of our comprehension; while ineffective 
representation or operation may stay tacit, open to 
novel interpretations, with or without symbolic 
representation. 
S 
6. Convivial existence of a group transcends 
individuals and time, establishing continuity of 
future knowledge sharing activities. 
 
Note: Triggered to overcome human limits, shaped by symbolic system in use & may 
exclude premises about tools assimilation & operation of interpretative frameworks  




W e i c k ’ s  S e n s e m a k i n g :  A  p l a u s i b l e  a n d  e n a c t e d  k n o w l e d g e  d i s c o v e r i n g  a n d  i n v e n t i n g  a p p r o a c h   
S u m m a r y  o f  D r i v e s ,  A b i l i t i e s ,  C o n s t r u c t s  a n d  P r o c e s s e s  
[a] Drives of knowing 
behavior 
[b] Knowing abilities [c] Knowing constructs:  
[c1] Language & knowledge – [c2] Meanings & knowledge 
[d] Knowing principles or processes:  




































Knowing drives:  Sensemaking abilities: [c1] Language in Plausible knowing [d1] Language, Meaning and Knowing Processes 
A  A C  1. Perception filtering 
 C S 
[2.8] Plausible, coherent, and 
reasonable stories (metaphors, 
paradigms, cause maps), show patterns 
of what is already in the mind and 
insinuate more order for the future. 
A C  [1] In  Structuring the unknown, … 
C 1. Ill-defined 
situations 
A C  2 & 3. Pattern recognition A C S 
[2]  Skills and context shape and bound the 




A C  
    2. Perceptual pattern 
recognition 
A C  
[3] Faithful presumption of certain contextual 





A C  
    3. Emotional pattern 
recognition 
[c1] Language in Social knowing A C  
[4] Stimuli-based reverse clarification process; 
in which … 
A C  4. Pattern simplification   S 
[7.1] Conversation with others and self 
about what the implicated think about 
the situation. 
A C  
[5] Interruptions invoke our emotional 
memory; all this … 
 C  5. Pattern contriving   S [7.2.d] Satisficing naming of objects A C S 
[6] In search of describing self or defining self; 
… 
A C  6 & 7. Commitment [c2] Meanings as Workable Social Formations A C S 
[7] Through workable social understandings 
that … 
A   
    6. Tight commitment to 
recognized patterns 
A   [7.2.a] Non-disclosive intimacy [d1 and d2] …and Recognition of quality of knower 
 C  
    7.Loose commitment to 
contrived patterns 
A  S [7.2.b] Equivalent meanings A C S 
[8] Triggers constraining or habilitating acts, 
in a now … 
 C  8. Suspending judgments 
A  S [7.2.c] Shared meanings A C  
[8.3] Redefined situation that invites to 
more knowing. 
A C S 
9. Interacting through 
vernacular language and 
artifacts  
A C S [7.2.d] Satisficing naming of objects 
 
A C S 
10. Forming social 
workablenesses 
A C S [7.2.e] Collective action experiencing 
A  S 
11. Enacting known 
categories/patterns 
A C S [7.2.f] Distributed meanings 
 C  
12. Enacting new 
categories/patterns 
A C S 
[7.2.g] Overlapping views of ambiguous 
events 
 C S 13. Plausible storytelling  





B r u n e r ’ s  A c t  o f  m e a n i n g :  A  c a n o n i c a l  n a r r a t i v e - b a s e d  k n o w l e d g e  b u i l d i n g  a p p r o a c h   
S u m m a r y  o f  D r i v e s ,  A b i l i t i e s ,  C o n s t r u c t s  a n d  P r o c e s s e s  
[a] Drives of knowing 
behavior 
[b] Knowing abilities [c] Knowing constructs:  
[c1] Language & knowledge – [c2] Meanings & knowledge 
[d] Knowing principles or processes:  




































Knowing drives:  Native readiness for social meaning [c1 & c2] Applying existing language & meanings [d1] Knowing Processes 
A 
Quest of meaning 
within culture:  
Breach between 
world states and 
personal intended 
states leads to 
meaning 
construction. 
A C S 
1.Protolinguistic 
sensemaking 
A C S 
1. Recognizing normative values of 
the participating culture 
Individuals, as holders of certain … 
 1. Personal intended behavior and states, share with others  …  
Legitimizing abilities A  S 
2. Acting and narrating in ways 
compatible with “way of life” canons 
   
2. Cultural settings 
that work as  … 
2a.Interpretative systems, built around established or 
expected canonical patterns, to organize and  know 
about experiences, and about social transactions, 
supported by …   
A  C  2. Order recognition [c1 & c2] Creating narratives and sharing of meanings 
 C  S 3. Order establishing 
A C S 
3. Recognizing normative values of 
the participating culture 
C 
 
A  C  4. Canon appreciation    2b. Shared symbol-based system and tools; in which … 
 C  S 5. Canon influencing 
 C S 
4. Interaction of acting and saying 
toward certain goals revealing 
narrator’s perspective 
   
3. Quest of 
meaning within 
culture; and that in 
the case of a … 
3a. Outside world states provides reasons for beliefs and 
desires, that is, the … 
S 
 
   3b. Match between world states and personal intended 
states, it leads to keep … 
 C S 
5. Narrating and legitimizing 
meanings 
 C S 
6. New meanings challenge the 
outside world states 
[d1] Knowing processes   &   [d2] Recognition of quality of knower 
A C S 
4. Using existing 
meanings, by … 
4a. Recognizing normative values of the participating 
culture, and … 
A 
Culture building: 
Limits of our 
biological substrate 
are overcome by our 
cultural inventions. 
[c1 & c2] Creating enculturated knowledge 
 C S 
7. New meanings and symbol-based 
systems and tools are negotiated 
as enculturated knowledge 
A  S 
4b. Acting in ways compatible with “way of life” 
canons; and in the case of a … 
C 
    
3c. Breach between world states and personal intended 
states, it leads to the … 
 
A C S 
5. Construction 
and sharing of 
meanings by … 
5a. Recognizing normative values of the participating 
culture, in which the … 
S 
 C S 
5b. Interaction of acting and saying toward certain goals reveals 
the narrator’s perspective, which could be understood as … 
 C S 
5c. Narrating and legitimizing meanings supported by 
means of … 
 
A C S 5d. Human’s narrative competences, which assumes a … 
A C S 
5e. Human native readiness for social meaning, that eventually 
confronts the … 
[d1] Knowing Processes 
   
6. Building of culture, 
which also created ... 
6a.Limits of the human biological substrate, which in 
turns challenges our cultural inventions by proposing … 
 C S 
6b. New meanings and symbol-based systems and tools, that 
are negotiated as enculturated knowledge; that is, the … 
    
3d. New meanings challenge the outside world states; 
which takes us back to the individual in a world of states 
that provide reasons for action and narratives in a 
continuously constructed culture.  
 C S  




I n d i v i d u a l  K n o w i n g  V i e w  
S u m m a r y  o f  K n o w i n g  D r i v e s ,  K n o w i n g  A b i l i t i e s ,  K n o w i n g  C o n s t r u c t s  a n d  K n o w i n g  P r o c e s s e s  
[a] Drives of knowing 
behavior 
[b] Knowing abilities [c] Knowing constructs:  
[c1] Language & knowledge – [c2] Meanings & knowledge 
[d] Knowing principles or processes:  









A C S 
1. Appetite 
satisfaction 
A C  
Primitive abilities: Innate 
sensory-motor-logical powers 
[c1 & c2] Language-oriented meanings framed by culture [d1] Subsidiary knowing process & Instrumentalization of objects    
  
S 
Cultural approach: conviviality, authority, and 
trust shape the general interpretative 
framework. 
A C  
Invoking subsidiarily heuristic abilities to use tools as part of our 
existence. Tools in which, we recognize or contrive order, 
anticipate generalizations, commit and rely. Abilities must meet 
private or public standards of performance in terms of the 
symbolic nature of tools in use. While holding tool's symbolic 
content tension between: Rich & Precise, and Routine & Novel. 
A C S 
2. Perceptual 
sensemaking  A C S 
Tacit heuristic abilities: 
patten recognition, 
generalizing and committing A   
Conceptual approach:  ordering, generalizing, 
and committing human’s heuristic abilities frame 
the particular experience. A C S 
3. Surrounding 
sensemaking 
A C S 
Intellectual abilities: 
 Denoting symbolically, 
heuristic passion, persuasive 
passion, and plausible 
expliciting 
 C  
Referential approach: follows poverty, 
consistency, iteration, grammar, and 
manageability symbols laws to scale up or 
down the notation of objects to the 
dimensions of our comprehension; while 
ineffective representation or operation may 
stay tacit, open to novel interpretations, with 
or without symbolic representation. 
 Knowledge creation logic [d1]
A C S 
4. Need of 
intellectual sense 
 C S 
Knowledge created is submitted to the personal adhered 
public standard of educated people or at scientific methods 
that academics formally set; such knowledge changes 
oneself by framing new ways of seeing reality, and drives to 
convert others by sharing a vision, that is not only argue by 
its certainty and systematic relevance, but by its plausibility. 
 C S 
5. Passion for 
intellectual sense 
A  S 
6. Desire for 
companionship 
  S 
7. Overcome 
human limits 
A C S 
Sensemaking abilities:  
Perceptual and emotional 
pattern filtering, 
recognition, simplification 
and contriving; suspending 
judgment, vernacularly 
interacting, tight and loose 
committing, forming social 
workablenesses, enacting 
known or new categories / 
patterns, and storytelling.  
[d2] Knowledge sharing propositions - Recognition of knower 
[c1]Language in plausible and social knowing  
A  S 
Master’s authority and learner’s trust support learning of 
shared tools and their use for carrying messages among 
them; traditions and values are assimilated by indwelling in 
the community’s practice. Trust in master is validated by 
results; and given limited personally justified knowledge, 
we continue trusting others. Rejecting imitation of master, 
affects his authority, and leads dissenter to authority. 
Convivial group’s existence transcends individuals and 






A C S 
8. Ill-defined 
situations A C S 
Plausible stories show patterns and insinuate 
the future through conversations with self 
and others using satisficing naming. 
A C S 
9. Enacted 
situations 
[c2] Meanings as Workable Social Formations 
A C S 
Oriented to joint action based on: Non-disclosive 
intimacy, equivalent meanings, shared meanings, 
satisficing naming of objects, collective action 
experiencing, distributed meanings, overlapping 












personal intend  
[d1, d2] A plausible & enacted knowledge discovering 
and inventing approach 
A C S 




[c1 & c2 ] Applying existing language and meanings 
existing meaning 
A C S 
In structuring the unknown, skills and context shape and 
bound the stories told; in which a faithful presumption of 
certain contextual order is followed by a stimuli-based 
reverse clarification process; in which interruptions invoke 
our emotional memory; all this in search of describing self 
or defining self; through workable social understandings 
that triggers constraining or habilitating acts in a now 
redefined situation that invites to more knowing. 
A  S 
Recognizing normative values of the culture 
and acting and narrating in ways compatible 
with canons of the “way of life” 
A C S 
11. Limits of our 
biological 
substrate are 
overcome by our 
cultural 
inventions. 
[c1 & c2] Creating narratives and sharing of meanings 
A C S 
Legitimizing abilities: 




 C S 
Interacting toward certain goals revealing the 
narrator’s perspective, while recognizing the 
normative values of the participating culture, 
to narrate legitimate meanings that 
challenge the states of the outside world. 
[d1, d2] A canonical narrative-based knowledge 
building approach  7 + 2 +2 = 11  
Knowing Drives 
A C S 
Individuals, holder of intentions, share with others a 
canonical interpretative system to know about experiences; 
that is supported by shared symbol-based systems and 
tools; in which the outside world provides reasons for 
beliefs and desires. The matching of world states with 
intentions leads to act according to canons; but in case of a 
mismatch, it leads to building and sharing meanings by 
narrating legitimizations through our native readiness for 
social meaning, which eventually confronts own limits, 
which triggers inventions that propose new meanings, 
systems and tools, negotiated as enculturated knowledge. 
 
[c1 & c2] Creating enculturated knowledge 
 C S 
To overcome biological limits, humans 
challenge them with new meanings and 
symbol-based systems that are negotiated as 
enculturated knowledge. 
10 + 13 + 5 = 28  
Knowing Abilities 




4.8.4 Individual Knowing (IK) Framework: Personal, Cultural and World States Layers 
Another way of seeing the integration of these three theories of individual knowing is to 
recognize that the reviewed individual knowing theories follow, in their understandings the same 
ontological structure – (P) Personal, (C) Cultural, and (W) World states layer – and a similar 
logical structure for explaining their epistemology (knowing drives, knowing abilities, knowing 
performance criteria, and tools). See Table 31. 
The (P) Personal layer is structured in a hierarchy composed by (K1) Native knowing 
(white colored), (K2) Ability based-knowing (light gray colored), and (K3) Symbol-based 
knowing (dark gray colored), in which K1 supports K2 and K3, and K2 supports K3 (ass 
denoted by the arrows). All these three knowing sub layers are logically explained by the 
sequence given by five structural elements of the (P) Personal layer: (PL) Human biological 
limits, (PD) Knowing drives, (PA) Abilities, (PC) Performance criteria, and (PT) knowing 
Tensions.  
At this Personal layer there are personal tools (PT1 and PT2) that correspond to less or 
more sharable knowledge respectably that denotes instrumentalized physical or intellectual 
objects based on personal native abilities (PA.1) and general physical and intellectual heuristic 
abilities (PA.3) for less shareable tools (PT1), and based on PA.1, and sensemaking abilities 
(PA.4) for more shareable tools (PT2),  
The (C) Cultural layer is described by two elements. First, by its (CI) Interpretative 
Systems, which is composed by the (CI.1) Initial assimilation processes and the (CI.2) Ongoing 
workable social formations; and second by its (CT) Tools, which in turns are composed by 




The (W) World states layer is described by the capacity to (W1) Provide humans reasons 
for beliefs and desires in which the (W1.1) Match between world states and personal intended 
states leads to either the use of existing (CI) Interpretative systems and (CT) Tools through the 
(PA.6) Cannon appreciation ability; and the (W1.2) Gap between world states and personal 
intended states leads to either the triggering of (PA.6) the Cannon influencing ability for the 
case that the gap could be plausible justified using existing meanings and tools, or the 
triggering of either the (PA.4) Sensemaking abilities or the (PA.5) Intellectual abilities to 
invoke human inventiveness to conceive (CI.2) Workable social formations or (CT) Tools that 
bridge the gap between world states and personal intended states.  
At the (P) Personal layer, the (P1) Human biological limits mainly defined by the limits of 
our (P1.1) Memory capacity and (P1.2) Perceptual sharpness, which characterize the limits of 
all of our (PA) abilities and the tension of our knowing performances (PT); and defines the 
threshold in which humans start searching for the instrumentalization of objects to overcome 
our limits. This overcoming holds the alternative of either following the (K2) Ability-based 
knowing route to use or create (CT.1) Non-symbolic tools, or the (K3) Symbol-based knowing 
route to use or create (CT.2) Shared symbol-based systems. This last case is triggered by the 
primitive (PD.2) Desire for companionship driver and supported by the (PA.2) Native proto-
symbolic predisposition to social meaning ability. 
The (PD) Knowing drives are composed by two (K1) Native knowing drives, the (PD.1) 
Primitive biological and perceptual appetites and the  (PD.2) Desire for companionship (which 
explains the development,  in the (C) Cultural layer, the formation of (CT.2) Shared symbol-
based systems). At (K2) Ability-based knowing level there is a general drive called the (PD.3) 




triggered by the (PD.4) Situational sensemaking appetite, (PD.3) Educated and scientific 
passion for intellectual sense, or (PD.3) Personal intended behaviors and desires.  
 The (PA) Knowing abilities are composed by two (K1) Native knowing abilities, the 
(PA.1) Primitive innate sensory-motor-logical powers and the (PA.2) Native proto-symbolic 
predisposition to social meaning. At (K2) Ability-based knowing level there is a set of three 
abilities grouped under la the label (PA.3) General physical and intellectual heuristic abilities, 
which is composed by the Order Recognition, Pattern Generalization, and Commitment to 
instrumentalization abilities. At (K3) Symbol-based knowing level, the corresponding abilities 
are the (PA.4) Sensemaking abilities, (PA.5), the Intellectual abilities, and (PA.6) Legitimizing 
abilities. Notice however, that some abilities composing PA.4 and PA.6 are part of the ability-
based knowing set (shown in dark gray in Table 31).  
The (PC) Performance criteria at (K1) Native knowing is the (PC.1) Private standard of 
appetitive satisfaction. At (K2) Ability-based knowing level there is a set of two criteria grouped 
under the label (PC.2) Heuristics Criteria, which is composed by the Private standard of usefulness 
for physical acts and Private standards of intellectual beauty for intellectual acts; and there is also, 
at K2 level, the (PC.3) Private standard of everyday sensemaking. At (K3) Symbol-based knowing 
level, the corresponding criteria are the (PC.4) the Public standard of intellectual duty, and the 
(PC.5) Public standard of canonical duty). 
The (PT) Tensions at (K1) Native knowing corresponds to the tension between (PT.1) 
Sharpness of contour and Image reasonableness. At (K2) Ability-based knowing level there are 
the tensions (PT.2) Heuristic Tension that corresponds to the tension between Wiliness of 
acting judiciously and Confidence of executing a novelty, and the tension (PT.3) between  Self-




level, the corresponding tensions are (PT.4) between Constraining acts and Habilitating acts, 
the tension (PT.5) among Certainty and Systematic relevance and Plausibility, and the tension 
(PT.6) between Committing to existing canons and Building and sharing new canons.  
The sequences showed between the personal, cultural and world layer using blue arrows are not 
exhaustive, but examples that illustrate the level of explication of the model.     
This personal knowing framework while integrating descriptions of primitive knowing, 
ability-based knowing, everyday knowing, and intellectual knowing; also incorporates 
descriptions for the role of language, meaning and the processes of sharing and creating 
knowledge, and proposes in an integrated way the epistemological and ontological drafts of the 





Table 31. Integrated Knowing Framework (IKF): Personal, Cultural and World states layers.
1. P e r s o n a l  L a y e r  ( P )  

























































































































































PA.1 Primitive innate 
sensory-motor-logical powers 
PC.1 Private standard 
of appetitive satisfaction 





PK1. Less  Sharable Tools  (Knowledge) 
 
K1. Native Knowing PK2. More Sharable Tools (Knowledge) 
K2. Ability-based Knowing Supporting ------ K3. Symbol-based Knowing 





























   














































































Pattern filtering  





Committing (Tight or Loose) 
Forming social workablenesses 
Enacting known patterns 











































































































































































































Notes about Sensemaking and Intellectual  Challenges 
Sensemaking Logic for Ill-define Situations Intellectual sense Logic for Knowledge Creation 
 Skills and context shape and limit the stories told;  
 In which a faithful presumption of certain contextual order  
 Is followed by a stimuli-based reverse clarification process;  
 In which interruptions invoke our emotional memory;  
 All this in search of describing self or defining self;  
 Through workable social understandings  
 That triggers constraining or habilitating acts  
 In a now redefined situation that invites to more knowing. 
 Knowledge created is submitted to the personal 
adhered public standard of educated people hold or 
at scientific methods that academics formally set. 
 Such knowledge changes oneself by framing new 
ways of seeing reality, and drives to convert others by 
sharing a vision, that is not only argued by its 
certainty and systematic relevance, but by its 
plausibility. 
2. C u l t u r a l  L a y e r  ( C )  
CI .  I nter pret at ive  Syste ms  CT.  T o o l s  
Established or expected canonical patterns 
to know about experiences and social 
transactions. 
To overcome biological limits, humans 
challenge them with new meanings and 
symbol-based systems that are negotiated 
as enculturated knowledge. 
CI.1 Initial Assimilation Process C T . 1  N o n - S y m bo l ic  T oo l s  
 Authority of master, trust of learner and 
sharing of tools for communicating. 
 Assimilation of tools through affiliation to a 
community that nurtures traditions in which 
we commit to act accordingly by practicing. 
 As learners show results, justified knowledge 
validates confidence in masters, releasing the 
tension of the trusting conjecture. 
 Given limited personally justified knowledge, 
we continue trusting authority of others. 
 Rejecting imitation of masters' doings and 
sayings, affects his authority, and leads the 
dissenter to be master, gaining authority. 
 Groups’ convivial existence transcends 
individuals and time, establishing continuity 
of future knowledge sharing activities. 
 Humans commit and rely in them supported 
and following heuristic abilities, performance 
criteria, and tension. 
 Only usage maxims could be told about, after 
analyzing application and success.  
 What is shared may exclude premises about 
tools assimilation & operation of interpretative 
frameworks 
CT.2 Shared Symbol-based Systems  
 Communicating about experiencing objects use 
subsidiarily a symbol system that hold, to denote 
experiencing, different levels of preciseness, 
richness, personal attachment/detachment, 
scalability, and reversibility, to make explicit our 
knowing about it. 
 Poverty, Consistency, Iteration, Grammar and 
Manageability Laws define how symbols may 
scale up or down the notations of objects to the 
dimensions of our comprehension. 
 When representation or operation of the set of 
symbols in use is not effective for a particular 
striving of intellectual control, our knowing may 
stay tacit and may trigger the knowing, with 
symbolic representation or not, of novel aspects 
of the experienced object. 
CI.2 Ongoing Workable Social 
Formations Oriented to Joint Action 
 Non-disclosive intimacy 
 Equivalent meanings 
 Shared meanings 
 Satisficing naming of objects 
 Collective action experiencing, 
 Distributed meanings 
 Overlapping views of ambiguous events 
 3. W o r l d  S t a t e s  L a y e r ( W )
W 1 . P r o v i d e s  r e a s o n s  f o r  b e l i e f s  a n d  d e s i r e s  
W1.1 Match between World 
states and Personal intended 
states 
W1.2 Gap between World states and Personal 
intended states 
 Leads to keep using existing 
meanings, by recognizing 
cannons of the participating 
culture; and acting in ways 
compatible with way of life 
(legitimizing abilities following 
cannon appreciation). 
 Leads to the construction and sharing of meanings by 
recognizing cannons of the participating culture, in which 
the interaction of acting and saying toward certain goals 
reveals the narrator’s perspective and invokes cannon 
influencing abilities. 
 Eventually limits of the human biological substrate are 
confronted, which in turns challenges our cultural 
inventiveness and leads to propose new meanings, tools, 





4.8.5 Integrated View of Language, Shared Meanings and Recognition of Knowers 
Considering the emerged Individual Knowing View (Table 30), we are ready to 
explore an integrated view of (a) language, (b) shared meanings, and (c) the criteria 
by which a knower is recognized. This view attends  
This view (see Table 32) will point out (in italics), the implied type of knowing 
activities (sharing knowledge, applying knowledge, and creating knowledge).  
Interestingly the proportion of activities types characterized by the “language” 
construct (4) is lower than those related to “shared meanings” (8), and much lower 
than those related to “recognition of knowers” (11).  
Since all these activities implied some level of tension, a preliminary discovery is 
that knowing-who related activities may hold greater tension that the other types of 
activities.  
In addition, given that (a) “language” may invoke 3 sharing, 1 applying, and 2 
creating instances of knowing types; and (b) “shared meanings” may invoke 4 
sharing, 5 applying, and 5 creating; and (c) “recognition of knowers” may invoke 4 
sharing, 4 applying, and 8 creating instances of knowing types, then (a) “language” 
reveals to be tool oriented for sharing knowledge, (b) “shared meanings” presents a 
more balance profile among knowing activity instances, and (c) “recognition of 
knowers” seems to be the tool for creating knowledge. 
 




In here, (1) language is conceived as: 
 (1a) shared contrived cultural tools, based on symbol-based systems used 
subsidiarily for communicating about the experiencing of objects or events  to 
make explicit our knowing about them (language as tool for sharing knowledge).  
(1b) tools that denote our knowing to the dimensions of our comprehension with 
different levels of preciseness, richness, attachment/detachment, scalability, and 
reversibility depending on the poverty, consistency, iteration, and grammar that 
govern the systematization of the symbolic system (different characteristics of 
the symbol system hold and in use implies different gradients of knowledge 
sharing); and  
(1c) when representation or operation of the set of symbols in use is not effective 
for a particular striving of intellectual execution, our knowing may stay tacit and 
may trigger the knowing, with symbolic representations or not, of novel aspects 
of the experienced object (ineffectiveness of the symbol system in use may limit 
knowledge sharing or trigger creating knowledge).  
 (1d) And finally, language is conceived as a challenging and changing symbol-
based tools in which specific symbols reflect the sensitivity to cultural canons 
and to human‘s limits. Here, narrating structures reveals either teller’s 
compliance to existing symbols or systems or legitimating of new ones (human 
limitations confronting challenges may trigger either the application of the 
existing symbol system to narrate a legitimating or plausible approach, or the 





Complementarily, (2) shared meanings first is understood (2a) threefold in the tension 
among:  
(2a1) its conception through perceptual or emotional heuristic ordering, 
generalizing, and tight or loose committing – conceptual approach (different 
gradients of commitment implies a transition from knowledge application to 
knowledge creation),  
(2a2) its enactment through workable social formations oriented to trigger 
different gradients of reading-authoring joint actions – cultural approach (each 
type of workable social formations holds different levels of sharing, applying and 
creation of knowledge), and its  
(2a3) denotation through symbolic systems – referential approach (symbolic 
systems as a way of sharing meanings); including the possibility of being 
ineffective.  
In this last understanding (referential), it is that shared meanings (2b) could be seen as: 
 (2b1) plausible stories that show patterns and insinuate the future through 
conversations with self and others through satisficing naming (sharing and 
applying knowledge by representing its meaning through existing shared 
symbolic systems), or as  
(2b2) canon legitimization stories that enrich cultures (sharing and applying 






Finally, (2c) shared meanings hold the reactive-proactive tension among: 
(2c1) acting according to the way of life canons (applying existing knowledge 
through culturally acceptable actions),  
(2c2) construction of culture (creating knowledge through actions that will be 
culturally acceptable), and  
(2c3) challenging the outside world states (creating knowledge through actions 
that create new tools and symbol systems negotiated as enculturated knowledge). 
To close, recognition of individual knowing domains is understood as a cultural-based 
disposition in which individual are recognized as holders of certain ability-based or 
symbol-based knowledge. Instances of these cultural dispositions happen at the: 
(3a) initial cultural assimilation stage, like in: 
(3a1) the master’s authority and learner’s trust relationship (sharing knowledge), 
 (3a2) the master’s confidence validation through learner’s results (applying 
knowledge)  
(3a3) when limitations to validate vast domains of knowledge keep our trust in 
the authority (applying knowledge)  
(3a4) by rejecting imitation of masters' doings and sayings, which affects his 








 (3b) ongoing cultural stages instances like in: 
(3b1) the successful enactment of plausible workable social understandings 
(sharing, applying and creating knowledge in terms of the workable social 
formation type),  
(3b2) the successful legitimizing of sayings and acts in terms of current cultural 
cannons (creating knowledge within the current system of symbols or tools),  
(3b3) successful legitimizing of sayings and acts in terms of challenging cultural 
cannons or states of the outside world (creating knowledge by enacting new 
system of symbols or tools), explains better the recognition of knowers.  
In more general terms, when recognizing knowers  
(3c), individuals are known for setting the standards (creating knowledge) for 
(3c1) usefulness for physical acts,  
(3c2) intellectual beauty or duty for intellectual acts,  
(3c3) everyday sensemaking for constraining or habilitating behaviors, and  




Integrated View of Language, Shared Meanings, and Recognition of Knowers 
1. Language 
Type of Knowing 
Activity (4) 2. Shared Meanings 
Type of Knowing  
Activity (8) 
3. Recognition of 
Knowers 
Type of Knowing 
Activity (11) 
1a. Language as 
shared contrived 





 2a. Shared meanings 
as the tension among: 
 3a. Recognition of 
knowers, at the cultural 
assimilation stage, follows 
the authority-trust 
relationship, like in: 
 
 (2a1) its conception 





2a1. Different gradients 
of commitment implies 





(3a1Master’s authority and 
learner’s trust relationship, 
3a1. Sharing 
knowledge 
1b. Language as 
systematic 







reversibility - use 
to denote our 
knowing to the 




the symbol system 
in use implies 
different gradients 
of 
 sharing knowledge 
(3a2) Master’s confidence 
validation through learner’s 
results, 
3a2. Applying 




2a2. Each type of workable 
social formations holds 
different levels of 
sharing knowledge 
 applying knowledge, &  
creating knowledge 
(3a3) Limitations to 
validate vast domains of 
knowledge keep our trust 







the possibility of 
ineffectiveness.  
(3a4) Rejecting imitation 
of masters' doings and 
sayings, affects his 
authority, and leads the 
dissenter to be a new 
master, gaining authority  
3a4.Creating 
knowledge 
2a3. Symbolic systems 
as a way of sharing 
meanings 
(sharing knowledge) 






of the symbol 
system in use may 
limit the  
sharing knowledge  
or trigger 
 creating knowledge  
2b. Denotations of 
shared meanings as: 
2b1. Sharing knowledge 
&  applying knowledge 




3b. Recognition of knowers, 










stories that show 
patterns and 
insinuate the future 
through 
conversations with 
self and others 
through satisficing 
naming, or as  
(3b1) the successful 















trigger either the 
application of the 
existing symbol 
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new symbols or new 







stories that enrich 
culture. 
2b2. Sharing knowledge,  
applying knowledge & 
creating knowledge by 
representing its meaning 
through existing shared 
symbolic systems 
(3b2) the successful 
legitimizing of sayings and 
acts in terms of current 
cultural cannons  
 
3b2. Sharing, 
applying & creating 
knowledge within 
the current system 
of symbols or tools 





(3b3) successful legitimizing 
of sayings and acts in terms 
of challenging cultural 
cannons or states of the 
outside world 
3b3. Sharing & 
creating knowledge 
by enacting new 
system of symbols 
or tools 
 (2c1) acting 
according to the way 
of life canons  




3c. Recognition of knowers 
is linked to the setting of 
knowing standards of: 
(3c1) usefulness for 
physical acts 
(3c2) intellectual beauty 





(3c4) canonical duty for 











(2c2) construction of 
culture, and  
2c2. Creating knowledge 
through actions that will 
be culturally acceptable 
 
(2c3) challenging the 
outside world states  
2c3. Creating knowledge 
through actions that 




3 Sharing, 1 Applying, 2 Creating Types 4 Sharing, 5 Applying, 5 Creating Types 4 Sharing, 4Applying, 8 Creating Types 




4.8.6 Knowing and Knowledge: Emerged Brief Descriptions  
Brief descriptions about complex issues are risky and tensioning, since they 
usually do not capture with sufficient emphasis those details that characterized 
integrity; however, they are necessary if we intend to offer some clarity and trigger 
appetite for further discovering. Then, I dared to summarized knowing and knowledge 
as follows: 
Knowing is understood as the committed instrumentalization, or socially 
workable enactment, or normative enculturation of objects or behaviors, in 
which the subsidiary process of assimilating tools, characterized as either 
more or less ability-based or symbol-based, invokes private or public self-
adhered, intended to be universal, standards of usefulness, plausibility 
(including emotional valuations), scientific or normative acceptability; an 
about which the knower hold different gradients of shared symbolization, 
that when inadequate, it may either limit sharing about it, staying tacit, or 
trigger innovative behaviors. 
Two more memorable descriptions of the integrated view of knowing, with lesser details, 
are offered for quick referencing as follows: 
Knowing as the committed instrumentalization, or socially workable enactment, or 
legitimized enculturation of objects or behaviors, about which knower may hold a 
shared symbolization, that when inadequate, it may either limit sharing about it, 





If we dare to encapsulate “committed instrumentalization, or socially workable 
enactment, or legitimized enculturation” in “instrumentalization” under the argument that 
such detonation will trigger the question for the contriving logic that drives objects and 
behaviors into tools, we could consider the following shortened description: 
Knowing as the committed instrumentalization of objects or behaviors, about which 
knowers may hold or not an adequate shared symbolization system. 
Finally, an extrapolated description of knowledge is proposed next: 
Knowledge as the committedly instrumentalized, or socially workable enactment, or 
legitimately enculturated object or behavior that when it is applied, shared or created 
meets private or public self-adhered standards of usefulness, plausibility (including 
emotional valuations), scientific or normative acceptability, and about which the knower 
may hold a shared symbolization system, that when inadequate, it may either limit her 
(his) communicating about it, staying tacit, or trigger innovative enactments.  
Recurring to the previous argument of encapsulating into commitment the ideas behind 
workableness and legitimization, we could consider the following shortened description: 
Knowledge as the committedly instrumentalized object or behavior, that when it is 
applied, shared or created meets standards of usefulness, plausibility, scientific or 
normative acceptability, and about which knowers may hold or not an adequate 
shared symbolization system. 
 Within such understanding, we should recall that the instrumentalized object or 




4.8.7 Epistemological Note about Knowing and Commonness Criterion 
In Chapter 2, while presenting the arguments that characterized the knowledge 
domain within which commonness happens, the knowledge definition of Tsoukas 
and Vladimirou (2001) – “Individual capability to draw distinctions, within a 
domain of action, based on the appreciation of context or theory, or both” – was 
used to argue for organizational context as the bounding reference. Now, that an 
integrated view of knowledge has emerged, it is necessary to justify the epistemological 
compatibilities of both approaches. 
The main components of the Tsoukas and Vladimirou (2001) knowledge definition 
(“Individual capability to draw distinctions, within a domain of action, based on the 
appreciation of context or theory, or both”) that our boundary-finding argumentation 
invoked could be summarily approached within three issues: (a) knowledge residency, (b) 
normative expectations, and (c) intuitive appreciation of consequences. The high level of 
similarities of both understandings to knowledge allows attending these issues 
unproblematicly:    
(a) The residency of knowledge remains in the individual in both approaches. 
(b) The “tacit awareness of the normative expectations” (Schutz, 1970; McCarthy, 
1994) that supports the idea of “based on the appreciation of context or theory, or 
both” (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001) fits with no problems with “subsidiary personal 





(c) The proposition “an intuitive appreciation of the consequences that might follow 
from breaking them” (McCarthy, 1994) that supports the idea of “based on the 
appreciation” (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001) fits unproblematicly with “subsidiary 
personal process... holds the tension of invoking… universal, standards… which 
characterizes, whether, the usefulness, plausibility (including emotional valuations), 





CHAPTER 5: FRAMING ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES 
5.1 A READING POSTURE ABOUT KNOWLEDGE IN KBV OF THE FIRM  
This chapter looks into relevant theories and views of the firm in which knowledge is 
key in the formulation of the capability to reveal their body of knowledge. The theories 
considered, including also pre-KBV of the firm, are Satisficing Heuristics (Simon, 1947), 
SOP-based (Cyert & March, 1992), Organizational Routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982, 
Levitt & March, 1988), Industry Recipes (Spender, 1989, 1992), Organizing Principles 
(Kogut & Zander, 1992) and Knowledge Integration (Grant, 1996a, 1996b). 
As we discussed in chapter 1, most knowledge-based approaches of value creation have 
assumed that the residency of knowledge is both at personal level and at organizational level. 
However, without denying the personal characteristic of knowledge, these views have 
emphasized organizations as knowing entities and used abstractions related to organizational 
knowledge as unit of analysis (Felin & Foss, 2004, Grant, 1996a).  
These conceptions about the residency of knowledge, holds serious implications for the 
verification and advancement of the theories of the firm; especially if we assume that they 
posit the general framework for the study of organizations. 
Following the integrated knowing framework of the previous chapter, to understand, 
while building theories of the firm, a theory of knowledge that conceives knowing and 
sharing of what one knows: 
 As resident and happening at individual level. 
 As a need to make intellectual sense of experiences or as response to overcome own 




 Manifested in what we say or act (physical or intellectual) subsidiarily or focally. 
 As committedly instrumentalized (Polanyi,1958; 1966), or normatively enculturated 
(Bruner, 1990), or socially enacted (Weick,1995). 
 With or through historically evolved, tangible or intangible, instrumentalized, socially 
workable or normative legitimized objects or behaviors (tools) with different 
gradients of shared and systematic symbolic content. 
  As evaluated by the intended to be universal private or public self adhered standards 
of performance, in terms of their non-symbolic or symbolic nature, respectively, of 
the tools in use; being this either useful, plausible (including emotional valuations), or 
scientifically or normatively acceptable. 
From such knowing posture, the coming reading of competing knowledge-based 
views of the firm pays attention to the epistemological posture about the residency of 
knowledge, to, more than, comment the problematic approach, but to recognize the body 
of knowledge represented in the artifacts (seeing them as tools while knowing) 
participating in the proposed organizational capability. Such inventory is useful data, 
indifferent of its argued residency, which will help to define the context, domain and 
boundaries of common knowledge in organizations.  
Then, instead of disqualifying such knowledge-based theories or capabilities, here 
they are re-read with the understanding that the knowing objects or knowledge embedded 
objects or behaviors corresponds to the instrumentalization of objects or to the 
instrumentalized objects or behaviors, respectively. 
5.2   FRAMING CAPABILITIES – A NOTE ON METHOD 
Framing organizational capabilities follows Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) coding 




   Coding of the theories was executed in two stages. First, open coding was applied 
to the text of the following theories: Simon’s (1955, 1991a), Cyert and March (1992) 
Nelson and Winter (1982), Spenders’ (1992), Kogut and Zander’s (1992) and Grant 
(1996a). In this first stage, each document was study as a whole asking the questions 
“How does an organization function within this theory of the firm?” and “What does it 
make this theory the same as, or different from, the previous one that I coded?” (Strauss 
& Corbin, 1998, p. 120). The purpose was to identify a set of categories that reveal the 
common structure of the capabilities of the firm, if any.  
At this stage, the finding is that literature on theories or views of the firm embeds in 
their descriptions three common categories. [a] First, there are some presumptions about 
the organizational context; which frequently interprets risk and/or uncertainty in certain 
ways. [b] Second, there are actors, real or socially constructed, playing certain roles and 
holding/affecting expectations about the accomplishment of some objectives; bounded by 
the previously mentioned presumptions. [c] Third, there is a certain way of conceiving 
the organization; an approach that even though is sometimes presented upfront, it is also 
the most subtle category. It is the subjacent logic of how the organization achieves its 
objectives while governs the relationships among actors. 
This last category exhibits two dimensions. The first tells that theories of the firm 
follow two, non-necessarily exclusive alternatives: (a) the exploitation of existing 
routines, and (b) the exploration of new alternatives. The second dimension tells about the 
challenge of attending the epistemology of possession and practice (Cook and Brown (1999) 
when conceiving knowledge in organizations, as it was discussed in Chapter 1. Such view lead 




the execution in the other side, they are labeled Organizational design premises and 
Organizational execution premises, respectively, in this framing. 
Then, considering these two dimensions, the description of the organizational capability 
of the theory of the firms will be frame by a schema – labeled “Organizational Capability 
Framework” – with the shape of a two-by-two matrix; in which one axis belongs to the 
dichotomy exploration-exploitation; and the other axis belongs to the alternatives: 
organizational design premises and organizational execution premises (see Table 33). 
O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  C a p a b i l i t y  F r a m e w o r k  
 [a] Theory’s contextual presumptions 
[b] Actors’ roles and expectations about objectives 








 Capability’s Body of Knowledge 
[d] Residency of knowledge domains 
 [e] Participating knowledge domains 
[f] Personal knowledge types 






Table 33. Organizational Capability Framework (OCF) in the context of 
Theories of the Firm. 
The second coding stage complies with axial coding; here the paradigm in use with 
the departing categories and dimensions corresponds to the schema that emerged during 
open coding – Organizational capability framework. However, recalling the constructivist 
approach to grounded theory described by Charmaz (1993), and sensing that there is 
additional data in the text that can be interpreted, and that the outcomes of such 




additionally, with: (1) “What knowledge sustains the organization capabilities in this 
theory?” (2) , and “Who possesses the knowledge, or in whom resides the knowledge that 
sustains the organizational capability?” (Simon, 1991a, p. 126).  
These two questions lead to add two categories to the axial coding paradigm: [d] 
“Residency of knowledge domain” and [e] “Participating knowledge domain”. 
Additionally, the identified knowledge domains will be typified either as ability-based or 
symbol-based under the category [f] “Personal knowledge type”, and [g] typified as 
“common language”, “shared meanings”, or “recognition of knowers” under de category 
“Common knowledge type”. 
In summary, axial coding asks each theory’s text questions about presumptions, 
participating actors, the relationships among these categories; and the knowledge 
domains that sustains either of the two capability approaches (exploration-exploitation) 
for the design and execution activities. 
Framing of the body of knowledge of these views follows a sequence. First, we will 
question the text about [a] presumptions, [b] actors’ role and expectations about 
objectives, and [c] logic of achievement of objectives and actors’ governance, all these to 
understand the subjacent logic behind the organizational capability, and from it, then, 
make explicit the domain of knowledge that sustains that logic, based on [a], [b] and [c]. 
The reading of each theory of the firm is characterized by a constant effort of: (a) sub-
categorizing the references and examples of the participating constructs presented in the 
text considering the essential property that characterized the instance, (b) assessing 
instances in a sub-category to look for additional instances in the text that complete or 




for direct and indirect relationships in the text among the identified categories, and (d) 
articulate the understanding that depicts the subcategory and its relationships with others 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
Before applying axial coding to the theories of the firm, it offers a clearer 
appreciation, for the task at hand, to examine the seminal work that elaborates on the 
basic foundations of the dichotomy exploration of new alternatives and the exploitation 
of existing ones (March, 1991). However, since March (1991) is not a theory of the firm, 
applying axial coding will show only a single mixed dimension of the organizational 
premises. Afterwards, we will enjoy the discoveries that axial coding of Simon (1955, 
1991a), Nelson and Winter (1982), Cyert and March (1992), Spenders’ (1992), Kogut 
and Zander’s (1992) and Grant (1996a) will reveal. 
5.3 KNOWLEDGE EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION 
James March’s (1991) seminal work about exploration and exploitation in 
organizational learning formalized the discussion about the explicit and implicit choices 
that organizations make between new possibilities and existing certainties.  
Explicit choices about exploration and exploitation in organizations are about the 
evaluation of alternative investments – the use of present technologies versus and new 
ones; or the refinement of an existing technology versus the invention of a new one 
(Levinthal & March, 1981); or alternatives strategies – the consolidation of existing 
markets or products versus the exploration of new markets an offerings (March, 1991). 
Implicit choices about exploration and exploitation in organizations are contained in 




organizational culture like the ways in which objectives are set and refined, or in (c) 
organizational norms like routines for accumulating and reducing slack (March, 1991). 
March (1991) analysis and modeling of these two choices is characterized by: (a) the 
“development and use of knowledge in organizations” (p. 71) and (b) the implicit 
assumption of the dual residence of knowledge – individuals and organization.  These 
two central ideas are the core of his models which is best described by his words:  
Organizations store knowledge in their procedures, norms, rules, and forms. They 
accumulate such knowledge over time, learning from their members. At the same 
time, individuals in an organization are socialized to organizational beliefs. Such 
mutual learning has implications for understanding and managing the trade-off 
between exploration and exploitation in organizations. (p. 73).  
March (1991) modeled exploitation and exploration using adaptive processes, that is 
“the process of performing computations on a set of measured or presented data (believed 
to be) from a physical, i.e. natural, source in such a way as to develop a “best” parametric 
model of that physical source, i.e. one that best fits the observed data according to some 
error criterion” (Daintith, 2004).  
5.3.1 Arbitrary Socializing Capability 
Basically, March’s (1991) model assumptions for the exploitation approach starts with 
a closed system that holds three dimensions: a fix quantity of members (50) with certain 
beliefs about reality (30); a fix representation of reality (30) and a representation of the 
organizational set of beliefs (30) referenced by March as the Organizational Code. Even 
though the number of repeated simulations was set to 80, March argues that the quantitative 




his conclusions – are insensitive to the quantity of members and representations of reality 
(1991, p 75). Summing up, this simulation is a closed system that shows that changes in 
members’ beliefs is directed to the reduction of differences between the members beliefs 
and organizational code, thus they converge over time (p. 75).  
In order to make the system more open, March (1991) incorporated two properties to 
the model: personnel turnover and environmental turbulence. Personnel turnover is 
implemented through the supposition that in each iteration, members of the organization 
have a certain probability of exiting the organization and being replaced by a new 
member with a set of naive beliefs (p. 78). The environmental turbulence is implemented 
through the supposition that in each iteration, each representation of reality has certain 
probability of shifting the numeric value assigned from 1 to -1 or from -1 to 1. (p. 79).  
Based on this modeling, March (1991) offered some qualitative findings that basically 
stated that the exploitation approach ask for: (a) speed-regulated knowledge socialization 
design, (b) intended turnover of organizational members; and also warns that (c) in 
competitive environments these actions may not be sufficient to be the leader, (see Table 34). 
There is another way of seeing the effects of members turnover, besides the suggested 
regulated adaptation – intended turnover - described by March (1991); it is the one 
presented by Simon (1991a, p. 127), which is the case of the organization that tries to 
distance itself from the nearby social beliefs to preserve its distinct world view. In this 
case, personnel turnover increases socialization costs since organizational members need 
to be trained from the ground up. In a way, we could consider this as intended turnover 




Contrasting Exploitation and Exploration Approaches in Organizations  
Levitt and March (1988), David (1990), March (1991) and Levinthal & March (1993) 
Exploitation Approach Exploration Approach 
Improvement of existing skills makes 
experimentation of other alternatives less 
appealing (Levitt & March, 1988, p. 322). 
Exploration of new alternatives reduces the 
speed of improving existing skills (Levitt & 
March, 1988, p. 323). 
Certainty, clarity and proximity of exploitation 
increase its tendency and reduce exploration 
(David, 1990), making organizational adaptive 
processes to environmental changes potentially 
self-destructive, since long run depends on 
sustaining some level of exploration (March, 
1991, p. 73). 
The outcomes of exploring new ideas, new 
products, new markets, or new social 
networks are more uncertain, diffused and 
characterized by longer time frames than 
exploiting existing ones (March, 1991, p. 85). 
Mutual learning between organizations and its 
members shows a convergence between 
organizational and individual beliefs; which 
reveals the possibility that individuals may 
assimilate organizational knowledge before 
organizations learn from them. (March, 1991, p. 
85). 
Tendency to retain and promote individuals 
linked to success and to demote and remove 
individual linked to failures under-sample 
population with failure experiences creates 
an illusion of success and control; and losing 
of valuable lessons learned (Levinthal & 
March, 1993, p.109).   
Slow socialization of new members and 
moderate turnover sustain variability in 
individual beliefs, thus improving organizational 
and average individual knowledge in the long 
run (March, 1991, p. 85). 
Selecting and promoting individuals with risk 
seeking preferences, and setting for them 
targets slightly above their aspiration of 
success would increase their exploratory 
behavior (Levinthal & March, 1993, p. 109). 
Knowledge increments by personnel turnover 
may be insufficient to surmount the adverse 
effects created by lower variability if finishing 
near the top is important in competitive 
environments (March, 1991, p. 85). 
Risk-averse members of the organization 
could be induced to feel more confident and 
adopt risk seeking behavior through 
managing risk perception – downplaying 
(Levinthal & March, 1993, p. 108). 
 In general, incentives in the form of big 
rewards, like sharing property rights, for 
those linked with successful explorations are 
effective; but it has better results providing 
safety-nets for failures (Levinthal & March, 
1993). 




All this implies that what is relevant in guiding choices in organizations in the 
exploitation approach are processes like: (a) norms development process, (b) norms 
socialization process, (c) organizational members’ turnover process and (d) norms 
feedback process; which indeed offer a characterization of the organizational capability 
and of the body of knowledge embedded in it in the form of norms, procedures, rules and 
forms; which are referenced, loosely without these specifics, by March (1991) as 
Organizational Code. Summing up, in organizations, in the exploitation approach, 
organizational code is dynamically shaped by speed regulated socialization and intended 
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dynamically shaped by:




















Exploration  Approach 
Body of Knowledge
Organizational Code 
(norms , procedures, 
rules, and forms) is 
dynamically shaped by:
(a) Embedded risk 
management 
processes, and 
(b) Lessons learned of 
explored alternatives.
March’s Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning









5.3.2 Arbitrary Risk Taking Capability 
March’s (1991) also models the exploration approach and concludes that exploration 
is challenging. He goes on saying that there is ambiguity in the results of the simulation 
for the exploration approach in competitive environments; and clearly described it with 
the comments told by Polanyi (1963, p. 1013) regarding one of his contributions to 
physics: "I would never have conceived my theory, let alone have made a great effort to 
verify it, if I had been more familiar with major developments in physics that were taking 
place. Moreover, my initial ignorance of the powerful, false objections that were raised 
against my ideas protected those ideas from being nipped in the bud." 
In a posterior related work Levinthal and March (1993, p. 107) brought some light to 
the kind of interventions that could sustain the exploration approach with these findings: 
(a) promoting risk takers and managing their expectations increase exploratory behavior, 
(b) downplaying risk perception of risk-averse members increase exploratory behavior, 
(c) property rights incentives are effective, but safety-nets are better; and finally they 
warn about (d) the retention and promotion of successful members and the removal and 
demotion of failing ones which could create an illusion of control and losing of lessons 
learned.  Thus, following Levinthal and March, the following risk management processes 
can be identified in the exploration approach as: (a) managing risk-averse member’s 
perception process, (b) members selection and promotion of risk takers process, (c) 
managing success and failure consequences process, and (d) lessons learned process. 
And, if we still follow March’s (1991) conception of organizational knowledge – code -, 




dynamically shaped by risk management processes that induce exploratory behavior; and 
lessons learned process of explored alternatives (See Figure 3).  
In closing March’s (1991) discussion of the exploration approach in his seminal 
work, it is convenient to recall the wisdom versions of his findings: “the returns to fast 
learning are not all positive”, “rapid socialization may hurt the socializers even as it helps 
the socialized”, “development of knowledge may depend on maintaining an influx of the 
naive and ignorant”, and that “competitive victory does not reliably go to the properly 
educated” (p. 86).  
Finally, the issue of knowledge residency in March´s (1991) exploitation and 
exploration approaches reveals itself as problematic since not all the exploit or explore 
knowledge in organizations could be explained in terms of coded norms regarding the 
socialization, turnover, promotion, risk management and outcomes management, unless 
individuals by themselves and other stakeholders besides organizational members have 
nothing to say    
March’s modeling does offer the possibility to appreciate the contribution of 
organizational modulating processes, like the speed regulated socialization and intended 
membership of the exploitation approach, and the risk management design and lessons 
learned process of the exploration approach, in characterizing how knowledge could be 
integrated in a organizational capability and what is the body of knowledge sustaining it; 
however, still is a distant computational account of the human participation in the 




5.4 SIMON’S ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 
5.4.1 Bounded rationality  
Simon’s (1955) A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice and his later related works 
are a reaction against economists’ view of rational decision making as maximizing 
behavior. He argues, as a main assumption, that decision makers use suboptimal decision 
heuristics and from that position he postulates a theory that basically says that decision 
making involves limited search for satisficing alternatives. This human bounded view of 
rationality is characterized by: (1) considering a limited set of alternatives, (2) counting 
with incomplete information about payoffs of future states, (3) having incomplete 
information about the probability of occurrence of any particular state, and (4) adjusting 
aspirations over time. In this context we, says Simon, as rational delimited humans, use 
efficient procedures to find good satisficing solutions, not necessarily best solutions, 
oriented to goals, about which the preferences are given. 
In 1991a, Simon, while trying to explain that the unit of analysis of organizational 
learning research is at the organizational level, make clear that: “All learning takes place 
inside individual human heads; an organization learns in only two ways: (a) by the 
learning of its members, or (b) by ingesting new members who have knowledge the 
organization didn't previously have” (1991a, p. 125); and added that this human learning 
and ingestion is a phenomena –  influenced by the organization and with consequences 
for the organization – that could not be understood simply by observing isolated 
individuals (p. 127). Then, Simon posits residence of knowledge in the members of the 
organization, but argues for observing the process of knowledge assimilation at 




who interact, then a theory that explains individual knowing is co-need it to understand 
the ingestion phenomena. 
Simon’s concentrated his research in human mental capacities, and this can be 
appreciated in a summary of his findings (1991a, p. 129); in which he posits that a world-
class expert in any field can be described as a professional with no less than ten years of 
full-time dedication to learn his business in action. This expert, as the holder of some 
50,000 indexed memory chunks (+/- one order of magnitude) of relevant information, is  
prepare, within the domain of his/her expertise, to respond to many situations intuitively 
by recognizing clues in them and evoking an appropriate response, and also ready to 
handle more protracted and systematic analysis of difficult problems.  
In this recalling, Simon (1991) links this individual expertise to automated expert 
systems that makes organizational memory less vulnerable to personnel turnover. In other 
words, Simon posits that this goal-satisficing heuristic-oriented rationality, resident in 
individuals, could be rationalized and made it explicit. We should  also note that his 
decisional heuristics excluded manifestations of knowledge-based decisions executed 
through tacit bodily activities – skills. 
In this last issued, Miller (2008, p. 945), following Polanyi (1958) and Wittgenstein 
(1958), goes further, and argues that: “Practices express rationality in ways that cannot be 
captured fully by verbal or symbolic representations”, implying that rationality as explained 




In summary, Simon sets emphasis on cognition over action, explicit knowledge over 
tacit knowledge; systematic information processing over human judgment, and means over 
ends (Miller, 2008, p. 949). 
5.4.2 Administrative Behavior, Organizations and Markets 
Administrative Behavior - Herbert Simon’s (1947) doctoral dissertation -  which is the 
departure point of most his work, achieves to describe the administrative man, a role 
described in contrast to the maximizing behavior of the economic man, as an actor that 
looks for a course of action that is satisfactory or good enough when confronting 
situations; by characterizing them by few relevant and crucial factors and by considering 
the consequences of few alternatives based on heuristics accumulated over experiences. 
Then, Simon anchored in this description of the individual as the administrative man, 
proposed that organizational processes should be designed in terms of establishing and 
maintaining the premises that influence the decisions into the chosen overall direction 
(Simon, 1997, p. 322).  
Before going further, I have to state that open and axial coding was executed against 
Simon’s (1991b) Organizations and Markets, an article in which he presents a theory of 
organizations, and in which he made references to Simon (1947). Finally, you will also 
see here references to Simon (1997), which is the 4
th
 Edition of Administrative Behavior, 
book that was consulted directly guided by the narrative of Simon (1991b). 
In Simon’s (1991b), the structure of the organizational capability is characterized by 
the design of an organization as an equilibrium system, which is constituted with three 




provided by the entrepreneurs / owners in exchange of nonmaterial values, such as of 
power or prestige, and also in exchange of profits and growth (Simon, 1997, p. 146). 
Employees receive wages and non-material incentives like facilitating the satisfaction of 
personal goals in exchange of time, effort and willingness to follow decisions while 
employed (p. 144); recalling that their efforts assume the exercise of the decision making 
based on heuristics. Customers, here, are served by the organization with its products, 
and in exchange, they contribute with their money, considering also that organizational 
objectives could be adapted to the values and preferences of customers, and that those 
customers could be induced to accept organizations objectives – products and services – 
through advertising (p. 147).  
In this organizational capability reading of Simon (1997), the conclusion is that the 
organization is oriented to the exploitation of knowledge; with some capacity of adapting 
to customers’ values. This is depicted as a returning flow from Customers to 
Organizational design in the capabilities framework. (See Figure 4).  
Simon’s implicit organizational design provides general stimuli to the members of the 
organization to create mutual stable expectations of behavior in the provided direction 
(1997, p. 110). This is achieve through: (1) general planning, which provides a strategy to 
limit future possibilities and stated goals as decision criteria (p. 109); and (2) five design 
mechanisms - (a) Organizational structure based on the hierarchy of decisions, (b) 
Division of work, (c) Communication channels, (d) Standard practices, and (e) 
Alignment, based on training and indoctrinating (p. 112).  
The implicit modeling of organizational execution includes attention-directors that 




direction (Simon, 1997, p. 110). Administrative behavior alignment is achieved through 
the following five modes of influencing: (a) Authority, understood as the power to make 
decisions which guide the actions of another without deliberation on the premises (p. 
179); (b) Communication, in its formal way, it is about informing decisions and 
consequences; and in its informal, it is a about the social relationships of the members (p. 
208); (c) Training prepares members to reach satisfactory decisions reducing the exercise 
of authority or advice (p. 13); (d) Organizational loyalty, which concerns with achieving 
that a person  identifies himself, while taking decisions, with his group, and the 
consequences of such decisions for his group (p. 284); and (e) the Criterion of efficiency 
is a based on two simple choosing rules stated as: "demands that, of two alternatives 
having the same cost, that one be chosen which will lead to the greater attainment of the 
organization objectives; and that, of two alternatives leading to the same degree of 
attainment, that one be chosen which entails the lesser cost" (p. 149).  
5.4.3 Goal-Satisficing Heuristic-Oriented Rational Organizational Capability 
In summary, under the presumption of a administrative man instead of the economic 
man; Herbert Simon’s (1947) Administrative Behavior, as described by Simon (1991b), 
while defining the administrative man as a goal-satisficing heuristic-oriented rational 
decision maker, shapes an understanding of an organization that operates in exploitation 
approach and in which its organizational capability establishes and maintains stimulus 






In that context, Organizational design knowledge provides the general stimuli for 
stable behavior expectations in the organization and it is characterized by: (a) knowledge 
of owners in the form of strategy and goals, which defines the patterns of decisions in the 
organization, (b) knowledge of managers in the form of classical managerial knowledge, 
refined by the goal-satisficing heuristic-oriented rationality, which shapes the design of 
organizational structure, division of work, communication channels, standard of practices 
and alignment processes, and (c) knowledge of managers about customers, in the form of 
product preferences, which refines the goals of the organization (see Table 35).  
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2. Organizational Execution Premises
-Authority
Power to take decisions without 
deliberation with subordinates.
-Communications
Inform decisions & consequences.
-Training
Prepares member to reach 
satisfactory d cisions reducing 
exercise of authority.
- Loyalty
Incentivizes member of firm to 
evaluate alternatives in terms of 
the consequences for the firm.
-Choosing  rules
Among options with same cost, chose 
one which leads to greater attainment 
of goals; and of two options with same 
degree of attainment, chose which 
entails the lesser cost.
S i m o n ’s  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  B e h a v i o r  - O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  C a p a b i l i t y
E x p l o i t a t i o n  A p p r o a c h
General Stimuli for stable behavior expectations Attention-directors to keep on in chosen direction 
[c] Logic of achievement : Goal-Satisficing Heuristic-Oriented Rational capability guided by stimuli and premises




S i m o n ’ s  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  B e h a v i o r   
B o d y  o f  K n o w l e d g e  o f  t h e  E x p l o i t a t i o n  C a p a b i l i t y   
[a] Theory 
presumption 




Profits, growth and non-material values, such as of power or 
prestige. 
Employee/Manager 
Wages and non-material incentives like facilitating the 
satisfaction of personal goals. 
Customer Alignment of products and services to their preferences.  




Goal-satisficing heuristic-oriented rational capability guided by stimuli and 
premises (strategy and choosing rules). See Figure 4 for details. 
1 . O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  D e s i g n  k n o w l e d g e  2 . O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  E x e c u t i o n  K n o w l e d g e  
Knowledge: [d] Residency, [e] Domain, [f], and Type (A: Ability-based, S: Symbol-based) 
[d] Entrepreneur/Owner: [d] Employee/Manager:  
1.1 Goals, Strategy and Choosing rules 
S 
 
2.1 Classical RRHH managerial knowledge 
S 
Defines patterns of decisions in the 
organization. 
Shapes the workings of authority, 
communications, training, and loyalty in the 
organization toward goals in the intended 
direction.  
[d] Employee/Manager:  
1.2 Classical managerial knowledge 
S 
2.2 Classical Marketing & Operational knowledge 
S 
Shapes planning, organizational structure, 
division of work, communication channels, 
standard of practices and alignment based 
on incentives and training. 
Shapes de marketing initiatives and delivery of 
products and services 
2.3 Goals & Choosing rules 
S 
1.3 Customer preferences 
S 
Leads to opt for satisficing decisions with lower 
costs. 
Refines goals of the organization. 2.4 Expert’s choosing heuristics  
A 
[d] Customer: 
Aligned by incentives and training to the 
authority and to the established decision 
making direction. 
1.4 Customer preferences 
S 
[d] Customer: 
Defines buying decisions. 2.5 Customer preferences 
S 
 
Defines marketing initiatives. 
Table 35. Simon’s (1947; 1991b) Body of knowledge of the Exploitation Capability of 
Administrative Behavior. 
And, Organizational execution knowledge provides attention-directors to keep on the 
chosen direction and it is characterized by: (a) knowledge of employees in the form of 
specialized indexed memory chunks and heuristics to apply them, which is aligned by 




making direction, and (b) knowledge of employees about the criterion of efficiency in the 
form of choosing rules, which leads to lower costs and attainment of objectives. 
5.5 CYERT AND MARCH’S BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM     
In the same research field than Herbert Simon, but refining the assumption from 
bounded rationality to adaptively rational, Cyert and March’s classic A Behavioral 
Theory of the Firm, originally published in 1963, presents a view of the firm as a 
coalition of individuals, with sub-coalitions in it, which in business organizations 
correspond to stockholders, managers, employees, customers, suppliers and regulatory 
institutions and governmental institutions  (1992, p. 31); that learns from experience and 
avoid environment uncertainty (p. 167). This organizational coalition agrees around 
imperfect rationalized and imperfect tested goals that are expressed in terms of 
expectations with certain aspiration levels, not always about operational issues, with no 
clear preference ordering, no much agreement in sub-goals, and refining – the goals - in 
response to experience (p.37); where consistency depends on the bargaining management 
capabilities, the sequence of demands, and the scarcity of resources. (p. 37). In summary, 
this theory was an attempt to complement the extant understanding of economic market 
factors with an understanding of the firm as developer of goals, manager of expectations 
and choice executer.  
In this theory, bargaining is the way of agreeing organizational goals; and side payment 
is the conceptual bargaining instrument, which takes the forms of money, organizational 
policies, personal treatment, authority (Cyert & March, 1992, p. 33). Total value of side 




is a function of the level of complementarily and conflict of the needs of its members (p. 
33). Here, the coalition, not the typical power-based asymmetric group in which the goal of 
the organization is to maximize profit (p. 34), but a group in which the bargaining 
processes characterized the demands of members of the organization. In these negotiations, 
a relevant number of side payments are in the form of policy commitments (p. 35). 
In this bargaining process, side payments hold certain attributes: (a) scarce resources, 
like money, limits bargaining alternatives, (b) some class of members are passive most of 
the time, with demands that can easily be satisfied, (c) some side payments are 
complementary, that is, they correspond to different policies that do not compete and are 
consistent in respect to goals, (d) some side payments  conflict, that is, they correspond to 
the same policy and represent an inconsistency in respect to the policy (Cyert & March, 
1992, p. 37), (e) information on actual prices of demands is hard to obtain, often 
misunderstood, and frequently unreliable, (f) market information related to demands 
needs to be searched and the search is typically initiated by some signal of failure, and (g) 
adaptation to demands is slow, still in the existence of pressure (p. 42). 
Even though side payments agreements are partial and do not foresee all upcoming 
circumstances; the coalition is motivated to function under such agreement and deploy 
reciprocal self-confirming control systems like budgeting and allocation of functions 
(Cyert & March, 1992, p.37-38). In this process, past bargaining becomes a guide for the 
future budget and allocation of functions and tend to institutionalization (p. 39). 
However, the characteristics of the demands change with experience and members are 
prone to attend to a small set of their demands depending in their participation in the 




adversity, that is the problems to be attended, or by solutions, that is the stimulation to 
satisfy goals (p. 40).    
Giving the adjustments of side payments and demands usually there is an excess of 
payments to members, labeled organizational slack (Cyert & March, 1992, p. 42). When 
the environment shows difficulties this organizational slack helps to absorb some of the 
variability, on the contrary when environment is booming the organization has the chance 
to capture resources in excess of its demands. Thus, organizational slack helps on dealing 
with the variability of the environment (p. 43). 
Assumptions about organizational goals ask for some assumptions about expectations 
in the formation and handling of environmental information used in decision making 
related to achieving of organizational goals (Cyert & March, 1992, p. 52, 55). These 
expectations are not protected from organizational members’ hopes, wishes, or needs. 
This conscious and unconscious bias in expectations is characterized by (a) optimistic or 
pessimistic predispositions, (b) being a member of subunit goals, (c) performance 
expectations, or (d) a priori preferences. Thus, the search for information is influenced by 
considerations that are important for the individual or subunit. And in general, following 
a scarcity criteria, search will be more intense in case of small organizational slack, and 
on the contrary, when slack is high, search becomes a typical routine (p. 95).  
Therefore, organizational decisions will depend on concrete information and 
estimates that may differ from reality, based on some characteristics of the organization 
and decision procedures; which depend on organizational goals, personal goals, and 
organizational slack (Cyert & March, 1992, p. 99). However, these decision procedures 




which the organization adapts to the environment (p. 99). When reading uncertainty in 
the environment, the rule is to substitute feedback data with expected data, that is, the 
organization learns from the environment in a limited way, where decisions consider 
feedback but the decision-rules that process this feedback hold their own goal aligning 
rules (p. 117). 
Then, the organizational choice mechanism is characterized by: (a) trying to choose 
an alternative that meets multiple changing aspiration-stated coalition demands, (b) 
choosing the first satisfactory call to mind alternative, considering existing policies as a 
fast track or intensifying search when failure calls, (c) avoiding uncertainty by 
committing to existing procedures instead of forecasting the environment, (d) applying 
standard operating procedures for the short run decision-making and implementation 
(Cyert & March, 1992, p. 134).   
This understanding of organizational procedure-based behavior asks for principles 
that guide the choice of procedures to be used for each situation. Cyert and March call 
them “general choice procedures” (1992, p. 121) and are assumed as learned – we will 
have to suppose by the members of the firm, since it is not specified; otherwise the 
procedures would be part of a never ending hierarchy. These principles to select 
procedures hold Cyert and March’s central idea of organizational capability. It takes the 
form of  three premises, that are about uncertainty management, trust and adaptation: (1) 
Avoid uncertainty (chose procedures that minimize future uncertain situations), (2) 
Maintain rules (do not abandon rules, otherwise problems could get worse), and (3) Use 
simple rules (take decisions using the  basic simple procedure provided, in case of an 




procedure may be modified; remembering that the firm relies on individual “judgment”) 
(p. 121). This last rule invites to take initiatives, as a last resort, in the context of certain 
explicit goal oriented considerations. A final idea of Cyert and March about the 
systemization potential that standard procedures hold – the adaptively rational strategy of 
the firm - is best described in the following sentences: “In fact, we can specify rather 
easily a set of environmental conditions and internal constrains that make these general 
rules sensible from the point of view of long-run rational.” (p. 121).  
In the context of our quest, understanding the details of standard operating 
procedures (SOP) of the Behavioral Theory of the Firm helps to identify the 
characteristics of the body of knowledge that is embedded in this view of the firm. Cyert 
and March  (1992, p. 120) argue for a characterization of SOP , that learns and adapts, in 
the form of:  (a) well-defined specific rules to change behavior according to a short-run 
feedback, and (b) general rules to change more specific rules in response to longer-run 
and feedback, and (c) a hierarchy of rules where lower-level rules learn from higher-level 
rules. 
SOP description as an organization abstract object that learns and adapt without 
referring to members of the organization, defines humans as procedure adapter and 





5.5.1 A Goal-Satisficing Adaptively Rational Uncertainty-Avoiding Capability 
Cyert and March’s Behavioral Theory of the Firm, while describing an understanding 
of organization as a goal bargainer, with search and choice satisfying orientation, 
uncertainty avoiding SOP follower, and slow experiential learner, reveals an organization 




that, from the perspective of our quest, could be described by the following two of 
knowledge domains: 
Organizational Design Knowledge characterized by: (a) knowledge of the coalition, 
characterized by goals and policies refined through actual and past experience, (b) 
managerial bargaining knowledge that hold the potential to influence value creation 
through balancing and prioritizing demands, and (c) classical managerial control 
knowledge. 
Organizational Execution Knowledge characterized by: (a) knowledge of managers 
and employees related to the information search and decision making processes, and 
oriented to satisfy organizational goals with the influence of own and subunit 
expectations, and (b) knowledge of managers about organizational Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOP) oriented to avoid uncertainty, keep operations running, and last-resort 





5.6 NELSON AND WINTER’S EVOLUTIONARY BEHAVIOR VIEW OF THE FIRM 
Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter proposed in 1982, in theirs An Evolutionary Theory 
of Economic Change, a general way of theorizing about economic change. Their exposition 
holds as assumption Polanyi´s limitations about expliciting knowledge, implying that the 
best way to share what they, as authors, know, accepting their own limitations, is to present 
few specific examples – models - of their evolutionary view (p. 399).  
C y e r t  a n d  M a r c h ’ s  B e h a v i o r a l  T h e o r y  o f  t h e  F i r m  
B o d y  o f  K n o w l e d g e  o f  t h e  E x p l o i t a t i o n  C a p a b i l i t y   
[a] Theory 
presumption 
The main idea is to complement extant theories about economic market factors with a 







regulatory  and 
government 
institutions  
Organizational coalition agrees around imperfect 
rationalized and imperfect tested goals that are 
expressed in terms of expectations with certain aspiration 
levels, not always about operational issues, with no clear 
preference ordering, no much agreement in sub-goals, 
and refining – the goals - in response to experience; in 
which consistency depends on the bargaining 
management capabilities, the sequence of demands, and 
the scarcity of resources. 




A Goal-satisficing adaptively rational uncertainty-avoiding capability guided by 
standard operating procedures. 
1 . O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  D e s i g n  k n o w l e d g e  2 . O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  E x e c u t i o n  K n o w l e d g e  
Knowledge: [d] Residency, [e] Domain, and [f] Type (A: Ability-based, S: Symbol-based) 
[d]  Firm’s Coalition:  [d] Employee/Manager:  
1.1 Goals and policies refined through actual 
and past experiences. 
S 
A 
2.1 Information search and decision making 
toward organizational goals and influence by own 
and subunit expectations. 
S 
A 
[d] Manager:  2.2 Uncertainty, Trust & Adaptation SOPs: rules to 
avoid uncertainty, run the operation as usual even 
under failure, and last-resort explicit goal-oriented 
norms to modify procedures. 
S 1.2 Bargaining knowledge use to leverage 
value creation by balancing demands. 
S 
A 
1.3  Classical managerial control knowledge  S 
 
Table 36. Body of knowledge of the exploitation capability of Cyert and March’s (1992) 




Among Nelson and Winter’s (1982) examples, there is an evolutionary view of the firm. 
This view is an account of the firm economic capabilities in which they use the analogy 
that links individual skills to organizational routines – “a repetitive pattern of activity in an 
entire organization” (p. 97) – to argue, through three main ideas, (a) that much of the 
knowledge that lies beneath effective performance in the organization is tacit knowledge 
(p. 134), (b) that as in individual skills, in organizational routines most of the choosing is 
automatic (pp. 82, 134), and (c) that the details of the routine behavior can only be 
described by its effectiveness (pp. 89, 134).  
Nelson and Winter also invoke the routine as genes metaphor to argue that like genes 
the routines holds a persistent trait that determines possible behavior (1982, p. 14) and thus, 
it explains the evolutionary aspects of organizational design and behavior of the firm.  
Nelson and Winter’s view, from the perspective of our quest, is revealing in three senses. 
First, it proposes a clear distinction between individual knowledge and organizational 
knowledge by arguing that the organizational context operates as the memory of the 
organization. Second, it develops an evolutionary routine-based approach to understand 
persistent behavior, grow, contraction, heuristic-based problem-solving and innovation in the 
firm (1982, p. 98 & 99); this routine-based approach explicitly and implicitly describes an 
organizational body of knowledge for both the exploitation and exploration organizational 
capabilities; however, as we will discover later, the proposed scope for the innovation 
capability is limited (p. 133). Finally, the critical reading of the evolutionary view of the firm 
invites to consider the conflicting views that exists around two key concepts that defined 





5.6.1 Organizational memory and Organizational context 
According to Nelson and Winter (1982) organizational knowledge resides mostly in 
organizational memories, which is instantiated – thus exists – while exercising the 
organizational routines, that is remembering by doing (p. 99). This exercising requires 
that all members of the organization knows their jobs by knowing their repertories of 
routines and knowing which and when to invoke an specific routine once a message is 
received  from the organization, or from the external environment (p. 100). 
Messages, here, are manifested in two ways. Through either [4.4] internal and 
external explicit messages in the form of directives, needs, description of situations, and 
other communication devices like hand language, signals, gestures, glances, whistles that 
hold invitations to action; and [4.5] implicit messages in the form of subtle (1) 
descriptions of situations, or (2) changes in the state of the working environment due to 
execution of another organizational routine, or (3) changes in the external environment, 
or (4) triggers form timers or gauging artifacts related to the working environment 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982, p. 101). It is relevant to notice that this picturing of messages 
assumes that organizational routines [4.6] proactively read explicit and implicit messages. 
Note: numbers in [brackets] refer to the elements in the Figure 6. 
The repertoires of routines of that organizational members hold – individuals or 
subunits –include the ability to operate equipment, the whole plant, or in general, to 
exercise the productive practice upon materials and customers, in other words, as a whole 
this could be recognized as the list of ingredients of the organizational capability (Nelson 
& Winter, 1982, p. 103). Complementarily, the sequencing of tasks to accomplish a result 




capability recipe (p. 104). However, what is central to this organizational capability is the 
coordination that guides the correct [4.7] interpretations of received messages to [4.8] 
invoke “the associations that link the incoming messages to the specific [4.9] 
performances that they call for” (p. 104). 
This [4.7] interpretative and coordination knowledge may be understood as shared 
and residing in the individuals of the organization; and Nelson and Winter are clear about 
this issue, when they say that this individual knowledge is only meaningful and effective 
in the context of the organization (1982, p. 106). The organizational context [4.11] here 
holds an specific an revealing structure compose of [4.2] forms of external memory – 
electronic files and documents – that are [4.9] maintained by organizational routines, 
[4.3] durable physical structures, equipment and work environments that are ordered and 
repaired by organizational routines, and [4.1] a shared communication system (p. 105). 
This last component is characterized by the knowledge of the natural language - English 
or the spoken languages in the organization, and the organizational dialect – informal 
names of products, customers, suppliers, locations of things in the organization, and the 
localized meanings of certain words, like “promptly” or “slower” (p. 102).  
Thus, the Nelson and Winter’s (1982) proposed [4.7] organizational interpretative and 
coordination system is context-modulated, and this organizational context [4.11] – 
proposed as the memory of the organization – relates to the order and structure of 
symbol-based documents, durable objects, and the shared language of the organization - 
which, from the perspective of our epistemological posture of recognizing knowledge as 
resident in individuals, it corresponds to the Interpretative system and Tools of the 




chapter. Seeing it in this way – mapping Nelson and Winter’s organizational context to 
our Bruner’s (1990) Cultural Layer (see Table 31) the is not incompatible with Nelson 
and Winter’s (1982) theory, but better it removes the Simon’s (1991a) and Grant’s 
(1996a) reifying worries about knowing organizations. 
This Nelson and Winter’s organizational context [4.11] and the [4.7] shared 
interpretative and coordination system, together with the aggregated repertories of 
routines resident in individuals, could be understood as the organizational execution 
capacity that: [4.6] proactively perceives messages from the internal and external 
environment, [4.7] contextually interprets those messages, [4.8] evoke from a repertoire 
an effective routine, [4.9] perform productive actions according to the chosen routine, 
and [4.10] sends contextual-based messages implicitly or explicitly as part of its actions; 
recalling that in which not all of it can be articulated since it is partially based in 
individuals tacit knowledge. See Figure 6 and Table 37. 
5.6.2 Organizational design as Truce and Control routines 
Theories about firms ask for a description of the firm’s objective resolution approach, 
and Nelson and Winter’s (1982) posture about firm’s objectives is closed to Cyert and 
March’s (1992) in respect that [1] there is no need of clear objectives, what is needed is a 
procedure that defines the course of action based on a choosing criteria. The main 
argument presented to sustain this affirmation is that in the real world organizations can 
drive their way without explicit and precise articulation of their objectives (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982, p. 57). Stakeholder’s motivational forces modulate the behavior of the 




differing interests and complex intra-organizational political processes (p. 58); and are 
the result of a not completely rational evolutionary clean-up of motives, which conflicts 
extremely with the survival of the organization (p. 58).  
The discussion of which firms’ objective should be met is not complete without a 
reference on why members of the organization will chose to do what is required. Rule-
enforcement mechanisms [2.2], based on supervision and sanctions, are necessary for 
effective performance but they demand continuous monitoring of organizational members, 
which it is not very convenient for higher levels in the organizational hierarchy. 
Motivational designs [2.1]  - based on (a) rewards linked to output levels, (b) alignment 
between organizational expected behavior and what is attractive to the individual member, 
or (c) the expectation of a rewarded long-term relationship in exchange of an effective 
present behavior (Nelson & Winter, 1982, p. 110), together with rule-enforcement 
mechanisms, creates a stable but still conflicting situation.  
The above mentioned intra-organizational conflict follows a largely persistent  [2.3] 
truce tradition terms of which are not fully explicit (p.111); however it follows a pattern 
were (a) provocative actions - signaling a lower commitment to the truce, including 
anything that looks as a new initiative - are executed with caution; and (b) defensive 
responses - revealing the alertness of the organizational member to defend their vested 
interest - reject even inoffensive actions that might be misinterpreted as breaking of the 
truce (p. 111). This understanding of [2] truce as a routine – based on alignment through 
[2.1] motivational design, [2.2] rule-enforcement mechanisms, and a (c) tradition of 
apprehensions about breaking the truce – reveals an approach to organizational design that 




Complementary to the organizational design are the [3] control routines, those that 
keep routines running smoothly, take care of the non-homogeneous productive inputs – 
materials, equipment, and personnel – by: (a) selecting from market those productive 
inputs that are compatible with the routine, (b) modifying – filter, order, dilute, train – 
inputs to meet the standards of the routine, (c) monitoring the process to detect 
productive input or behaviors failures - like a slow worker - and then re-invoke selecting 
a replacement or modifying and (d) adapting the routine to the new ranges of inputs being 
offer by the market, and compensating others routines as necessary (Nelson & Winter, 
1982, p. 114). Note: Nelson and Winter’s (1982) “select”, “modify”, “monitor” and 
“adapt” routine tactics are originally emphasized, but narrated in present simple tense.  
The main challenge for continuously running routines is the lost of knowledge that 
happens with personnel turnover (p. 115), in which the worst scenario - a situation when 
turnover was unanticipated, no one else knows about the routine, and the knowledge 
involved is mainly tacit - may imply a temporary shutting down of operations or 
deliveries (p. 115 & 117). Less complicated scenarios may imply mutations of routines 
with desirable or undesirable performances. In any case, the control routine tends to resist 
mutation by maintaining the terms of the truce – for example by resisting the innovative 





5.6.3 Organizational Execution as Target, Control, Grow, Contracting and 
Innovation Routines 
When the idea of keeping the existing routines running smoothly is view as difficult, 
then smooth execution of routines could be interpreted as the organizational target (Nelson 
& Winter, 1982, p. 112). However, a conflicting situation arises since organizational targets 
may change and truce routines implied an organizational persistent behavior. An initial 
solving approach to this apparent conflict could be best summarized in the continuum that 
goes from the phrase (a) let’s perform as effective like we did yesterday, to the phrase (b) 
let´s perform a similar successful action as of our competitor is doing, but better and 
cheaper (p. 112). The general view of this evolutionary approach for organizational 
execution include the already described [4] target routines that together with [5.1] 
replication and [5.2] imitation routines tactics describes how firms grow. Complementarily, 
target routines in combination with [5.3] contraction routines tactics is the route suggested 
for discarding failures and even the downsizing of the firm. Finally, target routines with [6] 
adapting, replacing and recombining, and problem-solving routine tactics are propose to 
understand the bridge into innovation opportunities (pp. 134-135). 
The replication routine tactics [5.1] - capability of adding an identical production unit 
delivering a particular output mix, in a particular way, from particular inputs - is 
understood in Nelson and Winter (1982) in the context of what is possible to achieve 
from the status quo of a running routine (Nelson & Winter, 1982, p. 118). Replication 
routines follow the pattern of the control routines, which is, the replicated routines 
confront a set of varied productive inputs – equipment, material, personnel - but with 




in replication than in control routines (p. 119). Here, existing routines are used as 
templates that embrace the functioning of a whole system, nevertheless the high cost of 
replicating individuals tacit knowledge cannot be avoided; this knowledge transferring is 
handled typically by either (a) training new members in the old facility, and (b) 
transferring selected experienced members to the new facility (p. 120). Nevertheless, 
difficulties like teaching disabilities, unwillingness to transfer knowledge and personal 
relationships are potential obstacles to replication, provoking mutations of routines (p. 
121). In such cases truce and control routines are invoked and adapting the routines to the 
new facility may be necessary; recalling that what is to be accomplished is not an 
identical new facility but a comparable overall performance (p. 121).  
Contract routines tactics [5.3], those mandatory organizational routines invoked for routines 
that fail to make a positive contribution (Nelson & Winter, 1982, p. 121 - 122), as is the case of 
routine outputs that do not achieve to cover routine input cost, initiates a search for a new viable 
routine under conditions of adversity, given the limited resources originated in the failure and 
the persistent behavior approach focused on the current routine. If the search is successful then 
the firms “carry out the new routine”– here we label this tactic as replace – which becomes the 
new organizational target (p. 122). However, if the failing is considered to be temporal, the 
only search invoked is for resources that sustain the functioning of the failing routine. In cases 
when that searching for resources fails short and the replacement of the routine is not possible 
then firm reduce its scales and eventually the firm may entirely disappear. However, 
unpredictable behavior may be expected under broad failing of routines, since truce routines 





[4] Firm’ s Target Routine 
[6] Innovation & Problem-solving Routines[5] Firms’ Grow & Contraction Routines 
[4.8] Evoke an 
effective routine 
from a repertoire 
[4.9] Perform 
productive actions 
according to the 
chosen routine
Organizational Execution as Target, Control, Grow, Contraction & Innovate Routines
[4.10] Send 
contextual-based 





•Change in the Working 
Environment




[4.4[ Internal & External 
Explicit Message
Directives, needs, 
signals, customer & 
suppliers instructions
[4.6] Proactive 




























[4.2] External memory 
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[4.3] Durable structures, 





































































Organizational Design as Truce Routine
[3] Firm´s Control Routine Tactics
•Select routine-compatible inputs from market
•Modify inputs to meet requirements
•Monitor process to detect input failure
•Adapt the routine, as last resort, to the new 
available productive input ranges
[5.1] Replicate Routine Tactics
•Select a routine as template for replication
•Invoke Knowledge transfer tactics
•Transfer knowledge to new members in existing 
facility
•Transfer selected knowledgeable members to new 
facility 
•Invoke select and modify tactics to productive inputs
•Invoke adapt -the-routine tactic, as last resort, to the 
new available productive input ranges
[5.2] Imitating Routine Tactics
•Select a tactic depending on level of explicitness of the 
knowledge embedded in the outcome of copied routine
•Reverse engineering
•Independent consultancy
•Hiring employees from the competing firm
•Industrial espionage 
[1] Firm’s Objectives
•No clear objectives result of  diverging interest, political 
processes & the purging  of  non-survival  requests
[6.1] Innovation Routine Tactics
• Invokes adapt tactic to solve 
anomalies of existing routine
•Replace routine tactic  is invoked if 
solutions to anomalies are radical
•Recombine existing sub-routines tactic 
is invoked to create a new component 
based-routine
•Replace component-based routine 




•Failure routine invokes 
a resource-restricted 
search for: (a) a new 
viable routine, and (b) 
survival resources 
•Replace routine tactic  
is invoked if new 
routine search is 
successful  
•Discard routine tactic 
is invoked if search is 
unsuccessful 
•Unpredictable behav-
ior may be expected 
under broad failing of 
routines
[6.2] Problem-solving  Routine Tactics
•Invokes heuristic tactic to reduce 
search and find satisfying solutions to 
handy problems
• Incorporates heuristic patterns to all 
organizational routines
N e l s o n  &  W i n t e r ’ s   E v o l u t i o n a r y  V i e w  o f  t h e  F i r m  – O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  C a p a b i l i t y
Exploitation (Target, Grow & Contraction routines) and Exploration (Innovate routine) Approaches
[2] Firm's Intra-organizational Truce Routine
•[2.1] Motivational Design
• Alignment between organizational 
expectations & member’s preferences
•Rewards linked to output levels
•Exchange between long-term 
relationship & effective present behavior
•[2.2] Rule-enforcement mechanisms
•Supervision & sanctions
•[2.3] Truce Tradition 
•Cautious provocative actions
•Alertness and rejection of even 
misinterpreted inoffensive actions
[a] Theory Presumption: Assumes that much of the knowledge behind effective performance in organizations is tacit, and as in skills in individuals, 
routines in organizations, can be understood as repetitive patterns of activity in which most of the choosing is automatic …
[c] Logic of achievement: A truce oriented approach that guides operations of the firm by following routines that fulfill its targets and 
that adapts to changes by replacing failing routines with existing satisficing recombined subroutines.
Figure 6. Nelson and Winters’s (1982) Exploitation and Exploration Capability in the Evolutionary 




Imitating routines tactics [5.2] are often initiated when a firm will like to be able to do what 
other firm is more successfully doing. In this case, the target routines are not available as 
templates, implying that the copied routine will be, if success greets, a mutation of the original 
with a different behavior; which is not relevant if the routine economic performance is within 
the acceptable range. Imitation is additionally motivated by the knowing that there is already a 
workable design for the routine, and the tactics to achieve imitation vary depending on the level 
of explicitness of the knowledge embedded in the components of the original routine outcomes 
– from standard to idiosyncratic tacit knowledge. This tactics include (a) reverse engineering, 
(b) independent consultancy, (c) hiring employees from the competing firm, and (d) industrial 
espionage (Nelson & Winter, 1982, p. 123 - 124). 
Innovation and routines [6] may be considered opposites; however Nelson and Winter 
(1982) achieve to describe [6.1] innovation as organizational routine tactics. The initial 
argument is a motivational one, and it is related to the challenge that puzzles and anomalies of 
prevailing routines sometimes show up. Often solving the anomalies of existing routines – 
adapting – presents no resistance from control and truce routines since functioning routines will 
continue to be the organizational targets; however, it may lead to innovations in the productive 
process. In other situations, the proposed solution to the anomalies may be radical and in such 
case adapting is not the sequence to follow but a large replacement of equipment, material or 
personnel might implied to replace the routine (p. 129 – 130). The other argument to 
understand innovation as a routine it is essentially anchored in the distinction between 
innovation as an activity and the innovation as a result. Anchoring in the former understanding 
of innovation, Nelson and Winter advocate for two additional approaches - routines as 




to the firm, leaving clear that the issue of prediction of effective results with these approaches is 
best view as stochastic (p. 136).   
Routine as component is an approach that proposes to understand innovation as (a) the 
tactics that recombine existing sub-routines in search of a new routine, and (b) the tactics that 
replace existing sub-routines for a better new one, in the context of surrounding activity that 
expects for no disturbances during the replacement (p. 130). This component approach asks for 
routines to be reliable and to hold a scope that is well-understood (Nelson & Winter, 1982, p. 
131) to avoid unexpected behaviors and routine integration problems.  
 Finally, [6.2] routine as heuristics – “any principle or device that contributes to the 
reduction in the average search to solution” (Newell, Shaw & Simon, 1962, p. 85) – is a 
problem-solving approach that follows Simon’s (1955) goal satisficing search of solutions, that 
is, the first founded instance that satisfies the problem at hand, after following a systematic 
sequential search, is accepted as a definite solution. Nelson and Winter’s view do not only 
propose to count with an heuristic routine to approach problems, but the broad incorporation of 
heuristic patterning to the concept of routine (Nelson & Winter, 1982, p. 131).  
Certainly, the routine approach to describe what the organization has learned and apply it 
severely limits the role of the individual in the organization to: a) the matching of routines to 
situations, b) interpreting the feedback to adjust the routine or increase the confidence on it, c) 
interpreting an experience as a lesson learned, and d) transform the lesson learned in one of the 





Nelson & Winter’s   Evolutionary View of the Firm  
Body of Knowledge of the  Exploitation and  Exploration Capability 
[a] Theory’s 
presumption 
Assumes that much of knowledge beneath effective performance in organizations is tacit, and 
as in skills in individuals, routines in organizations, are repetitive patterns of activity in which 
most of the choosing is automatic, and known only by its effectiveness, and persistent trait, as 







Stakeholder’s motivational forces modulate the behavior of the 
organization and constantly stress decisions because: 
 They are rooted in differing interests.  
 Generate complex intra-organizational political processes result of 
not completely rational evolutionary clean-up of motives. 
This conflicts with the survival of the organization.  
Members of the organization will chose to do what is required based on: 
 Rewards linked to output levels. 
 Alignment between organizational expected behavior and what is 
attractive to the individual member. 
 Expectation of a rewarded long-term relationship in exchange of an 
effective present behavior. 
 Rule-enforcement mechanisms. 
This, in any case, creates a stable but a still conflicting situation. 
[c] Logic of achievement 
of objectives and actors’ 
governance 
A truce oriented approach that guides operations of the firm by following 
routines that fulfill its targets and that adapts to changes by replacing failing 
routines with existing satisficing recombined subroutines. 
1 . O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  D e s i g n  k n o w l e d g e  2 . O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  E x e c u t i o n  K n o w l e d g e  
Knowledge: [d] Residency, [e] Domain, and [f] Type (A: Ability-based, S: Symbol-based) 
Combined Exploitation and Exploration Capability 
Exploitation knowledge domains 
[d]    Stockholder/Manager:  [d] Manager/Employee:  
Truce routine:  
- Motivational, Rule-enforcement and Truce 
mechanisms guide alignment to truce 
S/A 
Target routine:   
- Organizational memory: documents, work   
environment, and organizational dialect. 
- Internal & external, explicit & implicit messages. 
- Shared interpretative & coord. system: molded by 
organizational memory invokes actions & notifications. 
S/A 
Control routine: alignment and monitoring  
of resources, and adjustment of routines 
S/A 
Replicate routine tactics: transferring workers & 
knowledge, and select aligned resources 
S/A 
Grow and contraction routine: defines the 
tactics to follow for replication, imitation 
and contraction  
S/A 
Imitating routine tactics: reverse engineering, 
consultancy and hiring the competing’ employees 
S/A 
Contraction routine tactics: restricted search  for 
survival resources & discard routine at failure  
S/A 
Exploration knowledge domains 
[d]    Stockholder/Manager:  [d] Manager/Employee:  
Truce routine: (see above description). S/A Innovation routine tactics: adapt routine for simple 
anomalies, otherwise replace it with existing or 
recombine routines 
S/A 
Control routine: (see above description). S/A 
Innovation routine: defines innovation & 
problem solving tactics 
S/A Problem- solving routine tactics: heuristic search 
for satisficing solutions as pattern for all routines 
S/A 
Table 37. Body of knowledge of the exploitation and exploration capability of Nelson 




Here, we understand Nelson and Winter’s (1982) evolutionary conception of the 
workings of the firm as embedded with a combined exploitation and exploration 
organizational capability that follows a context modulated tacit and bounded-rational 
patterns for achieving [2] truce among the stakeholders’ objectives at organizational 
design level, while [4] accomplishing survived firm’s targets through a context- 
modulated  interpretative and coordination system, which evokes [5] grow and 
contraction routine tactics, and [3] control routine tactics at execution design level in the 
exploitative side; and evokes [6] innovation and problem solving routines and control 
routine tactics at execution design level in the explorative side (see Table 38). 
5.6.4 Routines: Conflicts between Tacit knowing and Bounded rationality 
The conception of heuristic patterning as a generalized characteristic of routines 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982, p. 131) invokes Simon’s (1991a) bounded rationality approach 
– decision-making involves limited search for satisficing alternatives. This 
epistemological feature holds difficulties according to Miller (2008) and Foss (2003a, 
2003b), given the already argued tacit knowing (Polanyi, 1958) characteristic of routines 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982, p. 134).  
The raised epistemological difficulties are best summarized in: 
Simon’s research emphasized cognition over action, explicit knowledge over tacit 
knowledge, mechanistic information processing over human judgment, and means 
over ends. Polanyi provides counterbalancing emphases for each of these 




The perspective of the Individual Knowing (IK) Framework ( Table 31) and the 
Integrated View of Language, Shared Meanings and Recognizing of Knowers (see Table 
32), in which ability-based knowing and symbol-based knowing differ, at contrivance 
stage, by the tools in use (non-symbolic and symbolic), proposes a non-conflicting 
explanation for the tactic-bounded rationality incompatibility.  
Accepting that enacting organizational routines are characterized by a tacit knowing 
process, then making explicit the systematic rules that bounded rationality asks for 
decision-making depends on the level of preciseness of the symbol system in use. The 
symbolic system described by Nelson & Winter (1982) in the shared communication 
system is the natural spoken language and the localized organizational dialect, and in this 
sense that the raised difficulties appeared to hold grounds, sine not all knowledge (rules) 
hold by members of the organization to take decisions could be denoted by those 
symbolic systems. However, (a) maxims could be available by analyzing application and 
success, (b) and bounded rationality’s criterion of success is satisfaction – achievable 
through maxims, and (c) since Nelson and Winter’s approach for the creation of 
knowledge follows the recombination of existing routines, then opportunities for 
analyzing application and success of components is highly probable. Therefore, Nelson 
and Winter’s organizational tacit component of routines hold only the tension, but not the 
incompatibility, of characterizing its heuristic patterning component through maxims.  
5.7 SPENDER’S KNOWLEDGE APPLICATION AND GENERATION  
With different motivations and denotations (labels) than previous theorists, John-




generating new possibilities in uncertain conditions – exploration - and applying the known 
in existing certainties – exploitation. He refereed them as knowledge generation (KG) and 
knowledge application (KA) respectively. His motivation had as a context the Soviet 
Union´s ceasing to exist as of December of 1991, and that fifteen countries were moving 
form socialism to capitalism. In that background, Spender wrote an article questioning the 
usefulness of management theories to help the organizations in those countries to develop 
management capacity, re-structure industry, and introduce competition. The questioning 
started with the existing criticism of management education; however, his relevant 
argument was that institutional systems – property, insurance, and stock markets – were 
being defined in these countries while management theories assumed these institutions, and 
their corresponding operational uncertainty management capacity, as given.  
Spender’ (1992) whole knowledge-based view of the firm is barely hinted in the 
article, in a context of a particular challenging situation – Soviet Union uncertainty 
scenario. The hints are provided through an open set of coherent premises that insinuates 
a recipe based on plausible and enlighten arguments referencing extant theories and 
findings; though it is revealed as to be completed by the reader researcher.  
5.7.1 Spender’s Theory of Postindustrial Organizations 
In that context, it could be said that Spender (1992) achieves to describe the elements 
of a theory of postindustrial organization (p. 397), that sketches an understanding of the 
organization, that to deliver its purposes starts recognizing that the organization operates 
under risk and uncertainty; and that such attending  is directed toward four contextual 




beneficiaries of residual rights (shareholders, employees, customers, or state), (c) the risk 
management capacity of the institutional systems of the industry where the organization 
operates, and (d) the beneficiaries of externalities costs (ecological damage, employee’ 
education and health). 
Spender’s (1992) theory, instead of presenting the conflicting choice between 
exploiting existing knowledge and exploring for new knowledge of March (1991), argues 
for a coupling approach that goes from knowledge application (KA) to knowledge 
generation (KG). The initial difference that should be noted between these two 
approaches is characterized by the reactive to proactive switch in appreciation of the four 
contextual factors: assumptions for action, beneficiaries of residual rights, social 
institutions, and beneficiaries of externalities cost. Spender moves from: identifying 
them; to: asses them, influence them and define them; within the same contextual factors, 
but extending its understanding. 
In describing his theory, he presents three complementary snapshots for the analysis 
of organizations and their industry. Spenders called them levels, but that label generates 
unfulfilled understanding expectations related to hierarchies, whereas the idea of 
snapshot works better, as we will see. The first one, related to operation of an 
organization under certainty environments; it is where conventional organizational theory 
is presumed to be adequate. The second has to do with social institutions and how they 
define the feasibility of the economic activity. The third is about organizational designs 
oriented to the management of uncertainties. 
At the first snapshot – the knowledge application (KA) approach, conventional 




available (Spender, 1992, p. 409). Here, the sought purposes define the organization; and 
the manager’s task is to bring the correct knowledge in action and to know how to 
structure the organization using that knowledge. (p. 397). In the process, managers 
address the appropriate division of labor, its coordination and control (p. 409).  
In this KA approach, teamwork is managed with tactical teams (Larson and LaFasto, 
1989 p. 42); which are “focused workgroups, highly trained with stable roles and relations 
in which the structure of the team is set by the knowledge to be applied, especially when 
much of this knowledge is built into specific apparatus” (Spender, 1992, p. 404).  
At the second snapshot of analysis, its central assumption is supported by North 
(1991, p. 97) by saying that institutional systems have been devised by human beings to 
create order, and reduce uncertainty in exchange. Together with the standard constraints 
of economics they determine transaction and production costs and hence the profitability 
and feasibility of engaging in economic activity (Spender, 1992; p. 398); however they 
are more helpful when we become aware of the cultural and historical contingencies 
embedded in the social dimension of these institutional systems (p. 410), like the 
historical commitments to develop a law system, contrasted against the stories of frauds 
and regulatory failures (p. 398).  
Property, employment and insurance are the main social institutions referred by 
Spender (1992, p. 406). Other institutions like university research facilities, trade 
federations, stock exchanges, professional associations; and nucleus of legal, financial, 




The western organizational theory, Spender (1992) argues, counts implicitly with a 
systems of law, professional etiquette, and commercial custom and practice, which add 
force to contracts and affect course of actions of contending parties (p. 398). The next four 
paragraphs give account of Spender’s view of the role of social institutions in the industry.  
Property is described as a critical social institution (Nedelsky, 1990) that calls for 
attention. While there is considerable experience with the development and regulation of 
financial and stock market institutions, the history also counts with not few misbehaviors 
and regulatory failures in which the wanted results, like the market expansion thru the 
flow of savings into economic and technological enterprises, could be quickly defeated 
by unwanted skilled operators that take advantage of naive investors with new Ponzi 
schemes or South Sea Bubble, right in front of inexperienced regulators armed with 
breakable  legislation (Spender, 1992, p. 398).  
Deficient intellectual property rights knowledge and law will make more complex for 
organizations to store knowledge independent of the personnel who participate in its 
development (Spender, 1992, p. 406). 
In the employment contract, four factors are relevant: authority, rewards, organizational 
identification, and coordination (Simon, 1991b, p. 24). This cannot develop without certain 
society’s arrangement, like employment law, welfare systems, education, and taxation 
(Spender, 1992, p. 399). Depending on them many different employment and management 
norms will emerge, like: a) those in Japan – with poor external labor market and high 
retention (Aoki, 1990) - or Scandinavia, and Nigeria (Spender, p. 399); or b) the case of 




labor market develops and allows foreigners workers to move in; thus it will slow the rate 
of technology introduction in workers’ regions. (p. 406). 
Insurance is also critical to transform organizational uncertainties into risks, as is the 
case of international trade. Comparable significance can be attached to institutions which 
make portfolio diversification possible, without them capital market cannot be successful 
(Spender, p. 407), see Figure 7. 
Finally, the third snapshot of analysis - the knowledge creative organizational level 
(KG) that confronts circumstances of uncertainty. Here, mainly two organizational 
mechanisms develop answers to uncertainty: (1) an internal approach that corresponds to 
certain non-bureaucratic types of organizational teams; and (2) an outbound approach 
that defines the management role in regards to the institutional context. In both 
uncertainty-dealing mechanisms, Spender (1992) explicitly states that these processes 
consider the role and production of tacit organizational knowledge (p. 409). 
on member











beneficiaries of residual 
rights
(shareholders,  
employees, customers,  
government)
1. Organizational Design 
Premises
1.1 Strategy and Organizational 
design based on the  possession 
of classical managerial 
knowledge.
1.2 Infrastructure & tool selection 
based on the possession of  
technical knowledge.
1.3 Operational design guided by 
knowledge embedded in tools.










and control) are based 
on the practice (use) of 
knowledge.
2.2. Operations (execute) 
are based on the use of 
tools.
Spender’s Theory of Postindustrial Organizations – Organizational Capability
Exploitation (Knowledge Application) Approach
[a] Theory Presumption: Questioning of Western’s view of the firm that assumes the existence and shape of certain contextual 
factors like assumptions for action, social institutional systems, and beneficiaries of externalities and residual rights.
[c] Logic of achievement: Reactive application of technical, managerial and operational knowledge.





A bureaucratic structure depends on knowledge at hand. Uncertainty, argues Spender, 
asks for workgroups that hold together under the conditions of bureaucratic failure by 
institutional forces, rather than by rational administration. Social institutions, outside the 
organization, happen to be relevant because they define the institutional bases for such teams 
(Spender, 1992, p. 390). Team members’ reflections on the institutions, in which they are 
embedded, offers them a sense of identity (p. 406) and defines a team social structure that is 
not dependent on the knowledge or tool necessary for the task at hand, but arises from 
patterns of social interaction with, but not limited to, school ties, religious affiliation, family 
membership, professional affiliation, or membership of a creative team (p. 406).  
Spender suggests that in the raised social structure, the team can cope with and focus on 
the uncertainty to be attended, it allows them to: (a) experience uncertainty, (b) develop 
suitable frameworks and set of symbols, (c) communicate, (d) bring their problem-solving 
abilities to bear, (e) develop the new knowledge, which (f) gives socialized members the 
confidence that the uncertainty is resolved (Spender, 1992, p. 406). 
Spender, following Larson & LaFasto (1989), told us about two additional kinds of 
teams – besides the tactical team - that fit in this KG approach. These are: (1) Problem-
solving teams that are in charge of dealing with situations that have already been framed 
and defined (Spender, 1992, p. 404). Their discovery resides in the non-defined 
cooperative activities to find a solution to a predefine problem. (2) Creative teams that 
are the intense version of problem-solvers, responsible of developing new possibilities, 
approaches, and frameworks. Their final delivery and work process cannot be defined by 
the tool or knowledge to be applied and, as a result, it is impossible to control, (Spender, 




goal, (b) a results-driven structure, (c) a collaborative climate, (d) internalized standards 
of excellence, (e) external support, and (f) principled leadership, (Larson & LaFasto, 
1989: 26). Here, we label this team’s patterns of interaction with social institutions and 
it’s sustaining characteristics as “team recipe”. 
Leadership in these teams may be as co-member, with supplementary externally 
defined responsibilities, or from outside the team, controlling team’s interactions with the 
environment. There is no role for an organizer (Spender, 1992, p. 404). “The relationship 
between individuals and the social institutions that emerge as they move into cooperation 
is complex and cannot be usefully reduced to leadership alone” (p. 405), especially if we 
are considering societies other than the Western. 
One issue that Spender (1992) states as relevant is that in some societies there may be 
political, religious, and family commitments and little commitment to organizations (p. 
399). Thus, when researchers talk about "trust" and "commitment" as the bonding basis 
for effective teamwork, they do so because these are common for society’s western 
societies (p. 405). Sociology (Denhardt, 1981) had suggested that commitment to the 
capitalistic forms of work often requires a shift in the individual's institutional 
commitments, away from politics, religion, and the family. Middle-class, in the Western, 
looks to their professional and organizational commitments for their sense of identity and 





Spender’s (1992) third analysis snapshot suggests that, when managers face 
uncertainties – “define as a condition of information deficiency in which the data by 
themselves neither contain nor determine a conclusion” (Spender, 1989, p. 173) - they 
look around for guidance, primarily from other managers operating in the same industry 
(p. 173).  
Industry-specific activities, such as networking, trade shows, trade journals, 
conferences, and lobby groups, provide members of an industry with a socializing 
language (Spender, 1992, p. 407). This allows managers to take on an approach for 
looking at their situations that is widely shared within their industry (Spender, 1989, p. 
Figure 8. Spender´s (1992, 1989) Exploration Capability in the Theory of Postindustrial 
Organizations. 







(c) Assess/Influence Uncertainty Management 
Capacity of Social Institutions
Primary: Property, employment and insurance.
Secondary: Stock exchanges, Research 
facilities.
Enforcers: National and Int. Systems of law, 
and Trade federations.
Influencers: Industry & Professional 
associations and etiquette, Commercial 
custom & practice, Nucleus of legal, financial 
& technical experts.
Contingencies: Historical level of commitment, 









1. Organizational Design 
Premises
1.1 Strategy and 
Organizational design is 
guided by the Industry 
Recipe: the knowledge 
embedded in the business  
world-view of a ‘tribe’ of 
industry experts.
1.2 Operational design is 
guided by knowledge 
embedded in the Creative 
Team’s recipe of 
interaction with social 
institutions that offer them 





- Standards of excellence
- External support 
- Principled leadership
(a) Assess / Influence Assumptions for Action
Bonding Target: profession, team, 
organization, industry, school, politics, 
religion, family.
Bonding Argument: commitment, trust, 
experiential ties, membership, other.
Bonding Activities: social networking, trade 
shows, Industry-specific events, trade 
journals, conferences, lobby groups.
2. Organizational Execution 
Premises
2.1 Resolving firm’s strategic 
uncertainties make use of  
the  rationality provided by 
the Industry recipe in which 
entrepreneurs -managers find 
or co-develop uncertainty 
coping mechanisms in social 
institutions.
2.2 Operations are based on 
the team collaboration
capacity  to cope with and 
focus on the uncertainty to 
be attended, by:
-Experiencing uncertainty
-Developing frameworks &  
set of symbols
- Communicating
- Bringing their problem-
solving abilities to bear
- Developing new knowledge
-Building members 
confidence through success.
Spender’s Theory of Postindustrial Organizations – Organizational Capability
Exploration (Knowledge Generation) Approach
[a] Theory Presumption: Questioning of Western’s view of the firm that assumes the existence and shape of certain contextual factors 
like assumptions for action, social institutional systems, and beneficiaries of externalities and residual rights.




173). Spender calls this pattern of judgments the industry's “recipe”. The industry recipe 
is knowledge embedded in the business world-view of a ‘tribe’ of industry experts (p.7); 
it represents knowledge about the industry where the organization operates; and it 
becomes the organization’s primary analytic environment (p. 60). Complementary, 
managers might built or find, depending of the development stage of social institutions, 
uncertainty coping mechanisms in this institutions (Spender, 1992, p. 407); and these 
mechanisms are embedded in the rationality of the industry recipe. Industry recipe is seen 
as the rationality that managers invoke to resolve firm’s strategic uncertainties; an 
assessment that does not deny the existence of other rationalities (Spender, 1989, p. 60). 
Then, in Spender´s view, industry recipe holds the body of knowledge that supports the 
knowledge creation (KG) approach in organizations. (See figure 8). 
5.7.2 Spender’s assumptions for action, institutions, externalities and residual 
rights 
This reading of Spenders’ (1992) knowledge-based view of the firm is characterized 
by a constant effort of: (a) categorizing the references and examples of the four 
uncertainty shaping constructs introduced in the text – assumptions for action, social 
institutions, beneficiaries of residual rights, and beneficiaries of externalities cost; and (b) 
indentifying the signaled or insinuated dependencies between these constructs and the 
characterization of the organization. In the second issue, given Spender’s departing 
arguments, the criterion chosen for the KA approach was “risk management” and the 




Complementarily, categories were introduced into the four risk and uncertainty 
shaping constructs, considering the essential property that characterized the instances 
being categorized and making sure that the set of categories assign to the construct covers 
to the whole domain of instances of the construct. The purpose of this categorization is 
dual. First, it reveals that the reading is rigorous to the instances of the references 
presented in the article - no category was introduced without an explicit textual reference. 
Second, it is a structural coherent approach for reveling more specifics of Spender’s 
knowledge-based view of firm; that is, categorization of textual instances allow adding 
more instances to the categories or identifying missing categories in respect to the whole.  
As it was commented before, the level of abstraction applied in this reading allows 
conceiving, for both, the KA and KG approaches, an identical structure of constructs, but 
with extended characterization and relationships for the KG approach. By applying such 
categorizing guideline, Assumptions for Action and Uncertainty Management Capacity of 
Social Institutions constructs were framed with extended characteristics:  
[a] Assumptions for Action: 
 Bonding Target: indentifies those instances of social institutions that are the target of 
affiliation, it includes: profession, team, organization, industry, school, politics, 
religion, family. 
 Bonding Argument: identifies the beliefs that sustain the affiliation to the social 
institution and assumptions for action, it includes: commitment, trust, experiential 




  Bonding Activities: identifies those instances of social activities through which 
affiliation is built, it includes: social networking, trade shows, industry-specific 
events, trade journals, conferences, lobby groups. 
[c] Uncertainty Management Capacity of Social Institutions:  
 Primary Institutions: Identifies those instances of social institutions that hold a 
historically evolved discourse of transforming uncertainty to risk or stability and that 
are globally use. It includes property, employment, and insurance. 
 Secondary Institutions: Identifies those instances of social institutions that hold a 
more recent discourse of transforming uncertainty to risk and that while globally 
known, its capacity is dependent of other conditions like population size or local 
culture. It includes: stock exchanges, research facilities. 
 Enforcers: Identifies those instances of social institutions that hold an enforcement 
capacity to make parties behave according to their obligations. Includes: national, 
international systems of law and trade federations. 
 Influencers: Identifies those instances of social institutions that hold an influence 
capacity to shape de discourse of social institutions. I includes: industry associations, 
professional associations, professional etiquette, commercial custom, commercial 
practice, nucleus of legal, financial & technical experts. 
 Contingencies: Identifies those instances in the history of social institutions and the public 
opinion about them that describe the level of coherence or incoherence with its discourse. It 
includes stories of commitment, stories of regulatory failures, and stories of fraud. 
The characterization of an organization that reflects Spender’s (1992) theory reveals 




organization and the other about the execution of activities of the organization. Then, in 
Spenders’ theory [1] organizational design knowledge corresponds to classical 
managerial knowledge and knowledge embedded in the selected infrastructure and tools; 
and [2] organizational execution knowledge corresponds to coordination (for KA) or 
collaboration (for KG) orientation to the delivery of the firm’s purposes. 
Then, the dependences between the domains of knowledge - organizational design 
knowledge and organizational execution knowledge - and the four uncertainty shaping 
constructs are similar for the KA and KG approaches, with the only key exception that in 
the KA approach the dependences are unidirectional - reactive - while in the KG 
approach the dependences are bidirectional – proactive; that is, in KG organizational 
design and execution knowledge also could shape assumptions, institutions and 
beneficiaries. Of course, knowledge content is different. While in KA, the classical 
management knowledge and knowledge embedded in tools guide the organizational 
design and execution; in KG, the industry recipe and creative team recipe do the 
designing and executing job.  
In summary, the knowledge application approach (KA) holds a reactive tone, in which:  
Organizational Design knowledge is constituted by [1.1] strategy and organizational 
design knowledge, [1.2] technical knowledge, and [1.3] the embedded knowledge of 
the selected infrastructure and productive tools, which is shaped by: [a] the 
assumptions for action, and [b] the beneficiaries of residual rights. Additionally, [1.2] 
technical knowledge and the [1.3] embedded knowledge of the selected infrastructure 




Organizational Execution Knowledge is constituted by the [2.1] practice of 
management and the [2.2] practice of operational skills, which is shaped by: [c] the 
management risk capacity of social institutions, the [d] beneficiaries of externalities 
cost. Additionally, the [2.1] practice of management is shaped by [1.1] strategy and 
organizational design knowledge. Additionally, the [2.2] practice of operational skills 
is shaped by the [1.2] embedded knowledge of the selected infrastructure and 
productive tools selected in operational design. 
It is important to notice how Spender (1992) extended the concept of “knowledge 
built into specific apparatus” (Spender, 1992, p. 404) form tangible infrastructure and 
tools in KA, to intangible social artifacts in KG. Given the epistemological posture of 
recognizing knowledge as resident in individuals, here, these Spenders’ conceptions of 
embedded knowledge are understood as form of symbol-based knowledge with high 
precision and none scalability for KA; and high richness and high scalability for KG.  
In summary, the knowledge generation approach (KG) holds a proactive tone, in which: 
Organizational Design knowledge is constituted by [1.1] Industry Recipe and [1.2] 
Creative Team’s Recipe, which gives shape and are shaped by: [a] the assumptions 
for action, and [b] the beneficiaries of residual rights. 
Organizational Execution Knowledge is constituted by [2.1] the uncertainty coping 
mechanism of the [2.2] Industry Recipe and the Creative Team’s Recipe collaboration 
skills, which give shape and are shaped by: [c] the uncertainty management capacity 
of social institutions, [d] the beneficiaries of externalities cost, and [1] the 
organizational design knowledge. Additionally, [1.1] interacts with [2.1] and [1.2] 








Spender’s Theory of Postindustrial Organizations  
Body of Knowledge of the Exploitation (Application) and Exploration (Generation) Capabilities 
[a] Theory’s 
presumption 
Questioning of Western’s view of the firm that presumes the existence and shape of 
certain contextual factors like assumptions for action, social institutional systems, and 








regulatory  and 
government 
institutions  
Exploitation approach: Expectations are related to operation of 
organizations under measurable risky environments; in which 
conventional organizational theory is presumed to be adequate 
and social institutional systems function as uncertainty to risk 
transformers. 
Exploration approach: Expectations are related to the operation of 
organizations under uncertainty and to the bureaucratic failure of 
institutional forces, in which the knowledge or tool necessary for 
the task arises from patterns of interaction with social institutions, 
outside the organization, like, but not limited to, school ties, 
religious affiliation, family membership, professional affiliation, or 
membership of a creative team. 





Exploitation approach: Reactive application of technical, managerial, and 
operational knowledge presuming certain actors’ assumptions for action 
(professional, organizational, political, religious, or family commitments).  
Exploration approach: Proactive application of creative entrepreneurial and 
collaborative “industry recipe-based knowledge” by assessing and influencing actors’ 
assumptions for action. 
1 . O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  D e s i g n  k n o w l e d g e  2 . O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  E x e c u t i o n  K n o w l e d g e  
Knowledge: [d] Residency, [e] Domain, and [f] Type (A: Ability-based, S: Symbol-based) 
Exploitation Capability  (Knowledge Application)  
[d]   Manager:  [d] Manager/Employee:  
1.1 Classical managerial knowledge shaped 
by the (a) assumptions for action and by (b) 
the expectations of the beneficiaries of 
residual rights. 
S 
2.1 Practice of classical managerial knowledge 
shaped by the (c) risk management capacity of 




1.2 Technical knowledge defines the 
characteristics of the productive apparatus 
and shapes the operation of the 
organization. 
S 
2.1 Practice of classical operational knowledge 
shaped by the selected productive apparatus.  
S 
A 
Exploration Capability (Knowledge Generation)  
[d]   Entrepreneur/Manager:  [d] Entrepreneur/Manager/Employee:  
1.1  Industry recipe knowledge and creative 
team ‘s knowledge about socially-built 
identity patterns give shape and are shaped 
by the (a)  assumptions  for action, the (b) 
beneficiaries of  residual rights. 
A 
2.1  Individuals’ skills on Industry Recipe’s 
uncertainty coping mechanism, and Creative 
Team’s collaboration skill’s  on attending 
uncertainty give shape and are shaped by (c) 
social institutions’ uncertainty management 
capacity, and (d) beneficiaries of externalities 
cost. 
A 
Table 38. Body of knowledge of the exploitation and exploration capability of Spender’s 




5.7.3 Integrating Knowledge Application (KA) and Generation (KG) Capabilities 
In Spender’s theory (1992), two final issues are still pending for discussion. The first 
one has to do with the question “What motives managers to care about coupling 
successfully with uncertainty?” The answer may be hidden in the swift transition along 
Spender’s text that goes from the label “managers” to the label “entrepreneurs”, in 
reference to those in charge of coupling with uncertainty (Spender, 1992, pp. 406 - 407). 
The theoretical arguments for this question are to be found in a brief reference to Knight 
(1965). Frank Knight published in Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, in 1921, the seminal 
ideas that argue that entrepreneurship is focused on managing uncertainty, and in taking 
the responsibility of decision-making in such conditions. Here, the entrepreneur arises as 
new productive agent. He is called to take chances under ignorance, based on opinion 
rather than knowledge, like forecasting consumer demands while never knowing in 
advance if his expectations are correct, but always being responsible for the results of 
decisions (Knight, 1965).   
Knight (1965) went on arguing that in corporations, where decisions are delegated, 
the true entrepreneur is the one who is responsible for decisions; even he did not take one 
in particular. Here, the critical decision is the selection of men who make decisions. In 
this context, the entrepreneur is not the mere manager who provides resource 
coordination as a routinely productive service, and who receives an imputed contractual 
value for it; but he is the responsible decision-making actor and the insurer of incomes to 
factors owners; and who receives a profit which magnitude is determined by the 




signal influencing the entrepreneur and the factor owners, as they can see opportunities 
for better returns. 
Thus, when Spender (1992) switches from managers to entrepreneurs in his text, it is 
assumed that he is not talking about mere managers but of entrepreneur-managers in 
which being a beneficiary of residual rights is his suggested answer to the motives of 
caring about coupling successfully with uncertainty; and hence the relevant factor in the 
knowledge generation approach (KG) while modeling organization design and execution 
design. 
The second and final issue has to do with the integration of the KG and KA 
approaches or coupling as is called by Spender (1992, p. 405). Even though that KA and 
KG structures in Spender´s theory, the constituting constructs are identical and that 
difference is focused on that dependences among the constructs follow the reactive to 
proactive transition respectively; it is not completely obvious how the coupling between 
KA and KG occurs; that is “Which organizational design and execution pattern is in 
charge of transferring the outcomes of the KG´s uncertainty-solving knowledge to the 
KA´s bureaucratic and optimizing knowledge?”  
The answer is embedded in the essence of his view. Since the KG approach copes 
with uncertainty in search of an externalized risk, and when this transformation 
successfully happens it becomes unproblematic for the KA approach to deal with that 
kind of knowledge since the KA design is ready for risk-managed environments. Of 
course, this changes the question to “How do organizations protect this intellectual 
property called uncertainty-solving knowledge?” And the answer to this question goes 




and the definition of residual rights at the organizational design level; and to social 
institutions, like property and employment at organizational execution level. 
5.8 KOGUT AND ZANDER’S THEORY OF REPLICATION AND COMBINATIVE 
CAPABILITIES OF THE FIRM 
Kogut and Zander (1992) argue that firms’ organizational context allows the sharing and 
transfer knowledge of individuals and groups within an organization better than markets (p. 
383). They departing point, when presenting the theory, is to find an explanation for the 
growth of the firm, in which they recognize the challenge of devising a capability that (a) 
facilitates knowledge transferability to drive organization’s grow by the replication of current 
activities, and (b) reduces the risk of imitation by the competition (p. 383). In this sense, then, 
the goal of the firm is to reduce the cost of transferring knowledge by replicating existing 
activities while preserving the knowledge’s value (p. 390).    
Kogut and Zander (1992) proposed a theory of the firm that goes as: “Firms exist because 
they provide a social community of voluntaristic action structured by organizing principles 
that are not reduceable to individuals” (p. 384), in that line posed that organizations are “what 
they know how to do” (p. 383); and that the knowledge implicated in the transformation of 
products and services in an organization is embedded in “the persistence in the organizing of 
social relationships” (p. 384) or better said, firm's know-how content is to be found “in the 
regularity of the structuring of work and of the interactions of employees conforming to 
explicit or implicit recipes” (p. 387). 
Here, given their pledged unit of analysis (organizational knowledge), Kogut and Zander 
(p.399) recognized the tacit component of personal knowledge (Polanyi, 1966) only in terms 




their understanding they focally described problem-solving skills as “search rules, or 
heuristics, which identify the problem and the elements consisting of the solution” (Polanyi 
1966, pp. 23-24). 
This distinction about the residency of knowledge – personal knowledge and social 
knowledge – is somewhat similar to what Nelson and Winter (1982) proposed when they 
explained individual skills and organizational routines; however Kogut and Zander (1992) 
pointed out the difference of their approach when they say that learning – as is emphasized in 
the concept of routine – “has little significance in the absence of a theory of organizational 
knowledge” (p. 386), implying that Nelson and Winter (1982) did not provided such theory. 
Assertion that may be questionable given that our axial reading of Nelson and Winter (1982) 
unveiling their organizational capability and body of knowledge sets that the organizational 
context operates as an interpretative and coordination system. 
Besides classifying knowledge by its residency (personal knowledge and social 
knowledge), Kogut and Zander (1992, p. 387) also categorized knowledge into information 
(blueprints, declaratives, facts) and of know-how (recipes, procedures, process, accumulated 
practical skill). However, the transferability issue is not attended but such knowledge 
taxonomies, but by considering two static properties of knowledge: codifiability and 
complexity.  
Codifiability  is related to the structuring of knowledge “into a set of identifiable rules 
and relationships that can be easily communicated” (Kogut & Zander, 1992, p. 387). Both, 
know-how and information may not always be encoded, as is the case of the recipe that 
should capture all the skillful actions of a musical instrument builder or the specifications of 




identification of a backing theory, explicit scientific theory (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1988) or a 
derived theory-in-use (Argyris & Schoen, 1978, p. 11), which guides knowledge 
representation – the coding scheme.  
Codification, when possible, most frequently, transforms the nature of the knowledge. A 
coding scheme habilitates the functioning (exploitation) of a complex knowledge 
embodiment, by reducing its complexity; but also may neglect the substantive technology of 
its workings (knowledge to create the embodiment). Codification allows the separation of the 
expert knowledge required to create something and the skill to use it (p. 390).    
Complexity is best described in terms of simplification, which is use of a coding scheme 
to reduce the number of parameters to define a problem or system (Pringle, 1951), that is, to 
reduce the degree of complexity and knowledge transferring cost (Kogut & Zander 1992, p. 
388). This simplification carries on a transformation of the nature of the organizational 
knowledge through the separation of substantive knowledge, which is nested and hidden 
behind a set of available functions – functional knowledge - that at the same time ease and 
restrict organizational members’ choices (p. 390). A simpler common coding scheme is easy 
to learn (p. 391); and a familiar language facilitates learning; however, it presents difficulties 
for describing complex knowledge (p. 391; Pappert, 1979, p. 77) and makes difficult 
addressing environmental changes. The corollary here is that simple coding schemes are 
useful for the short-term survival (Kogut & Zander, 1992, p. 396). 
The paradox is that while codification of knowledge holds the advantage of lower intra or 
inter-firm technology transfer cost, preserving quality, exploiting value, and guiding firm’s 




encouraging imitation by competitors (p. 390); and eventually triggering decreasing returns 
(Kogut & Zander, 1992, p. 385).  
Then, the choosing of a knowledge coding scheme deserves discussion. The main issue 
here when attending changes in the environment is the existing tension between (a) the 
desired level of easiness to learn new codes, due to that we see as changing is familiar with 
what we already know, and (b) the unwanted level of difficulties of learning an unfamiliar 
language code given that environmental changes are understood as novel (Papert, 1979; 
Kogut & Zander, 1992, p. 391).   
In the context of this tension, Kogut and Zander (1992) argues for conceiving an 
organizational capability that explores for the new, by exploiting existing knowledge, by 
recombine it (p. 391). In this conception of capability - combinative capability - the chosen 
coding scheme is more closely it related to the existing practice (p. 392) and the selection is 
justified on: (a) the unpredictable probabilities of success, similar to a start-up, when a firm 
moves away from his exiting knowledge base (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982), (b) that the 
growth of our knowledge is guided by an existing set of stable know-how and information 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982), that is, learning is path dependent, and (c) that even though that 
personnel rotation may bring new knowledge into the organization, capabilities are 
dependent of what is currently organized (Kogut & Zander, 1992, p. 392).  
Then, Kogut and Zander’s organizational combinative capability is a bet for a coding 
scheme that is proximal to our existing knowledge, which proposes a code set that is chosen 
as the organizational common language, to be used to communicate and combine expert 
knowledge (p. 390).This also implies that when the gap between environmental needs and 




workings, as a result of the struggling with language constraints (Pappert, 1979, p. 77). In the 
worst case, environmental changes may go unknown (Kogut and Zander, 1992, p. 392), 
given the unsuitableness of the language to recognize the particular change.  
Knowledge of the firm must be understood, also, as socially constructed and resting in 
the path dependent localized learning of the organizing of human resources (p. 388), in which 
the transfer of knowledge within groups is facilitated by (a) information about who knows 
what, (b) sharing of a common stock of technical and organizational knowledge to 
economize in communication (Arrow, 1974, Katz & Kahn, 1978), and (c) learning a set of 
values, through a shared language, (Berger & Luckman, 1967) which provides “a normative 
sanction of how activities are to be organized or what information is to be collected and 
evaluated how activities are organized” (Kogut & Zander, 1992, p. 389).  
However, reading the theory in this isolated way is to lose its core competence, the most 
dynamic aspect of it: the balancing between (a) the capability of applying what the firm 
knows how to do well, and (b) the capability of creating by recombining what the firm knows 
how to do; to achieve (c) valuable platforms to get into new markets (Kogut & Zander, p. 
395), and better if this combinative effort is focused on market-valued bottleneck factors (pp. 
392-393).  
Summing up, Kogut and Zander (1992) posit to reframe research about the use and 
creation of knowledge in organizations to focus on applying and building knowledge-based 
capabilities. Firms grow through exploiting capabilities that replicate, through a common 
language, either, (a) existing codified knowledge, or (b) licensed complex ready to be used 




Firms, also, grow through combinative capabilities that recombine, through organizing 
principles (coding scheme) and common language, the organization’s social cumulative 
knowledge. A capability that deters imitation, since theirs inert resources – social knowledge 
and organizing principles – are difficult to imitate and redeploy (pp. 383 – 385). 
This combinative approach suggests that the coding scheme and its organizational 
common language is an explicit issue at organizational design time. Common language 
includes the set of organizational values, inventory of bottleneck market-valued factors, 
formal organizational structure; and the coding scheme is mainly defined by the incentives to 
follow and exercise authority, inventory of substantial knowledge, inventory of functional 
knowledge, resource accessing procedures, protocols for transacting and cooperating, 
knowledge boundary spanners protocols, and innovative collaboration flow (see Table 39). 
From the perspective of organizational execution, Kogut and Zander’s (1992) both 
capabilities are about organizational facts, product information, accounting data, 
communication skills, problem solving skills, crafting skills, informal organizational 
structures. The combinative capability adds to the previous four more items: who know the 
technical what, managerial knowledge to organized activities, feedback responsibilities 




Kogut and Zander's Kogut Theory of Replication and Combinative Capabilities  
Body of Knowledge of the Exploitation (Replication of Technology) & Exploitation (Recombination of Knowledge)  Capabilities 
[a] Theory’s 
presumption 
Firms’ organizational context allows the sharing and transfer knowledge of individuals and groups 





- Act according to shared values. 





Exploitation approach: Replication of activities by a shared language that eases knowledge 
transferability and exploitation of complex knowledge embodiments. 
Exploration approach: Use of knowledge through organizing principles that (a) recombine 
functional knowledge focused on market rewarded bottleneck capabilities, through a coding 
scheme and shared language that encapsulates substantial knowledge, and (b) by recognizing 
social knowledge, embedded in social relationships of HHRR, as source of inert resources. 
Actors’ governance: Incentives to follow and exercise authority. 
1 . O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  D e s i g n  k n o w l e d g e  2 . O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  E x e c u t i o n  K n o w l e d g e  
Knowledge: [d] Residency, [e] Domain, and [f] Type (A: Ability-based, S: Symbol-based) 
Exploitation Capability (Replication of Technology)  
[d]   Manager/Employee:  [d] Manager/Employee:  
1.1 Social knowledge  2.1 Individual knowledge (Information and Know- how): 
Shared language (common code): Organizational  facts (transactions, events) S 
Formal organizational structure S Product and accounting data S 
 
Communication skills  A 
Problem solving skills A 
Crafting skills A 
2.2 Social knowledge 
Informal organizational structure S/A 
Exploration Capability (Recombination of  Knowledge )  
[d]   Manager/Employee:  [d] Manager/Employee:  
1.1 Social knowledge  2.1 Individual knowledge (Information and Know- how): 
Shared language (common code): Organizational  facts (transactions, events) S 
Set of organizational  values S Product and accounting data S 
Inventory of bottleneck market-valued factors S Communication skills  A 
Formal organizational structure S Problem solving skills A 
Shared coding scheme (Organizing principles): Crafting skills A 
Allocation of incentives to exercise authority S 
 
Inventory of substantial knowledge S 2.2 Social knowledge  
Inventory of functional knowledge S Informal organizational structure S/A 
Knowledge codifying approach S Who knows the technical what S 
Resource accessing procedures S Managerial knowledge for organizing activities  S 
Protocols for transacting and cooperating S Responsibilities of feedback among functions S 
Knowledge boundary spanning A Establishing long term relationships A 
Innovative collaboration flow S/A   
Table 39. Body of knowledge of the exploitation and exploration capability of Kogut and 




5.9 GRANT’S KBV OF THE FIRM AND ITS INTEGRATION CAPABILITY 
Similar to Kogut and Zander (1992), Grant’s (1996a, 1996b) view of the firm makes 
explicit its organizational capability: knowledge integration.  
His firm’s view presumption is that since explicit knowledge holds inherent value 
appropriation limitations through market contracts (once it is exposed it can be taken for 
free by competition), and tacit knowledge, acquired by and stored within individuals, 
requires specific environments for its transferability (which markets may not easily 
provide), the firm may be viewed as an institution that integrates a wide array of 
knowledge to convert inputs into outputs. This leads to a definition of the firm in which 
knowledge, explicit and tacit, is the principal productive resource of the firm.  
Grant published two main articles regarding KBV of the firm. In the first one, Grant 
(1996a) introduces the knowledge application approach (integration). In the second 
article (1996b), he proposes to understand and extend the knowledge integration 
capability in the context of firms prospering in dynamically competitive environments. 
In both articles he argues (a) that knowledge holds residence in individuals (Polanyi, 
1966), (b) that knowledge follows the tacit and explicit dichotomy, and (c) for the 
positive role of three [4Aa] common knowledge types in the [4a] efficiency of the 
knowledge integration capability that transforms inputs into outputs, see Figure 9.  
These common knowledge types  are described by Grant (1996a, pp. 114-115) in 
general terms as: (a) common language (rules, directives, English,  literacy, numeracy, 
computer software, statistics, and commonality in the specialized knowledge), (b) shared 
meanings (common cognitive schema, metaphor, analogy, and stories), and (c) 




Grant (1996a) posits that in the exploitation approach (knowledge application) the 
main concern of management is to coordinate the knowledge integration of the specialist 
of the firm into products and services. While, he said, that most research has been 
directed to the problem of cooperation – the challenge of reconciling and subordinating 
the dissimilar objectives of firm members – the coordination of day to day operations, 
even in the case when no goal conflicts exist, it is not an easy task when members’ tacit 
knowledge holds a significant role in production (p. 113).  
The recognized difficulties of transferring such tacit knowledge (Nonaka, 1994; 
Brown & Duguid, 1991) and the unpractical approach of learning everything that others 
know, leads Grant (p. 114) to argue in favor of proposing knowledge transfer 
minimization in the context of members’ interdependence; in which managers choices 
hold a prevailing role over the production technology in use in the firm.  
Supported in the research into integration across specialized units (Thompson, 1967; 
Van de Ven, Delbecq, & Koenig, 1976), Grant (1996a) pointed out four types of 
interdependence among organizational members and their related knowledge integration 
mechanisms.  
In pooled interdependence [3A], coordination is driven by rules and directives, which 
do not only reduce communication needs among specialist, but also lead to revealing tacit 
knowledge as explicit maxims. Their knowledge content (directives) does not sustain the 
bureaucratic authority, but is oriented to induce sharing of specialists’ knowledge.  
In sequential interdependence [3B], plans, understood as time regulated activities 
dependent in great deal by production technology, achieve effective coordination through 




In reciprocal interdependence [3C], mutual adjustment, in the form of routines that 
support, in one dimension, automatic complex patterns of interaction, which includes 
simultaneity of execution; and in other dimension, the holding of a flexible repertory of 
responses that see individual actions as part of an implicit grammar (Pentland & Rueter, 
1994).  
Finally, in team interdependence, planned and unplanned meetings achieve group 
coordination through group problem solving and decision making, see Figure 9.   
Grant (1996a) argues that efficiency in organizations is mostly related to rules, plans, 
and routines, and “reserve[s] problem solving and decision making by teams to unusual, 
complex, and important tasks” (p. 115), neglecting any proposition regarding “meetings” 
as integration mechanism. 
Most of these knowledge integration mechanisms, except for routines, fit into the 
organizational design premises, that by the criteria of knowledge transferring 
minimization, it does not follow the traditional authority hierarchic. 
 Instead, a [4Ac] modular team-based organizational design and supporting 
technology – in which membership is fluid and individuals engage in multiple 
organizational roles in multiple teams in overlapping or simultaneous execution 
(extending Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) – allow accessing and applying specialists’ 
knowledge situated anywhere in the firm.  
In addition, since stockholders and employees mutually own firm knowledge, then 
firms are understood as a system of joint dual control in which decisions requiring 




issues — are decentralized; and those dealing with symbol-based knowing — explicit 
quantifiable treasury and financial risk issues –  are centralized (Grant, 1996a, p. 119)   
Here, knowledge dependence also defines the boundary of the firm. The higher level 
of knowledge dependence between the output and inputs of units of production tends to 
keep productive units within the firm; and when such dependence is low, separated firms 
operating through a market interface may be more efficient.  
Complementarily, [2B] effective knowledge utilization requires high correspondence 
between knowledge domains and product domains. However, since knowledge demanded 
by the products supplied by the organization is not completely hold within the 
organization, and since products do not represent symbolically all organizational 
knowledge, then knowledge trading opportunities emerge, and may take the form of 
strategic alliances (Grant, 1996a, pp. 119-120). 
In his second article, Grant (1996b) goes further and develops four specific 
propositions regarding (see Figure 9): 
 (1) The nature of the firm [1A] (integrate specialist knowledge into the outcomes of 
the productive practice). 
(2) The architecture of the knowledge integration capability into products and 
services [2A] (hierarchical knowledge integration structures in which at the base 
are the individual specialized knowers, and then moving up are the simple single 
task, the specialized task, the coordinated activities, the broad functional 
(manufacturing, logistics, finance, …), and finally, the cross-functional 




(3) Three knowledge integration mechanisms ([3A] directives, [3B] plans, and [3C] 
routines).  
(4) The relationships between knowledge integration capabilities attributes ([2B] 
effectiveness, [4A] efficiency, [4Cb] flexibility, and [4B] potential) and the 
achievement of competitive advantage in the context of the nature of the firm [1A].  
Efficiency [4a] of the knowledge integration capability is the attribute most extensible 
described by Grant (1996b). About this, he argues for two factors to achieve efficient 
knowledge integration: (1) the level of common knowledge [4Aa], (2) the lower frequency and 
variability of the organizational activities [4Ab].  
Grant’s common knowledge behaves as the members’ communication and 
interpretative system that poses (1) Organizational design premises that [4Ac] structure 
the organization, [2A] architect the capability, and focus the integration of knowledge 
through [3A] directives and [3B] plans; and (2) Organizational execution premises that 
[3C] routinely integrated knowledge through a pattern of actions that hold flexibility 
through an implicit shared grammar of actions.  
Grant’s organizational execution knowledge involves organizational routines that 
follows organizational architecture, structures and mechanisms like in Nelson and 
Winter’s (1982) firm’s Target Routine, with the difference that Grant’s approach suggest 
to frame the shared communication and coordination system (common language, share 
meanings and knowledge domains) in design time instead of leaving as emergent during 




Grant’s (1996b, p. 379) pledge to understand organizational routines as coordination 
mechanisms that hold two apparently incompatible attributes: repetitive patterns of 
actions and flexible responses. However, Grant achieved to reframe this conflicting issue. 
First, sharing with Nelson and Winter (1982) the same epistemological posture, 
routines enactment are supported  by ability-based knowing; in that sense patterns of 
interaction allows repetitively integration of specialized knowledge without the cost of 
much explicit communication.  
Then, following Pentland and Rueter’s (1994) approach to organizational routines as 
grammars of action, Grant invites the reader to see that patterns of actions are reflection 
of implicit language rules that allow members to construct a diversity of organizational 
routines that guide members in the creation of flexible responses in complex situations (3C).  
This way of seeing an organizational routine is similar to Nelson and Winter’s (1982) 
recombined tactic to create components, however Grant´s approach argues that routines 
implicitly shared operational language principles, which in our reading of individual 
knowing means that the activities that constituted routines are part of a systematic 
symbolic tool with low levels of preciseness, and scalability, and reversibility; and high 
levels of richness and attachment. 
In summary, Grant’s common knowledge behaves as the members’ communication 
and interpretative system that poses (1) Organizational design premises that [4Ac] 
structure the organization, [2A] architect the capability, and focus the integration of 
knowledge through [3A] directives and [3B] plans; and (2) Organizational execution 
premises that [3C] routinely integrated knowledge through a pattern of actions that hold 




That is, in terms of the proposed integrated individual knowledge-based view, Grant´s 
organizational common knowledge is to be understood as a set of shared tools (directives, 
plans, routines, organizational structures and capability architecture) that hold different 
gradients of shared and systematized symbolic content that adhere to certain shared 
public standards of performance about which members of the organization declare their 
commitment with universal intent and enact them subsidiarily for integrating members´ 
specialized knowledge into the productive practice.  
These tools, as committedly instrumentalized, or socially workable enacted, or 
legitimately enculturated knowledge, can be viewed from three different, typified, but 
integrated dimensions: common language, shared meanings, and the shared recognition 
of knowers. 
Finally, within our research questions, Grant´s proposition [4Ab] regarding the 
categories of common knowledge (common language, shared meanings, shared 
recognition of knowers) is now understood with a different perspective; the three 
common knowledge categories are now understood as dimensions of the five 




Grant’s Knowledge-based View of the Firm 
Body of Knowledge of the Exploitation (Knowledge Integration) Capability 
[a] Theory’s 
presumption 
Since explicit knowledge holds inherent value appropriation limitations through market 
contracts, and tacit knowledge, acquired by and stored within individuals, requires 
specific environments for its transferability, the firm is viewed as an institution that 
integrates a wide array) of knowledge (mix of explicit an tacit to create value. 
[b] Actors’ 
expectations 
Stockholders, employees  
- Coordination of activities based on the co-ownership of 
knowledge.  





Firms, as institutions for knowledge application and creation, have the fundamental 
task of integrating efforts of many specialists into goods and services, and the key to do 
it efficiently is to minimize knowledge transfer through use of common knowledge. 
Actors’ governance: Given the co-ownership of knowledge, interdependence among 
actors is part of organizational design (ability-based knowing is decentralized, and 
symbol-based knowing is centralized).  
1.Organizational Design knowledge 2.Organizational Execution Knowledge 
Knowledge: [d] Residency, [e] Domain, and [f] Type (A: Ability-based, S: Symbol-based) 
Exploitation (Application)Capability 
[d]   Manager/Employee: [d] Manager/Employee:  
1.1 Interdependent integrating mechanisms 2.1 Interdependent integrating mechanisms 
Directives (rules and procedures) S/A Organizational routines (patterns of 
interaction that integrates specialized 
knowledge without much communication 
and through the sharing of grammars of 
action) 
A Plans (time regulated activities guided by 
production tech and managers discretional 
decisions  about sequencing and 
overlapping) 
S/A 
2.2 The commitment to and subsidiary 
enactment of capability architectures, 
organizational structures, and integration 
mechanisms (directives, plans and routines) 
as the shared interpretative and 
communication tools of the members of the 
organization.  
Tools, understood as plausible 
instrumentalized enculturated knowledge, 
can be viewed from three different, but 
integrated dimensions:  
 
1.2  Architecture and Structure 
Organizational structure  (Modular team-
based with fluid multiple role & 
simultaneous membership) 
S/A 
Capabilities architecture (product 
knowledge hierarchy that goes from 










2.3 Application of specialized knowledge A 
Table 40. Body of knowledge of the exploration capability of Grant’s (1996a, 1996b) Knowledge 








5.10 COMPARING KNOWLEDGE DOMAINS OF CAPABILITIES 
 
Knowledge domains of the reviewed organizational capabilities of the views and theories 
of the firm could be further examined (a) by qualifying their knowledge through the lenses of 
the proposed integrated view of language, shared meanings, and recognition of knowers 
presented in the previous chapter (see Table 32), (b) by accepting the organizational 
capability as the theory in use that characterizes the domain of knowledge within which  
CKO comes to exists, and (c) by accepting that CKO commonness criterion correspond to 
the domain of practices of the theory in use in the organization, which avoids 
misunderstandings and allows loose coordination of actions, as argued in section 1.7 in the 
first chapter. 
Choosing rules (Simon, 1991b), standard operating procedures (Cyert & March, 1992), 
organizational routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982), industry recipe (Spender, 1989; 1992), 
organizing principles (Kogut & Zander, 1992), and knowledge integration mechanisms 
(Grant, 1996a; 1996b) are competing ways of seeing knowledge-based organizational 
capabilities and reveal different axles around which the instances of common language, 
shared meanings and recognition of knowers spin (see Tables 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40).  
Comparison of CKO in this KBV of the firm is not complete without contrasting [a] 
theory’s contextual presumptions, [b] actors’ roles/expectations about objectives, and [c] 
logic of achievement of objectives and actors’ governance (see Organizational Capability 
Framework in Table 33).  
The origins of matches and misses surge from the shared goal-orientation that these 
theories hold and the diverse logics of achievement follow by them.  Interestingly, the 




of goal agreeing, and the organizational execution dimension illustrated the goal 
achieving mechanisms (see Table 43).  
Seeing these theories and their capabilities from such contrasting perspective allows 
appreciating that their knowledge domains (Tables 41 and 42) follow tool-oriented 
approaches to attend organizational goals. These made sound obvious, but it stop being 
when, for example, “truce mechanisms for goal agreement” (Nelson & Winter, 1982) 
shows up as one of the organizational tools.   
Them, except for Simon (1991b), who assumed goals as given, theories of the firm 
propose conceptions of organizations that count within their knowledge domains with  
ability-based tools for arriving to a set of organizational goals like bargaining, truce-
arriving, two-way socialization, valued-based agreeing, and interdependent governance. 
A similar pattern   
 Simon’s (1991b) (a) given goals and (b) expert’s choosing heuristics;  
 Cyert and March’s (1992) (a) goal bargaining, and (b) standard operating procedures 
for managing uncertainty, trust and adaptation;  
 Nelson and Winter’s (1982) (a) truce mechanisms for goals agreement, and (b) the 
organizational context as the memory that modulates communication and 
coordination of goals;  
 Spender’s (1989; 1992) (a) manager/entrepreneur’ assumptions for action and 
residual rights as mechanism for goals shaping; and (b) members skills on uncertainty 
coping mechanism/institutions, and the agreement about the beneficiaries of 




 Kogut & Zander’s (1992) (a) common language, common values, shared inventory of 
bottleneck market-valued factors, and a common coding system that encapsulates 
substantive knowledge to offer functional knowledge as the mechanisms by which 
members share given goals; and (b) data about organizational facts, individual skills, 
the sharing of who knows what and the establishing of long term relationships as the 
mechanisms for achieving those goals; and  
 Grants’ (1996a; 1996b) (a) interdependence of goals governance given the recognition of 
the co-ownership of knowledge (individual and organization), which shapes organzitional 
tools (directives, plans, capabilities architecture and organizational structure); and 
(b) the enacting of routines as grammars for action while committing to organizational 
tools, as the interdependent mechanism that integrates specialized knowledge into the 
productive practice that leads to the accomplishing of objectives. 
In summary, we here have advanced in responding our main research question and 
secondary research questions from the theoretical standpoint (see Tables 41, 42, 43, 44 
and 45), and the same time have achieved to develop a common knowledge conceptual 




S u m m a r y  o f  O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  C a p a b i l i t i e s  a n d  i t s  K n o w l e d g e  D o m a i n s  i n  T h e o r i e s  o f  t h e  F i r m  -   1 / 2  
[a] Views of 
the Firm 
[c] Logic of achievement of 
objectives and actors’ governance 
[e] Organizational Design Knowledge and 
[f] type (Symbol/Ability based)  
[e] Organizational Execution Knowledge 
and [f] type (Symbol/Ability based) 












rational capability guided by 
stimuli and premises (strategy and 
choosing rules). 










Classical managerial knowledge 
S 






Customer preferences S 
Goals & Choosing rules S 
D 
E  






Theory of the 
Firm 
Exploitation approach: A Goal-
satisficing adaptively rational 
uncertainty-avoiding capability 
guided by standard operating 
procedures. 
Goals and policies refined through 
actual and past experiences 
S 
Information search and decision 
making toward goals and influence by 
own and subunit expectations 









Bargaining knowledge use to leverage 
value creation by balancing demands 
A 
Uncertainty, Trust & Adaptation SOPs: avoid 
uncertainty, run the operation as usual 
even under failure, and last-resort explicit 












View of the 
Firm 
Combined Exploitation and 
Exploration approach: A truce 
oriented approach that guides 
operations of the firm by following 
routines that fulfill its targets and 
that adapts to changes by replacing 
failing routines with existing 
satisficing recombined subroutines. 
Truce routine: motivational, rule-
enforcement, and truce mechanisms  
S/A 
Target routine: shared comm. & shared 




E  D  
 
D E 






Grow and contraction routine S/A Imitating routine tactics S/A 
  
Innovation routine S/A Contraction routine tactics S/A   
 
 
Innovation routine tactics S/A   





Exploitation approach: Reactive 
application of technical, managerial, 
and operational knowledge presuming 
certain actors’ assumptions for action 
and expectations of beneficiaries of 
residual rights. 
Classical managerial knowledge  S Practice of managerial knowledge S/A 
   
E D E 
Technical knowledge defines the 
characteristics of the productive 
apparatus and shapes the operation 
of the organization. 
S 
Practice of operational knowledge 




D E D E 
Exploration approach: Proactive 
application of creative entrepreneurial 
and collaborative industry recipe-
based knowledge” by assessing and 
influencing actors’ assumptions for 
action. 
Industry Recipe knowledge and 
creative team‘s knowledge about 
socially-built identity patterns give 
shape and are shaped by the   
assumptions for action, and the 
beneficiaries of residual rights. 
A 
Manager’ skills on Industry Recipe’s 
uncertainty coping mechanism, and 
Creative Team’s collaboration skill’s  
shape and are shaped by uncertainty 
management institutions, and 
beneficiaries of externalities cost. 
A D E D E D E 




S u m m a r y  o f  O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  C a p a b i l i t i e s  a n d  i t s  K n o w l e d g e  D o m a i n s  i n  T h e o r i e s  o f  t h e  F i r m  -   2 / 2  
[a] Views of 
the Firm 
[c] Logic of achievement of objectives and 
actors’ governance 
[e] Organizational Design Knowledge 
and [f] type (Symbol/Ability based) 
[e] Organizational Execution Knowledge and 
[f] type (Symbol/Ability based) 














Exploitation approach: Replication of 
activities by a shared language that eases 
knowledge transferability and exploitation 
of complex knowledge embodiments. 
Social knowledge - Organizing principles: Individual knowledge (Information & Know- how):  
 





Formal organizational structure S Communication, problem-solving & craft skills A D 
 
D E D 
 
Social knowledge - Organizing principles 
  
 
 Informal organizational structure S/A E E 
Exploration approach: Use of knowledge 
through organizing principles that (a) 
recombine functional knowledge focused 
on market rewarded bottleneck 
capabilities, through a coding scheme and 
shared language that encapsulates 
substantial knowledge, and (b) by 
recognizing social knowledge, embedded in 
social relationships of HHRR, as a source of 
inert resources. 
Social knowledge 
Shared language (common code): 
Set of organizational  values S/A 
Inventory of bottleneck market-
valued factors 
S 
Formal organizational structure S 
Coding scheme (organizing principles): 
Incentives to exercise authority S 
Inventory of substantial knowledge S 
Inventory of functional knowledge S 
Resource accessing procedures S 
Transacting & cooperating protocols S 
Knowledge boundary spanning A 
Innovative collaboration flow A 
 
Individual knowledge (Information & Know- how): 
Organizational  facts (events) S 
Product  and accounting data S 
Communication, problem-solving and 
crafting skills 
A 
Social knowledge:  
Informal organizational structure S/A 
Managerial knowledge for organizing activities  S 
Responsibilities of feedback among functions S 
Establishing long term relationships A 




















D D E D 













D D D 




of the Firm 
Exploitation approach: Firms, as institutions 
for knowledge application have the 
fundamental task of integrating 
knowledge of many specialists into goods 
and services, and the key to do it efficiently 
is to minimize knowledge transfer through 
use of common knowledge. 
Actors’ governance: Given the co-ownership of 
knowledge, interdependence among actors is 
part of organizational design, in which symbol-
based knowing is centralized and ability-based 
knowing is decentralized. 
Interdependent integrating mechanisms Interdependent Integration mechanisms  
Directives (rules and procedures) S/A Organizational routines  (as grammars for action) D E D E D E 
Plans S/A Committing to directives and plans A D  D E D E 
Architecture and Structure Committing to organizational structure A  E  E  E 
Organization structure (modular) S/A Committing to capabilities architecture A D 
 
D E D E 
Capabilities architecture (hierarchical) S/A Application of specialized knowledge A D D  D E 
 











Comparison of Organizational Capabilities of KVB of The Firm  
KVB of  
the 
Firm  
[a] Theory’s contextual presumptions 
[b] Actors’ roles/expectations about goals: 
(1) Organizational Goals Agreeing 
[c] Logic of achievement of goals and actors’ governance: 
(2) Organizational Goal Achieving 
Simon  
(1991b) 
Goal satisficing administrative man, instead of the optimizing economic man. 





Complement extant theories of economic market factors with a firm’s view as goal developer, 
manager of expectations and choice executer. 
Goals are the result of a bargaining 
process 
Standard operating procedures for managing 





Much of knowledge in organizations is tacit, and as in skills in individuals, routines in organizations, are 
repetitive patterns of activity, and known only by its effectiveness, and persistent trait, as if they were 
genes, which determines possible evolutionary designs and behaviors of the firm. 
Goals are agreed following truce 
mechanisms  
Organizational context as the memory that modulates 





Questioning of presumptions about the shape of certain contextual factors like assumptions for action, 
social institutional systems, and beneficiaries of externalities and residual rights. 
Goals are shaped by manager 
/entrepreneur' assumptions for action while 
attending beneficiaries of residual rights  
Members skills on uncertainty coping 
mechanism/institutions while agreeing about the 






Organizational context allows the sharing and transfer knowledge of individuals and groups 
within organizations better than markets. 
Given goals are shared though common 
language and values, a shared inventory of 
bottleneck market-valued factors, and a 
coding system that encapsulates substantive 
knowledge to offer it as functional 
Data about organizational facts, individual skills, 
the sharing of who knows what, and the 




Since symbol-based knowing holds inherent value appropriation limitations through market 
contracts, and ability-based knowing, acquired by and hold by individuals, requires specific 
environments for its transferability, the firm is viewed as an institution that integrates a wide 
array of knowledge (mix of ability-based and symbol-based) to create value. 
Goals are governed by the interdependence 
that surges from recognizing knowledge 
as co-own (personal and organizational), 
that shapes directives, plans, capabilities 
architecture and organizational structure, in 
which symbol-based knowing is centralized 
and ability-based knowing is decentralized. 
Enacting of routines as grammars for action 
(repetitive patterns of actions and flexible 
responses) while committing to directives, plans, 
capabilities architecture, and organizational 
structure, with the purpose of integrating 
specialized knowledge into the productive practice. 




5.11 CKO FRAMEWORK IN THE CONTEXT OF  VIEWS OF THE FIRM 
The interception of  (a) the Integrated view of language, shared meanings and 
recognition of knower (Table 32) emerged in the context of individual knowing theories 
with (b) the Organizational Capability Framework (Table 33), and the transversal 
application of  (c) the Commonness Criterion – understood as  the domain of practices 
exercised within the framework of the theory in use by the members of the organization, 
to economize in communications, recognize, reconcile and share understandings, 
replicate and protect key knowledge, and ease coordination of actions – allows for the 
elaboration of a conceptual model that served as a departing point to observe empirical 
instances of common knowledge within the context of  the different views or theories of 
the firm. 
The application of such framework to the different organizational capabilities –
Satisficing Heuristics (Simon, 1947), SOP-based (Cyert & March, 1992), Organizational 
Routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982, Levitt & March, 1988), Industry Recipes (Spender, 
1989, 1992), Organizing Principles (Kogut & Zander, 1992) and Knowledge Integration 
(Grant, 1996a, 1996b) – reveals specific instances of observable common knowledge 






Framework of Common Knowledge Types in Views/Theories of the Firm 1/2 
Organizational Common Knowledge  (CKO) 
&   Commonness Criteria (CC) 
I n d i v i d u a l  K n o w i n g  V i e w  
 Knowing as the committed instrumentalization, or socially workable enactment, or legitimized 
enculturation of objects or behaviors, about which knower may hold a shared symbolization, that 
when inadequate, it may either limit sharing about it, staying tacit, or trigger innovative behaviors.. 
Language Shared meanings Recognition of knowers 
CK:  is about what actors, which know 
about the other; jointly know about a 
particular situation (Wilby, 2010). 
CKO and CC: Domain of practices 
exercised within the framework of the 
theory in use by the members of the 
organization (Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 
2001; Schutz, 1970; McCarthy, 1994; 
Argyris & Schön, 1974), to economize 
in communications (Arrow, 1974; 
Grant, 1996), recognize, reconcile and 
share goals (Brown & Duguid, 1991), 
replicate and protect key knowledge 
(Kogut & Zander, 1992), and ease 
coordination of actions (Nonaka, 1994; 
Thompson, 1967, Demsetz, 1991, 
Spender, 1989). 
1a. Shared contrived 
cultural tools for 
expliciting knowledge. 
2a. (2a1) Conception through 
tight or loose committed 
perceptual or emotional 
patterning, (2a2) enactment 
through workable social 
formations, and (2a3) denotations 
through symbolic systems. 
3a. At cultural 
assimilation stage, it 
follows the authority-
trust relationship. 
1b. Systematic symbolic 
tools with different levels 
of preciseness, richness, 
attachment, scalability, 
and reversibility 
3b. At cultural ongoing 
stage, it follows the 
successful restricting or 
habilitating saying/acting 
instances. 
2b. (2b1) Plausible stories that 
show patterns and insinuate the 
future, or (2b2) canon-based 
legitimization stories that enrich 
culture. 
1c. Ineffective expliciting and 
innovative symbolic systems. 
1d. Challenging and 
changing symbol-based 
tools reflecting cultural 
canons and human‘s 
limits. 
2c. As the reactive-proactive 
tension among (2c1) acting 
according to the way of life 
canons, (2c2) construction of 
culture, and (2c3) challenging 
the outside world states. 
3c. Recognition 
ofknowers is linked to 
the setting of knowing 
standards. 
KBV View or 
Theory of the Firm 
Organizational 
Capability Approach 
Theoretical Instances of Common Knowledge Types 






- Goals & choosing rules 
- Customer preferences 
- Goals, Strategy and Choosing 
rules 










- Goals and policies 
- Uncertainty, Trust & 
Adaptation SOPs  
- Bargaining knowledge 
- Subunit expectations 
- Uncertainty, Trust & 
Adaptation SOPs 
- Managers’ goal 
bargaining abilities 







































- Organizational memory: 
documents, work   
environment, and 
organizational dialect. 
-  Routine repertories 
- Motivational mechanisms. 
- Rules enforcement 
mechanisms 
- Truce tradition. 
- Shared message interpretation 
and routine coordination 
system. 
- Current routine as replication 
template. 
- Manager’s  control 
actions for monitoring 
& aligning resources 
and routines 
- Expert’s imitation 
abilities 





- Manager and experts’ 
recombination abilities 










- Technical knowledge 
defines characteristics 
of productive apparatus  
- Technical knowledge shapes 
operation of the organization 
- Practice of managerial & 
operational knowledge 
- Managers’ classical 
managerial knowledge 




- Industry, professional or 
vocational bonding 
language 
- Industry, professional or 
vocational assumptions for 
action. 
- Socially-built identity patterns: 
elevating goals, results-driven 
structure, collaborative 
climate, standards of 
excellence, external support, 





- Team’s uncertainty 
collaborating abilities 




Framework of Common Knowledge Types in Views/Theories of the Firm 2/2 
Organizational Common Knowledge  (OCK) 
&   Commonness Criteria (CC) 
I n d i v i d u a l  K n o w i n g  V i e w  
Knowing as the committed instrumentalization, or socially workable enactment, or legitimized 
enculturation of objects or behaviors, about which knower may hold a shared symbolization, that 
when inadequate, it may either limit sharing about it, staying tacit, or trigger innovative behaviors.. 
Language Meanings Recognition of knowers 
CK:  is about what actors, which know 
about the other; jointly know about a 
particular situation (Wilby, 2010). 
CKO and CC: Domain of practices 
exercised within the framework of the 
theory in use by the members of the 
organization (Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 
2001; Schutz, 1970; McCarthy, 1994; 
Argyris & Schön, 1974), to economize 
in communications (Arrow, 1974; 
Grant, 1996), recognize, reconcile and 
share goals (Brown & Duguid, 1991), 
replicate and protect key knowledge 
(Kogut & Zander, 1992), and ease 
coordination of actions (Nonaka, 
1994; Thompson, 1967, Demsetz, 
1991, Spender, 1989). 
1a. Shared contrived 
cultural tools for 
expliciting knowledge. 
2a. (2a1) Conception through 
tight or loose committed 
perceptual or emotional 
patterning, (2a2) enactment 
through workable social 
formations, and (2a3) denotations 
through symbolic systems. 
3a. At cultural 
assimilation stage, it 
follows the authority-
trust relationship. 
1b. Systematic symbolic 
tools with different levels 
of preciseness, richness, 
attachment, scalability, 
and reversibility 
3b. At cultural ongoing 
stage, it follows the 
successful restricting or 
habilitating saying/acting 
instances. 
2b. (2b1) Plausible stories that 
show patterns and insinuate the 
future, or (2b2) canon-based 
legitimization stories that enrich 
culture. 
1c. Ineffective expliciting 
and innovative symbolic 
systems. 
1d. Challenging and 
changing symbol-based 
tools reflecting cultural 
canons and human‘s 
limits. 
2c. As the reactive-proactive 
tension among (2c1) acting 
according to the way of life 
canons, (2c2) construction of 
culture, and (2c3) challenging 
the outside world states. 
3c. Recognition of 
knowers is linked to the 





Theoretical Instances of Common Knowledge Types  
Common  Language Shared meanings 




































 Replication of 
activities 
(Exploitation) 
- Formal structure 
-  Product & Accounting 
data 
- Informal structure 
- Communication, problem-
solving & craft skills 






- Organizational  values 
- Market-valued factors 
- Formal structure 
- Authority Incentives 
- Inventory of substantial 
knowledge 
- Inventory of functional 
knowledge 
- Resource accessing proc. 
- Trans. & coop. protocol 
- Knowledge boundary 
spanning 
- Innovative collaboration 
flow 
- Product & Accounting data 
- Who knows the tech. what 
- Organizational  values 
- Market-valued factors 
- Formal structure 
- Authority Incentives 
- Inventory of functional 
knowledge 
- Resource accessing proc. 
- Trans. & coop. protocol 
- Knowledge boundary spanning 
- Innovative collaboration flow 
- Communication, problem-
solving & craft skills 
- Informal structure 
- Organizing activities 
- Establish long term relationships 
- Who knows the technical what 
- Members’ formal 
authority 













1. Directives (rules and 
procedures). 
2. Plans. 
3. Organizational routines 
(patterns & grammar). 
4. Organizational structure 
(Modular team-based). 
5. Capabilities architecture 
(Product knowledge 
hierarchy).  
1. Directives (rules and 
procedures). 
2. Plans. 
3. Organizational routines 
(patterns & grammar). 
4. Organization structure 
(Modular team-based). 
5. Capabilities architecture 
(Product knowledge 
hierarchy).  
1. Directives (rules and 
procedures). 
2. Plans. 
3. Organizational routines 
(patterns & grammar). 
4. Organization structure 
(Modular team-
based). 
5. Capabilities architecture 
(Product knowledge 
hierarchy). 
The commitment to and subsidiary enactment of these 5 tools operate as the shared 
interpretative and communication system of the members of the organization.   




CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 THEORETICAL FINDINGS 
Most views of organizations that gear knowledge as their impeller stage common 
knowledge as relevant (Simon, 1991a; Cyert & March, 1992; Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Spender, 1992; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996a).  
Understanding and explaining common knowledge in organizations in the context of 
such views of the firm asks for clarity about (a) knowledge, (b) organizational capability 
and (c) commonness criterion. 
The extensive variety of approaches to knowledge in organizations, its non-
operationalized status (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2001; Kakihara & Sorensen, 2002), and 
critics about the miss-read or mixing of incompatible epistemologies that organizational 
studies hold (Gourlay, 2004; 2006; Foss, 2003a; 2003b; Miller, 2008) lead to verify the 
theoretical and empirical status of research work about knowledge and common 
knowledge in organizations.  
Literature review showed a recent focus in action, that is knowing and practice, 
instead of knowledge types and their conversion (Wenger, 1998; Cook & Brown, 1999; 
Bou et al., 2004a; 2004b).  
However, such research works leave as pending the previously mentioned 
epistemological questionings about knowledge, and extend the epistemological gap to 




Literature review of organizational capabilities reveals rich understandings about the 
subject from several authors (see Table 2), and from them the following emerging 
definition captures their main properties: 
Organizational capabilities are complex patterns of coordination, between 
people and between people and resources for the purpose of creating value. 
 Surprisingly, no organizational capability framework accompanied such 
understandings, or it has been published later. Neither the associated knowledge domain 
has been explicitly identified; an issue that is key, when talking about common 
knowledge. 
Contrasting this joint action-oriented and people-based definition of capability are (a) 
the variety of knowledge conceptions and assumed residency, mostly proposed in views 
of the firm within which such capabilities were conceived (see Table 3).  
Within this views of the firm, knowledge conceptions include concepts like satisficing 
heuristics, routines, tacit knowledge, operating procedures, industry recipe, productive 
infrastructure, organizing principles, shared coding system, shared meanings, and know-who.  
There, knowledge is described as residing in individual, organization, physical, abstract, 
and social objects, documents, infrastructure, cultural and social processes, and social tools. 
Finally, organizational research works have omitted, in general, the discussion of the 
criterion by which knowledge is common, and they had treated the issue with the labels 




Given the lack of definite understandings within organizational studies, the idea of 
common knowledge and its commonness criterion was discussed following philosophical 
and cognitive psychology approaches.  
Such discussion revealed three main features embedded in the idea of common 
knowledge: (a) the object of attention, (b) the actors attending the object, and (c) the 
jointly understood social situation as the generating property that calibrates interactions 
to reach common knowledge (Campbell, 2005; Wilby, 2010).  
In few words, common knowledge and the commonness criterion are understood as: 
Common knowledge is not only what actors share about a particular 
situation, but about what actors, who know about the other, jointly know 
about a particular situation.  
Commonness criterion corresponds to the reference that drives joint actions 
toward a jointly understood situation. 
The definition of organizational knowledge of Tsoukas and Vladimirou (2001) leaded 
the specialization of the arrived understanding of common knowledge for the scope of 
organizations. Such definition bounded knowledge to the appreciation of theory or 
context (see Section 2.2.4). 
Adherence to both criteria allowed to asses many the descriptions of common 
knowledge in communication and organizational studies and achieved to describe common 




Domain of practices exercised within the framework of the theory in use by 
the members of the organization, to economize in communications, recognize, 
reconcile and share understandings, replicate and protect key knowledge, 
and ease coordination of actions. 
This understanding of common knowledge and CKO (see Section 2.1.7) sets the focus 
of attention in action and practice. Such focus confirmed the requirement of exploring 
theories of knowledge from both perspectives knowledge and practice.   
Then, following a methodological re-reading, invoking grounded theory (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998; Charmaz 2000; 2006), knowledge theories and knowledge-oriented views 
of the firm provided, first, a well-founded and framed understanding of knowledge and 
knowing in the context of views of the firm; and second, a framed understanding of 
organizational capabilities, together with their knowledge domains, and typified instances 
of common knowledge.  
Coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) Polanyi’s (1958, 1966) tacit knowing, Weick’s (1995) 
sensemaking, Bruner’s (1990) enculturated knowing, and Gourlay’s (2004) semiotic 
knowing approach from the perspective of a sensitizing concept (Charmaz 2000; 2006)  like 
views of organizations (Grant, 1996a; b) revealed from the beginning a structured and 
integrated way of querying about knowing and knowledge from the perspective of 
organizational studies. 
Emerged questions like What triggers knowing? Which abilities participate in 
knowing? What is the role of language and meaning in knowing and knowledge? How 




recognizing knowers? (see Table 12) revealed organizational studies research-aligned 
details that may been previously raised in an isolated way (Gourlay, 2004; 2006; Foss, 
2003a; b; Miller, 2008), neglecting the opportunity of interpreting them as a whole.. 
From such inquiry emerge an understanding of knowledge and knowing that adheres 
to the truth within the framework of commitment, which allows confining of the dangers 
of understanding knowledge as justified true belief (Gourlay, 2004), by proposing 
knowing and knowledge as (see Section 4.8.6) : 
Knowing as the committed instrumentalization, or socially workable 
enactments, or legitimized enculturation of objects or behaviors, 
characterized by a more or less ability-based or symbol-based subsidiary 
process of assimilating tools, about which knowers may hold a shared 
symbolization system, that when inadequate, it may either limit sharing about 
it, staying tacit, or trigger innovative enactments.  
Knowledge as the committedly instrumentalized, or socially workable, or 
legitimately enculturated object or behavior that when it is applied, shared or 
created meets private or public self-adhered standards of usefulness, 
plausibility (including emotional valuations), scientific or normative 
acceptability, and about which the knower may hold a shared symbolization 
system, that when inadequate, it may either limit her (his) communicating 




This is an approach to knowing and knowledge, emerged from extant knowing 
theories, that in the general aspects about knowledge: 
(1) Proposes instrumenting and instruments (tools) as the key to understand the 
integration of the knowing and knowledge epistemologies. 
(2) Attends to the practical, intellectual, social and cultural instances of knowing. 
(3) Reinterprets the tacit-explicit knowledge dichotomy as the ability-based to symbol-
based knowing continuum, translating the focus to the active side. 
This Individual Knowing View reveals a logical link among (a) knowing drives 
(motivations), (b) knowing abilities in play, (c) knowing performance criteria, and (d) 
knowing tensions hold while knowing. In brief, this view:  
(4) Identifies a holistic set of drives (11) of knowing behavior including appetite, 
sensemaking, intellectual, desire of companionship, enacted situations, meeting 
desires and overcoming human limits (Table 30). 
(5) Frames knowing abilities as recursive and scalable (28)  
(a) grouping them as native, heuristic, sensemaking, intellectual, and legitimizing, and  
(b) reveling in them orientations to the application  (pattern recognition, tight 
commitment, enacting known categories) or to the creation (pattern contriving 
loose commitment, enacting new categories)  (Tables 27, 28, 29 & 30). 
(6) Characterizes the criteria of knowing performance (6) as either private standards of 
satisfaction (appetitive, usefulness, beauty and sensemaking) or public standards of 
duty (intellectual and canonical), thus defining the stance in which knowledge is 




(7) Identifies the variety (6) of tensions (sharpness vs. reasonableness, judicious vs. 
novel, self-image caring vs. innovative transacting, constraining vs. habilitating, 
certainty vs. systematic vs. plausibility, cannon following vs. reframer), which 
characterize the alternatives between routine and innovative knowing at different 
levels of knowing (native, ability-based, symbol-based) (Table 31). 
This view also depicts the roles of (a) language, (b) shared meanings and (c) 
recognizing knowers in the process of knowing, summarized as follows: 
(8) Points out language as (a) capable of denoting enculturated knowledge, (b) with 
different levels of richness, attachment, scalability and reversibility, which (c) 
sometimes is ineffective at expliciting knowledge, thus either limiting sharing, or 
triggering creations, which (d) may be legitimized within extant culture or reframe 
culture with new symbol-based systems (Table 32). 
(9) Proposes that (a) lower gradients of commitment to shared meanings may imply 
transitions from applying to creating knowledge, and that (b) workable social 
formations (non-disclosive intimacy, equivalent meanings, shared meanings, 
satisficing naming of objects, collective action experiencing, distributed meanings, 
overlapping views of ambiguous events) trigger different levels of sharing, 
applying and creating (Tables 28 & 30). 
(10) Clarifies that in know-who: 
(a) At the initial stage of membership, the role of trust-authority relationship 
follows an opening conjecture, in which the trust in the expert or superior is 
validated by results; and given the limited personally justified knowledge, we 
continue trusting them; however, rejecting imitation of them affects their 




(b)  At the ongoing stages of membership, individuals are recognize as knowers 
for setting standards, which is revealed through the beauty or usefulness of 
their physical acts, or the beauty or dutifulness of their intellectual acts. 
(Tables 26, 27 & 28). 
 
Finally, this view achieves to describe the (a) sharing, (b) applying and (a) creating 
knowing activities within the framework of instrumentation of objects and behaviors, in which 
we recognize/contrive certain order, anticipate generalization, and commit and rely; in which:  
(11) Sharing is motivated by needs; it is shaped by the adequacy of symbolic system, 
and may exclude premises about tools assimilation in ability-base knowing, or 
operation of interpretative framework for symbol-based knowing given their 
irreversibility (Table 27 & 30). 
(12) Identifies instances of applying knowledge as related to: useful acts, beautifully 
intellectual acts, plausible and legitimized communicating, and socially workable 
acts (Table 30). 
(13) Identifies that knowledge creation activities may be triggered either by (a) needs to 
overcome the limits of our biological substrate, (b) ineffective symbolizations or 
conceptions, (c) needs of social self-definitions, (d) search of legitimacy within 
cultural settings (Table 30). 
The Individual Knowing View (Table 30), the Integrated Knowing Framework (Table 
31), the Integrated View of Language, Shared Meanings, and Recognition of Knowers (Table 




Now, by accepting  organizational capability as the theory in use that characterizes the 
domain of knowledge within which  CKO comes to exists, and  by accepting that CKO 
commonness criterion correspond to the domain of practices of the theory in use in the 
organization, it comes as a requirement to unveil  (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) knowledge 
domains of the organizational capabilities of competing knowledge-based views of the firm 
through the lenses (Charmaz 2000; 2006)  of the emerged integrated view of knowing. 
The framing of such firm´s theories, following an emerged schema (see Table 33) 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998) revealed for each view its [a] theory’s contextual presumptions, 
[b] actors’ roles and expectations about objectives, [c] logic of achievement of objectives 
and actors’ governance, [d] residency of knowledge domains, [e] participating knowledge 
domains, [f] personal knowledge types, and [g] common knowledge types (see Tables 35 
- 40). All this within the dichotomies exploitation-exploration and design-execution. 
The goal orientation of the theories of the firm, which are captured in the ideas of (1) 
goals agreeing approaches (at the organizational design stage) and (2) goal achieving 
approaches (organizational execution stage), shows that the logic that attends such 
conception is impelled by knowledge-based tools (see Table 43).  
Such tool-oriented conception of organizations is compatible with the instrumental 
view of knowing of the examined knowledge theories.   
Then, the knowledge domains that emerged from coding views of the firm (see Table 
35-40) show a diversity of tools, like: 




(2) Cyert and March’s (1992) (a) goal bargaining, and (b) standard operating 
procedures for managing uncertainty, trust and adaptation; or  
(3) Nelson and Winter’s (1982) (a) truce mechanisms for goals agreement, and (b) 
context as the memory that modulates communication and coordination of goals; or  
(4) Spender’s (1989; 1992) (a) managers´ assumptions for action for goals shaping; 
and (b) members skills on uncertainty coping mechanism as tools for goal 
attainment; or  
(5) Kogut & Zander’s (1992) (a) coding system of functional knowledge for sharing 
given goals; and (b) long term relationships as mechanisms for achieving goals; or  
(6) Grants’ (1996a; 1996b) (a) knowledge co-ownership (individual and organization) as 
shaper of directives, plans, capabilities architecture and organizational structure; 
and (b) the enacting of routines as grammars for action while committing to 
organizational tools, as the mechanism to achieve objectives. 
Examining these goal-oriented organizational tools through the lenses of the framework 
of common knowledge types in views/theories of the firm show a variety of theoretical 
instances of common language,  shared meanings and know-who for each view of the firm 
(see Tables 44 and 45), which constitute a rich and detailed specification of observable 
instances of OCK.  
In the context of the framed Grant (1996a; 1996b) KBV of the firm (Figure 9), its 
organizational capability holds the intertwined tension among organizational tools and 





In such tension, the body of knowledge of the capability revealed five categories of 
tools: directives, plans, organizational routines, organizational structure, and capabilities 
architecture.  
These organizational tools [OT], which only come to be knowledge in terms of 
organizational member’s enactments, are understood, within Grant´s (1996a) view, as: 
 [D] Directives: rules and procedures published by authorized members of the 
organization and expected to be followed. 
[P] Plans: time regulated activities guided by technical and production requirements 
and managers discretional decisions about sequencing and overlapping. 
[R] Routines: patterns of interaction among individuals that integrate specialized 
knowledge without much communication through the sharing of grammars of action. 
[S] Structure of the organization: modular team-based fluid organizational designs in which 
members play multiple roles within the team and are open to simultaneous membership. 
[A] Architecture of the capability: design of the product or service knowledge 
hierarchy.  
It is within these theoretical instances of organizational tools that the commonness 
criterion (the reference that drives joint actions toward a jointly understood situation) is 
applied to reveal instances of OCK related to common language, shared meanings and 
recognition of knowers.   
In summary, Grant’s OCK works as communication and interpretative system that 
structure the organization, architect the capability, focuses the integration of knowledge 
through directives and plans; and that routinely integrated knowledge through pattern of 




At this point, significant advancement has been achieved in responding our main 
research question (How is common knowledge in organizations related to the knowledge 
integration capability?) and secondary research questions from the theoretical standpoint, 
and at the same time, we have achieved to develop a common knowledge conceptual 
framework (Table 44 & 45) as departing point for analyzing empirical observations.   
6.2 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Findings revealed that all five theoretical organizational tools are represented in the 
empirical instances of the Lessons learned case study. Such empirical instances are also 
found to be related to the second dimension of the observational framework, that is, they 
represent instances of common language [CL], share meanings [SM], and recognition of 
knowers [RK], see Tables 46-48.  
Analyzing such CKO empirical instances in search of categories that may shape 
dimensions of an emerging paradigm (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) revealed them as 
instrumentalizing behaviors.  
Also, the set of empirical instances in each OT shows [1] drafts of the knowing 
integration tensions described in the IKF (Table 31, section PT.2), [2] drafts of the logic 
of the contrivance of tools (Table 31, section CT), [3 and 4] criteria for recognizing 
knowers in either of the two stages (Table 31, section CI.1 and CI.2), and [5] abilities by 
which knowers are recognized (Table 31, section PA.3).  
It should be noticed, at this point, that common knowledge types are still a dimension 




These findings, summarized in Tables 49 and 50, describe, in a rich and structured 
way, the role of the five organizational tools (OT) in relation with the efficiency of the 
knowledge integration capability (EKIC).  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Methodological note: Back tracking information was incorporated in the tables to satisfy the 
internal validity and reliability criteria (Yin, 2003a, p. 34).These tables (46, 47 and 48) show 
the synthesized open coding process (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) following the format [CL, SM 
or RK #], where 1 stands for directives, 2 for plans, 3 for routines, 4 for organizational 
structure, and 5 for capability architecture. In addition, when the instance of common 
knowledge is related to an specific PMI´s knowledge area, letter(s) is(are) coded following 
the format: Lessons #: S, T, R, C, Q, P, H, Cm I, F, Sh or G), where # stands for lessons from 
1 to 36, and the letter or letters stand for the selected underline letters of the PMI’s 
knowledge areas (Scope, Time, Risk, Cost, Quality, Procurement, HHRR, Communication 





Empirical Instances of Common Knowledge Types founded in the Lessons Learned Case 1/3 
Organizational Common Knowledge  (OCK) 
&   Commonness Criteria (CC) 
I n t e g r a t e d  V i e w  o f  I n d i v i d u a l  K n o w i n g  
Language Shared Meanings Recognition of Knowers 
In the context of Individual knowing theories (see Table 32)  
CK:  is about what actors, which know 
about the other; jointly know about a 
particular situation (Wilby, 2010). 
CKO and CC: Domain of practices of  the 
theory in use in the organization (Tsoukas 
and Vladimirou, 2001; Schutz, 1970; 
McCarthy, 1994; Argyris & Schön, 1974), 
which  avoids misunderstandings and 
allows loose coordination of actions 
(Brown & Duguid, 1991; Arrow, 1974; 
Weick, 1995; Polanyi, 1966; Leudar, 1992; 
Clark, 1996; Cramton, 2001; Krauss & 




cultural tools for 
expliciting 
knowledge. 
(2a) Shared meanings as the tension 
among: 
 (2a1) Conception through tight or 
loose committed perceptual or 
emotional patterning,  
(2a2) enactment through workable 
social formations, and (2a3) 
denotations through symbolic 
systems, even if it is ineffective. 
(3a) At cultural assimilation stage, 
it follows the authority-trust 
relationship, like in: 
(3a1) master-learner  relationship, 
(3a2) master’s validation through 
learner’s results,   
(3a3) limitations to validate 
knowledge keep trust in authority,  
(3a4) rejecting masters imitation 
affects his authority, leading 










(2b) Denotations of shared 
meanings as:  
 (2b1) Plausible stories that show 
patterns and insinuate the future, 
or  
(2b2) canon-based legitimization 
stories that enrich culture. 
(3b) At cultural ongoing stage, it 
follows the successful: 
(3b1) enactment of workable 
social understandings,   
(3b2) legitimizing of says/acts in 
terms of cultural cannons, or 
(3b3) legitimizing of says/acts in 
terms of challenging cannons or 






(2c) As the reactive-proactive 
tension among: 
(2c1) acting according to the way 
of life canons,  
(2c2) construction of culture, and 
(2c3) challenging the outside 
world states. 
(3c) Recognition of knower is linked to 
the setting of knowing standards of:  
(3c1) usefulness for physical acts, 
(3c2) intellectual beauty or duty 
for intellectual acts,  
(3c3) everyday sensemaking for 
constraining or habilitating behaviors,  
(3c4) canonical duty for 









KBV of the Firm 
[Theoretical Instances of 
OCK in the Organizational 
Capability] 
E m p i r i c a l  I n s t a n c e s  o f  C o m m o n  K n o w l e d g e  T y p e s  F o u n d  
Common  
Language[CL] 
Shared Meanings [SM] 
Recognition of Knowers 
[RK] 
Grant’s KBV of 






task of integrating 
knowledge of many 
specialists into 
goods and services, 
and the key to do it 
efficiently is to 
minimize 
knowledge transfer 













[1] Directives (rules and 
procedures). 
[2] Plans (time regulated 
activities guided by 






routines (patterns of 
interaction that 
integrates specialized 
knowledge without much 
communication through 
the sharing of grammars 
of action). 
[4] Organizational structure 
(modular team-based 





knowledge hierarchy).  
[6] Other (empirical 
founded instances not 
referenced in theoretical 
framework) 
[CL 1 & SM 1] Long term gap between common language 
and normative shared values. (Lesson 1 , 13 & 35) 
  
 [RK 3 & 5] Knowledge (practices & 
standards) of non-participant 
members may be left out of 
organizational capacities and 
routines. (Lesson 2) 
[RK 1 &2] Trust on delivery presides 
economic & skill issues. (Lesson 3) 
[RK  3] Discovering other 
expectations and their limits are 
type of instances that triggers 
recognizing knowers. (Lesson 4)  
[RK 1 & 3] Trust propagation is a 
type of instance that triggers 
recognizing knowers. (Lesson 5 
 [SM 1] Meaning building initiatives 
are not free of debate, not only 
the meanings but also the kind of 
effort, time, and cost. (Lesson 1) 
[SM 5] Integration happens 
progressively  with leadership and 
incentive dependence (Lesson 1) 
[SM 1] Economic and psychological 
incentives help adhering to the 
meanings of the normative values of 
the organizational culture. (Lesson 1) 
[SM 4] Difficult translation of known 
previous organizational structures 
into the existing o[ne. (Lesson 1) 
[SM 4] Non obvious short time benefits 
resist the following of organizational 
structure. (Lesson 1) 
[SM 1, 2 & 4] There is ineffective tension 
among priority of directives, plans, 
and organizational structure 
membership. (Lessons 2 & 10) 
[SM 1 & 5] Directional messages 
need to be persistent but also be 
adaptable  to context (Lesson 3) 
  




Empirical Instances of Common Knowledge Types founded in Lessons the Learned Case 2/3 
Approach of 
KBV of the 
Firm 
[Theoretical 
Instances of OCK in 
the Organizational 
Capability] 
I n t e g r a t e d  V i e w  o f  I n d i v i d u a l  K n o w i n g  







Grant’s KBV of 










into goods and 
services, and the 
key to do it 

















[1] Directives (rules 
and procedures). 

















through the sharing 



















[CL 2, SM 2 & RK 2] 
Either, not knowing, or 
own weakness 
awareness may enact 
distorted scope 
meanings for the same 
terms. 
(Lesson 15: S & H) 
 
 
[SM 1] Normative values should be 
linked to incentives. (Lesson 6) 
[SM 5] Constructive trust-based 
work-related criticism as way of 
executing. (Lessons 7: C & 8: C) 
[SM 1 & 3] Managed communal 
support knowledge fund as a 
normative shared value.  
(Lesson 7: I,  F) 
[SM 3, RK3] Management of 
members’ unawareness or 
weaknesses portrays  proactive 
intervention, reduces risk and 
improves quality (Lesson 7: R, Q, H) 
[SM 3 & 4] Sharing as a way of 
growing and incorporating 
members. (Lesson 7: Sh &  G) 
[SM 2 & 4] There is a tension 
among priority of directives, 
plans ‘goals, and organizational 
structure membership.  
(Lessons 9: S, 11: H) 
[SM 2] Administrative plans 
follow plausible patterns to 
characterize the future – 
through aligned scope 
breakdown planning (Lesson 
14). Research plans follow 
canon-based legitimization 
approaches for scope drafts 
that insinuate the future 
(Lesson 13 & 14) 
[SM 5] Product plans ask for 
alignment among specialized 
skills, team work, and 
organizational structure. 
(Lesson 14: G) 
[SM 2, CL 2 & RK 2] Either, not 
knowing, or own weakness 
awareness may enact 
distorted scope meaning for 
the same terms. (Lesson 15) 
[SM 2, 3 & 5] Specialist 
involvement in activities 
regarding knowledge out of his 
field (project planning and 
product management) may 
distract specialist from their 
goals. (Lessons 16, 17, 18, 19 & 20) 
[SM 4] Activities involving 
explicit knowledge may be 
centralized for efficiency reasons.  
(Lessons 16, 17, 18, 19 & 20) 
 
[SM 3, RK3] Actions 
revealing  members’ 
unawareness or 
weaknesses are types 
of instances that 
trigger recognizing 
non-knowers     
(Lesson 7: R, Q, H) 
[RK 4] Exercising 
members’ power is a 
type of instance that 
triggers recognizing 
knowers.  
(Lesson 9: G) 
[RK 3 & 5] Specialist’s 
skilful execution is a 
type of instance that 
triggers recognizing 
knowers.  
(Lesson 9: G & S) 




besides transfer of 
technology. 
(Lesson 9: Cm & I) 
[RK 5] Members-
product cross 
referencing is a type 
of instance that 
triggers recognizing 
knowers. (Lesson 10) 
[RK 1, 3 & 5] 
Communicating 
effectively is a type 
of instance that 
triggers recognizing 
knowers.  
(Lesson 11: Cm) 
[RK 3] Collaboration un-
hides existing 
knowledge. (Lesson 12) 
[RK 3] Collaboration 
triggers recognizing 
of knowers.  
(Lesson 12) 
[CL 2, SM 2 & RK 2] 
Either, not knowing, 
or own weakness 
awareness may enact 
distorted scope 
meanings for the 
same language 
terms. (Lesson 15) 




Empirical Instances of Common Knowledge Types founded in Lessons Learned Case 3/3 
Approach of 
KBV of the 
Firm 
[Theoretical 
Instances of OCK in 
the Organizational 
Capability] 
I n t e g r a t e d  V i e w  o f  I n d i v i d u a l  K n o w i n g  







Grant’s KBV of 










into goods and 
services, and the 
key to do it 

















[1] Directives (rules 
and procedures). 

















through the sharing 

























[SM 2 & 5] Specialist 
unawareness of certain 
planning and product 
management issues (cost, 
HHRR, stakeholders, & 
procurement) may affect the 
integration of his knowledge 
into plans and products.  
(Lessons 17, 18, 19, 20 & 21) 
 [RK 1, 2 & 4] Managers 
authority and success 
record may be able to 
set, initially, cost 
estimates. (Lessons 23 
& 24) 
 [RK 1, 2] New members’ 
success may be able to 
change initial set cost 
estimates, while 
refining goals and 
delivery time. (Lessons 
23 & 24) 
[RK 1, 3 & 4] Certain 
standards of knowing 
behavior (adaptable, 
collaborative, and 
foresighted) help the 
integration process. 
(Lessons 25, 26 & 27) 
[RK 3] Discussing as a 




[RK 1 & 2] Recognizing 
setter of standards 
starts with those that 
have the best 
possibilities of being 
successful. (Lesson 35) 
 
 
[ CL3, SM 3] Without pledged explicit standards/best 
practices, delivering satisfactory outcomes ask for non-
replicable extraordinary efforts (Lesson 22: Q, I) 
[CL 1, 2, 3,4, & 5] 
Operating tongue 
language proficiency 
affects pace of plans, 
routines, execution 
capability, social life, 
and integration 
process. (Lessons 20, 
28, 29, 30 &, 31)  
 
[SM 2 & 4] Long term and 
disjoint distance learning 
may trigger misalignment 




[CL 1, SM 1] Telling canon-based legitimating stories may 
shape key long term meanings that define the 
organizational culture. (Lesson 33) 
 [SM 2] Goals may be set to 
challenge the outside world. 
(Lesson 34) 
[SM 1 & 3] Norms based on the 
authority-trust knowing 
relationship eventually 
confronts the standards/best 
practices-compliance 
relationship. (Lesson 35) 
[SM 1] Transcendent shared 
meanings may be the result 
of the aggregated enactment 
of deliveries of a plan. 
(Lesson 36) 
[SM 1] Knowledge co-
ownership shapes the 
discussion about benefits 









Common Knowledge Types in Organizations in the Context of the Integrating Capability of KBV of the Firm – 1 of 2 
 C o m m o n  K n o w l e d g e  T y p e s   
 
 
A. Common  
Language (CL) 















K n o w l e d g e  I n t e g r a t i o n  T e n s i o n s  Initial Knower Recognition Process 
1. Trust on delivery presides economic & skill issues.  
[RK 1 & 2] (Lesson 3: S, Cm) 
2. Manager’s authority and success record may 
set, initially, planning estimates.  
[RK 1, 2 & 4] (Lessons 23:  Cm & 24: Cm, C, T, S) 
3. Recognizing setter of standards starts with those 
with best possibilities of being successful.  
[RK 1 & 2] (Lesson 35: S, T, R, C) 
4. New members’ success may allow changing 
initial planning estimates to refine cost, goals…  
[RK 1 & 2] (Lessons 23: C, T, S & 24: T) 
Ongoing Knower Recognition Process 
1. Trust propagation is a type of instance that 
triggers recognizing knowers.  
[RK 1 & 3] (Lesson 5: Cm, Sh) 
2. Certain knowing approaches (adaptable, 
collaborative, and foresighted) help integration.  
































































































2. Bridging language terms to shared norms is a long term issue.  
[CL 1, SM 1]  (Lessons 1, 13 & 35) 
3. Key meanings of organizational culture are shaped by legitimating 




3. Norms based on the authority-trust knowing 
relationship eventually confronts the 
standards/best practices-compliance relationship. 
(SM 1 & 3] (Lesson 35) 
4. There is tension among priority of directives, plan´s 
goals, and organizational structure membership.   
[SM 1, 2 & 4] (Lessons 2: Sh, 9: S, 10: Sh & 11: H) 
Logic of instrumentalization (Logic of Contrivance)    
1. Managed communal support knowledge 
instrumentalized as transaction fund that helps 
integration and financing.  
[SM 1 & 3] (Lesson 7: I,  F) 
2. Transcendent shared meanings emerged by the 
enactment of aggregated productive outcomes. 
[SM 1] (Lesson 36) 
3. Economic and emotional incentives help adhering 
to the meanings of the normative values of the 
organizational culture.  
[SM 1] (Lessons 1 & 6) 
4. Meaning sharing initiatives hold debates. 
[SM 1] (Lesson 1) 
5. Knowledge co-ownership shapes residual rights. 
 [SM 1] (Lesson 36)  
Abilities by which Knowers are 
Recognized  
1. Communicating effectively is a type of instance 
that triggers recognizing knowers.  










Kn ow ledge  In tegrat ion  Te ns io ns  
2. Not knowing or weakness awareness may enact different goal’s scope for 
same language terms. [CL 2 , SM 2] (Lesson 15) 
Initial Knower Recognition Process 
1. Trust on delivery presides economic & skill issues.  
[RK 1 & 2] (Lesson 3: S, Cm) 
2. Manager’s authority and success record may 
set, initially, planning estimates.  
[RK 1, 2 & 4] (Lessons 23:  Cm & 24: Cm, C, T, S) 
3. Recognizing setter of standards starts with those 
with best possibilities of being successful.  
[RK 1 & 2] (Lesson 35: S, T, R, C) 
4. New members’ success may allow changing 
initial planning estimates to refining cost, goals… 
[RK 1 & 2] (Lessons 23: C, T, S & 24: T)  
Ongoing Knower Recognition Process 
5. Takes time to adjust and pledge to an 
organizational design.  [RK 2, 4] (Lesson 1: G, H) 
 
 
3. There is tension among priority of directives, plans 
‘goals, and organizational structure membership.   
[SM 1, 2 & 4] (Lessons 2: Sh, 9: S, 10: Sh & 11: H) 
4. There is tension between specialist unawareness of 
certain planning issues and the integration of his 
knowledge into plans. 
[SM 2, 5] (Lessons 17, 18, 19, 20 & 21) 
5. Long term and disjoint distance learning may provoke 
goal and structure misalignments. 
[SM 2 & 4] (Lesson 26) 
Logic of instrumentalization (Logic of Achievement)  
1. Exploitation plans plausibly characterize the future 
through aligned and broken down scopes.  
[SM2] (Lessons 13 & 14) 
2. Exploration plans follow canon-based legitimization 
approaches through scope drafts that insinuate the 
future. [SM2] (Lessons 13 & 14) 
  
Table 49. Common Knowledge Types in Organizations in the Context of the Integrating Capability of KBV of the Firm – 1 of 2 




Common Knowledge Types in Organizations in the Context of the Integrating Capability of KBV of the Firm – 2 of 2 
 C o m m o n  K n o w l e d g e  T y p e s   
 
 
A. Common  
Language (CL) 














Kn ow ledge  In tegrat ion  Te ns io ns  
2. Without pledged explicit standards/best practices, delivering 
satisfactory outcomes ask for non-replicable extraordinary efforts.  
[CL 3 & SM 3] (Lesson 22)  
Ongoing Knower Recognition Process  
1. Trust propagation is a type of instance that triggers 
recognizing knowers. [RK 1 & 3] (Lesson 5: Cm, Sh) 
2. Certain knowing approaches (adaptable, 
collaborative and foresighted) help integration.  
[RK 1, 3 & 4] (Lessons 25, 26 & 27) 
3. Plausible discussions help to share knowledge.  
[RK 3] (Lesson 32)  
4. Collaboration un-hides existing knowledge.  
[RK[RK 3] (Lessons 12)  
5. Discovering other’s expectations and their limits are 
type of instances that triggers recognizing knowers. 
 [RK 3] (Lesson 4) 
6. Knowledge (practices & standards) of non-partici-
pant members may be left out of organizational 









































































































 3. Norms based on the authority-trust knowing 
relationship eventually confronts standards/best 
practices-compliance relationship.  
[SM 1 & 3] (Lesson 35) 
4. There is tension between the decision of sharing 
resources and the opportunities of embracing new 
members and growing. [SM 3 & 4] (Lesson 7: Sh & G) 
5. There is tension between specialist unawareness 
of certain product management issues and the 
integration of his knowledge into products.  
[SM 3 &  5] (Lessons 17, 18, 19, 20 & 21) 
Logic of Instrumentalization (Logic of Achievement) 
1. Managed communal support knowledge 
instrumentalized as transaction fund that helps 
integration and financing.  
[SM 1 & 3] (Lesson 7: I,  F) 
2. Management of members' unawareness or 
weaknesses is portrayed as proactive 
interventions that try to reduce risk and improve 
quality.  
[SM 3] (Lesson 7: R, Q, H) 
Abilities by which Knowers are Recognized   
1. Communicating effectively is a type of instance that 
triggers recognizing knowers. 
[RK 1, 3 & 5] (Lessons 9: Cm, I & 11: Cm) 
2. Collaboration triggers recognizing of knowers.  
[RK 3] (Lesson 12) 
3. Specialist’s skillful execution is a type of instance that 
triggers recognizing knowers. [RK 3 & 5] (Lesson 9: G & S) 
4. Actions revealing unawareness or weaknesses are 
types of instances that trigger recognizing non-













Kn ow ledge  In tegrat ion  Te ns io ns  Initial Knower Recognition Process 
1. Recognizing setter of standards starts with those with best 
possibilities of being successful. [RK 2] (Lesson 35: S, T, R, C) 
2. Manager’s authority and success record may set, 
initially, planning estimates.  
[RK 1, 2 & 4] (Lessons 23:  Cm & 24: Cm, C, T, S) 
 1. There is ineffective tension among priority of directives, 
plan´s goals, and organizational structure membership 
(closed). [SM 1, 2 & 4] (Lessons 2: Sh, 9: S, 10: Sh & 11: H) 
2. Long term and disjoint distance learning may 
provoke goal and structure misalignments. [SM 2 
& 4] (Lessons 9, 11 & 26: R, K & C) 
3. There is tension between the decision of sharing 
resources and the opportunities of embracing new 
members and growing.  [SM 3 & 4] (Lesson 7: Sh & G) 
Ongoing Knower Recognition Process  
1. It takes time to adjust and pledge to an 
organizational design.  
[RK 2, 4] (Lesson 1: G, H) 
2. Certain knowing approaches (adaptable, 
collaborative and foresighted) help integration.  
[RK 1, 3 & 4] (Lessons 25, 26 & 27) 
Logic of Instrumentalization (Logic of Achievement) 
1. Difficult translation of known previous organizational 
structures into the existing one. [SM 4] (Lesson 1) 
2. Non obvious short time benefits resist the pledging to 
organizational structure. [SM 4] (Lesson 1) 
Abilities by which Knowers are Recognized  
1. Exercising members’ power is a type of instance that 
















Kn ow ledge  In tegrat ion  Te ns io ns  Ongoing Knower Recognition Process  
1. Member-product cross referencing is a type of instance 
that triggers recognizing knowers. [RK 5] (Lesson 10) 
2. Transition to product exploitation asks for 
communication skills besides technology transfer. 
[RK 5] (Lesson 9: C, I & 11) 
3. Knowledge (practices & standards) of non-participant 
members may be left out of organizational capacities and 
routines. [RK 3 & 5] (Lesson 2) 
 1. There is tension between specialist unawareness of 
certain product management issues and the 
integration of his knowledge into products.   
[SM 3 & 5] (Lessons 17, 18, 19, 20 & 21) 
Logic of Instrumentalization (Logic of Achievement) 
1. Integration happens progressively  with leadership 
and incentive dependence  
[SM  5] (Lessons 1) 
2. Persistent but contextually adaptable directives 
help integration. [ 
SM 1 & 5] (Lesson 3) 
3. Constructive trust-based work-related criticism 
helps integration.  
[SM 1 & 5] (Lessons 7: C & 8: C) 
Abilities by which Knowers are Recognized   
1. Communicating effectively is a type of instance that 
triggers recognizing knowers. [RK 1, 3 & 5] (Lessons 
9: Cm, I & 11: Cm)  
2. Specialist’s skillful execution is a type of instance that 
triggers recognizing knowers. [RK 3 & 5] (Lesson 9) 




However, we can notice, within those instances, that there are interactions among 
common knowledge types that do not fit the lineal relation between organizational tools 
(OT) and the efficiency of the knowledge integration capability (EKIC). 
Letting rest the data helped.  
In search of patterns that show a plausible way of seeing, the coded data lead to 
extending the scope of the secondary research question (How are common knowledge types 
related to the knowledge integration capability?), to ask for:   
What if common knowledge types hold relationships among them (within the scope of 
knowledge integration)?  
What if common knowledge relationships between types represent processes within 
knowing?  
What if such relationships among common knowledge types hold a moderator role in 
the relation between OTs and EKIC? 
 To answer such questions, I explored the possibility of seeing the coded instances in 
terms of the whole set organizational tools, instead of seeing them separately (see Table 
51). In such view, what originally looked like a draft of knowing processes, it became clear 
instances of them. 
Coded data from lessons learned support a positive answer to such extended 
interpretation of the common knowledge types, as can be appreciated in the framing 
achieved in Table 51. Such table shows not only the 42 propositions moderating the 
relation between organizational tools with the efficiency of the knowledge integration, but 
the pattern that such propositions follow: knowing tensions, logic of contrivance, 
recognizing knowers at initial and ongoing stages, and abilities that characterize the 








M o d e r a t i n g  C o m m o n  K n o w l e d g e  T y p e s ,  P r o c e s s e s  a n d  A b i l i t i e s  
 
[CL] Common  
Language 
[SM] Shared meanings  [RK] Recognition of Knowers 












   
   











   
   













   
   
   











   
   
   





















[ K I T ]  K n o w l e d g e  I n t e g r a t i o n  T e n s i o n s  
2. Bridging language terms to shared norms is a long term issue. [Directives] 
3. Key meanings of organizational culture are shaped by legitimating stories. 
[Directives] 
4. Not knowing or weakness awareness may enact different goal's scope for 
same language terms. [Plans] 
5. Without pledged explicit standards/best practices, delivering satisfactory 
outcomes ask for non-replicable extraordinary efforts. [Routines] 
 [IKPR] Initial Knower Recognition  
Process 
25. Manager's authority and success record may 
set, initially, planning estimates. [ Directives, 
Plans, Structure] 
26. Trust on delivery presides economic & skill 
issues. [Directives, Plans] 
27. Recognizing setter of standards starts with 
those with best possibilities of being 
successful. [Directives, Plans] 
28. New members' success may allow changing 
initial planning estimates to refine cost, 











































































6. Norms based on the authority-trust knowing relationship 
eventually confronts standards/best practices-compliance 
relationship. [Directives, Routines] 
7. There is a tension among priority of directives, plan´s goals, 
and organizational structure membership. [Directives, Plans, 
Structure] 
8. There is tension between specialist unawareness of certain 
planning issues and the integration of his knowledge into plans. 
[Plans, Architecture] 
9. Long term and disjoint distance learning may provoke goal 
and structure misalignments. [Plans, Structure] 
10. There is tension between the decision of sharing resources and 
opportunities of embracing new members & growing. 
[Routines, Structure] 
11. There is tension between specialist unawareness of certain 
product management issues and the integration of his 
knowledge into products. [Routines, Architecture]  
[OKPR] Ongoing Knower Recognition 
Process 
29. Trust propagation is a type of instance that 
triggers recognizing knowers. [Directives, 
Routines] 
30. Certain knowing approaches (adaptable, 
collaborative, and foresighted) help 
integration. [Directives, Routines, Structure] 
31. Plausible discussions help to share 
knowledge. [Routines]  
32. Collaboration un-hides existing knowledge. 
[Routines] 
33. Discovering other's expectations and their 
limits are type of instances that triggers 
recognizing knowers. [Routines] 
34. It takes time to adjust and pledge to an 
organizational design. [Plans, Structure] 
35. Member-product cross referencing is a type 
of instance that triggers recognizing knowers. 
[Architecture] 
36. Transition to product exploitation asks for 
communication skills besides technology 
transfer. [Architecture] 
37.  Knowledge (practices & standards) of non-
participant members may be left out of 
organizational capabilities and routines.  
[Routines, Architecture] 
[Lo I ]  Log ic  of  I ns tru men ta l izat ion  
12. Managed communal knowledge transaction fund helps 
integration and financing. [Directives, Routines] 
13. Transcendent shared meanings emerged by the enactment of 
aggregated productive outcomes. [Directives] 
14. Economic and emotional incentives help adhering to the 
meanings of the normative values of the organizational culture.  
[Directives]   
15. Meaning sharing initiatives hold debates. [Directives]  
16. Knowledge co-ownership shapes residual rights. [Directives]   
17. Exploitation plans plausibly characterize the future through 
aligned and broken down scopes. [Plans]   
18. Exploration plans follow canon-based legitimization 
approaches through scope drafts that insinuate the future. 
[Plans]   
19. Management of members' unawareness or weaknesses is 
portrayed as proactive interventions that try to reduce risk 
and improve quality. [Routines] 
20. Difficult translation of known previous organizational 
structures into the existing one. [Structure] 
21. Non obvious short time benefits resist the pledging to 
organizational structure. [Structure] 
22. Integration happens progressively with leadership and 
incentive dependence. [Architecture] 
23. Persistent but contextually adaptable directives help 
integration. [Directives, Architecture]  
24. Constructive trust-based work-related criticism helps 
integration. [Architecture] 
 
[AKR] Abilities by which Knowers are 
Recognized 
38.  Communicating effectively is a type of 
instance that triggers recognizing knowers.  
[Directives, Routines, Architecture] 
39. Specialist's skilful execution is a type of 
instance that triggers recognizing knowers.  
[Routines, Architecture] 
40. Collaboration triggers recognizing of 
knowers. [Routines]  
41. Exercising members' power is a type of 
instance that triggers recognizing knowers. 
[Structure] 
42. Actions revealing unawareness or 
weaknesses are types of instances that 










Following those emerged moderating roles of the common knowledge types and their 
mutual interactions allows for elaborating answers for the research questions, which are 
posited as follows: 
Main research question: How is common knowledge in organizations (CKO) related 
to the knowledge integration capability (KIC)? 
Answer: CKO, seen as a set, moderates the relationship between (OTs) 
organizational tools (Directives, Plans, Routines, Structure, and Architecture) 
and the efficiency of the knowledge integration capability (EKIC).  
In this moderating role, CKO found instances fit into the knowing behaviors 
related to either the knowing integration tensions (KIT), or the logic of 
instrumentalization (LoI), or the initial knower recognition process (IKPR), or 
the ongoing knower recognition process (OKPR); all these findings are 
consistent with the integrated view of language, meanings and recognition of 
knowers (Table 32). 
Secondary research questions 1: How is common language (CL) in organizations 
related to the knowledge integration capability (KIC)? 
Answer (part a): Common language (CL) participates in the moderation of the 
relationship between organizational tools (OTs) and the efficiency of knowledge 
integration capability (EKIC), such participation happens within the tensions of 
integrating knowing (KIT); and is represented by the proposition that goes as:  
[P1] Operating language tongue proficiency is the number one knowledge 




Answer (part b): Common language (CL) and Shared meanings (SM) while 
shaping each other participate in the moderation of the relationship between 
organizational tools (OT) and the efficiency of knowledge integration capability 
(EKIC); such participation happens within the tensions of integrating knowing 
(KIT); and is represented by propositions that go as:  
[P2] Bridging language terms to shared norms is a long-term issue. 
Proposition applies to the OT: Directives.  
[P3] Key meanings of organizational culture are shaped by legitimating 
stories. Proposition applies to the OT: Directives. 
[P4] Not knowing or weakness awareness may enact different goal's scope for 
same language terms. Proposition applies to the OT: Plans. 
[P5] Without pledged explicit standards/best practices, delivering satisfactory 
outcomes ask for non-replicable extraordinary efforts. Proposition 
applies to the OT: Routines. 
Secondary research questions 2: How are shared meanings in organizations related 
to the knowledge integration capability? 
Answer (part a): Shared meanings (SM) participates in the moderation of the 
relationship between organizational tools (OT) and the efficiency of the 
knowledge integration capability (EKIC); such participation happens within the 
tensions of integrating knowing (KIT); and is represented by propositions that go as: 
[P6] Norms based on the authority-trust knowing relationship eventually 
confronts standards/best practices-compliance relationship. Proposition 
applies to the OT: Directives, Routines. 
[P7] There is tension among priority of directives, plan´s goals, and 
organizational structure membership. Proposition applies to the OT: 




[P8] There is tension between specialist unawareness of certain planning 
issues and the integration of his knowledge into plans. Proposition 
applies to the OT: Plans, Architecture. 
[P9] Long term and disjoint distance learning may provoke goal and structure 
misalignments. Proposition applies to the OT: Plans, Structure. 
[P10] There is tension between the decision of sharing resources and the 
opportunities of embracing new members and growing. Proposition 
applies to the OT: Routines, Structure. 
[P11] There is tension between specialist unawareness of certain product 
management issues and the integration of his knowledge into products. 
Proposition applies to the OT: Routines, Architecture.   
Answer (part b): Shared meanings (SM) participates in the moderation of the 
relation between organizational tools (OT) and the efficiency of the knowledge 
integration capability (EKIC); such participation happens within the logic of 
instrumentalization [LoI] of organizational tools, and is represented by 
propositions which go as: 
[P12] Managed communal knowledge transaction fund helps integration and 
financing. Proposition applies to the OT: Directives, Routines] 
[P13] Transcendent shared meanings emerged by the enactment of aggregated 
productive outcomes. Proposition applies to the OT: Directives] 
[P14] Economic and emotional incentives help adhering to the meanings of 
the normative values of the organizational culture.  Proposition applies 
to the OT: Directives.   
[P15] Meaning sharing initiatives hold debates. Proposition applies to the OT: 
Directives. 
[P16] Knowledge co-ownership shapes residual rights. Proposition applies to 
the OT: Directives.  
[P17] Exploitation plans plausibly characterize the future through aligned and 




[P18] Exploration plans follow canon-based legitimization approaches 
through scope drafts that insinuate the future. Proposition applies to the 
OT: Plans.   
[P19] Management of members' unawareness or weaknesses is portrayed as 
proactive interventions that try to reduce risk and improve quality. 
Proposition applies to the OT: Routines. 
[P20] Difficult translation of known previous organizational structures into 
the existing one. Proposition applies to the OT: Structure. 
[P21] Non obvious short time benefits resist the pledging to organizational 
structure. Proposition applies to the OT: Structure. 
[P22] Integration happens progressively with leadership and incentive 
dependence. Proposition applies to the OT: Architecture. 
[P23] Persistent but contextually adaptable directives help integration. 
Proposition applies to the OT: Directives, Architecture.  
[P24] Constructive trust-based work-related criticism helps integration. 
Proposition applies to the OT: Architecture]  
Secondary research questions 3: How is the recognition of individuals of knowers in 
organizations related to the knowledge integration capability? 
Answer (part a): Recognition of knowers (RK) participates in the moderation of 
the relation between OTs and the efficiency knowledge integration capability 
(EKIC); such participation happens within the initial knower recognition process 
[IKPR]; and is represented by propositions that go as: 
[P25] Manager's authority and success record may set, initially, planning 
estimates. Proposition applies to the OT: Directives, Plans, Structure. 
[P26] Trust on delivery presides economic & skill issues. Proposition applies 
to the OT: Directives, Plans] 
[P27] Recognizing setter of standards starts with those with best possibilities 




[P28] New members' success may allow changing initial planning estimates to 
refine cost, goals… Proposition applies to the OT: Directives, Plans. 
Answer (part b): Recognition of knowers (RK) participates in the moderation of 
the relation between OTs and the efficiency knowledge integration capability 
(EKIC); such participation happens within the ongoing knower recognition 
process [OKPR]; and is represented by propositions that go as: 
 [P29] Trust propagation is a type of instance that triggers recognizing 
knowers. Proposition applies to the OT: Directives, Routines. 
[P30] Certain knowing approaches (adaptable, collaborative, and foresighted) 
help integration. Proposition applies to the OT: Directives, Routines. 
[P31] Plausible discussions help to share knowledge. Proposition applies to 
the OT: Routines. 
[P32] Collaboration un-hides existing knowledge. Proposition applies to the 
OT: Routines. 
[P33] Discovering other's expectations and their limits are type of instances 
that triggers recognizing knowers. Proposition applies to the OT: 
Routines. 
[P34] It takes time to adjust and pledge to an organizational design. 
Proposition applies to the OT: Plans, Structure. 
[P35] Member-product cross referencing is a type of instance that triggers 
recognizing knowers. Proposition applies to the OT: Architecture. 
[P36] Transition to product exploitation asks for communication skills besides 
technology transfer. Proposition applies to the OT: Architecture. 
[P37] Knowledge (practices & standards) of non-participant members may be 
left out of organizational capabilities and routines. Proposition applies to 
the OT: Routines, Architecture. 
Answer (part c): Abilities by which knowers are recognized [AKR] shape, both, 
the Initial Knower Recognition Process [IKPR], and the Ongoing Recognition 




 [P38] Communicating effectively is a type of instance that triggers 
recognizing knowers. Proposition applies to the OT: Directives, 
Routines, Architecture. 
[P39] Specialist's skilful execution is a type of instance that triggers 
recognizing knowers. Proposition applies to the OT: Routines, 
Architecture. 
[P40] Collaboration triggers recognizing of knowers. Proposition applies to 
the OT: Routines. 
[P41] Exercising members' power is a type of instance that triggers 
recognizing knowers. Proposition applies to the OT: Structure. 
[P42] Actions revealing unawareness or weaknesses are types of instances that 
trigger recognizing non-knowers. Proposition applies to the OT: 
Routines. 
These 42 propositions could be summarized in the following five meta-propositions, 
which capture the essence of the emerged moderating role that common knowledge types 
hold in the relation between organizational tools [OT] and the efficiency of the knowledge 
integration capability [EKIC]:      
1. Knowledge Integration Tension [KTI] Propositions 
1.1 KIT and CL: Common language [CL] moderates the relationship between 
organizational tools (Directives [D], Plans [P], Routines [R], Structure [S], Architecture 
[A]) and the efficiency of the knowledge integration capability [EKIC]; such 
moderating role holds a tension [KIT] characterized by the proposition 1, which 
posits that organizational operating language tongue proficiency is the number one 
rate-defining factor. 
1.2 KIT and CL-SM: Common Language [CL] and Shared Meanings [SM], while 




(Directives [D], Plans [P], Routines [R], Structure [S], Architecture [A]) and the 
efficiency of the knowledge integration capability [EKIC]; such moderating role 
holds a tension [KIT] characterized by propositions 2 to 5, which describe the 
tensions between discourse and enactment within the same organizational tool.  
1.3 KIT and SM: Shared Meanings [SM] moderate the relationship between 
organizational tools (Directives [D], Plans [P], Routines [R], Structure [S], Architecture 
[A]) and the efficiency of the knowledge integration capability [EKIC]; such 
moderating role holds a tension [KIT] characterized by propositions 6 to 11; which 
describe the tensions of enactment between different  organizational tools.  
2. Logic of Instrumentation [LoI] Propositions  
LoI and SM: Shared Meanings [SM] moderate the relationship between 
organizational tools (Directives [D], Plans [P], Routines [R], Structure [S], Architecture 
[A]) and the efficiency of the knowledge integration capability [EKIC]; such 
moderating role happens within the context of activities related to the logic of 
instrumentalization [LoI] characterized by propositions 12 to 24; which describe 
instances that goes from order recognition, through pattern generalization, to the its 
committed usage. 
3. Initial Knower Recognition Process [IKPR] Propositions 
IKPR and RK: Recognition of knowers [RK] moderates the relationship between 
certain organizational tools (Directives [D] and Plans [P]) and the efficiency of the 
knowledge integration capability [EKIC]; such moderating role happens within the 
context of activities related to the process of initially recognizing knowers [IKPR] 
characterized by propositions 25 to 28; which describe instances that follow the 





4. Ongoing Knower Recognition Process [OKPR] Propositions 
OKPR and RK: Recognition of knowers [RK] moderates the relationship between 
organizational tools (Directives [D], Plans [P], Routines [R], Structure [S], Architecture 
[A]) and the efficiency of the knowledge integration capability [EKIC]; such 
moderating role happens within the context of activities related to the ongoing 
process of  recognizing knowers [OKPR] characterized by propositions 29 to 37; 
which describe instances that follow the successful restricting or habilitating sayings 
and acts. 
5. Abilities by which Knowers are Recognized [AKR] 
AKR and IKPR/OKPR: Abilities by which knowers are recognized [AKR] shape, 
both, the Initial Knower Recognition Process [IKPR], and the Ongoing Recognition 
Process [OKRP] as described by propositions 38 to 42; which recognize knowers as 






Figure 10. Common Knowledge and Common Practice in Organizations and the Efficiency of the 






Empirical exploratory findings support Grant´s (1996a; b) propositions regarding the 
relationships between, the now understood as organizational tools (directives, plans, 
routines, structure, and architecture), and the efficiency of the knowledge integration 
capability (EKIC).  
However, findings make clearer the understanding of common knowledge in 
organizations (CKO) as holding a moderating role between organizational tools (OT) and 
the efficiency of the knowledge integration capability (EKIC). Moreover, such moderating 
role redefines the original understanding of common knowledge, centered in common 
language (CL), shared meanings (SM) and recognition of knowers (RK). 
 In the emerged conception, these three constructs still play a key role in common 
knowledge but are supplemented within a processual understanding of knowing, revealed 
as a set of behaviors enacted through abilities; which are better understood, at 
organizational level, within the framework of common practice than common knowledge.   
Forty two clustered propositions (see Table 51) revealed that common practice in 
organizations has to do more with the (1) Knowing Integration Tension, (2) Logic of 
Instrumentation, (3) Initial Knower Recognition Process, (4) Ongoing Knower 
Recognition Process, and  (5) Abilities by which Knowers are Recognized. 
The following paragraphs frame the scope and implications of such characterization 




(Figure 10) within an extended version of the mapped propositions of Grant´s (1996a) 
KBV of the Firm.  
 (1) “Knowing Integration Tension” (KIT) clusters propositions that characterize 
organizational tools as time-dependent, narrative-dependent and inter-meaning- 
dependent. That is, knowledge integration efficiency asks for (a) operating language 
proficiency, (b) cultivating value-aligned organizational stories and (c) negotiating 
meanings among organizational tools, all that, to shape the knowing integration 
efficiency. 
Knowledge integration tension (KIT) propositions are mostly related to usage of 
abilities that deal with the tension of legitimating directives, plans, routines, 
organizational structure and the architecture of the body of knowledge in 
organizations.  
That is, order recognition and establishing, and canon appreciation and 
influencing are key knowing abilities that participate in the interplay characterized 
by the extremes “committing to existing canons” and “building and sharing new 
canons”.  
This integration tension is eventually resolved in terms of the private standards 
of intellectual beauty and the public standards of canonical duty that are brought to 
our attention by the organizational tools in play.  
These findings fit with Carlile´s (2004) approach to boundary objects, in regards 




however, the way it is understood and explained here is closer to the managerial 
practice than the distance boundary object approach posited by Carlile..  
In other words, what is common in organizations are not the organizational tools 
(directives, plans …) but the tension that characterize the enactment of such 
organizational tools in respect to own and organizational standards, as is the case of 
tension hold by the specialist due to his unawareness about certain issues of the 
planning process and the integration of his knowledge into the plan.   
(2) “Logic of Instrumentation” (LoI) clusters 13 propositions that characterize 
the patterned flow of behaviors for enacting organizational tools. This logic, 
described originally by Polanyi (1958), now exemplified at organizational level, 
posits the recognition of patterns about enacting shared meanings as linked to the 
efficiency of knowledge integration, as is the case of patterns like managed 
communal knowledge funds, aggregated productive outcomes, economic and 
emotional incentives, detail planning, weakness awareness, or trust-based work-
related criticism. 
The above long list could have not meant much without the Individual Level 
Knowing framework and Organizational Capability framework. They achieve to 
focus patterning and generalizing in the context of organizational tools.  That is, 
knowledge integration efficiency asks for not only perceptual, but also for 
emotional pattern recognizing abilities.  
These findings are similar to Carlile´s (2004) when he describes the sharing of 




object (modularity, abstraction, accommodation and standardization). If we 
conceive Carlile´s objects as organizational tools, them he is also proposing pre-
categorized approaches for patterning and instrumentalizing.  
However, the instrumentalization of objects here meets an additional criterion: 
common knowledge is about what actors, who know about the other, jointly know about a 
particular situation.  
That is, here, tool´s contriving and usage is not an isolated act in organizations, but a 
joint enactment that asks for additional abilities like (a) iterating through vernacular 
language and artifacts, and (b) forming social workableness through approaches like non-
disclosive intimacy, equivalent meanings, shared meanings, or satisficing naming (see 
knowing abilities in Table 30).  
In few words, the flow of joint patterning, generalizing and enacting socially 
workable objects and behaviors corresponds to the practice counterpart of 
(organizational) genres of the knowledge-practice framework (Cook and Brown, 1999). 
This understanding of common knowing attends Bou, Bonet and Sauquet (2004a; b) 
comments about the limited description of practice that such framework offers.  
Then again, common knowledge is not about organizational tools, but how 
organizational tools are contrived and applied it.  
 (3) “Initial Knower Recognition Process” (IKPR), and (4) “Ongoing Knower 




trust relationship, (b) socially workable enactments, and the (c) canon-based legitimizing 
behaviors or discourses; which end-up triggering the recognition of knowers.  
Recognizing knowers in organizations at initial stage (IKPR) follows the authority-
trust relationship understood as the process in which (a) expert´s authority and success 
record shape standards of execution, (b) expert and novice trust on delivery competence 
operates before the evaluation of skills of the parties, (c) and novice successful execution 
allows for refining and setting new standards.  
This is an approach that while considers the peripheral and participatory discourse of 
situated learning theory (Wenger & Lave, 1991), also hold the benefit of understanding it 
within an integrated and framed epistemology and in the context of organizational tools. 
The ongoing stage for recognizing knowers (OKPR) is an evolution from the rules of 
the knowing engagement of two hierarchical parties. In OKPR, the enactment of 
successful restricting or habilitating sayings and acting in the organization seems to credit 
individuals as knowers. Examples of such enactments were found to be manifested as 
trusty, adaptable, collaborative, foresighted, communicative, discussing plausibly and 
discoverer of others expectations and limits. 
The revealed IKPR and OKPR logic tells us that when we recognize an individual as 
a knower, we do not only recognize his knowing authority, but also recognize in him a 




Moreover, when in these activities the recognition of the quality of knower is related 
to the enactment of habilitating conditions (Weick, 1995), we identify that a part of the 
logic of the interpretation system has changed. 
The linkage between recognized knowers and the enactment of the interpretative 
system of the organization is an approach that solves the risk of reification mentioned by 
Grant (1996a) and exemplified in Nelson and Winter´s (1982) conception of the firm, 
since the interpretative system refers no more to an abstract organizational object 
disconnected from members’ participation, but a function of recognized human knowers. 
Wenger´s (1998) CoP and its framing (Bozarth, 2008) emphasize participation and 
reification as tools for modulating institutionalization in organizations (Wenger, 1998, 
pp. 242-243). Such view is consistent with our conclusion about the recognition of 
knowers as the enactment of an interpretative system.  
These findings hold the advantage that participation and reification here are 
understood within the logic in which knowers are recognized by their trust and as setter 
of standards through the instrumentalization objects and behaviors as organizational 
tools, which reflect on how value is created within the chosen capability (e.g. knowledge 
integrated into the productive practice).  
This is a useful transformative reinterpretation of participation and reification that 
holds the possibility, given the now revealed framed IKPR and OKPR propositions, of 
being manageable (Wenger, 1998). An affirmation that contrasts with the 




Summarily, the relationship between organizational tools (OT) and the efficiency of 
the knowledge integration capability (EKIC) is moderated by the interpretation system of 
the organization, which emerges from the accumulated experiences of recognizing 
knowers, either as instances of the authority-trust relationship, enactment of social 
understandings, or the instrumentalization of organizational tools. 
(5) Finally, “Abilities by which Knowers are Recognized” (AKR) clusters 
propositions linked to the practice of abilities that trigger the recognition of the individual 
as a knower, like (a) specialist skillful execution, (b) communicating effectively, (c) 
collaborating and (d) exercising of power. These abilities specialized our understanding, 
in organizational terms, of the more general abilities posited in the IKF (Tables 31 and 
51). However, such set of abilities does not allow for conclusions, but for proposing 
further research. 
Summarily, the logic of instrumentation, its knowing integration tension, and the 
knower recognition processes constitute, first, a tool-oriented operationalization of 
common knowledge in organizations for the efficient integration of knowledge; second, a 
know-who approach for understanding the organizational interpretative system;  and 
third, an exemplar enactment of a epistemological framework that proposes to bridge 
knowledge and practice understandings from the perspective of the ability-based to 
symbol-base knowing continuum; in which possibilities of externalizing what is  known 










6.4 CONTRIBUTION OF RESEARCH 
6.4.1 Theoretical and Empirical Contributions 
The intent to answer a focused research question in organizational studies, like How 
is common knowledge in organizations related to the knowledge integration capability in 
Grant´s (1996a) KBV of the Firm?, led to a re-reading of the theories of knowledge 
and the theories of the firm. The outcomes – frameworks – of such methodologically re-
reading (Charmaz, 2000; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) are valuable contributions of this 
dissertation, even though they surged as an inevitable requisite within the research strategy.  
Questions like [a] What does it trigger knowing?, [b] Which are the abilities that 
drive knowing?, [c1] Which is the role of language in knowing?, [c2] Which is the 
role of meanings in knowing?, [d1] Which are the principles or processes that guide 
knowing?, and [d2] What does it drive the recognition of the quality of knower? 
(Table 12) emerged from querying theories of the firm that conceive knowledge as the 
key factor in their logic of achievement goals and governing stakeholders. 
The application of such framed questioning to re-read individual level knowing, 
sensemaking, and meaning theories (Polanyi, 1958; Bruner, 1990; Weick, 1995) 
confirmed Gourlay (2006) and Tsoukas (2003) critics about the misreading of the 
personal approach to knowing proposed by Polanyi, and posited, through methodological 




hold holistic, complementary and compatible views of knowing, which summarily is 
expressed as:  
Knowing as the committed instrumentalization, or socially workable enactment, or 
legitimized enculturation of objects or behaviors, with greater or lesser shared and 
systematic symbolization, that when ineffective, it may either limit sharing, staying 
tacit, or trigger innovative behaviors. 
Together with this instrumental view of knowing, an integrated knowing framework 
(IKF) (Table 31) and an integrated view of language, shared meanings and recognition of 
knowers (Table 32) are proposed as a guideline for observing and talking about instances 
of knowing in organizational contexts, as it is suggested by Tsoukas (2003) and Gourlay 
(2006). 
 Our research question also demands clarity on the body of knowledge that sustains 
the organizational capability of a particular KBV of the firm (Grants´ (1996a). This 
dissertation could have attended such requirement independently of other theories of the 
firm; however that approach would have diminished its external validity (Yin, 2003a, p. 
34), since the framing process could not be replicable for other theories of the firm.  
The need to frame organizational capabilities was also motivated (a) by the abundant 
focused approaches on knowledge in organizations, but disconnected from the theories of 
the firm and (b) by the several extensively narrated knowledge-based theories of the firm 
that tacitly portray organizational capabilities. 
The grounded theory-based (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) framing of organizational 




theories of the firm (Table 33), and (b) six comparable framed theories of the firm 
(Tables 41-43). 
Finally, common knowledge was argued as what actors, who know about the other; 
jointly know about a particular situation (Wilby, 2010), and common knowledge in 
organizations was argued as the domain of practices exercised within the framework of 
the theory in use by the members of the organization (Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 2001; 
Schutz, 1970; McCarthy, 1994; Argyris & Schön, 1974), to economize in 
communications (Arrow, 1974; Grant, 1996), recognize, reconcile and share goals 
(Brown & Duguid, 1991), replicate and protect key knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1992), 
and ease coordination of actions (Nonaka, 1994; Thompson, 1967, Demsetz, 1991, 
Spender, 1989). 
In the empirical side, the exploratory findings confirm the applicability of the 
Integrated Knowing Framework and the scheme for framing theories of the firm; 
revealing an instrumentalized way of seeing knowledge in organizations (organizational 
tools like directives, plans, structure, architecture and routines) and how certain aspects 
of the instrumentalization of such tools, recognized as common knowledge, moderate the 
efficiency of the integration of the knowledge of the specialist into the productive 
practice.  
The knowing integration tension, the logic for contriving tools, and the knower 
recognition processes were identified as the efficiency moderating knowing processes of 
the integration capability; processes in which, common language, shared meanings and 




In this knowing approach the accumulated instances of recognizing knowers is 
understood as the interpretive system of the organization, an understanding that removes 
the risk of reifying the organization as a knower (Grant, 1996a), and that lead to rethink 
in the organizational value of the “who knows what/how/who”.   
6.4.2 Contributions for Practice 
Now is time to recall research motivations. As a businessperson, in the opening 
section, I stated a question that led to define the purpose and scope of this dissertation, 
which represents a practice-oriented instance of the academic research question, and that 
now is reproduced to validate the contribution to practice of this endeavor:  
Why is it that, even though we advise everyone in the organization to take action 
according to a broadly shared specific directive, we frequently confront 
misalignments to it? 
Considering the exploratory findings, we are able to say that when instrumentalizing 
directives, as an organizational tool, to integrate knowledge of specialist into the 
productive practice, we could consider for efficiency reasons, a set of moderating factors 
that are related to the following questions: 
1. Are members familiarized with the language used in directives? (KIT:CL) 
2. Are members aware of meaning-based organizational stories that tell about previous 
instances of alignment to the values shared in directives? (KIT:CL-SM) 
3. Are members open to shape, together with other members, the understandings 





4. Are members, based on extant directives, recognizing order, patterning 
generalizations and committing to them in new situations related to the directives? 
(LoI:SM) 
5. Are certain extant members invested with the authority and experience to serve as 
reference for the new member, in regards to issues of the directives? (IKPR:KR) 
6. Are members enacting workable viable social understandings, with other members, in 
situations related to directives? (OKPR:KR) 
7. Are members arguing, with other members, about the legitimacy of directives? 
(OKPR:KR) 
8. Who are the recognized members that set the standard of how directives are enacted?       
(OKPR-IKPR: Interpretative system) 
9. Are specialists prepared to show skillful executions in situations related to the 
directives? (AKR:OKPR) 
10. Are members prepared to communicate effectively on the issues related to the 
directives? (AKR:OKPR) 
11. Are members prepared to collaborate in situations related to the directives? 
(AKR:OKPR) 
12. Are specialists prepared and invested with the authority to exercise power in the 
issues related to the directives? (AKR:OKPR) 
This set of questions reflects the kind of knowledge management tools that could 
emerge from the proposed KIC model (Table 51). A similar format could be used for 
every organizational tool.  
It should not go unnoticed how common knowing in organizations attends such 
diverse managerial issues, and how a plausible knowing theory helps to frame such 




6.5 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The proposed knowledge integration (KIC) model (Table 51) posits rich details about 
Grant´s (1996a; b) proposition related to the efficiency of the integration of knowledge 
[4A] into the productive practice (Figure 10).  
However, it leaves as still pending the exploration of the propositions related to being 
able to encompass new knowledge [4Ca] and new patterns of existing knowledge [4Cb]. 
Grant narrates these two last propositions as also related to common knowledge (Figure 11). 
Attending such research gap will open opportunities of discussing Grant´s KBV of 
the firm in terms of the combined exploitation-exploration approach, which is the view of 
an ambidextrous organization (Duncan, 1976; Tushman & O´Reilly, 1996), but departing 
from an holistic and framed knowledge view (Table 31 and 32) and a framed knowledge-
based theory of the firm (Table 51 and Figure 11). 
Within a more specific, but relevant issue, the idea of a recognized knower-based 
organizational interpretative system is an understanding that may fits into the Bou, Bonet 
and Sauquet´s (2004a; b) bundle of knowledge framework.  
Bou et al. argue that organizational context plays as an active actor that shapes the 
composition of the bundle of knowledge, and the definition of the concept of expert 
(recognized knower in our terms); and described context with variables like structure, job 
characteristics, degree of labor intensity and customization, among others.  
However, they also observed also instances of know-who that did fit into the 




proposed to extend the framework with know-who type as tacit knowledge across the 
individual and collective dimensions, but without much discussing.  
Bou´s et al. active role of organizational context and know-who knowledge type 
could be understood, together, within the idea of a recognized knower-based 
organizational interpretative system, and we may say that Bou´s contextual variables 
correspond to organizational tools, and that know-who corresponds to those acts through 
which knowers are recognized (for cases in which the interpretative system is shaped) 
and to those acts in which individual recognize knowers (for cases in which the 
interpretative system is used). 
Such conjectures represent opportunities of future research that points to the 
integration of extant research works. 
Finally, in this dissertation, as in any exploratory research work, its findings call for 
verification; and this is not an exception. The open invitation of following this line of 
research was clearly expressed by Grant (1996b):  
While making some progress in integrating prior research on organizational learning 
and organizational resources and capabilities, much remains to be done at both the 
empirical and the theoretical level, especially in relation to understanding the 
organizational processes through which knowledge is integrated” (p. 384).  
This dissertation attended his call, and now, following his discourse, I posit a call for 
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APPENDIX 1: Program Knowledge Areas and Processes 
Program Specific Knowledge Areas and Related Processes 
Source: Adapted from The Standard for Program Management, 2nd. Edition & Project Management Body of Knowledge, 4th. Edition  






















It includes all processes involved in identifying the program’s financial sources and resources, integrating the budgets of the individual program 
components, developing the overall budget for the program, and controlling costs throughout the life cycle of both the component and program.  
1. Establish program financial framework 
2. Develop program financial plan 
3. Estimate program costs 
4. Budget program cost. 

























  It identifies individuals and organizations whose interest may be affected by program outcomes, and how the program will affect them, and then 
develops a communication strategy to engage the affected stakeholders, manage their expectations and acceptance of the objectives of the program.  
1. Plan program stakeholder management  
2.  identify program stakeholders 
3. Engage program stakeholders 














It ensures that decision-making and delivery management activities are focused on achieving program goals in a consistent manner, 
addressing appropriate risks, and fulfilling stakeholder requirements. 
1. Plan and establish program governance structure 
2. Plan for audits 
3. Plan program quality 
4. Approve component initiation 
5. Provide governance oversight 
6. Manage program benefits. 
7. Monitor and control program changes 








Program and Project Knowledge Areas and Related Processes 
Source: Adapted from The Standard for Program Management, 2nd. Edition & Project Management Body of Knowledge, 4th. Edition 




















It includes the processes required to ensure that the project includes all the work required, and only the work required, 
to complete the project successfully. It is primarily concerned with defining and controlling what is and is not 
included in the project. 
1. Collect requirements 
2. Define scope 
3. Create Work Breakdown Structure 
4. Verify scope 



















It includes processes involved in estimating, budgeting, and controlling costs so that the project can be completed 
within the approved budget. 
1. Estimate costs 
2. Determinate budget  

















  It includes processes required to accomplish timely completion of the project.  
1. Define activities 
2. Sequence activities 
3. Estimate activity resources 
4. Estimate Activity Durations 
5. Develop schedule 




Program and Project Knowledge Areas and Related Processes 
Source: Adapted from The Standard for Program Management, 2nd. Edition & Project Management Body of Knowledge, 4th. Edition 
 


















It includes processes of conducting risk management planning, identification, analysis, response planning, and 
monitoring and control on a project. 
1. Plan risk management 
2. Identify risks 
3. Perform qualitative risk analysis 
4. Perform quantitative risk analysis 
5. Plan risk responses 





















It includes processes of conducting risk management planning, identification, analysis, response planning, and 
monitoring and control on a project. 
1. Plan the quality 
2. Perform quality assurance 

























  Includes the processes necessary to purchase or acquire products, services, or results needed from outside the project 
team, and to administer any contract issued by an outside organization (the buyer) that is acquiring the project from 
the performing organization (the seller). 
1. Plan procurements 
2. Conduct procurements 
3. Administer procurements  





Program and Project Knowledge Areas and Related Processes 
Source: Adapted from The Standard for Program Management, 2nd. Edition & Project Management Body of Knowledge, 4th. Edition 
 
















It includes the processes that organize, manage, and lead the project team.  
1. Develop human resource plan 
2. Acquire project team 
3. Develop project team 


























It includes processes required to ensure timely and appropriate generation, collection, distribution, storage, 
retrieval, and ultimate disposition of project information.  
1. Identify stakeholders 
2. Plan communications 
3. Distribute information 
4. Manage stakeholder expectation 























It includes the processes and activities needed to identify, define, combine, unify, and coordinate the various 
processes and program management activities within the PM Processes Groups.  
1. Develop project charter 
2. Develop project management plan 
3. Direct and manage project execution 
4. Monitor and control project work 
5. Perform integrated change control 




APPENDIX 3: Introductory Message for the Surveys 
          September 2008 
Dear Colleague: 
As you surely know, the Program IUC VLIR ESPOL will come to an end in March 2009, after 10 years 
of execution.   
Given the importance and impact of this long lasting and wide spectrum program, ESPOL has initiated a 
methodological process to register the lessons learned during its management. This endeavor seeks to 
increase intangible assets for all stakeholders, in consistency with the Knowledge Society´s principles that 
our institutions promote. 
Lessons learned constitute an important element of the knowledge management efforts of this program 
and intents to be useful for the impact analysis of the delineated Belgian and Ecuadorian program policies 
as well as point of reference for the continuous development of the scientific and academic capacity of 
ESPOL.   
This project collects stories from people that were involved in one or another way in the Program. We ask 
for your collaboration to identify those relevant stories from which lessons could be drawn.  
The asked collaboration, for this first stage, is to answer the attached questionnaire from the role you had 
with the Program; this information will help to build a faithful evidence of the Program’s successes and 
shortcomings.  
Thanks in advance for your time and valuable collaboration on this project.   
Kindly regards,   





APPENDIX 4: Scholarship Holder Survey 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SURVEY - VLIR-ESPOL PROGRAM 
Scholarship Holder Survey 
Rev. 1.8, 25/7/2008 
 
Project Name: Externalization of lessons learned during the Cooperation Program ESPOL-VLIR 
Date (DD/MM/YYYY): 25/07/2008 
 
This survey will help to identify those relevant stories from which lessons could be drawn 
 This survey is part of the intangible assets formalization exercise so that they (the intangible 
assets) could be considered in future programs or projects of cooperation  
 Here, those who have participated in the Program or in any of its projects, or those who have 
been users of the services / products (deliveries) of the program are invited to participate  
 This specific version of the survey is oriented to the Scholarship Holders 
  
1.  Lessons Learned Survey - VLIR-ESPOL Program: Scholarship Holder Group 
1.1 Lessons Learned  Yes No N/A 
Impact 
Low High 
1 2 3 4 5 
Mark with an X your answer in the appropriate cell: 
Yes = You agree with the statement (In this case you are ask to quantify its impact in relation with your project) 
No = You disagree with the statement  
N/A = The statement does not apply to the project where you participated  
Impact = The extent to which this statement has an impact in the project where you participated 
Statements to quantify: 
1.  The original goals and commitments resulting  from your 
scholarship where clearly established 
        
2.  Your studies support the objectives of the Project that 
sustained its scholarship 
        
3.  The scholarship  selection process  was opened and with 
well-known rules 
        
4.  Since you started to study, the length of time of your studies 
was clearly defined 
        
5.  The length of time projected for your studies was fulfilled         
6.  The relation with your Academic Advisor was fluid and 
relevant for the fulfillment of your studies 
        
7.  Periodic reports related to your studies were deliver  to the 
Project that sustained your scholarship  
        
8.  Project administrators related to your scholarship pay 
suitable attention and time to the subjects derived from 
your studies 
        
9.  Other functional and departmental areas of the ESPOL had a 
collaborative attitude of with the fulfillment of your studies 




1.  Lessons Learned Survey - VLIR-ESPOL Program: Scholarship Holder Group 
1.1 Lessons Learned  Yes No N/A 
Impact 
Low High 
1 2 3 4 5 
Mark with an X your answer in the appropriate cell: 
Yes = You agree with the statement (In this case you are ask to quantify its impact in relation with your project) 
No = You disagree with the statement  
N/A = The statement does not apply to the project where you participated  
Impact = The extent to which this statement has an impact in the project where you participated 
10.  Belgian institutions had collaboration attitude with the 
fulfillment of your studies 
        
11.  The mission of the Program "Improve ESPOL academic 
excellence by developing a sustainable research” was 
accomplished 
        
 
 
1.  Lessons Learned Survey - VLIR-ESPOL Program: Scholarship Holder Group 
1.2 Questions to comment 
1. Which was a key element (weakness or threat) 
that put in danger the success of your studies? 
 
2. What did work well - and what did not - for the 
fulfillment of your studies? 
 
3. What circumstances that were not anticipated 
affected the accomplishment of your studies? 
 
4. Do you consider that the modality of your 
studies - programming of places and durations - 
was appropriate? If your answer is negative, 
how would you improve it? 
 
5. Do the committed economic resources for your 
studies were available so that they did not affect 
the fulfillment of your objectives? If the answer 
is negative, please comment the reasons for the 
delays 
 
6. ¿Was the dedication to the Project a full-time 
assignment during your studies? If the answer is 
negative, please comment 
 
7. Can you mention some element of the 
international surroundings - as languages, laws, 
schedules, etc. - that has affected positively or 
negatively the success of your studies? 
 
8. Can you mention some cultural difference - as 
ethics, customs, vital spaces, etc. - that have 





1.  Lessons Learned Survey - VLIR-ESPOL Program: Scholarship Holder Group 
1.2 Questions to comment 
9. When assessing your studies, do you justify the 
personal and institutional invested efforts? 
 
1.3 Personal stories related to the Program or Project: 
If you have an experience or a story to share related 
to management of this program or project in which 
you participated and you think it is useful to comment 
it and to try to rescue learning from it, please write 
down a phrase with the central idea of your 





2.  Personal data: 
Name Project e-mail 







APPENDIX 5: Project Survey 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SURVEY - VLIR-ESPOL PROGRAM 
Project Survey 
Rev. 1.8, 25/7/2008 
 
Project Name: Externalization of lessons learned during the Cooperation Program ESPOL-VLIR 
Date (DD/MM/AAAA): 25/07/2008 
 
This survey will help to identify those relevant stories from which lessons could be drawn 
 This survey is part of the intangible assets formalization exercise so that they (the intangible 
assets) could be considered in future programs or projects of cooperation 
 Here, those who have participated in the Program or in any of its projects, or those who have 
been users of the services / products (deliveries) of the program are invited to participate 
 This specific version of the survey is oriented to Project Members 
 
1.  Personal data: 
Name Project e-mail 
   
Mark the context of your answers with and (X): 
Section 2 statements are related to the specific project or activity where 
you have an active participation 
Project  or Activity   
 
 
2.  Lessons Learned Survey - VLIR-ESPOL Program: Project Members 
2.1 Lessons learned by knowledge area (PMI®) Yes No N/A 
Impact 
Low High 
1 2 3 4 5 
Mark with an X your answer in the appropriate cell: 
Yes = You agree with the statement (In this case you are ask to quantify its impact in relation with your project) 
No = You disagree with the statement 
N/A = The statement does not apply to the project where you participated  
Impact = The extent to which this statement has an impact in the project where you participated 
Statements to quantify - Knowledge Area: Integration 
12.  Since the beginning, the objectives of the Project or activity 
in which you participated were specific, measurable, agreed, 
realistic and time-bound (SMART characteristics) 
        
13.  Now at the end of the Project or activity in which you 
participated, you consider that the initially assigned metrics 
to measure objectives accomplishment were appropriate 
        
14.  The program counted with relevant, established and known 
policies to manage the Project or activity where you 
participated 




2.  Lessons Learned Survey - VLIR-ESPOL Program: Project Members 
2.1 Lessons learned by knowledge area (PMI®) Yes No N/A 
Impact 
Low High 
1 2 3 4 5 
Mark with an X your answer in the appropriate cell: 
Yes = You agree with the statement (In this case you are ask to quantify its impact in relation with your project) 
No = You disagree with the statement 
N/A = The statement does not apply to the project where you participated  
Impact = The extent to which this statement has an impact in the project where you participated 
15.  The Project or activity in which you participated counted 
with appropriate documented and structured plans and 
chronograms 
        
16.  Policies changes related to the Project or activity in which 
you participated were of manageable frequency and 
magnitude 
        
17.  Scope, time, cost and quality baselines were handled 
appropriately and they were changed only through a formal 
approval process 
        
18.  The Project or activity coordinator had an effective relation 
with the administration of the Program 
        
19.  The Project or activity members worked effectively with 
organizations that are external to the Program 
        
20.  Program administration appropriately responded to changes 
of Project or activity resource requirements  
        
21.  La misión del Programa de “mejorar la excelencia académica 
de la ESPOL mediante el desarrollo de una investigación 
sustentable”  fue cumplida   
        
Statements to quantify - Knowledge Area: Scope, Cost, Time and Quality 
22.  The Project or activity initial costs and duration were 
appropriate, according to a later evaluation 
        
23.  The Project or activity objectives were reached         
24.  The project or activity success requirements were 
appropriately participated 
        
25.  Specifications of the project or activity deliveries were 
appropriately participated to you 
        
26.  The Project or activity accomplished the original established 
objectives 
        
27.  The user of the Project or activity delivery were satisfied 
with the outcome 
        
28.  The Project or activity chronogram included all the activities  
El cronograma del Proyecto o actividad en que usted 
participó incluyó todas las tareas 
        




2.  Lessons Learned Survey - VLIR-ESPOL Program: Project Members 
2.1 Lessons learned by knowledge area (PMI®) Yes No N/A 
Impact 
Low High 
1 2 3 4 5 
Mark with an X your answer in the appropriate cell: 
Yes = You agree with the statement (In this case you are ask to quantify its impact in relation with your project) 
No = You disagree with the statement 
N/A = The statement does not apply to the project where you participated  
Impact = The extent to which this statement has an impact in the project where you participated 
30.  The outcomes were obtained within the programmed term         
31.  The outcomes were obtained within the programmed 
budget 
        
32.  The Project or activity counted with appropriate quality 
control 
        
Statements to quantify - Knowledge Areas: Risks, Communications, Human Talent and 
Acquisitions 
33.  The initial assumptions of the Project or activity were 
fulfilled 
        
34.  If an external factor jeopardize the accomplishment of the 
Project or activity goals, this factor could been foreseen in 
advance 
        
35.  The Project or activity delivered periodic and reliable 
progress information compared to a baseline 
        
36.  All stakeholders of the project or activity were satisfied with 
the information that they received 
        
37.  Program administrators pay suitable attention and time to 
the subjects derived from the Project or activity 
        
38.  Other functional and departmental areas of your institution 
had a collaborative attitude 
        
39.  Policies of other areas or programs of your institution were 
not in conflict with this Program 
        
40.  Acquisitions (proposal requests, contracts with suppliers) 
were well managed (SOUTH PROJECTS) 
        
41.  Suppliers delivered products or services of appropriate 
quality, on time and within the agreed budget (SOUTH 
PROJECTS) 
        
42.  Human resources were not overloaded with responsibilities 
and activities 
        
43.  Responsibilities were clearly defined and diffused         
44.  Project or activity members were appropriately organized 
and guided 
        
45.  The competence and experience of the members of the 
Project or activity were the suitable ones 
        
46.  Project or activity members worked effectively toward the 
goals  




2.  Lessons Learned Survey - VLIR-ESPOL Program: Project Members 
2.1 Lessons learned by knowledge area (PMI®) Yes No N/A 
Impact 
Low High 
1 2 3 4 5 
Mark with an X your answer in the appropriate cell: 
Yes = You agree with the statement (In this case you are ask to quantify its impact in relation with your project) 
No = You disagree with the statement 
N/A = The statement does not apply to the project where you participated  
Impact = The extent to which this statement has an impact in the project where you participated 
47.  Good communication existed among the members of the 
Project or activity  
        
 
 
2.  Lessons Learned Survey - VLIR-ESPOL Program: Project Members 
2.2 Questions to comment: 
10. Which was a key element (strength or 
opportunity) that allows the success of your 
Project or activity? 
                                                                                                               
11. Which was a key element (weakness or threat) 
that put in danger the success of your Project or 
activity? 
 
12. What did work well - and what did not – during 
this Project or activity? 
 
13. What circumstances that were not anticipated 
affected the execution of the Project or activity? 
 
14. Were the objectives of the Project or activity 
achieved? If the answer is negative, what 
changes are needed to do well in other Projects 
in the future? 
 
15. Could you mention any additional achievement, 
product of the Project or activity that was not 
among the original objectives? 
 
16. Can you mention some additional result that 
could have been obtained from the Project or 
activity, with little or no additional effort, 
although it was not among its original 
objectives? 
 
17. Can you mention some element of the 
international surroundings - as they can be it 
languages, laws, schedules, etc. - that has 






2.  Lessons Learned Survey - VLIR-ESPOL Program: Project Members 
2.2 Questions to comment: 
18. Can mention some cultural difference - as they 
can be it ethical, customs, vital spaces, etc. 
between people of different countries that have 




2.3 Personal stories related to the Program or Project: 
If you have an experience or a story to share related 
to the management of this program or project in 
which you participated and you think it is useful to 
comment it and to try to rescue learning from it, 
please write down a phrase with the central idea of 







APPENDIX 6: Program Survey 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SURVEY - VLIR-ESPOL PROGRAM 
Program Survey  
Rev. 1.8, 25/7/2008 
 
Project Name: Externalization of lessons learned during the Cooperation Program ESPOL-VLIR 
Date (DD/MM/AAAA): 25/07/2008 
 
This survey will help to identify those relevant stories from which lessons could be drawn 
 This survey is part of the intangible assets formalization exercise so that they (the intangible 
assets) could be considered in future programs or projects of cooperation 
 Here, those who have participated in the Program or in any of its projects, or those who have 
been users of the services / products (deliveries) of the program are invited to participate 
 This specific version of the survey is oriented to the Program Administrators 
 
1.  Lessons Learned Survey - VLIR-ESPOL Program: Program Administrators 
1.1 Lessons learned Yes No N/A 
Impact 
Low High 
1 2 3 4 5 
Mark with an X your answer in the appropriate cell: 
Yes = You agree with the statement (In this case you are ask to quantify its impact on the Program in general) 
No = You disagree with the statement 
N/A = The statement does not apply to the project where you participated  
Impact = The extent to which of what is stated has an impact to the Program in general 
Declarations to quantify 
48.  The mission of the Program "Improve ESPOL academic 
excellence by developing a sustainable research” was 
accomplished 
        
49.  The mission of this program was aligned with ESPOL’s 
strategic direction 
        
50.  Since the beginning, the objectives of the Projects of the 
Program were specific, measurable, agreed, realistic and 
time-bound (SMART characteristics) 
        
51.  Now at the end of the Projects of the Program, you believe 
that the initially assigned metrics to measure objectives 
accomplishment were appropriate 
        
52.  Throughout your participation, the Program counted with 
relevant, established and known policies to manage the 
Projects 
        
53.  The set of selected Projects was the appropriate to 
accomplish the mission of the Program 
        
54.  The Projects of the Program counted with appropriate 
documented and structured plans and chronograms 




1.  Lessons Learned Survey - VLIR-ESPOL Program: Program Administrators 
1.1 Lessons learned Yes No N/A 
Impact 
Low High 
1 2 3 4 5 
Mark with an X your answer in the appropriate cell: 
Yes = You agree with the statement (In this case you are ask to quantify its impact on the Program in general) 
No = You disagree with the statement 
N/A = The statement does not apply to the project where you participated  
Impact = The extent to which of what is stated has an impact to the Program in general 
55.  Program policies changes were of manageable frequency 
and magnitude 
        
56.  The resources committed to the Projects were opportunely 
delivered 
        
57.  Program changes were effectively managed         
58.  Changes and adjustments to the Projects were decided with 
the approval of the Program administrator 
        
59.  The Program success requirements were clearly 
documented 
        
60.  The Projects delivered periodic and reliable progress 
information compared to a baseline  
        
61.  All stakeholders of the Program were satisfied with the 
information that they received 
        
62.  Policies of other areas or programs of your institution were 
not in conflict with this Program 
        
63.  Acquisitions (proposal requests, contracts with suppliers) 
were well managed (SOUTH PROGRAM) 
        
64.  Suppliers delivered products or services of appropriate 
quality, on time and within the agreed budget (SOUTH 
PROGRAM) 
        
65.  Human resources were not overloaded with responsibilities 
and activities (SOUTH PROGRAM) 
        
66.  Responsibilities were clearly defined and diffused         
67.  The competence and experience of the work group (steering 
committee) were the suitable ones 
        
68.  Members of the Program (steering committee) worked 
effectively toward the goals 
        
69.  Good communication within the work group existed 
(steering committee) 
        
 
 
1.  Lessons Learned Survey - VLIR-ESPOL Program: Program Administrators 
1.2 Open questions: 
19. Which was a key element (strength or 
opportunity) that allows ESPOL to attain this 





1.  Lessons Learned Survey - VLIR-ESPOL Program: Program Administrators 
1.2 Open questions: 
20. Which was a key element (weakness or threat) 
that jeopardized the attainment of the 
Agreement of Cooperation? 
 
21. Which was a key element (weakness or threat) 
that jeopardized the attainment of the Program 
goals? 
 
22. Which achievements do you consider are the 
most significant of the program? And what 
factors can be linked to them? 
 
23. Which are the most significant shortcomings of 
this program? And how could they be resolved 
in the future? 
 
24. Do you think that there was something that is 
was not done during the program; however, it 
should have been done? 
 
25. What circumstances that were not anticipated 
affected the execution of the Program? 
 
26. Were the objectives of the Program achieved? If 
the answer is negative, what changes are 
needed to do well in other Programs in the 
future? 
 
27. Do you think that the overall outcome of the 
program is greater than the sum of the results of 
the projects? If so, please comment 
 
28. Could you mention any additional achievement, 
product of the Program and that was not among 
the original goals? 
 
29. Can you mention some additional result that 
could have been obtained from the Program, 
with little or no additional effort, although it was 
not among its original goals? 
 
30. Can you mention some element of the 
international surroundings - as they can be it 
languages, laws, schedules, etc. - that has 
affected positively or negatively the Program? 
 
31. Can mention some cultural difference - as they 
can be it ethical, customs, vital spaces, etc. 
between people of different countries that have 





1.  Lessons Learned Survey - VLIR-ESPOL Program: Program Administrators 
1.2 Open questions: 
32. Do you consider that the study modality of the 
scholarship holder - programming of places and 
durations - was appropriate? If your answer is 
negative, how would you improve it? 
 
33. Can you mention situations related to the 
administration of scholarships that merit 
considerations in future decisions? 
 
34. When finalizing the Program, how do you 
evaluate the capacity of ESPOL to manage 
sustainable research? 
 
1.3 Historias personales acerca del Programa o Proyecto: 
If you have an experience or a story to share related 
to the management of this program and you think it is 
useful to comment it and to try to rescue learning 
from it, please write down a phrase with the central 




2.  Personal data: 
Name Institution e-mail 




























APPENDIX 8: Interviews’ transcript related to lessons learned  
1. A Flemish historical and critical view of the programme  
(…) in 1999 the Flemish universities (VLIR) had (already) taken the strategic decision to go for a collaboration with 
southern countries within the development of international programs (IUC), and Ecuador was one of the countries 
chosen, and, within Ecuador, ESPOL was decided as being the best partner for that period.  
(…) it was not easy for us to find the right scientific topics in this kind of collaborative program, especially since 
IUC Programs (…) are (…) demand-driven.  
That means that ESPOL has (…) well-defined strategic questions about scientific aspects and we were looking for 
the right Flemish partners.  (…) in the search (…) we had to go and look for more individual research-orientated 
laboratories. 
We did that; we succeeded in it, but it means that at a general institutional level on the Flemish side (…) the impact 
was rather low at the start of the program.  
In the beginning, it was mainly individually-driven, although backed up with the strategic plan of ESPOL. In the 
first phase of the Programme (…) I had witnessed six individual projects.  
We developed a certain scenario, a certain model of collaboration between the north and south, with the vision of the 
north. (…) The vision of the north has taken into account the models of activity in the northern universities.  
When you come here, you work with other models of activities. You have other management boards, you have 
another university structure.  And it’s not straight forward to translate simply the one situation to the other. To be 
honest (…) the first two or three years there were a lot of things which stunned me, which I was not feeling 
comfortable with, which I had questions and doubts about (…) 
(…) today, I realize that I understand much better why things had to change a bit during the running of the program. 
And, perhaps, we could have been a little bit more efficient, if we had known, if I had known (…) I knew it from the 
paper, I knew it from the management notes, but I didn’t  (…) feel how it really operates …  
I think there were very, very few people within the ESPOL (…), that when we were talking about research (…), 
were aware of those items which are very necessary for a research culture. And, I think, this is the kind of attitude 
that we were trying to develop within the Programme …  
Perhaps, an important story here, it is the story about biotechnology (…). From the beginning ESPOL was very 
ambitious about the new biotechnology program, which is now implemented through the CIBE center. But in the 
beginning, (…) research capacity to build upon, (…) was nothing. There were no trained people; there were no 
available logistics, no instruments. So, ESPOL thought: OK, we have the money, we will do the investment, we will 
create new labs, and then the culture is there.  
Certainly for the sustainability of the program, a lot of effort should go also into the incentives (…) to be sure that 




simply to maintain the same drive for the continuation of the spirit that has been grown, partly thanks to the VLIR 
program. 
2. An outsider‘s reservations and expectations 
More than stories, because I wasn’t a person that was very closely involved with the Programme (…) I have, rather, 
opinions about it.  
Although it’s clear that the area where (…) I am and the area around me have not been greatly influenced by the 
program, I think that in general, ESPOL has received (…) an improvement on the academic side, especially in 
human resources and (…) that’s the legacy that this Programme has left behind for the years to come. 
(..) I remember having talked about (…) and having expressed (…) my point of view with respect to it, because I 
had a few reservations, but I don’t at all remember a notable story in favor or against the Program. 
In the first phase, the VLIR (VLIR – ESPOL) Programme was little-known and therefore democracy was not the 
most well known characteristic to take advantage of it. In the second phase, (…) it was more widely-known about 
and there were more expectations.  
However, the VLIR (VLIR – ESPOL) Programme has always been seen, at least in the circles in which I move, as a 
slightly closed program, which not everyone has access to. I wouldn’t say that that was my perception, maybe 
because I’ve had the opportunity to talk to the leaders or those that were running the Programme and I understand 
that it’s not like that, but that’s the perception that I found.  
I couldn’t point to, for example, any discrimination among the given rules (…) and the opportunity (for 
scholarships) was given to those who complied with those conditions, and they had them compete so that they could 
be chosen. In other words, in the classic polytechnic style which we use to make sure the best wins (…) that type of 
incentive. 
The Programme didn’t cover what it should have covered in the basic sciences. Mathematics, physics and chemistry 
were not touched by this Programme (…) In general, we here in ESPOL – not because of the VLIR program, but 
because of what we’re like n ESPOL – always direct the best resources towards the engineering degrees, and we 
don’t empower the basic sciences, and in general I’ve made those observations.  
It’s also possible that that’s not only the fault of those that ran the programs or those that set out the rules of the 
program, but that those that had access to part of (…) the basic sciences didn’t apply effectively at the very least to 
get priority on the program, but priorities, (…) quotas (…) or it could be premeditated discrimination, not in terms 
of doing damage, but that the priority is this. 
ESPOL is applying for international accreditation in the United States (…) and over there are the VLIR scholarships 
that have been affected (…) by this Programme (…) and in general they have been my students, and I’ve noticed 
that it’s a valuable experience and an experience that has improved them very much. (…) It hasn’t met the doctoral 




I think that the PhD studies (…) has to be carried out completely by (…) an on-site, experienced researcher, not here 
and there.  
(…) It could be that I have the United States culture. There, you have to stick to a  dissertation during which what 
you are doing is very closely monitored.  
It’s possible that the Internet and the Web and all that have changed things. (…) Or maybe I’m prejudiced in my 
area – I’m a mathematician (…) - where you have to be extremely close to your director; it doesn’t matter how 
brilliant he is.  
It seems to me that when they share out responsibilities, with respect to the graduation of people, someone loses out 
and it appears to me that it’s the education of the individual. 
It’s not necessary to associate a PhD student with a wise man, but think of him as a knowledge generator; and I 
don’t see much influence from the Programme in this respect.  
I’d like to feel the influence of 20, 30 PhDs (…) and I don’t feel that. I can feel it in the teaching staff, (…) where 
the presence of a doctor should be felt (…) It’s in the research and we still haven’t managed to get completely off 
the ground.  
3. The beginnings 1: Building trusty networks 
There is a story that goes back to 1991 when this experience began (…) with the Belgians. 
(…) CENAIM (The National Aquaculture and Marine Research Center) was having serious problems. It had a 
multimillion dollar infrastructure, donated by the Japanese Government, but we had neither the human resources nor 
the money to run it … 
(…) We had to draw up some kind of strategy to (…) start to deliver the results of applied research. (…) One of the 
strategies was to explore the possibility of international collaboration. 
(…) I met Patrick Sorgeloos (at that moment he was the Director of the Aquaculture Laboratory at the Ghent 
University and with him we began to carry out small projects … 
Over the course of time, I continued to learn something … 
(…) When it comes to international collaboration, there is no lack of human resources because experts or foreigners 
can always come and take part (…) and there is no shortage of financial resources (…) The important thing is the 
trust that (…) you can gain as a local counterpart …  
(…) The big problem with international collaboration is that money is invested and it disappears or the results are 
not as expected. (…) If you can (…) deliver results and you take the work seriously. (…) More and more 
opportunities for projects arise … 




(…) In 1993, the Belgian Development Minister came on a visit to Ecuador, and, through those contacts at the 
embassy as well as in the Belgian Universities, I managed to get him to put “a visit to CENAIM” in his diary, and he 
went to San Pedro de Manglaralto, and there (…) he commented that he had an idea to create a support program for 
Centers of Excellence around the world, and (…) he proposed that CENAIM could be one of those centers. (…)  
So in the following years, I worked with the (Belgian) Development  Minister to try to get this Programme off the 
ground, but (…) it’s a political ministry (…) and the policy changed … 
Finally, when the Programme was approved, it was only for universities and CENAIM had changed its status from 
that of a center of ESPOL to an independent nonprofit organization, so, CENAIM couldn’t apply for those funds 
anymore … 
(…) But I had already set up a network of contacts (…) in Belgium (…) and Patrick Sorgeloos and I decided that 
(…) if CENAIM couldn’t benefit, ESPOL could … 
(…) We had to get others involved, turn to people that I didn’t know in Belgium, but based on friendships … ; I met 
Madga Vincx (Belgian Programme Coordinator) (…) and that’s how it all got off the ground …  
4. The beginnings 2: Identifying expectations of “the stakeholder”  
The VLIR Programme (…) is an inter-university program, whose purpose is to help universities in developing 
countries. (…) The idea (…) is to help universities that are “in a bad way” (…) so that the qualitative leap forward 
(…)made as a result of the Programme is relevant to them …  
(…) It was an open contest. VLIR or the Belgian Government selects a country and then the universities compete …  
(… ) Three universities entered this contest initially: The National Polytechnic, the University of Cuenca and us. 
The National Polytechnic was eliminated very quickly …  
(…) Cuenca lobbied very aggressively in Belgium. (…) They were connected to Louvain University. (…) There was 
a lot of pressure …  
(…)The pressure from Cuenca (University of Cuenca) was to have (…) two programs in one, (…) and VLIR argued 
(…) that Cuenca had much more extensive coverage in the fields of knowledge, (…) that we were basically an 
engineering school with little connection to social issues. They couldn’t find any evidence of how ESPOL was 
directly connected to the community. (…) We had many connections with industry, to the productive sectors.  
(…) According to those arguments, we ran the risk of being left out. 
(…) Whilst visiting Belgium, on an exploratory visit (…), I talked to the Rector of ESPOL (Victor Bastidas). (…) 
He was clear: “We’re going it alone!” (…) We took the risk of being left out. That’s the position we maintained. 
(…) Years later, I found myself in a meeting in Bangkok with the then director of VLIR. (…) At an informal lunch, 
He said to me, (…) “The bet we made to ESPOL was worth it.” 




(…) The risk was to invest in a university where the benefits could not have been very clear, given that it already 
had doctors, (…)  it already had infrastructure …  
5. From exploiting to extending the trusty network 
When the VLIR made the announcement, Madga (Vincx) and Patrick Sorgeloos (…) were designated and formed 
part of the team that came to ESPOL to investigate and put down certain things in black and white with respect to a 
possible proposal.  
(…) I had already met Patrick in one or two meetings, but we weren’t friends. I didn’t know them. It was Jorge 
(Calderón) that they knew.  
When I was called to the meeting, it was necessary to respond to concrete questions (…) Why did we think that 
ESPOL should be the winning institution (…) in this project? (…) One of the things we said was (…) the onsite 
technological capacity that ESPOL had at that moment and that it meant advantages from the point of view, not only 
of the institution, but also the region.  
(…) The lists of researchers (…) the references (…) came to light (…) with the theme of education (…) with the 
backbone and (…) the libraries (…)  
(…) ESPOL was asked why ESPOL was for the elite. They were engineering degrees, hard science programs, and 
they questioned the fact that we didn’t have any community projects (…)  
(…) But in reality (…) in the region and in the United States we could demonstrate the many things that we had 
achieved.  
(…) Jorge Calderón, who was well-known for these connections with the European Community, was invaluable (…) 
for the credibility, for the fact that (with) him at the helm of CENAIM (National Center of Aquaculture and Marine 
Research) things had already been achieved along with Patrick; (…) and ESPOL had already worked with Magda. 
(…)  
(…) It was important in the sense that they allowed us to put forward ideas (and) these reservations, which were 
direct and concrete, simplify the proposal (…) combine things that we were doing abroad (…) that could be linked 
to the goal of the VLIR.  
(…) when we were going to defend the project proposal, (…) ESPOL had to go to Belgium (…) sell its ideas (…) 
and see which of the Belgian universities would buy (…); then these teachers, with whom we had had previous 
contact and (…) who knew ESPOL and (…) Jorge (…) viewed those informal conversations as not quite so stressful 
as they could have been had we been unknown to them (…)  
(…) Once people had gotten to know us, these networks (…) were extended and have led to (…) the opening up of 
other opportunities and horizons in a spectacular way.  
(…) We were seen as the people from the south (…) so that we should support them to develop something. Today, 




the European Community. (…) The messages that (…) reach them from different sides are that they are good at 
what they do, do what they say they will, they are at the forefront in these things (…)  
6. A look to the institutional culture 
(…) the culture (…) that publishing is good, that publishing means a direct benefit to your pocket, that (…) means 
prestige; (…) it wasn’t an everyday thing. 
(…) the demand for publications, the demand for journals, and the demand for network access to databases (…) is 
concrete evidence that the research culture has another connotation (…) 
(…) the demand for research assistants, the arguments to incorporate the category of researcher into the rankings of 
the institution didn’t exist ten years ago either. 
(…) Now (…) the graduates, the students know that if they go to a congress and present something, it brings 
prestige (…) 
(…) If you look at how many journals (…) today publish papers from the VLIR students, (…) only with respect to 
Component 2 (Education and Innovation) (…) Two PhDs have published 9 articles in 9 different type A1 journals 
(…) A1 tells you the scientific rigor (…) You can’t publish low quality content in the journals with referee. 
(…) In probably all the academic departments, there are research groups. In the Electronics faculty, there is more 
than one. (…) In the Mechanics faculty (…) a Nanotechnology center (…) and in the institutes as well (…) these 
departments come looking for the incorporation of PhDs with a lot of enthusiasm. (…)  
(…) Look at the hallways, people are talking about (…) projects (…) proposals and about (…) publications. Has this 
reached the classroom? I think so (…)  
(…) If you look at the trend (…) in the number of publications (…), approved proposals, (…) of the economic 
resources generated by the projects, you get the idea that this culture is different. We can talk about an ESPOL 
before VLIR and an ESPOL after VLIR.  
(…) The most important things, I think, are two things (…) that are being discussed today and are part of the 
institutional strategy. One is the “Parque del Conocimiento” (Knowledge Park), a cluster of research centers, (…) 
and the other is the institutional strategy to turn ESPOL into a research university. You can’t talk about something 
like that if you don’t have a base (…) to launch from (…)  
7. “Sharing” an approach to governance and management 
(…) The first Monday of every month (…) we talked basically about problems (…) continuously and with 
perseverance.  
(…) we weren’t used to being criticized or being told: “you won’t achieve your objective successfully with what 
you’re doing because (…) that’s affecting us and it’s affecting you (…) What we said that we were going to be able 




(…) During the meetings, there was a lot of tension in terms of the criticism, but (…) the meetings ended and we 
continued with our everyday lives as friends …  
(…) When (…) you travel and share (…) moments with your team, you develop (…) that level of trust that you 
don’t normally develop just with meetings.  
(…) and we noticed (…) each other’s weaknesses; (…) we understood each person’s Achilles heel and we knew 
where it was necessary to support him/her (…) and a lot of the time, we made advances.  
(…) it’s important to get to know yourself. (…) You have to know where (…) your weaknesses lie.  
(…) you don’t take anything for granted, but you understand where your colleagues are in the project and where 
they’re heading, and thus what needs to be done to support them …  
Why this about the weaknesses? (…) Why can we compensate (for weaknesses)?  
Because decisions are taken (…) as a team. (…) That makes you take the attitude of first taking a look before not 
doing an activity, planning well (…) before proposing something to the group, because we knew that the funds 
would enter into the communal kitty and we all had the equal opportunity to propose activities if there was an 
activity that had not been carried out.  
(…) There was another type of activity which was carried out and even so (…) there were weaknesses and it was 
then that as a team we began to reflect. (…) What is it that the team can do? I know! Let’s talk to the promoter. I 
know! (…) I can lend you the money so you can carry it out (…) and next year in the project (…) you can pay it 
back. I know! (…) I can buy you this equipment because I’m not going to spend it this year …  
(…) It was the VLIR project and the strength of the project was the strength of everyone …  
(…) Incorporating new groups into this stream of activity (…) isn’t so easy. (…) When the project was launched for 
the first four years (…) we knew the conditions for the second phase: (…) if we were successful, it was possible that 
this could be extended for another six years. (…) We achieved that!  
(…) the most logical thing was to continue (…) but the group took the decision to reduce 50% of the funds, that’s to 
say, do more things in six years, but with half of what you had in the first phase and give opportunity (…) to other 
groups. (…) All the departments, without exception, had an equal opportunity to participate. (…) They entered and 
formed part of the networks of contacts and …  
8. Peer review - A way of living … the culture 
(…) The ability to carry out research is part of the culture, and that reflects more (…) your level of access to 
technology (…) your level of knowledge … 
(…) Many may refer to that (as research culture), but that generally isn’t difficult to introduce into an institution like 
ours, which already has a certain historical legacy in academic excellence, in technical rigor …   
(…) We have a natural ability to criticize. Everyone criticizes, but no one wants to be criticized, and the consensus 




knowledge and the rest of us will listen without criticizing to avoid being criticized ourselves when the moment 
come.  
(…) That’s a serious problem when (…) you try to establish a scientific culture … 
(…) Science is based precisely on having the knowledge that you are developing considered by your colleagues, 
who analyze it critically and comment on it publicly. That doesn’t exist in Ecuador and it didn’t (…) exist in 
ESPOL, … 
(…) When we began our periodical meetings, one of the things that we were trying to do was to evaluate your work, 
among your peers, (…) you present there what you’ve done (…) and we constructively criticize (…) the scientific 
rigor (…) the methodologies (…) and even the administrative (activities). 
9. Let's replicate management - Let's refine policies 
When we presented the proposals to VLIR, they had an open proposal presentation format. Each person presented 
the project as best they knew how, and that was it.  
When (…) they had already chosen the projects that they were going to fund, it turned out that VLIR decided to 
adopt the BID methodology to represent the projects, basically understood to be the Logical Framework Approach.  
(…) The person who supervised the Junior Enterprise voluntarily, (…) Denise Rodriguez, was a VLIR project 
Masters scholarship holder. (…) Now she’s doing her doctorate, but not within the project.  
(…) I don’t think we’ve managed to (…) consolidate it sufficiently either and in the faculty I don’t know if they’ve 
seen the potential of it, as if we haven’t managed to transmit that either. (… ) When I write the last report, I’ll have 
to put it down as (…) probably not very sustainable. 
As the scholarships holders were selected, it isn’t possible to offer them anything. If it is a teacher with appointment 
(“nombramiento”), of course, they maintain their appointment, they maintain their salary while carrying out their 
PhD studies. But if it is a contracted teacher, they can’t teach while they are studying their doctorate. That’s to say, 
they don’t have any resources while they are studying.  
(…) As a result of this (…) the same VLIR project, through its General Coordinator Madga Vincx, asked us that 
those scholarship holders that were teachers without appointment in ESPOL (…) be paid from project funds (…) a 
monthly sum (…) of 500 dollars as a help (…) for the eight months that the scholarship holder was in Ecuador, (…) 
so that they would have something with which to maintain themselves.  
(…) The university (…) doesn’t guarantee (job) reintegration, but demands that the scholarship holder be available 
on his/her return and that has created a certain uncertainty that could have affected the application of some people.  
(…) The reintegration of the scholarship holders hasn’t taken place automatically. It has been necessary for the 
promoters and teachers to lobby (…) until the best have ended up locating themselves in one of the faculties.  
It’s difficult for someone who hasn’t any previous research experience to have assured success on a European 




because they even mentioned that some candidates could need to do a so-called pre-doctoral program and some of 
the promoters considered it not to be necessary, that the person was going to perform satisfactorily, and that wasn’t 
always the case.  
The work is also completely independent. (…) The person starts by presenting his/her proposal. (…) They presume 
that you can prepare a research proposal. (…) The training is completely individual (…) and not all the candidates 
are prepared for that.  
(…) In the case of Edgar (Izquierdo – VLIR Scholarship holder), his previous education had a big influence. (…) He 
had done a Masters in the United States and had acquired research skills. 
(…) We are trying, now that the project is over, to see how to generate applications so that other people can 
participate with the agreements that exist between Belgium and Senacyt or between ESPOL and the Ghent 
University (…) There they ask that the initiatives be taken by people that haven’t participated in these (VLIR) 
projects. The topics can be continued, but not by the same people. That is interesting.  
There have been funds within the VLIR project – competitive funds and seed funds – so that undergraduate theses 
can be done. (…) Some students (…) have been seen to be motivated because they know that the tutor is in the 
VLIR Project or because they participate in a research center (…) like those from the robotics center. (…) They 
have competed for those funds and they have been put into contact with the research centers. So, (…) there has been 
a way to keep on forming this (research) culture. I think that in this sense there has been an impact.  
10. Do you travel and eat well in the ESPOL-VLIR program? 
(…) Whilst tendering for the second phase (of the ESPOL-VLIR Program), (…) one day I was in the rectorate and 
an ex-student of mine who works for ESPOL greeted me and said (…) “You’re going to be part of the group that 
uses the money to travel and hold meetings where they eat a lot!” 
(…) After that, one day, (…) being part of the VLIR project (…) a survey was organized to see what people in 
ESPOL thought of the project and they went to my faculty, (…) and there, in the bar, they were interviewing a 
colleague of mine, and (…) it was impossible not to hear his responses and he didn’t express good opinions about 
the project. 
(…) When the results of the survey were released (…), there was evidence that for (..) a large group of people in 
ESPOL, the VLIR project was something at least unknown (…) They said that they didn’t know about the VLIR 
project! … anyway (…) some of the comments weren’t very good and obviously, there were also groups, which 
didn’t make up more than 20-30% of the people, that said that there had been positive results. 
So having been inside (…) and also outside the project, I can see the two sides and I think that (…) the project has 
had very positive results for ESPOL and it’s a shame that not everyone has been able to see it like that (…) 
(…) In the second phase of the Project, I think, a greater effort was made than in the first, (…) they allowed new 




After that, the concept of the Seed projects, contestable funds was launched, (…) and with that a large number of 
people came on board 
(…) but despite this, I think that they could have done a bit more. (…) Maybe, organize a few open forums, visit the 
academic departments, make an effort to approach them and organize a kind of round table, (…) listen to them and 
say, “How do you think that, if you wanted to join the project, it would be easier for you? What do you think has 
prevented you from joining?” 
That’s to say, demonstrate a bit more openness. I’m not saying that there hasn’t been any, (…) but for some it hasn’t 
been like that. 
11. Difficulties on sharing what you do not know or have 
(…) two things that I think (…) were weak. 
(…) We’re not good at (…) doing publicity … 
(…) You ask the students about things that are happening on the project and they don’t know, unless they are 
involved in some way … 
(…) I’m not just talking about ESPOL; I’m talking about at national level, at regional level. We ought to have better 
publicity options. 
It’s a project that ESPOL won for the whole of Ecuador because universities from all over competed. So, the country 
should know that.  
And the other thing that I think I would do differently is the selection of the PhD scholarship holders …  
I think that we showed weaknesses there. In fact, we have failures, we have students (…) that simply dropped out 
(…) and there are others that took a lot of time. (…) In fact, some still haven’t finished after seven years. 
I think that the selection process wasn’t the most appropriate. We made an effort. We changed the method twice (…) 
I don’t think we did that very well … 
(…) It’s true that the reintegration (into the ESPOL workforce) could be part (…) of the problem (…). The 
reintegration of the PhD students hasn’t been very smooth … 
12. Research scope: It’s not always crystal clear, on occasion it has a White Spot 
At the given moment (…) they said to me, this is the goal: Make a warning system for shrimp diseases found on 
farms in Ecuador. 
They were the years of an epidemic, the biggest experienced by the shrimp farming systems in Ecuador, the White 
Spot Everyone was in a state of confusion. The industry went bankrupt. Many people lost their jobs as a 
consequence of the crisis …  
(…) We have to make a warning system for epidemics, but we have been hit by an epidemic (…) a rather strange 
situation. 




I lived (…) not only, (…) the case of Warning System that was part Component 4, (...) I also witnessed (…) that 
(…) much of (…) the efforts of the Aquaculture Component,  Component 5, were directed towards trying to dig into 
the problem a bit, to find techniques that could reduce the impact (of the White Spot) … 
(…) We didn’t know at which moments it was having more of an impact (…) We didn’t know what point we were 
going to reach, we didn’t know … 
Sometime later … 
We were in CENAIM (The National Center of Aquaculture and Marine Research), with the then Director Dr. 
Calderón, (and) with Stanislaus Sonnenholzner, who is now the Scientific Coordinator of CENAIM, trying to see 
how we could overcome the problems …  
First of all, we headed in the wrong direction. We tried to make a warning system based on periodical samples of the 
environmental conditions, (…) the state of health of the shrimp; but we didn’t get anywhere because what we got 
was a snapshot, (and) the following day the situation could change.  
The knowledge from other countries didn’t help us because there wasn’t anything similar, (…) (but we knew that) in 
every warning system, the key is the combination of conditions that raise the alarm. 
So, I recall (…) one of Dr. Calderón's ideas … Why not the production data? (…) If production is going down, that 
indicates that something is wrong in biological terms. (…) After having that idea, the warning system (SAEMA 
www.saema.espol.edu.ec) took another turn …  
Note: SAEMA  is a Project  of the Component 4 and Bonny Bayot was a researcher of this project at that time.  
13. Research planning – Tension between norms and creativity 
The planning and organization (…) was very well thought out in the beginning of the Programme (…) Everything 
was properly planned, put on paper, put in nice schemes and it was very easy to take a look back at those schemes 
year after year to see what the way forward was.  
The management structure of the Programme is perfect. Doing research with this kind of structure is (…) difficult …  
When planning research, you should have a scenario, but it should be adjustable at relevant times when you decide 
that the results were not as you thought they would have been. It should be possible to go, to take some sideways 
which are relevant.  
For some activities I have seen here, the people simply listed at the end of the year: “achieved, achieved, achieved, 
accomplished”. (…) But for research, this is not the way an audit needs to be going …  
(…) You have a management plan (…) and you have a research plan. (…) the management plan can be less flexible 
than the research plan, (…) the research plan should be content–driven, not deliverable-driven.  
It’s a bit of a different kind of approach; and the second one is the most difficult one.  




You have to put some creative ideas; you have to put some effort in trying to divide from your original plan, not too 
much because you will have some results at the end, but it’s not like an eventual list of activities.  
Research is to be creative, to be original, to come up with new things, things that you did not know five years ago, 
but perhaps you do know nowadays.  
That’s a tricky thing. So management planning, strict formats – perfect. Research – it should be more flexible.  
14. More and better 
… (…) The CIBE (Center for Biotechnological Research in Ecuador) was established with the support of the VLIR 
and (…) from previous work; (…) and (…) as a university importance was given to research, …  
(…) As a research center I think that (…) in ten years a larger number of PhDs or masters could have been set up; 
the depth and quality of postgraduate courses could have been improved on. (…) Specializations, such as plant 
pathology, weren`t sufficiently exploited. (…) It would have been good to train bacteriologists, virologists etc. who 
are also necessary for the banana (Ecuadorian plantations) …  
(…) A lot of experience was gained by working as a team (…) The people are better prepared to do research, to 
tackle new projects, search for funding, (…); which can be seen with the projects that have been obtain over all 
these years. 
(…) What`s worth looking at are the things that didn`t work out sufficiently well to be repeated, especially those that 
relate to the management of research.  
And I would make one request, since the VLIR couldn`t finish with a doctorate program, that priority is given to 
that, at least in our specialization in biotechnology, together with agronomy. We`re in great need of that.  
15. Variations and Differences: Weaknesses, therefore Threats 
… (Threats?): the variation in the scientific level of the participants, and, perhaps, the differences in exposure to 
international criticism …  
(…) The fact that some partners were chosen without perhaps checking that level was a potential weakness from the 
beginning.  
Most of them adjusted; some of them grew faster; some of them adjusted only a little bit. Like always in selection, 
some of them afterwards might not have been selected, if we had known what would be the outcome. (…) 
I came into the project only during the second phase. That should be clear. So, the first phase I never saw it. When I 
came here (at the beginning of the second phase), I was thinking about having a Research Council that somehow 
regulates research and allocation of funds. I was wrong.  
(…) The Research Council was involved in the production of kinds of internal papers, that were not distributed 
internationally, which were not subjected to international criticism, which were not selected for their absolute 
qualities. But some of the papers, in this journal, could easily have stood the test of something like that, and so on. It 




aware of the possibilities of having their work controlled or evaluated by external forces. It doesn’t cost anything. It 
is an automatic system which is world-wide and very well established.  
(…) So, it shows that the experience of some groups was not that large that: they decided to go outside immediately? 
No, they went to this local  paper.   
(…) So the interaction with the outside world is perhaps something that was less strongly developed here in the 
beginning than it is now, (…) there were no internationally acceptable publications, or very few, perhaps in 
CENAIM a few, but most of the participating groups had none. And now they have one, two, three … Some have 
more than others. 
16. We learned to do research … and also to manage – Part 1  
Even (…) the assistants that were contracted for the research projects in the long term ended up getting involved in 
the administrative tasks because (…) unfortunately in this institution (…) if you’re not pushing things along, things 
don’t get done at the same rate as when someone stops pushing. 
So, the assistant has to get involved in (getting to know) how the purchasing process works … 
(…) There have been activities that, perhaps, in a project such as this not the whole team should get involved in (…) 
(…) It has demanded that the people that are working in the Programme also develop certain kinds of administrative 
skills … 
17. Snapshots of costs, RRHH, and stakeholders at sub-component level  
About Costs: 
The underestimation of the costs was evident practically from the first year. We needed (…) the Software 
Engineering Laboratory and (…) the costs that had been set (…) were much less than it actually cost us (…) 
Additionally, the calculation had been made to buy equipment for the laboratory, but not for the personnel … 
(…) what we did was to unite our laboratory (…) with a multimedia laboratory that already existed (…) and over 
time we continued (…) acquiring more computers for this laboratory. 
About Human Resources:  
Initially, (…) we didn’t have a manual that said: these are the responsibilities (…). It was like: OK, it’s supposed 
that the co-promoter carries the administrative responsibility and the researcher does (…) research (…). But in 
reality, (…) the researcher (…) was involved with parts of the administration and the co-promoter was involved with 
parts of the research …  
(…) As researcher, (..) it was also necessary to go and carry out the surveys … (…) If the planning had been done 




(…) I had really worked as a developer, never as a staff administrator. (…) We worked with students who were 
doing their thesis and then they moved away from the project and (…) that was a big problem to meet (…) the final 
objectives which were to make a larger Software Engineering research group. 
About  Stakeholders:  
(…) We drew up a metric framework. We carried out an initial survey (…) to determine the state of the art (…) 
(and) we needed (…) a sample …  
(…) The companies in general didn’t want to support us. (…) We approached various companies in Guayaquil, but 
they said that they simply had no time for that. So we had to travel to Quito where (…) we realized that there were 
more openings (…). Finally, we had to direct ourselves towards Quito, where fourteen companies agreed to work …  
(…) The companies in Guayaquil see ESPOL as a competitor because ESPOL has worked on (software) 
development projects with the government. When a state company (like ESPOL) offers its services to the 
government, there is no need to make a tender (compete). They (the companies) saw it as a disloyal competition 
between what ESPOL does and what they do. They were scared of revealing their information. They didn’t see it as 
if we wanted to help.  
18. We learned to do research … and also to manage – Part 2 
(…) If we had problems, it was with the issue of imports (…) There is a kind of lack of coordination. (…) I brought 
some small pieces of equipment (…) (and)  we found out one day that we had to pay 500 dollars in tax, five hundred 
dollars that wasn’t in anyone’s budget (…) because ESPOL supposedly doesn’t have to pay taxes … 
(…) In the end, there was a kind of dispute between the CTT (Center for the Transference of Technologies) and 
Supplies (…) one month went by. I had to talk to the Head of Customs, explain to him the situation. They reduced 
the taxes (…) I paid the taxes … 
(…) That caused me a lot of problems (…) because my trip (…) was the last one, so I had to concentrate on 
preparing everything (…) and I spent that month going to the Customs District, talking to the Officer (…) to try and 
prevent them from charging us all those taxes. I ended up learning how customs works, but that wasn’t really what I 
was interested in learning and something I had to invest a lot of time in. 
We were a subcomponent that had several very ambitious goals: to create a center.  
(…) for a great part of the first few years, it was necessary to invest in building the infrastructure of the center, and 
during that period everyone had to collaborate, …  
(…) We ourselves made a telephone exchange with software. Then, it took time to investigate, test, our laboratory 
networks with the aim of not having any problems, for example, with viruses. I even had to supervise the air 
conditioning, the cracks in the walls (…) a series of things so that finally when they hand over the facilities to us we 
can say, this is OK …  
(…) On the other hand, we also had the challenge that what we were doing was quite new; it’s not something they 




the students so that they would take the courses that we were promoting, (…) but it’s not that simple. We had to take 
the equipment, do live demonstrations so that the people could actually see what it was about; (…) give interviews 
…  
(…) In the case of my particular research, they were periods in which you really couldn’t do anything of 
significance because usually people who do research need to spend several days thinking. (…) It’s a bit problematic 
when those types of situations occurred because (…) the train of thought got cut short. (…) I don’t know the 
cognitive process of others; in my case, (…) it ´s to keep developing an idea, it’s to continue constructing it, finish 
the experiment. It’s not something that you feel one day and you get a revelation and the idea appears.  
19. A very sad procurement story 
First time, when I went to CIBE (Ecuadorian Biotechnology Research Center), I found that the library was, to my 
understanding, virtually empty. There were just very few books and I found that this was quite striking because I 
really believe that in the training of young scientists, it’s extremely important that they have access to a good library, 
a rich library, with a lot of books, with a lot of journals, and especially, of course, when good science is to be done, 
then they need recent journals. (…)  
In order to help, I contacted the American Society of Plant Biologists. I wrote a very nice long letter to them asking 
them whether they could make a gift to ESPOL. I explained to them that I had been teaching at ESPOL. I explained 
to them that I had seen a good potential of young students that could grow into good scientists in the future. I 
explained to them the whole situation of the CIBE and the collaboration that we have between Ghent University and 
ESPOL. And I got a very positive reply from them. As a matter of fact, they offered a whole set of free books, which 
were not only basic biology books, but also agriculturally-related. And they also offered free subscriptions for their 
major journals – Plant Cell and Plant Physiology (…)  
Now, unfortunately, something went wrong because the package was actually arriving in Guayaquil, but, somehow, 
at customs, they were asking, I suppose, for quite some money, for the package to be actually delivered to ESPOL. 
And as far as I understood from Dr. Maribona at the time, this package never arrived and they actually even 
mentioned that they would destroy the whole package at customs! And I found this very, very sad (…)  
The people from ASPB were warned. So, somehow, they got a message from the Ecuadorian customs that the 
package that they had been sending could not be delivered to the address because the fees were not paid.  
So this is a very sad story, I think, because the students could really have benefited quite nicely from this. (…)  
The administration has to be arranged in such a way that such things cannot happen, that there is an immediate 
follow-up for such problems, administrative problems.  
20. We should have been more ambitious 
(…) We have published in national and international magazines. (…) I’m finishing a book about zeolites (…) on the 




(…) with what we’ve achieved, we’ve only reached the point of finishing another piece of research, of having 
knowledge (…) We should have taken a step further (…) The research shouldn’t be limited to paper (…) There 
should be a product that comes out of it and that’s something that, at least in our component, hasn’t been achieved. 
That’s the part that we still owe (…) 
(…) I think that with respect to the cost (estimates), it wasn’t appropriate, but with respect to the time, I think that 
the time it has taken us to do the research is OK.  
(…) Buying equipment is a pending issue. (…) The budget that we managed (…) didn’t permit us to buy equipment 
(…) and with what we had (the equipment) it wasn’t possible to carry it out (the research).  
So, much of the analysis (…) had to be done abroad, that’s to say, in Belgium, in some cases (…) in Spain.  
It’s true, we lacked funds. (…) We have had some problems; (…) we’ve given a lot of priority to administrative 
expenditure, more than to technical expenditure.  
(…) We have talked about it. (…) It seems that the information didn’t trigger the right people. (…)  
Some matters (…) in fact, I argued over them with the Belgian promoter and he was aware of the things that were 
happening (…), but he didn’t manage the financial side, but he did make some important suggestions, some were 
addressed, others not … 
(…) Despite the fact that there have been some restrictions, (…) we’ve been able to handle the project in such a way 
as to achieve the objectives.  
(…) We’ve put into practice internal projects in ESPOL and external projects. (…) (For example) I’m already 
finishing a project (…) financed by CONESUP (The National Higher Education Council – Ecuador) related to the 
topic of zeolites; (…) A large part of these resources served as a support for the component, … 
(…) We’ve always tried to make a success of things (…) In the case of sample analysis, (…) we’ve sent several 
analyses to Argentina, others to Brazil. We’ve made contacts. (…) We’ve not been paralyzed by adverse conditions 
…  
(…) The promoter of our component had to make contact with (…) customs or (…) Belgium so that the samples 
could get through. If a student or some of the members were traveling to Spain, for example, we sent them samples 
so that they could analyze them there or if someone traveled to Argentina or Brazil (…) That way we kept on 
resolving the problems …  
(…) I think that it should have been planned (…) that getting items through customs was going to take some time. 
All that should have been taken into consideration.  
I think that the Programme should have organized some training in the English language (…) and not only at 
component level, but the whole program. I think that was a serious, serious mistake (…)  
There were some very good scholarship holders with (…) the profile of researchers and they were left out in some 
cases due to the question of the language.  




21. Do we need to keep the research assistants? 
(…) Retaining (…) our assistants, (…) students that had already spent a couple of years with us, who hadn’t just 
taken the processing courses, but already had some practical experience, but as in the majority of cases,  it reaches 
the point where (…) they are about to graduate (…) (and) they look for a bigger income (and) they have their plans 
…  
(…) With all the work that was done in the first few years (assembling) the infrastructure, (…) it was very 
complicated to put together an offer, (…) say we’re offering you this (…) so that you continue to work with us.  
(…) so we lost some good assistants who could have done a masters and continue to collaborate with us …  
22. We Learned to do Research … and also to Manage –  An Alternative 
(…) The deadlines were always met. It was necessary to make a greater effort, but they were always met. 
(…) In the case of the quality, (…) it was managed quite well in the sense that we could always hand over what had 
been promised. For example, our publications increased in quality. At the beginning, they were (diffused) in local 
events, and they ended up in “journals” … 
(…) Other centers have already implemented ISO 9000. They have well-defined processes. (…) It’s possible to 
think that we shouldn’t yet be at that stage because (those) centers (…) have twice the time of existence than us. 
But, I do think that somehow at the beginning, we should have tried to implement a simplified version (of ISO 
9000); because after a while the organization becomes a bit chaotic and (…) everyone does a little bit of everything 
and time is wasted and human resources are wasted. 
23. Frozen for the commitment: tension among scope, cost and time 
(…) The idea that you’re going to enter, (…) I call it “a freezer”, (…) that you’re going to commit yourself to doing 
research, (…) and part of that freezer is the financial side, which is a personal topic.  
(…) Almost everyone that was involved as scholarship holder in this Programme came (…) working with a certain 
level of income. You present your proposal and from the outset you know that the proposal implies a significant 
reduction in your income and (…) you make an investment for the future (…) because what you receive is going to 
be a lot more.  
(…) It’s an institution that’s placing a bet, that’s putting you in a position of importance. It’s investing a quantity of 
resources and you’re not contributing anything at that moment, at least not at the beginning of the program.  
(…) I knew that if I dedicated myself to this, I couldn’t teach the same number of classes; I couldn’t commit myself 
doing any consultancy work (…). For me, it was relatively simple because I was single so it didn’t cause a big 
problem, but for other people in the group that were scholarship holders, it was a very tough decision.  
(…) The Programme (…) at the beginning didn’t make those things very clear. It didn’t make it very clear, in the 




much we would receive once we were over there (abroad), if we were going to receive the two (financial 
allowances) at the same time. That part (…) wasn’t clear at the start and it became clearer a bit more later on.  
(…) but we are part (…) of that as well. So, we also also took the decision. I would say that it wasn’t a major 
inconvenience. 
(…) Basically, I took more time than I should have done. It was a four-year program (…). I finished in four years 
and ten months; it wasn’t (…) such a big extension.  
 I put it down to the fact that during my stays in Ecuador, given it was a “sandwich” program, I couldn’t put myself 
100% into the freezer.  
I had to do other things, things that ESPOL itself demanded of me, such as manage a project (…) and also in part the 
financial side which doesn’t stop being important. I taught classes (…) to make ends meet (…).  
Now putting things in perspective, I can say that all the things I did that would seem to be extra curricular (…) were 
in fact part of the Programme and they taught me lessons and abilities that would justify the extension.  
 (…) I remember (…) asking (…) if I could teach classes (…) (that) at the beginning, it was not taken into 
consideration (…). I think that to continue to be in contact with students is important in the training that we had as 
researchers (…). It was time-consuming (…) but it was part of the process. 
24. More tension in the scholarship holder commitment 
(…) When we interviewed them in the selection committee, we were upfront (…). We asked them: how much 
would you need to live and be a student for all these years? And they suggested a figure. We made the agreements 
with ESPOL based upon those figures. 
From my personal experience as a scholarship holder for eight years abroad, these were luxury scholarships. I was a 
scholarship holder under far more restrictive economic conditions. During my period of study, it was clear: the 
student is a slave of his academic studies. He works just to pay the apartment, the telephone and to eat. But here in 
Belgium, they received large salaries (…) with the “sandwich” system they came and went from the country. When 
I left, I spent five years abroad without returning to Ecuador (…) because I couldn’t afford the airfare. 
So, (…) I think that some of them thought themselves important at some point and their demands increased, 
forgetting what had been decided at the interview, (…) with the abilities that they acquired and the opportunities that 
came up … 
(…) Many of them extended their studies more than was necessary according to their plan. So, that, I can 
understand, brought them other types of inconvenience; (…) It was planned for them to take a maximum of four 
years. Many took more than six. So, outside this scheme, any financial plan collapses … 
25. Sandwich studies: a “glocal” approach 
(…) In Belgium, you open a freezer and take out the reactive material. Here you have to think about it four months 




(…) So, sending a student out for four or five years to do a doctorate so that later he comes back and begins to 
complain that nothing works, that he can’t do science because he’s used to a different culture, that’s a mistake! 
(…) The sandwich system teaches them where ESPOL is at. They are in Ecuador and here things have to be thought 
of in advance if you want to make them work; because nothing is just round the corner. … 
(…) It’s more convenient if you see the two worlds. 
(…) Do not come just used to the European system to complain about the local bureaucracy and inefficiency. 
26. Sandwich Studies:  A “Community of Practice” Approach 
I think that such long, and to some extent disjointed, stays means: that you lose people, that there are people that 
don`t come back, or people who really don`t achieve their objectives, or people who, when they come back here, are 
not completely accustomed to the conditions we have . (…)  
(…) How much would we have gained if Efrén and Oscar were in a “sandwich” type of doctoral program? A bit of 
time here, a bit of time there. Our youngest students, here, would have advanced more because what they were 
learning over there, they would bring over here. They would see our needs and also participate with us, even though 
they were no longer here; (…) They could go back again to work knowing what we needed and could look for and 
suggest ideas and send work methodologies because they  know what was lacking here.  
(…) There is a need for an entailment and that they somehow form part of our community of work  …  
27. Sandwich studies:  a “flexible control” approach  
The Sandwich scheme has two key parts:  
(…) The area of research is related to what we are working on (…) here …  
(…) And, secondly, there is quite a close relationship among the Belgian promoter, the thesis director and our 
promoters …  
(…) Now, in certain areas, at a given moment, it could be that (…) the student is required to attend continually to 
carry out the experiments (…) So, it’s necessary to be sufficiently flexible to (…) make it possible; that’s to say, it’s 
not a black and white question.  
(…) we’ve had to do it a number of times and it’s worked well (…) One (…) should seek the mechanisms not to say 
“everything is sandwich and there is nothing more that can be done”. 
28. Please send more PhD students, as long as … 
Initially, when I was asked to play the role of a supervisor for a PhD, it wasn’t clear to me what my responsibilities 
and roles were. So, the first year it was rather a loose collaboration with the PhD student Katherine Chiluiza, but 





I have to say that this collaboration was really promoted by her very high level of English; so she could 
communicate and write in English at a very high level. She also had a very good Masters degree from the U.S., so 
we could jump, in fact, ride on the right wagon so the train got rolling.  
(…) we had a very good close collaboration, even to the extent that after a trip for a holiday to Ecuador, I came 
home and I found this email with big questions and really a panic situation of Katherine … that again, in fact, I 
jumped on a plane the next day and went back to Ecuador for a three day stay in a hotel to run through all the 
problems – to solve them. 
Also the relationship with the department went smoothly. She integrated very well in Flanders. And that’s another 
issue – her willingness, in fact, to be on a team also at the international level. She wanted to learn; she wanted to be 
also in Flanders to get acquainted with the right skills: academic English, research skills and the literature. 
So, I am very happy about it and I would say next time, immediately I would take a second PhD in the Program.  
29. English proficiency optimizes not only lab interactions but also social life  
(…) The step to go, leave your home, leave your family, your friends, is in any case not such an easy step. For many 
people, it’s probably a very difficult step.  
(…) When I was leaving the first time, I was in England for a while, right after I finished my first masters here in 
Belgium, and then I went to the United States for the first part of my PhD, and I must say that, of course, for myself, 
the experience was that in the beginning, you feel a little uneasy, but, of course, if you can communicate with 
people, you can easily make new friends. And that’s a very important basis for feeling at home when you are abroad. 
I believe that it’s very important prior to leaving for another country where the main language is not Spanish, that 
students should really get the opportunity to get good training at home to improve their English proficiency; so that 
when they arrive they can immediately have very fluent communication with people in the new lab, and, of course, 
this optimizes not only their social life, but especially also the interactions in the lab where they are studying their 
PhD. 
30. English Language -More planning is required  
On the one hand, we’ve seen (…) the moment at which the scholarship holder has set out his ideas and the thesis 
director, realizing that his knowledge of the language isn’t very good, hasn’t felt like continuing with the topic, 
seeing the difficulties to come in the future, (…) basically, not to get into all the problems of trying to read a thesis 
or some articles that are very difficult to understand given the way the student expresses himself …  
It has also happened to others, on the other hand, that despite this being an obstacle, (…) they have made a much 
greater effort than perhaps they should have. One of them (…) met every week with the (…) scholarship holder to 
see how she was getting on, but basically more (...) to try to correct her English. Obviously, you can do that once, 
twice, but you can’t do it forever, because (…) the thesis director is a very busy person and feels that (…) he or she 
is a language checker … 




I think that the issue of the scholarship holders must be more planned. (…) The institution (…) should say (…) next 
year we’re going to send this number of scholars in these areas, (…) say, this scholar will go after a year, once he 
has improved his level of English … 
(…) That doesn’t usually happen. We worked in the opposite way. There are scholarships on the one hand … we 
looked for someone to participate … 
31. The number one rate-defining factor 
It’s the number one issue, really. I’m sorry to say, it is the number one rate-defining step in doing anything. “Rate-
defining” means it determines the speed at which things can happen.  
(…) I have a student, who’s from an Asian country, who is extremely poor in English and it has taken me and her 
many, many hours in trying to assess and to understand basic human interaction skills in different parts of the world, 
which I think would be exchangeable in a few minutes if you could speak at the normal rate. But if you have to 
explain terms like “methodology”, or (…) “throughput”, (…) or – simple things like that (…) you don’t arrive at the 
stage where this is only a tool for doing scientific research and so it’s a waste of time. I’m sorry, it’s a waste. (…)  In 
normal operations, it’s so important that we should not have to worry about that.  
(…) Mechanisms for selection? Certainly. Even, if it is necessary, a VLIR project like this could take care of 
improving the language of people. Why not? We’ve done that on other projects. We’ve organized English courses 
for people that went abroad (…) It’s not as bad as it could be in Ecuador, I must say that, honestly. (…) But it’s still 
something that you should not overlook. (…) It did not have a major impact because on average it was reasonable, 
but in some cases it can be absolutely devastating for a project, and it should not be like that. It’s too expensive …  
32. Get together and learn to discuss 
I taught the courses of molecular plant physiology twice to the students at ESPOL, and it was a very nice 
experience, I must say. I believe that the students probably remember me as one of those professors that really likes 
to teach, five hours a day, if necessary, … Now, when I was there, I remember that I was suggesting two things.  
Number one was to hold scientific discussions on a very regular basis – a weekly basis – where students and 
postdoctoral co-workers are presenting their work using small PowerPoint presentations, bringing the plates, if, for 
instance, they’ve been growing some plantlets, on tissue culture plates, bringing them along, showing them to their 
colleagues to discuss the results that they obtained. 
I believe that it’s very good and it’s really part of their training to become good scientists because it’s not only a 
matter of being able to design and perform the experiments, but also to convey the message, … to share the results 
with other people, with other scientists.  
(…) and on top of that (…) I made the suggestion to run journal clubs also on a weekly basis.  
Of course, in order to run journal clubs that are really significant and up-to-date, you also need access to the recent 




student to prepare the paper and to present the findings in that paper to their fellow students and to their fellow lab 
members.  
 (…) I believe that it’s an enormous stimulus for students if they see what other people do: they read on a regular 
basis, they get ideas for their own research and also they learn to discuss about science with their fellow lab 
members; … 
 (It) is stimulatory because then they feel involved also in each other’s work and they will start to discuss on a much 
more regular basis about what they are finding and how they could actually proceed in the future. 
33. We need x PhDs, ¿do we send x / (1 – f1 - f2 – f3) scholarship holders to study? 
(…) It’s inevitable that, if the scholarship holder is good, opportunities will present themselves for him in another 
country and that it will cross his mind not to return. So, I think that the problem isn’t so much about how to write the 
contract with relation to the scholarship holder’s needs, I think that’s very good, but what to do in the case that the 
scholarship holder says: “I’m not coming back.” 
(…) There were moments in the history of ESPOL where, to all intents and purposes, the scholarship holder said 
they would not return and nothing happened. Obviously, that sets a bad precedent because the next scholarship 
holder … 
(…) I know of the experience of a sandwich scholarship holder (…). He had to come and go, nine months here and 
three months there. Suddenly, in his first month there in Belgium, he sends a letter saying that he’s going to stay 
there for the long run, doing his doctorate. He was told “No”, that he should return, but it wasn’t possible. What 
happened was that they suspended his financial support (…)  
The economic hardship that he feels is in the sense that he stopped receiving financial support, nothing more, but, 
maybe, he was able to cope with that. 
Now, as far as I can see, they’ve gone back to the idea that if the scholarship holder doesn’t return, he at least has to 
pay. So, I don’t know if it’s worth being a bit stricter there. 
And definitely make it (…) much more attractive for the scholarship holder to return to ESPOL. I think that very 
important steps have been made. (…) The most likely thing is that laboratories can be found in certain areas where 
they can work. The conditions are improving, but on this issue there is more work to be done.  (…) 
(…) One day, I spoke to the Rector of the UTPL (Universidad Técnica Particular de Loja) about this. They are 
training, I think, almost two hundred people on doctorate programs abroad. So I said to him: why so many? (…). He 
(the rector) told me: 
(…) “You can’t avoid human nature. Of those two hundred, there is a high percentage that don’t finish (f1 =0.33). 
There’s another percentage that decide never to return (f2=0.13). There is another percentage that come back, but 
equally decide not to work with you anymore (f3=0.14). And despite doing as much as you can possibly do, you get 




having more money, you’ve waste time. I submitted my percentages, based on experience, and say I need x number 
of doctors. Let’s say, eighty. If I need eighty doctors, I can’t send eighty, I have to send two hundred.” 
So, maybe in this area, ESPOL (with an enigmatic smile) also has to put forward those numbers and say, OK, I need 
two hundred doctors; let’s send five hundred. 
* Values assigned to f1, f2 and f3 are fictitious  
34. Multidisciplinary projects to solve national problems 
In the second phase of the VLIR Project, there were funds to compete for. Any individual in ESPOL could compete. 
But, the majority of those projects, if not all, have been individual projects, of the Seed type, or support for theses 
that are seen to have a good level of research, and it’s true that sometimes (…) there were projects that naturally 
related to more than one component.  
Nevertheless, (…) I think it would have been a good idea (…) to put aside a certain amount of money for project 
proposals that necessarily combined more than three components. That’s to say (…) a research project where the 
scientific contribution of different branches of knowledge is required, where (…) the problem that has to be solved 
demands (…) multiple disciplines. 
So, I think that it would have been good because, as a result of that, an ESPOL research program could have been 
created that joins different centers and that (…) presents (...) a proposal to resolve a national problem, …  
35. Research Council – A more deductive approach  
(I think that) … the way in which decisions to select strategic subjects or research teams are selected and the way in 
which funding is allocated (…) it could be a little bit more a deductive process, a relational process to society, … 
I think that, from that point of view, the running of a university which wants to invest a lot of money and go very 
high, wants to be the best for technological development, it should also take responsibility for selecting and 
attributing the money to those racehorses that will really provide the best possibilities. So (…) , selecting what kind 
of problems we want to answer (we can’t answer all of them). What can we answer with the groups we have? Who 
should be helped? Who should, perhaps, be allowed to continue and see if he proves himself worth? (…) I think this 
is in part the responsibility of the Research Council, which could, perhaps, suggest to the Rector certain priorities 
(…) 
It might also be that … all of a sudden you give a lot of money to a group, and what happens after two or three 
years? Was that worthwhile? Was that well-spent? Was it not well-spent? Even if it was not well-spent, can we use 
this knowledge to improve or to change things in the future? Or are we going to continue to …? It’s a big 
responsibility to distribute that without any feedback, without an international mirror, (…) or without any 
commitment from industry or things like that. So it’s a very big role I think that the Research Council could play and 




36. Sustaining dreams and opportunities 
I think the most significant achievement of the Programme is that some people here were allowed to express their 
enthusiasm and realize part of the ideas they had. And this is something that I’m only realizing clearly today (…) 
that this had a very strong effect on the environment, (…) 
(…) Although only a few people, eight components, were allowed to (…) shape their dreams (and) received money 
to do that; (…) a lot of people around have seen this, have felt this happening, “What is this? What is happening 
there? Why are they chosen and why are we not? How can we go in the same direction too?”  
(…) Having research papers in internationally recognized journals (…) is important for the researchers themselves 
and so I’m sure that this has been very significant. But, perhaps, even more, that other people in ESPOL have heard 
about it, have felt it. The Rector has felt something happening. The students, some students, may have had the 
feeling that something was happening and have seen some differences.  
I’ve just come from the Chemistry Department, which has not been involved, but why would I have contact with the 
Chemistry Department if the VLIR project was not there? So there are a lot of additional benefits that have not been 
part of the deliverables of the project. And I think for the institution it’s very important. (…) 
Whether it’s sustainable or not, I don’t know. It’s certainly an evolution. … I don’t think it’s sustainable as it is now. 
(…)  
It is absolutely an evolution. So what made this possible? The very simple answer is money, of course, money made 
this possible. (…) Here, you can still very quickly develop and do something as we have seen in ten years; which on 
a scientific level is relatively fast. (…) 
On the question of sustainability, I think this is a whole big problem, (…) I think that sustainability is inevitably 
something that you start to feel when resources run out. And in the beginning of the project nobody worries about 
sustainability. And now it starts to become a very serious issue, not only because the money’s running out of the 
VLIR project, money can also run out in several other aspects of Ecuador at the moment, (…) 
The sustainability has more to do with, of course, finding funds elsewhere, but also in generating mechanisms that 
can grow in the financing methodologies, generating mechanisms, for instance, by using intellectual property rights 
to inject money back into the centers, to inject money back into the university.  
(…) I don’t know exactly what the Ecuadorian law is, but I think that the intellectual property belongs to the 
university, and not to the person who did it. It may seem strange, but it is this institution that made it possible. After 
all, it’s because there were programs like the VLIR; it’s because there were a lot of activities; it’s because there was 
schooling, that these people were in the circumstance good enough to generate this knowledge and this added value. 
Some of the added value should go back because it was invested in them. And this is one of the mechanisms that can 
sustain, that can increase sustainability.  
(…) Of course, a university is a science and knowledge machine, and should be paid for that by its government.  (…) But 
growing, if we want to grow, we can (…) employ the benefits of this knowledge. It’s the knowledge of the university … 
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